

The Anthology

GODIAC – Good practice for dialogue and communication
as strategic principles for policing political manifestations
in Europe



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Preface

This *anthology* forms part of the “*Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe*” (GODIAC) project. The anthology is one of four documents produced by the GODIAC project. The other documents include a booklet summarising the field study results, a handbook on the peer-review method and ten individual field study reports.

The purpose of the project was to identify and spread good practice in relation to dialogue and communication as strategic principles in managing and preventing public disorder at political manifestations in order to uphold fundamental human rights and to increase public safety at these events in general. The overall idea of the project has been to integrate operative police work, research and training within the field and to build international and institutional networks.

The main target group for the anthology is police commanders, researchers and trainers that wish to increase their knowledge on the social identities of

demonstrators and activists, their motivation, mobility and strategies. The material also addresses dialogue and communication as strategic principles and promotes the evaluation of policing major events to stimulate lessons to be learnt.

The project co-ordinator was the Swedish National Police Board. There were twenty partner organisations in twelve European countries. These consisted of twelve police organisations and eight research/educational organisations.

The project ran between 1st August 2010 until 31st July 2013 with grateful financial support provided by the Prevention and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Commission-Directorate-General Home Affairs and the Swedish National Police Board.

Our aim and aspiration is that the material produced by the project will serve as a contribution towards a European approach on how to police crowds and political manifestations through effective dialogue and communication.


Stockholm in May 2013

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Introduction

This anthology is part of the project “*Good Practice for Dialogue and Communication as Strategic Principles for Policing Political Manifestations in Europe*” (GODIAC).¹

The purpose of the GODIAC project was to contribute to the development of a European approach to policing political manifestations.

The strategic objectives of the GODIAC project were:

- ◆ Analyse and disseminate good practices of applying research-based principles focusing on communication and dialogue as strategic principles for de-escalation and prevention of public order disturbances at political manifestations in Europe.
- ◆ Increase knowledge on the social identities of demonstrators and activists, their motivation, mobility and strategies.
- ◆ Stimulate the use of research-based knowledge in policing political manifestations.
- ◆ Promote evaluation of policing major events at a European level.
- ◆ Stimulate lessons to be learnt, disseminated and used nationally and internationally.
- ◆ Develop institutional co-operation and networks at a European level between practitioners, researchers and trainers.
- ◆ Facilitate collaboration between law enforcement agencies and research networks.

GODIAC addressed the following overall research questions:

- ◆ How can communication and dialogue strategies contribute to preventing public order disturbances or help de-escalate tense situations in demonstrations?

- ◆ What are the motives of and the different tactics and strategies used by different kinds of protest groups?
- ◆ What police strategies and tactics can be seen as good examples?

The aim of this researcher volume is, on the one hand, to present research produced during the course of the GODIAC project, along with the experiences of police officers in the field and of trainers who participated in the project, and on the other hand, to broaden that perspective by incorporating contributions from outside the project. The volume is divided into two parts; the first deals with issues related to the police, and the second addresses issues related to demonstrators and protesters. We hope that this volume will provide further insight into issues associated with policing at major events and shed light on the complexity of the organisations, motives, and strategies in play whenever protester groups are involved.

The first part of the volume consists of a series of articles dealing with issues of dialogue and communication as a strategic tool in policing major events. First, Marianne Hilton and Christian Wessman present the Swedish special police tactics (SPT) project. Hilton was the SPT project manager, and as a police commander, Wessman was one of the practitioners to take part in the field studies conducted under the project’s aegis. The SPT project came about in the aftermath of the riots during the European Union (EU) summit in Gothenburg in 2001, and the article discusses how the project was developed, what lessons were learned, and what happened after the project’s completion. The experiences of those involved with the Swedish project in turn inspired the Swedish National Police to initiate the GODIAC project.

Ola Österling, head of the dialogue unit of the Stockholm County Police, provides his perspective and experience on dialogue and communication. He does so from the perspective of a police officer on the ground. Österling was one of the key figures in

¹ This publication reflects the views of its authors alone. The European Commission cannot be held responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained herein.

developing the dialogue concept that became central to the establishment of dialogue policing as a tactic within the Swedish police.

Barnabás Hajas and Ágnes Lux, who both work at the Hungarian ombudsman's office, provide another experience of developing police tactics. Together they describe experiences in the ombudsman's office related to field studies and inquiries into policing at major events in Hungary. Their article also describes an alternative to the field study methodology used by the GODIAC project. In a second article, Hajas addresses the question whether participation in the GODIAC project has affected policing style in Hungary.

In an overview of developments in Germany regarding tactical communication, Daniel Brunsch presents a perspective from outside the project. His article provides valuable insight into current issues of tactical communication in Germany and also aims to provoke discussion and the further development of common European crowd-management practices of communication.

Jozef Metenko provides an important piece of the puzzle as he discusses using public security services in Slovakia to ensure local and state public order. His article is based on experiences dating to the period during which the GODIAC field study of the 2012 Bratislava Rainbow Pride parade was conducted.

As for the question of building on experience, Bo Wennström addresses learning and special events in an article that deals with the issues of how organisations and their constituents learn from previous special events and how learning can become an integral part of working with special events. Organisational learning represents a very important aspect of the project because reality is constantly changing; police must be able to adapt to new situations, integrating new experiences into existing concepts.

The second part of this volume addresses demonstrators and protesters. This section opens with a historical article by David Rappoport, who offers another perspective from outside the GODIAC

project. Rappoport addresses the use of mob terror as a strategic tool for creating panic in a US context. Using mobs as a strategic tool is an old tactic, as are many tactics used by militant groups; these tactics have been changed and adapted over the course of time to suit the goals of those who employ them.

Following this, and in a similar vein, Heléne Lööw considers the revival of old tactics and the changing landscape of protests in an article dealing with protester strategies, motives, and the integration of social media (and other new communication methods) into older protest tactics. The article is based partly on GODIAC project findings.

The issue of transnational protests is the focus of an article by Sérgio Felgueiras, Lucia G. Pais, et al., a study based on observations made during the GODIAC field study of the Lisbon 2010 NATO summit. Focusing on transnational protest movements – in particular, the ATTAC, WRI, and the black blok – that were present during those anti-NATO protests, the study provides insight into the resource mobilization, the political opportunities, and the cultural framing employed by the movements in question.

Ágnes Lux discusses the policing of an LGBT pride march, as well as the freedom of peaceful assembly, in her article on the Rainbow Pride march in Bratislava, Hungary – but the issues are also relevant to other Eastern European countries. The article's focus is the authorisation of an assembly, the aggression (or lack thereof) directed towards marchers, police intervention (or lack thereof), and finally, the acceptance of versus protests against LGBT marches.

Maria de Fatima Amante's article addresses concerns involving the state, security, and the media. She considers ritualization processes in contemporary politics, particularly addressing the roles of the state and the media in communicating Portugal's temporary suspension of the Schengen agreement and its reinforcement of border controls during the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon.

The role that the media play during major events is also central to the article by Lucia G. Pais and Sérgio Felguieras et al., which considers the media's perceptions of police activity during major political events in Portugal during 2011. This study considers the ways media shape and publicise a particular perspective on crowd events, thus influencing public perceptions of the police.

Joachim Kersten and Caroline Shugs contribution addresses the issues of how the perception of the police is portrayed via YouTube and the impact of this in a broader perspective.

Finally, Jeffrey Kaplan provides another non project perspective in his discussion of the transnational aspects of social media. His piece deals with influence, signals, and false flags which ties into the broader question of the impact of modern communication technology and the use of social media before, during and after major events. These issues have been also been discussed in the GODIAC field study reports.

Overall, the studies included in this volume represent a range of perspectives and a variety of concerns. It is our hope that this volume will provide some more in-depth knowledge into the different areas central to the main objectives of the GODIAC project.

1 Police

1.1 The influence of knowledge-based learning on the development of special police tactics in Sweden

Marianne Hilton, Organisation consultant, Sweden and Christian Wessman, Police Superintendent, Swedish National Police Board

1. Introduction

This article describes the development of special police tactics (SPT)² in Sweden, focusing on a project that took place during the period 2007–2010 in order to explore how development continued after the project was completed and the development needs that are now identified by SPT police officers, trainers, and officials responsible for SPT at a national level.³ In addition, it presents the background of the GODIAC project and describes both positive and negative project experiences.⁴

The target audience is the GODIAC organisation and others who are interested in development work within the police.

The authors have both been engaged in SPT developments in the Swedish police organisation. Christian Wessman is a police superintendent with several years of theoretical and practical experience with SPT. He has been a tutor at the Swedish National Police Academy (PHS) in Solna and the deputy division commander for SPT with the Stockholm County Police. He is now manager of the GODIAC project at the Swedish National Police Board (NPB). Marianne Hilton is an academic in social sciences

and has served as a tutor in psychology as well as a project manager and director of studies in police basic training and advanced training at PHS. She was also the steering committee chair and then manager of the SPT project and manager of the GODIAC during its first year. She now works as an organisation consultant outside the police organisation.

In researching this article, we read the SPT reports, examined five field-study reports from the post-project period (2010), and interviewed thirteen individuals who work with SPT in different police functions, including chiefs at various levels of the police organisation.

2. The SPT project

The development of SPT in Sweden, as in many other countries, has origins in external events. One such event was the EU summit in Gothenburg, which led to major damage and violent confrontations between demonstrators and police officers.



Confrontations between demonstrators and police during the EU summit in Gothenburg, 2001.

The events led to measures aimed at improving police ability to prevent and handle serious public disorder. A governmental investigation recommended that the police develop national guidelines for policing major

² *Special police tactics* refers to police approaches and methods meant to prevent and manage large-scale public disorder.

³ National Police Board, *Knowledge Development within Special Police Tactics, 2007–2010: Final Report* (Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010).

⁴ GODIAC, “Good Practice for Dialogue and Communication as Strategic Principles for Policing Political Manifestations in Europe” (PoA 109–4029/09, HOME/2009/ISEC/AG/182).

events.⁵ The Swedish NPB spent several years on SPT development work.⁶ In 2004 a NPB decision to changed police work methods, implementing a national concept related to tactical approaches, methods, equipment, and training.⁷ These unified police tactics are based on the principles of *non-confrontation*, *de-escalation*, and *dialogue*, to be implemented by the police in situations that are or might become dangerous, both in everyday police work (basic tactics⁸) and at major events where the risk of confrontation or violence is increased SPT. The goal was that the ability of police to act judiciously and effectively would be improved through application of these principles.

SPT builds on situational adapted conflict management and the mobile operational concept, which was introduced as a tactical method in 2004. Situational adapted conflict management is a development of the mental and communicative approach used in basic tactics, whereas the mobile concept has been used by the Danish police since 2000 and was adapted for the Swedish police context.⁹ The mobile methods aim at quick, forceful, and effective operations against public order disturbances. Central elements are the use of mobile units in order to increase flexibility and protection for the police, as well as a respectful and non-provocative approach to groups and crowds. In the Danish context, dialogue is carried out before, during, and after an operation by the operational (silver) commander; in Sweden, dialogue police officers were chosen for this.

The PHS was tasked with developing training within the field. In spring 2005 a number of Danish instructors arrived at PHS and conducted the first educational course for SPT instructors in Sweden. By autumn 2005 the new training material had been completed, and from then on education began for commanders (gold commanders, silver commanders, and staff chiefs), uniformed officers, plainclothes arrest units, and dialogue officers.¹⁰ The material and training mainly focused on tactical methods (particularly the mobile concept).

A National Reinforcement Organisation (NFO) for SPT was set up that, following a decision by the National Bureau of Investigation (RKP), could be used all over Sweden to temporarily assist police authorities with SPT competency.¹¹ It consists of specially trained public order police officers and commanders from the three largest police authorities – namely, Stockholm, Västra Götaland, and Skåne. Gold (strategic), silver (operational), and bronze (tactical) group commanders, dialogue police officers, uniformed officers in mobile units, plainclothes arrest units, transport units, and media information officers were part of the NFO to start with, as were equipment and specially developed vehicles. Since 2010 SPT instructors, supporter police, dog units, and mounted units have also been part of the NFO.

2.1 Aim, Goals, and Organization

During 2006 regional differences in SPT were noted on several occasions. These differences relate to the ways police authorities applied SPT – among other things, how the mobile concept was used, how the local SPT training courses were conducted, and how differences in command culture within the three counties were reflected. During the same period

5 SOU 2002:122, *Göteborg 2001: Betänkande av Göteborgsskommittén* (Stockholm: Fritzes, 2002); K. Granström, *Göteborgskravallerna*, Rapport 187 (Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar, 2002).

6 *National Police Tactics*, parts 1–3 (Stockholm: National Police Board, 2003).

7 NPB decision POL-109–1204/03.

8 National Police Academy, *National Basic Tactics: Training Material* (Stockholm: National Police Academy, 2005), Dnr 779–3798/04 2005.

9 Rigspolitiet, København, 2005, 4:e udgaven, *Det mobila insatskonceptet*.

10 National Police Academy, 2005, *Det mobila insatskonceptet; Training Material*

11 Rikspolisstyrelsens föreskrifter och allmänna råd, FAP 201–1, RPSFS 2006:14.

a CEPOL (European Police College) conference highlighted European research on the psychology of crowds and the possibilities for the police to prevent public disorder.¹²

Owing to the knowledge and development needs that had been identified (see above), in 2006 the NPB decided to carry out a three-year project called the Knowledge Development within Special Police Tactics Project, or the SPT Project.¹³ The project took place from 1 January 2007 to 30 April 2010.¹⁴ The aim of the project was to, within the SPT, develop a long-term strategy for knowledge development that integrates research, training and practice. The intention was to increase the competency of the police to work knowledge based in order to prevent and manage larger or/serious public disorder and in a better way ensure that they were upholding the constitutional right of assembly.

Specifically the goals were to increase police knowledge of factors that contribute to effective operations, to increase integration of practical and theoretical knowledge and to increase the use of research results in police education and training.

The project's terms of reference make clear two important preconditions for the work: first, participants should represent the fields of practice, training, and research within SPT in order to allow for integration of different knowledge and experiences; and second, that comparative field studies should be used. The SPT Project's organisation consisted of a steering committee, a reference group, a project group with two project managers, and nineteen field-study groups.¹⁵ The NPB led the project, and the groups included representatives from different levels of the NFO and the three police counties (practice); the Police Academy in Solna (training); and the Police

Academy of the Netherlands, the police Academy of Oslo, and the University of Linköping (research).¹⁶

2.2 Work Methods

The strategy for long-term knowledge development consisted of several interrelated parts:

- ◆ identifying competency needs for the functions in the SPT organisation (NFO),
- ◆ identifying relevant research based knowledge and integrating this with SPT practice and training,
- ◆ evaluating operations and analysing them in relation to relevant theoretical knowledge,
- ◆ presenting the results of evaluations on SPT practice through seminars, workshops, and relevant training courses.




Figure 1. Strategy for long-term knowledge development

2.2.1 Identification of competency

One of the first tasks project participants undertook was to develop job descriptions and competency

¹² Police Science Conference, CEPOL 2006.

¹³ NPB decision, Dnr PoA-109–4499/06.

¹⁴ A more detailed description can be found in the final report of the project.

¹⁵ Some people were part of several field-study groups.

¹⁶ Professor Otto Adang of the Police Academy of the Netherlands was head project manager (20%). There was also a Swedish project manager (100%).

profiles for the various functions in an NFO (gold, silver, bronze, and group commanders; dialogue, uniformed, and plainclothes arrest officers).¹⁷ The profiles were designed for use in recruitment and as a basis for training.

2.2.2 Knowledge inventory

Project researchers began by producing an inventory of theories and research results that could explain the development of incidents during crowd events. It became evident that although research on crowd behaviour at events such as demonstrations, football matches, and so on, has a long history (dating from the end of the 1800s), early explanations of how events can develop into riots and disturbances do not consider the police.¹⁸ Police may have been at the scene but were not incorporated into these early explanatory models; rather, police forces were regarded as a constant entity. In modern theories, however, the police play an active part in the development of an event. Modern research shows that civil unrest and violence in crowds develop as a consequence of processes between groups and within groups.¹⁹ This has led to a shift in the way

crowd behaviour is perceived. Thus, the interaction between police and individuals in the crowd is now understood to play a major role in determining whether order is maintained or confrontations occur and escalate.

The developed social identity theory is the foundation for the conflict-reducing principles in policing crowds.²⁰ These principles are *knowledge* of the groups the police will meet and of the dynamics of crowds, *facilitation* of the legitimate goals of a group or crowd, *communication* with the group, and *differentiation* of people based on their behaviour. By applying these principles, the police can help create conditions for so-called self-policing, by which group members themselves take responsibility for keeping order within their groups.

- 17 National Police Board, *Kompetensprofiler* (Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008); National Police Board, *Kompetensprofiler för dialogpolis och civila gripare* (Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010).
- 18 G. Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (1896; City: Publisher, 1945).
- 19 S. Reicher et al., "Ett integrerat förhållningssätt till folksamlingars psykologi och polisens upprätthållande av allmän ordning," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 27, no. 4 (2008): 558–572; S. Reicher et al., "Upprätthållande av allmän ordning genom kunskapsbaserat polisarbete, principer och praktik," *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 1, no. 4 (2008): 403–415; G. Guvå, *Kravaller och social identitet – En forskningsöversikt*, FOG rapport no. 53 (Linköping: Linköpings Universitet, 2005); K. Granström, G. Guvå, I. Hylander, and M. Rosander, *Riots and Disturbances: How Riots Start and How Order Is Secured*, FOG rapport no. 64 (Linköping: Linköpings Universitet, 2009).

- 20 J. C. Turner, "Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Group," in *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*, ed. H. Tajfel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); C. Stott and S. Reicher, "Crowd Action as Intergroup Process: Introducing the Police Perspective," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 28, no. 4 (1998): 509–529; C. Stott and S. Reicher, "How Conflict Escalates: The Inter-Group Dynamics of Collective Football Crowd 'Violence,'" *Sociology* 32, no. 2 (1998): 353–377; S. Reicher, "'The Battle of Westminster': Developing the Social Identity Model of Crowd Behaviour in Order to Explain the Initiation and Development of Collective Conflict," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 26, no. 1 (1996): 115–134; J. Drury and S. Reicher, "Collective Action and Psychological Change: The Emergence of New Social Identities," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 39 (2000): 579–604; J. Drury and S. Reicher, "Explaining Enduring Empowerment: A Comparative Study of Collective Action and Psychological Outcomes," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 35, no. 1 (2005): 35–58; C. Stott "Police Expectations and the Control of English Soccer Fans at 'Euro 2000,'" *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management* 26, no. 4 (2003): 640–655; Reicher et al., "Ett integrerat förhållningssätt"; Reicher et al., "Upprätthållande"; D. Della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., *The Policing of Transnational Protest* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).




Figure 2. The conflict-reducing principles

These four principles are relevant to police behaviour in both calm and disorderly situations. They were introduced as concepts in the 2006 command training but had not been applied at a tactical level before the SPT Project started.

2.2.3 Evaluation of practice

In order to examine SPT application in practice, nineteen field studies were carried out, observing police operations in which the SPT concept was used during the period 2007–2009. In all, the project studied fourteen demonstrations or public gatherings and five football matches. In 2007 the project group, with help from police students at the Swedish National Police Academy in Solna, carried out three field studies at demonstrations in Stockholm. These studies focused on verbal and nonverbal communication between the demonstrators and the police as well as on that among the police themselves. A semi-structured observation method²¹ was used. The results of the studies are described in a report.²² In response to the lessons learned from the 2007 studies the peer review method was used in the field studies during 2008 and 2009.

2.2.3.1 Peer Review Methodology

For each field study a group was composed, each comprising six to eight participants.²³ Commanders and dialogue police officers of the NFO from the three largest police authorities (Stockholm, Västra Götaland, and Skåne), together with members of the project group, were assigned to the field-study groups, which thus included practitioners, trainers, and researchers. These participants took part in a two-day course in the peer review method. The studies were planned well in advance of the police operations. In the run-up to each one, a field-study member was responsible for maintaining contact with

21 All interviewees were asked the same open-ended questions, providing them equal opportunities to present their opinions on the same questions

22 *The Communicative Interplay between Protesters and Police* (Stockholm: Swedish National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008)

23 O. Adang and E. Brown, *Policing Football in Europe: Experience from Peer Review Evaluation Teams* (Police Academy of the Netherlands, 2008).

the command of the operation and participated in the preparatory meetings held by the police authority; after an operation, the same project representative attended the follow-up police meeting, as well. Each of these field studies spanned three consecutive days.

The day before the event, observers met in order to plan the study according to a predetermined structure; they examined the planning and command documents of the operation.

Day two of each field study was the day of the operation itself. Working in pairs, observers collected data and conducted interviews at the event, while one or two members of the field-study group followed the staff's work and radio communication during the operation.

Group members spent day three of each study discussing and compiling their observations. The discussion followed a fixed structure, which facilitated report writing.

During each field study, two important principles guided the observers' approach. First, neither the observations nor the interviews were to be carried out in a way that disturbed the police work, and second, the safety of the observers was always prioritized above any other interest.

Field interviews (571) were carried out in conjunction with the observations; the majority of interviewees were police officers from different NFO levels (321); others were demonstrators or sports-team supporters (78) and members of the general public (172).

As for documentation of the data, one person was appointed to finalise each report within a month of the field study. These reports answer the questions that had been articulated before each study and identify good examples of SPT application as well as areas in need of development. The results were reported to the relevant commanders. Each year, the project group analysed the patterns in the field-study results. The analyses of 2008 and 2009 are described in two reports. In total, the project produced sixteen field-study reports (see references). The 2008 and

2009 field studies focused on the interaction between the demonstrators and the police, whereas the 2009 study also emphasised the management of operations, an adjustment made as a response to the 2008 results.

2.2.4 Exchange of Knowledge and Experiences: Learning from Practice

An important part of the project work involved holding workshops and seminars to present feedback and discuss the results of the peer reviews. Examples of both good practices and development needs were addressed. Five seminars took place between 2008 and 2009; participants represented the NFO, the field-study groups, the project group, and SPT instructors (191 participants in all). A final seminar with the project organisation was carried out in February 2010 to discuss what had been learned from the project (40 participants). Two seminars were also carried out with police officers and commanders, researchers, and trainers from other countries (165 participants in all). The topics were policing public order disturbances (2007) and using dialogue and communication as preventive tools in managing large events (2008).

Through the project work, it became evident that internationalisation was taking place in protest movements and among sports supporters and this phenomenon in turn required an internationalisation of police knowledge. Therefore, an application for a three-year project on developing dialogue and communication as preventive principles for policing political manifestations in Europe was sent to the European Commission in July 2009.²⁴

²⁴ The application was accepted, and the project was launched 1 August 2010 (GODIAC; PoA 109–4029/09, HOME/2009/ISEC/AG/182).

2.2.5 Participation in Training

One of the SPT project's goals was to implement research results into courses of SPT. This was carried out in different ways. The project managers, other researchers, project members, and field-study groups participated in the national SPT commander training, as well as in the development of the group commander training during 2007–2009 and in the updating of the SPT training material in 2008–2009. The contributions consisted of both discussions of the field-study results and the process of commanding.

2.3 Results

Overall, the project achieved its aims, and the long-term strategy for knowledge development proved to work well.

2.3.1 Factors for Effective Operations

From the theoretical frame of reference that was chosen, the following factors were identified by the project group as significant in effective SPT operations: the application of the conflict-reducing principles for policing crowds, the quality of the operational command (the application of command principles), and the competency at every level of the operation.

Development can be noted throughout the field studies. The common theoretical base and the principles have also facilitated and increased cooperation both between the police authorities of Stockholm, Västra Götaland, and Skåne and also between the NFO and the public order policing in the remaining police jurisdictions.

When it comes to competency at all levels and to the various functions in the NFO, work descriptions and competency profiles came to be used in the selection of training material and for planning training programmes. Restructuring SPT courses and updating training material also positively affected competency.

2.3.2 Integration of Practical and Theoretical Knowledge

When the SPT concept was introduced in 2005 it mainly consisted of methods. The field-study results show how the research-based principles have been implemented in police practice. Figure 3 illustrates various aspects of the knowledge that was integrated through the project work.




Figure 3. Components of SPT

2.3.2.1 Conflict-reducing principles applied in SPT operations

In 2007 it was the dialogue police officers who communicated verbally with demonstrators. The uniformed officers mainly communicated nonverbally through body language, tactical methods, equipment, formations, and vehicles.

Overall analysis of the 2008 field studies shows that the application of the mobile concept and of dialogue police work had developed, but variation was great and to a high degree depended on individual strategic and tactical commanders. The conflict-reducing principles were now being included in the strategic commander's order for the operations. Further, those interviewed during the field studies from among the public, protesters, and supporters commented that

the police approach to these events had developed into a friendlier one.

Among the areas identified as requiring improvement were further application of the conflict-reducing principles and an increased role for supporter police officers.



Police giving way at a demonstration, 2008



Interaction between police and demonstrator, 2008

During the 2009 field studies developments were apparent. More information about the groups expected to participate in the event was available at the police briefings, and the conflict-reducing principles were used by the strategic and operational commanders to describe the operation's goals. Group commanders used the principles in their commands to a greater extent: during the events uniformed police officers communicated more than before with demonstrators, members of the public, and sports-team supporters,

informing them of police intentions and mingling at rally points. Information leaflets and loudspeakers were also used more than they had been in the past.

There was a clear increase in police facilitation through dialogue police work, which consisted of long-term contact with the organisers and groups before, during, and after operations; this shift is significant in terms of how events developed when disorder started and for the outcome of the operation itself.

It is difficult to know whether differentiation was based on actual behaviour or on the belief of the police concerning which group individuals belonged to. During many demonstrations different groups took responsibility for keeping order themselves, in accordance with agreements with the police. Examples of such self-policing were observed both among demonstrators and among police.

The project work also meant that the basis for police work with crowds, upholding the constitutional right of assembly and freedom of speech, was reinforced. Although criminal investigations during the police operations were not the focus of the field studies, observers noted that police authorities exchanged accounts of their experiences and that both chiefs of investigations and investigators started to appear in the field during the operations.

The needs for further development identified in 2009 relate especially to police officers' ability to differentiate. In order to achieve this, others within the police force, in addition to the dialogue police, need to know more about the various groups the police meet during a given event. Another need is SPT training for dog units and mounted units, for supporter police units, and for the criminal intelligence service.²⁵

Observers also noted differences in police behaviour across jurisdictions at football matches, discrepancies related to police presence inside the arena and to the ways they handled invasions of the pitch.

25 The criminal intelligence service collects information to facilitate decision making.



Interaction between police and a person from the general public²⁶

2.3.2.2 *Command process developed through principles of command*

In the project's inception, the focus during field studies was on the interactions between the police, demonstrators or supporters, and the general public. From the first year's analysis and interpretation, the command process emerged as an additional area of interest. SPT command training had introduced the theoretical principles of an operation command,²⁷

26 Demonstrators had thrown paint onto the police and members of the public during a 2009 demonstration. The photograph shows a dialogue about this incident.

27 Theories, for instance, regarding viable systems, the span of control, the ability to manage different time scales and simultaneous developments of events, the importance of updating the situational picture, and so on. See P. Johansson, *Effektiv insatsledning: Några teoretiska grunder för ledning av polis- och räddningsinsatser* (Karlstad: Räddningsverket, 2000); L. Nylén, *Operativ ledning: Bedömande och beslutsfattande: Lednings- och fältstaber vid särskild händelse: En handledning* (Stockholm: National Police Board, 2006); M. Lindahl, *Grundsyn i ledning: Ledning och styrning inom ramen för mängdbrottsuppdraget*. (Polismyndigheten i Västerbotten, 2007).

and assignment tactics were to be used insofar as possible.²⁸

Analysis of the 2008 field studies shows several notable things in terms of applying command principles. First, the importance of communication along the chain of command and the quality of preparation for operations received more attention during that year. Among the good examples recorded in 2008 was that the strategic, operational, and tactical commanders shared views on direction and priorities. Further, in comparison to what was observed in earlier operations, the command orders and decisions were adjusted more appropriately to the events in the three police jurisdictions; the conflict-reducing principles were also stressed. New forms of briefings and follow-up meetings were introduced during some operations.

At some events observers noted police officers' ability to persist with an adjusted defensive tactic in order to avoid escalation. Cooperation between the staff of the three police authorities had also developed at every level of the operation relative to that seen in past years. However, there were differences regarding whether starting and finishing conversations took place.²⁹

Among the areas identified as needing development for 2008 were the command process, assignment tactics, the coordination of the forces involved in the operational, and the harmonisation of information, criminal intelligence, and dynamic risk assessment.

28 NPB, FAP 22201–1. RPSFS 2006:14.

29 A starting conversation is one whose purpose is to create, in a short time, conditions for the greatest possible cooperation within a temporary group during an operation. The conversation should take place at the outset of an operation and be led by the group commander, who has prepared for it. The focus is on the joint approach, the task of each officer, roles, and so on. The purpose of the finishing conversation is to create possibilities for stress reduction at the end of an operation and to ensure learning from gained experience. The conversation takes place in the group that has worked together during the operation before it ends.

What was most evident from the 2009 field studies was the impact the command training had on the group commanders. The decision at large (BIS) became clearer and also had a more visible effect on the operation than in past years. A shared approach and language were observed along the chain of command, contributing to improved communication at several operations. There was greater focus on creating positive conditions for the group commanders' management. The group commanders themselves were sharper in their demands for additional time to prepare for their tasks and for feedback on suggested solutions. They took more initiative than observed in earlier years and also acted in accordance with the conflict-reducing principles. Experiences from earlier operations were integrated into the planning process, and at some of the operations commanders employed methodological tools to support that process (e.g., situational picture, juridical assessment, goal picture, acting, and follow-up).




Figure 4. The steps of methodological support for management

The tool called scenario planning was used before some of the operations, which meant that the different levels of the command chain acted and got feedback on their planning.³⁰ Finishing conversations were carried out to a larger extent than before. It had become more common to conduct follow-up meetings, at which scenarios were used to analyse the operation.

The 2009 field studies show that differences remained between the three police authorities that needed to be addressed in order to ensure unified operation management. The development needs identified for that year relate to preparation for an event aimed at improving proactive operational work that would prevent escalation of events; this would also increase the efficacy of the planning process and the chain of command. The SPT training courses required updating, and some SPT concepts related to the original strategies (e.g., adapted offensive and defensive strategy) needed adjustment to better accommodate the strategic use of the conflict-reducing principles.

2.3.3 Increased integration of research results into SPT training

The SPT command training (gold, silver, bronze, and group commanders), as well as the instructor and group-member training, and the Basic Tactics Level 2 training to a large degree build on research-based knowledge.³¹ This is also true of the crowd dynamics aspect of basic training for police officers.

The results of the field studies influenced the restructuring of SPT command training. The impact of the theories, the conflict-reducing principles, and the principles of command became apparent when the bronze and group commander training began at

30 Scenario planning is a method of visualizing the development of events on a map, on which one positions different units in order to simulate possible scenarios.

31 Basic Tactic Level 2 involves deepening the principles of basic tactics, working in a group, and handling crowds by applying the conflict-reducing principles.

the end of 2008. In order to strengthen the cooperation and communication along the chain of command, the bronze commanders were educated with the gold and silver commanders beginning in autumn 2010. Also as a result of the project work, SPT training material was updated in 2010.³² The theoretical sections were expanded and integrated with the methods, and the National Police Board produced a handbook in field-study methodology.³³

2.4 Learning Processes

Overall, a more open learning climate was developed in the SPT organisation (NFO). At the concluding SPT Project workshop (February 2010), those who had participated in the project identified the field studies as key to the project's success. They said that the field studies had allowed the participating police to take a step back and reflect on their activities. Moreover, the peer review method had shown that it is possible to evaluate such events in an uncomplicated way. The strength of the field studies is that they balanced different perspectives, combining a number of diverse elements. The studies had created a demand for feedback and strengthened the motivation for development within the NFO. The exchange among practitioners, researchers (who contributed theories and an evaluation method), and trainers was crucial.

Openness in the NFO to integrating the research and evaluation results had increased. Commanders participated in the seminars in spite of having received critical feedback in the field-study reports. This was probably a result of both the project's design and the close cooperation of practitioners and researchers. The literature was anchored in an uncomplicated way – the reports used, for instance, the conflict-reducing and management principles in

their analyses. One of the project's strengths was that the strategy for knowledge development (the work process) was refined and polished over three years.

2.4.1 Project Work Challenges

One initial difficulty that the project faced was that there was no precedent for evaluating police operations. The difference between inspections and field studies was unclear; therefore, concerns arose that individuals would be criticized and perhaps hang out. This attitude changed, however, partly because members of the field-study groups were present at operation briefings and were given the opportunity to explain how the field studies would be conducted.

Another reason such fears were allayed involves the way workshops and seminars were carried out once the field-study results had been discussed. The participants in the field-study groups filled roles as commanders, dialogue officers, plainclothes arrest officers, and group members in the NFO. Thus, the organisation identified them all as belonging to the same "family." Other contributing factors were that the field study reports included examples of both what worked well (good practice) and what needed to be changed (development needs), and that commanders had opportunities to process the results in relation to research-based knowledge.

A learning process took place as observers developed the ability to see the operation from a holistic perspective, produce analyses from theoretical points of view, and critically reflect on what had been observed. Initially, observers were cautious in their feedback, but as members of the NFO came to demand more critical feedback, observers met these demands. The overall idea of this project was that researchers, practitioners, and trainers would work together, combining each group's perspective and knowledge of a different field so as to enrich the others' perspectives.

During the first field studies (spring 2007), the project group acknowledged that the police officers'

32 National Police Board, *Special Police Tactics. Basis. Training Material* (Stockholm: National Police Board, 2010).]

33 National Police Board, *Peer Review Methodology* (Stockholm: National Police Board, 2010).

duty to report crimes could conflict with their role as observers during the field studies. If an officer observed a crime, how should he or she handle it? Thorough discussions ensued, and comparisons were drawn with research in other fields. Formally, the officer's duty still existed and could not be waived. During the field studies that followed, the issue remained unsolved, but no incidents occurred in which this conflict arose. For the Swedish researchers this reporting duty conflicted with research ethics rules, a contributing factor in their deciding to withdraw after only half the project time.

2.5 Further Development

At the concluding SPT workshop (February 2010), the three police authorities presented the ways they planned to continue the development of special tactics – for instance, through organising local training days.

In the police jurisdiction of Stockholm County, there would be two training days each year for the operational commanders. For the bronze and group commanders, thematic days for quality assurance would be implemented. All SPT operations during the year would be evaluated.

The Skåne police would conduct follow-up meetings after each operation, and summaries would be made for a follow-up conference at which experiences would be discussed. A forum had been developed in which strategic and operational commanders and the chief of operations could address various topics.

In Västra Götaland the police authority resolved to keep the competency that had been established. A new division-commander post with responsibility for development and evaluation would be introduced.

In the final SPT report the project management and steering committee concluded from the experience that three years is a short period in which to achieve such a radical change as knowledge-based police work. This report recommends that the attempted strategy for long-term knowledge development be implemented further, developing practice,

research, and training, as well as continuous interaction between these fields.

Among the recommendations, two are most notable. First, the report recommends a decision on a strategic approach to policing crowds. That is, the conflict-reducing principles and the principles of command should be applied in a dynamic way,³⁴ that graded police work should be developed,³⁵ and that the responsibilities of the each command level of the operational organisation should be clarified.

The second recommendation calls for measures for continued long-term knowledge development. This would entail the implementation of a national system for field studies using peer review methodology carried out by researchers, practitioners, and trainers and linked to seminars and training courses in which field-study results are discussed. It also calls for training in evaluation methodology and for quality assurance of the evaluation work; for a national command resource group of tactical advisers consisting of commanders, dialogue police, and instructors; for increased knowledge about demonstrators and the protest movements, reflecting the changing protest landscape; and finally, for a scientific basis for continued development and evaluation work within SPT.

3. Post-Project Developments

Three years after the SPT project concluded, we examine the project's impact, identifying further developments that have occurred in its wake and

34 The background to this is that the description of SPT needed to be updated and some concepts needed to be clarified in order to achieve further unified development. The strategic concepts of offensive and defensive tactics (which come from military terminology) and descriptions of SPT in terms of the mobile concept and dialogue police work needed to be replaced with a more dynamic application of the conflict-reducing principles.

35 This means that the deployment resources and their use are better adjusted to risk and threat assessments. The kind of messages the police want to signal in an operation is important.

determining what the development needs of SPT are today. To achieve this we explore the ways the field-study element of the strategy for knowledge development is now used. As part of this investigation, we interviewed a number of police officers at different levels of the NFO.

The National Bureau of Investigation (RKP) received a mandate in 2011 to decide when a field study should be carried out within an NFO operation.³⁶ The authority requesting an NFO may also ask for tactical advisers. A system with a group of reviewers has been installed by RKP, and its task is to advise RKP when an NFO is to be implemented.

3.1 Field Studies

In total, five field studies were carried out by RKP during the period 2011–2012: two by the NPB evaluation unit in 2011 and three as part of the command training at PHS in 2012. One field study took place during a demonstration in Malmö, another during a public gathering in Gothenburg (2011), and the final three during sports events (2012) – two high-risk hockey matches and one football derby in Gothenburg. The peer review methodology was used, and the studies' questions were the same as during the SPT project, a fact that facilitates a comparative analysis of SPT application in 2011 and 2012 with that recorded in the SPT project from 2007 to 2009. The next section provides reflections on these five reports.³⁷

The following developments have taken place since the SPT project's conclusion. The planning process now includes preparing for an operation; one day is dedicated to preparation, in which group commanders also participate. Good examples mentioned in the reports are the work of the dialogue and supporter police in communicating information to the general public, demonstrators, and supporters, as well as

these groups' cooperation with the uniformed officers and the police officers understanding of the importance of communication and differentiation. The conflict-reducing principles are apparent to varying degrees in the strategic and operational documents. In one event the operational commander used a tactical adviser, something that the commander greatly appreciated.

Our impressions are that the development needs identified in the 2009 field studies still exist to a large extent.

3.2 Interviews

The interviews we conducted were designed to illuminate three key areas: (1) how some of those working in special police tactics perceive the SPT project, (2) how development has continued in the SPT project's wake, and (3) what further development is needed today.

3.2.1 Interview method

Thirteen police officers working with SPT were interviewed during the period 30 November 2012 to 8 January 2013. Eleven of the participants were selected in consultation with the division commanders of the three police forces (Stockholm, Västra Götaland, and Skåne).³⁸ We also chose to interview two police officers who had been involved in the SPT project, surmising that their positions at the NPB would add knowledge about trends over time. At the time of the interviews, participants were bronze, silver, and gold commanders in the NFO, division commanders in the three SPT counties, trainers at the Swedish National Police Academy, and officers in charge of SPT at the NPB. On average, they had twenty-three years of police experience, and their professional experience as police officers ranged from nine to for-

36 RKP decides when an NFO will be used.

37 More detail can be found in the reports themselves, listed in appendix 1.

38 A division commander is the administrative chief for the SPT organisation in each county's police authority. The commander is responsible for, among other things, recruitment and training of the SPT officers within the county.

ty-two years. All indicated that they had been educated for their level of command in the SPT.

How representative are our thirteen interviewees of those officers who make up the NFO? We cannot know, but we are content to describe the ways a number of officers well versed in SPT described the field's progress and its needs for further development.

For our interviews we developed a questionnaire (see appendix 3) that included both closed- and open-ended questions. We conducted a test interview in order to examine the questions' effectiveness and then made some minor adjustments. The questionnaire and instructions on how the interview was to be conducted circulated a week in advance so that participants could be prepared. One author conducted all the interviews, either by telephone or face to face; interviews lasted on average one hour (ranging in length from forty-five to ninety minutes).

3.2.2 Interview responses

Five respondents had been involved in the SPT project and had attended either two or three field studies. Another two interviewees had participated in a peer review after the project period, and three had taken part in the SPT project workshops. Therefore, the answers to questions 1, 2, and 4 (see appendix) are derived from the responses these seven or eight individuals made, while answers to all the other questions reflect responses from all the participants. Quotes from the interviews appear in italics.

1. What is your strongest memory from the field studies?

In response to this question, three of the interviewees mentioned the experience of seeing with someone else's eyes and having the opportunity to observe how colleagues behaved. *For the first time I was able to stand at the side and see how we actually work. [I have] benefited greatly from that experience; [there was] nothing negative at all.* Another perspective on the role of observer was the opportunity it offered

to question police practice. *My strongest memory is what I experienced in the perspective of being outside the operation. It was strange to see our police behave strangely. To stand outside my own guild and question my own people: Was there really a thought in what we did as police officers? It was also interesting to see the police as the public does.*

Another strong memory for one interviewee was the feeling of wanting to develop police capacity. *It was a bit messy in the beginning of the project. Swedish police had never previously worked with evaluation in a similar way. It was with anguished delight that we attended. I was pleasantly surprised to see that the officers at the events actually responded to researchers' questions. I was not expecting it, nor that the right- and left-wing activists would agree to be interviewed. [It was] exciting that people wanted to contribute.*

Another theme that arose during the observations was the range of possible ways to command events. *Although we use a national concept we could see that it was applied differently in the three SPT counties. One example was that the chief of staff and the gold commander did all the preliminary work in Skåne, while in Stockholm it was handled by the joint effort of the gold and silver commanders.*

Finally, respondents highlighted the exchange of knowledge between colleagues as important, especially the interaction between observers and active officers at an event.

2. What did you learn from the field studies?

Several interviewees mentioned that they had learned how the operational organisation works in practice. *Thanks to the insight I could see what worked well and what worked less well. It helped us to do something about it by pointing out what needed to be prioritized. The observations visualised the entire organisation and pointed out what could be improved. Since the focus was on improvement... the project did not hang individuals out to dry. Earlier, no one had a holistic approach to how the operational organisation actually worked.*

Further, through the project it became clear to many of those interviewed how difficult it is to reach out with the intentions and goals set by the strategic commanders, especially to reach all the way to down the chain of command of the operational organisation. Some interviewees stressed the importance of communicating the decision at large (BIS) to all officers so that they understand in what context they are operating. *You can never inform enough. It turned out that the officers at the end of the line often did not understand their role, duty, or how they were expected to act. One can jeopardise the whole effort as an individual. [I realised] the importance of the BIS being communicated so that everyone understands their role. Instead of just placing an officer at a roadblock, one can explain why no one is allowed to enter the street.* Another answer develops this idea: *You can spend lots of time preparing and then believe that everyone has the information. It was a rough awakening to see how little of everything that was prepared actually reached all those concerned. It became apparent in the interviews. As a result of my participation in the project I have changed my way of briefing the officers and how I discuss different scenarios with my staff before an event.*

Many commented that they had learned a great deal by observing others perform the role they usually occupied in events. *[It was] extremely useful to participate in a field-study group. One learned so much by watching others command in one's own role. This in turn affected how one worked at home. Maybe one tested something new. Moreover, it was good for the hosting authority to have their operation observed by friendly eyes.*

In another recurring answer, respondents indicated that they had noticed how important the situational picture is in an event – and that it often differed and was not communicated adequately within the command structure. Interviews revealed, further, that a deeper knowledge of the conflict-reducing principles developed as a result of the principles' being used as analytical tools for the observations. *To listen to*

the counterpart and learn about our own behaviour... gave weight to the need for principles. Today we believe that the perspective of the counterpart is very important for the positive outcome of an event. In addition, it was useful to see alternative solutions to problems that one later could try at home. Between the first and last field study, one could see that we got better and better. The dialogue (unit) came along on the ride in a totally new way. [I'm] glad we got better and better.

A repeated point was that the opportunity to be involved and to influence the situation also contributed to learning. *We also got a very constructive and good network.*

3. How have you used SPT project reports and in what context?

The majority (nine) of the interviewees had read the final report and several of the individual field-study reports, and they had also made use of these documents in several contexts. One interviewee who had not read the reports before the interview commented that *I browsed through them on IntraPolis just before this interview and realized that there's so much good material! Too bad that not many know that all the material is there.*³⁹

The reports have been used as literature in the national instructor and operational command training (OPC) in SPT at PHS, and in courses for bronze and group commanders on both national (PHS) and regional levels (in the three police jurisdictions). The following responses illustrate the ways reports have been used in such contexts. *In SPT basic training we use individual field-study reports. It is important that what is said is born out of research and not out of the instructor's own opinions. This increases credibility and means that instructors do not only educate in the methods. The reports are also used in instructor training at PHS. One learns to analyse and examine the source*

³⁹ IntraPolis is an intranet for employees of the Swedish police forces.

of knowledge more critically. [The reports] make me think a little more about what is being written and said in conjunction with an event [and] provide an excellent basis for discussion. We enjoyed having them in OPC training at PHS. The purpose was to review how field studies work, what peer review is. [We also examined] situational planning, an example of what can happen during an operation. Good for discussions!

Several interviewees have used individual reports to prepare for recurring events – for instance, studying the report from the previous year’s event to improve planning for the upcoming event. Some also used the annual reports summarising field-study reports as the basis for prioritising development and education in the SPT at a national level.

As to why the reports are important, the following responses should be noted. *The reports have been very important in themselves to penetrate the conflict-reducing principles. During the period of the project the concept of conflict-reducing principles was completely new to the Swedish police. The reports contained practical examples, seen with the eyes of this concept, from events that officers could relate to and served as a bridge between theory and methods. The strength of these reports is that they were based on events policed by their own organisation and not, for example, on events in other countries. Further, the reports have given the organisation more meat on the bones when discussing, above all, the principles. Previously, it was basically just dialogue officers who could lecture on the principles because they were perceived as complicated. Now everyone can [discuss them], much thanks to practical examples from the reports. One individual described his use of the reports as follows: I have always printed the finished reports and handed them out to the county’s silver commanders. After that I have introduced them to the group in a session so that we could discuss them and look at lessons learned. Reports based on events I commanded have been sent to all officers who took part in the event. The instructors have also made use of them in the SPT basic training*

in order to see if anything needed to be enhanced or reduced.

It is clear from the interview responses that the reports contributed to improved conditions in which group commanders could fulfil their role. *The reports were, as an example, used in an educational context to discuss how the “tactical losses” some team members on the street experienced related to the “strategic benefits” management strived to gain when making decisions. The officers struggling in the street often fail to see the profit of a decision that leads to a short-term tactical loss.*⁴⁰ Another commented that *the conclusions in the reports were sometimes used in discussions with senior commanders. Much thanks to the reports, we were able to get more time for the group commanders at the planning stage, [and] we only had to refer to the comments in a report to make a point.*

Comments on the reports were not entirely positive, however; criticisms also emerged. *The dissemination of the reports has not been clear. The challenge has often been to find and access them after publication. Do people have the stamina to search for them?* Another interviewee highlighted that the reports were seldom used and that the gold and silver commanders could have made good use of them during the project; they could have been used, for example, in the local education for the position of police superintendent (*yttre kommissarier*).⁴¹

One respondent called for more critical views in the field-study reports, even though the purpose of the project was to underline good examples. *[I] read them for my own learning. [I] felt, however, that the*

40 A tactical loss might be perceived when one party chooses to put off an intervention, trying instead to resolve the situation through dialogue. A quick solution with a short-term win and a potential long-term loss is less desirable to command, this interviewee indicated, than a slower solution that results in a long-term win and a potential short-term (tactical) loss.

41 *Yttre kommissarie* is the police superintendent, an operational commander with direct responsibility for the patrol cars in a county.

reports did not produce “new” material or “new” observations at the end. What was good kept being perceived as good, event after event. Another view was that the time required for report writing, from observation to finished report, had been too long, a phenomenon that could make the material appear obsolete.

4. What did you learn from participating in the SPT project workshops?

Eight of the respondents had participated in workshops (ranging from one to many); most attended the final seminar and the international seminars. Several interviewees highlighted that cooperation between police officers and scientists was crucial to development. *The SPT project workshops were probably the first time that Swedish police gathered to discuss this particular topic. The need for closer cooperation between researchers and practitioners clearly emerged. We identified a “red thread.” We witnessed how researchers came closer to the police organisation as they were forced to become more concrete in their feedback. The officers, on the other hand, were forced to accept theories and work on a more scientific basis.*

It appears that the workshops encouraged new development and that approaches were firmly established. *The workshops were incredibly important and crucial. One of the reasons that SPT is where it is today is the discussion that took place during the workshops. Transparency was created as several command levels attended and participated in the discussions. This contributed to establishing an acceptance in the whole organisation. The advantages of workshops are further developed in another answer. The entire organisation was represented, and through discussions, we reached different decisions and means of implementation. This was a completely new process for the police. We also began to informally ask each other about how to deal with different issues. Workshops opened up for it [and] helped to create a common vision.*

Another commented: *We grabbed hold of new knowledge and were strengthened in our belief in the*

principles, a trust that had already started to grow. Overall, the exchange fostered in the workshops was described as having many advantages. [It is] important to know that you were on the right path, that we should continue in the direction we were heading. [This knowledge] contributed to a better situational awareness of what was going on outside our own county. [My] lasting memory of that [is that] one was proud that Swedish police were so far ahead in an international context. Typical feedback indicated that the workshops were high quality and that the lectures were perceived as relevant; one respondent described an engaged feeling, very much “business,” and many good discussions.

5. What impact do you think the SPT project had on the development of the special police tactics? How and why?

The interview responses (even those from people who were not involved in the project) show that the project is perceived to have had a lasting positive effect and significant impact on SPT. The programme had contributed significantly to [the fact] that the SPT concept evolved and still today, with police measures, maintains high quality. *The project contributed to turning SPT into a national concept. Previously there were big differences [across jurisdictions] in how authorities worked. Today, it is much more synchronised and this is much to the credit of the project. A key was rectified training, job descriptions, and competency profiles. All this was produced by the project. Another interviewee described the project’s impact as follows: [I am] fully convinced that the project had a major impact in a positive sense. Many thanks to those who took part in the project. They had a rough time but refused to give up. They had to struggle a lot with old leaders who did not want to change. Thanks to the project, we have undergone a major development. The connection between theory and practice has become evident. It’s OK to talk about principles. This would not have been the case without the project. Although it might not have changed*

so much at the time, it has kept evolving until we are where we are today. Officers who were interviewed during the field studies were also affected by being forced to reflect on their decisions and actions in order to respond to the project questions. It may have propelled them [to adopt] a more questioning attitude. We have also gained a better understanding of the concept “us and them”, a counterpart perspective.⁴²

It is argued by the respondents that the strength of the project was the cooperation among the police (practitioners), researchers (theorists), and trainers; the process of meeting and discussing common problems was vital, in most interviewees' opinions. Workshops and field studies created a forum for the three counties, and observing the other organizations increased transparency in each of the participating bodies. The project's working methods contributed to the creation of good networks, and they propelled change. Through field studies, reflections increased regarding what worked well and what did not. *This opened for discussions on how commanders make their decisions. It was allowed to take some time, and this patience was trend breaking for the Swedish police.*

A similar theme that recurs in the interview responses is that the project demonstrated the link between science and practical police work, an advantage of building the project on a scientific foundation. *Establishing the project was the most important step after the Danes delivered the mobile concept. Without the project we would still have stood there with our methods, instead of talking about principles. The principles are now used in all three SPT counties.* Another answer addresses the ways that the authorities' focus shifted. *The project contributed to the shift in focus from tactical methods to principles. Suddenly we dared to think of principles rather than methods. It was a turning point and a starting point. The way of thinking has spread to development of other concepts,*

for example in “conflict management and self-defence.” Previously all development was driven by methodology. Nowadays it takes longer to learn, but the gain is that the knowledge is anchored much better in the individual.

Respondents also described the importance of the reports – for instance, *the reports provided an opportunity to link theory to planning and implementation. Even if one did not participate in any of the workshops, their impact is visible. The concept was clarified. The officers who attended seminars and read reports have been able to meet the police organisation with faith and confidence. They have been able to describe theories based on good experiences and observations.* Moreover, it emerged that the development was not painless. *It was controversial to introduce the principles. It must not be forgotten. Colleagues looked askance at us as field-study members. During one period, the principles were given a bit too much room at the expense of method development. It created a passivity that we are dealing with even today. This may be because the principles were difficult to apply in practice. They were easy to grasp, but the organisation was not ready to use them as tactics.*

In addition, interviewees emphasised that the project contributed to the transparency of management, and they noted the challenge of trying to disseminate the commanders' aims and direction throughout the operational organisation. In this regard, the project examined the application of command principles, focusing and clarifying planning, and thus leading to a more participatory approach. *The project also highlighted the planning process, which has now changed and been streamlined. Now, unlike in the past, it is OK if it costs a little time and money to get a good product. We make more use of different scenarios in our preparatory work.* This respondent clarified that *much of the progress made regarding briefing, the group commanders' participation in the planning process, etc., is a direct result of the reports, which pointed to shortcomings in these respects.*

⁴² Counterpart perspective other actors in the event, such as protesters, sport supporters and the public.

Further, the project influenced command training and other tactical developments in several ways; knowledge gained through the project was integrated into national operational command training, and project reports became part of the training material, as well. *[There is a] clear link between the studies and the introduction of the national OPC courses. [It was a] clever move to involve the bronze commanders as instructors of group commanders and at basic SPT courses. This made it possible to openly share operational experience with all the levels of command.* Respondents likewise emphasised the importance of the fact that participants and instructors came from several levels of command: *[It is] good to have the “commanders” show themselves. [It] may seem lame that senior commanders have to be present during an education; [this] should not be needed, but it is. For knowledge to gain support, it has to be shared by someone you have sweated next to in rough situations.*

Several interviewees noted that the project framework’s development of job descriptions and competency profiles led to national educational standards and examinations, as well as to similar developments in the regional courses.

Some pointed out that the way of thinking – that is, linking theory and practice – had spread to other areas within the police organisation. *The project... introduced an evaluation method that the police had long talked about introducing for other activities. Peer review remains one of the few evidence-based methods the police use. The project forced development to take place.* Further, it emerges from the interview data that overall understanding of counterpart perspective increased, and that the office of division commander in Västra Götaland would never have been introduced without the incentive the project provided.

One respondent highlighted that additional follow-up after the workshops would have been desirable in order to show what was discussed, when and which decisions were made, and so on. *The vast majority of the participants who were interviewed did*

not get access to the reports. [They] should have been presented to the group members as well. Another issue is that the intended recipient did not always have time to read a given report; the project should have done more to disseminate the knowledge gained in other forms (e.g., a film).

6. *How are the conflict reducing principles used at the strategic level today? As an example, in the decision at large, the planning of an operation, etc.?*

All but one of the interviewees answered that the conflict-reducing principles were used to a greater extent at the time of the interviews than they had been before the project. *Senior commanders have become much better at explaining in their own words what they mean by the principles. It does not feel like you are just copying the BIS anymore. BIS has better depth and is more intuitive than before. It is easier to absorb and thus to take responsibility, dare to make mistakes, and use common sense.* Why clarity is important is addressed in another response: *Clear prioritisation and more comprehensible BIS is needed if commanders on all levels are to, in their turn, dare to delegate responsibility to others. Planning days are crucial to convey what BIS means. Participation in the scenario planning is also important. Then you can have a dialogue about the mission. The words are translated into cases and scenarios. The scenario planning is an important forum so that BIS is not just empty words. [It] contributes to better mental preparation. The challenge is to make the principles seep all the way down the chain of the command. [It is also] important that time is set aside for all levels of command to meet, since they are expected to later convey the message in their own words to their staff.*

Precisely how the principles were used in the wake of the project becomes clearer in the following response: *They [the principles] are used to a greater extent. BIS could previously consist of only two lines. Now it’s a helpful document for the silver commander [that outlines] what will be allowed to happen and*

how we [are to] address different things. A silver commander should find support in the BIS. BIS was formerly filled with buzzwords. Silver commanders today are very good, [though it is] hard to know how this is received at the end [of the chain of command]. Sometimes it seems to get stuck on the road, but not at the silver command level. Group commanders are most important in reaching the group members. Sometimes they try and find other solutions that have not been discussed. Another point is that: the project opened for dialogue between the gold and silver commanders. Today they sit down and write the BIS together. It would have been unthinkable in 2006; this also bridges the knowledge gaps between commanding levels.

The interview responses indicated that further development is needed. Six individuals believe that use of the principles can improve. A person sees a decline in the use of the principles and believes that much depends on who is in charge at any given time. *There are people on all levels that see the principles only as a concept without meaning. It would help to visualise what is meant by each principle. There is very little time for follow-up after an operation, which means that you never have time to discuss what has been done with regards to the ambition and principles. No questions like; "How did we facilitated for the football fans..." are asked.*

It also appears that the level of understanding and knowledge of the principles partly depends on which of the OPC courses a commander has attended. *Depending on who is gold commander, when he was trained and in relation to who the silver commander is and when he was trained, you can end up with many different outcomes. They can address the communicative approach in a bantering manner. Participants in the two, three earliest OPC courses generally lack any deeper knowledge. I miss a discussion of "What do you mean when you write like this". It creates frustration. The first courses had other concepts, which were not really confirmed. They focused more on staff functions and staff management. Today we use the*

methodological support for management, formerly know as the planning process. If you are a silver commander who participated in one of the later courses, and you are teamed up with a gold commander from an earlier course, then you need a very good personal chemistry to make it work. One of them communicates A, which the other perceives as B. An example: a gold commander decided that a silver commander was to take active contact with a supporter group to ask how the police could facilitate for them. The next game the same team played was led by a different gold commander. Problems aroused when the commander refused to use the same buses as last game to transport the fans to the game. The fans did not understand why the police did not help them; they had behaved exemplary the last time. The result was that the police were perceived to be inconsistent, and therefore unreliable and strange.

Several interviewees believe that there are gaps in knowledge of the group members and that the skills of group commanders are shifting. It appears that there are individuals on all functions that only see the principles as a concept without meaning. *The principles are being used but it can become much clearer. The need for a more graded policing is large. We still use all the police on the ground, we do not rest, and all are visible. We're supposed to step up when it escalates. We should have the resource but we cannot facilitate self-policing if we have a massive police presence. Today we have extra margin, and dare not trust our own intelligence. I feel that the event organisations just keeps growing in the number of active police officers. One response describes the way one Swedish police jurisdiction intends to deal with the skill gap. It feels like the assignments drop in quality between the group commander and group members. [It] depends on which group commanders we have. Because of this, the authority of Västra Götaland will introduce appraisals of the group commanders. We want to know how well they command, based on the principles. The division commander will be responsible for this. The talks will*

take place at an individual level and follow the model of a traditional appraisal but be based on the standards set for command within the SPT. In a year they will ask group members and group commanders how well they have performed in their roles.

Several interviewees mentioned that there is too little time for follow-ups and indicated that they would like to see more visualisation of what the conflict-reducing principles entail in practice. It appears that local initiatives are under way for this. In 2012 the basic SPT training in Västra Götaland was updated, so participants now start with a two-day training session on the principles. The same year the jurisdiction introduced an additional two-day training course on the principles for all who had undergone SPT training, as well as two days of training on applying the principles at a strategic level, required for all silver and bronze commanders. On a similar note, police in Stockholm are planning to deepen knowledge of the conflict-reducing principles by introducing further training courses: five days for bronze commanders and group commanders and three days for group members.

7. Is there a national framework for the evaluation of SPT activities with the support of the peer review method? If so, describe what it consists of.

Five of those interviewed said they know that the RKP could decide on a peer review evaluation when they decide on a NFO, but this occurs very rarely. *[I] do not feel that there is [a national evaluation standard]. When they work with peer review it works fine, but evaluation still occurs too irregularly. We're supposed to follow up and learn from all events. We write the PUM-A, but afterwards we never even look at them again.*⁴³ *Stockholm has not followed up on every event, which they promised they would in the SPT project's final report.* Other respondents did not know whether

any concept for evaluation existed. *No; it feels like the peer review died at the same moment that the project ended. The field studies that have been carried out during the OPC courses aim more at educating the participants in the peer review method than at writing a good report. No one has kept the method alive, and important knowledge may have died out.*

One interviewee was aware that a handbook on the peer review method exists, and three respondents thought that participating in a peer review was part of the OPC course at the Swedish PHS.

8. Is there a national framework for knowledge sharing based on the experiences of SPT events? If so, describe what it consists of.

The interviewees believed that there was no national framework for knowledge sharing within the SPT area – regulating, for instance, how reports should be incorporated into further education. *Today, knowledge is spread haphazardly and at the individual level, usually when you meet in other contexts, during a coffee break, etc. You could connect to tactical advisers to get a good ideas and feedback.* Knowledge dissemination also presents challenges. *To simply put the SPT project reports on IntraPolis is not enough. One cannot expect the intended target group to seek out the knowledge by themselves.* In an example of how knowledge is being spread today, one responded commented, *If you are lucky, it is seasoned SPT commanders in the teachers' team at, for example, the national OPC courses at PHS who pass knowledge on.* Another person suggested, *We should run a two-day seminar every year with all commanding officers and talk about the reports.*

These interview responses demonstrate that it is unclear who is responsible for dissemination of gathered knowledge. *There is no concept of how the experience should be brought back into the organisation through, as an example, workshops or national courses. Is it the division commanders' role to spread [this knowledge]? Is there a job description for them?*

⁴³ PUM-A is the administrative system for the intelligence model of the Swedish police.

RKP has no seminars for this. NPB is organising OPC seminars, but those are perceived to focus more on commanders meeting to discuss strategic directions. We lack a forum for lower commanders and instructors.

Nevertheless, the interviews show that local efforts to address the issue of knowledge dissemination are under way. The Stockholm County Police took an early initiative with the implementation of so-called OPC days. The target group is, from within the county, all the participants in the national OPC courses, the division management, a pair of instructors, and the management of the Operations Department (which is responsible for the county SPT organisation). So far, two one-day seminars have been conducted since the division was created in 2010, and these forums have been important in uniting participants from different OPC courses, as well as in bringing staff managers and gold and silver commanders into closer contact at a local level. This has been achieved through discussions about current challenges and directives. The police authorities of both Västra Götaland and Skåne have also conducted seminars of their own for local staff and invited representatives from the other division managements. Representatives from NPB have so far not participated in these seminars.

The NPB has organised OPC seminars on two occasions at Hooks Herrgård (a conference hotel) in Jönköping. Interviewees described these as a vital attempt in uniting the SPT counties regarding management and governance. The NPB intends to conduct this seminar at least once a year.

One respondent proposed that silver commanders be allowed to work across jurisdictional boundaries more regularly. *For example, the silver commanders should work with each other over the county borders. Today knowledge is only shared while in other forums, and then we are usually not honest; we just say how good we have been. To be honest you need to arrange a peer review that highlights questions. With the right guidance I believe that we are ready for it now.*

9. What challenges do you think the SPT concept faces today?

Many interviewees suggested that the concept is currently at great risk because the SPT is simply being administered and no major development is taking place, partly owing to economic constraints. *It is dangerous to roll on in the same route. Some highlighted a dilemma: There is a risk that if SPT continues to be successful, it will progress to a halt. If things were to instead go bad, it would be important to have the ability to evaluate what does not work. Otherwise, we risk stating that the SPT concept does not work.* We agree that when examining the concept it is important to separate individual behaviour from the way the system is supposed to work.

Another challenge that remains in the wake of the SPT project is to extend acceptance of the commanding principles throughout the entire command structure. *They must be felt in the body. All levels of command are on board the ship, but not the group members. [It is] important for them to feel as calm and secure as the commanders do [with these new ideas]. We have to dare to try and dare to learn.* Coupled with this is the need to implement the positive experiences all the way to the group members. *[We need to] talk about what we have learned. Most have other tasks in everyday police life, so they do not have time to read as much as they should. How do we keep everyone focused and curious after they leave the OPC seminars, etc.? Everyday police life catches up. How do we create enough time to read and search for knowledge?*

It is now understood that highlighting issues at a national level is quite difficult, and coordination of the three divisions has apparently deteriorated. There is a risk that counties are slipping into greater divergence in terms of their practices. Several of those interviewed suggested that the investigative elements of the SPT concept need to be developed and improved, including in the area of documenting tactical prosecution. *We lack a national concept for investigation and reconnaissance and all development*

ends up being all about tactics. They talk about prioritising prosecution, but we have no national support for it. We need an alignment between the counties through a connecting link – something that is lacking today. Now different local solutions for reconnaissance, documentation, and investigation are starting to surface.

Several interviewees raised thoughts about the group commanders' role. *We need to get the group commanders on board in terms of thinking about the principles so that they are in sync with the rest of the command chain. This is essential for assignment tactics. Group commanders have a key function for the implementation of BIS and other strategic documents. Still, they have the shortest training and minimal time for preparation. Moreover, there are so many commanders that they do not work very often and therefore lack routine. Again, the result depends on how skilled the individual is. They easily fall back into the same old rut, become reactive, stop "dialoguing," cannot be bothered to facilitate or differentiate, position their group as [they would have] in the 1990s, etc.*

The need for becoming more skilled at dealing with sports-related violence was highlighted by some, in particular regarding tactical prosecution. *We have come to terms with public events but not the sports-related violence. We must achieve collaboration between all partners, clubs, associations, venues, etc.* Another respondent mentioned the status of instructors, which must be increased if the NFO are to attract people who have the right motivation. In the long run, the way the organisation views its instructors needs to become more appreciative. These educators are able and proficient individuals, and if the authorities are to build a learning organisation, their expertise will be crucial. Finally, the lack of recent field studies is also perceived to be a problem. For how long can the organisation use the existing ones and retain its credibility? One interviewee speculated on how SPT would be developed in terms of instructor education in both SPT and Basic Tactics Level 2, as the two were about to merge. The same person especially

wondered how to educate officers from counties that had never implemented SPT in the field of command at an operational level.

Additional challenges put forward are the police organisation's needs (1) to recruit more female group and bronze commanders, (2) to update and improve knowledge of the counterpart, (3) to adjust SPT basic training, reflecting the fact that newly graduated officers from the academy have been educated in the conflict-reducing principles, and finally (4) to address the lack of information concerning the newly developed event police function.

10. Which development needs do you consider to be the greatest?

Perhaps the strongest response to this question was that the conflict-reducing principles need to be continuously strengthened: *Work harder to gain an understanding of the principles in connection with operational work, ranging from balaclavas to treatment of individuals. We need to know what different groups attending an event stand for. We should know it! Individual bronze commanders should not be tasked with reading up on the latest trends using their private computers to Google [groups] the night before an event. The intelligence units must be able to provide this information. This of course requires that the gold commanders be clear in their orders to the intelligence unit.*

Calls to develop operational management represent another recurring theme in the interview data. *We need to become better at management; we'll have site managers, multiple silver commanders, etc. What do leadership theories and principles promote? What sorts of leadership theories have we decided on, and are we loyal to them? [We need] management-related pathways. Technical and human limitations. Strengthen the group commanders and their knowledge of the principles. Group commanders are extremely useful. [It] has become clear how little time and training they have received to fulfill their role. Although the group commanders participate in the planning day, not all take the*

starting conversations seriously. [These conversations] are not used as intended.

The need to revise courses, including SPT basic training, was also highlighted by several interviewees. *How well do the courses meet the demands of today? Much looks the same as it did in 2005. Maybe it is good, but because we do not evaluate [adequately], we do not know. [The issue] could be addressed by introducing nationally defined curricula for further training courses. Today it is up to each county to more or less do what it wants based on the curriculum for basic training, and it leaves too much leeway. In a new curriculum, one could, for example, add new methods for operation in the bleachers, etc. Training of the SPT operational commanders [would] certify officers serving in every function. Strengthen group commanders, knowledge of the principles, implementation of appraisals and changes in the BT2 [Basic Tactics Level 2] education.*

Evaluation, exchange of experiences, and knowledge dissemination also remain priorities, according to interviewees. *Peer review should not be the responsibility of RKP because they are operational and are not to be pushing development forward; perhaps it should be the responsibility of the Department of Police Affairs or the evaluation unit at the Swedish National Police Board. A solid evaluation organisation for SPT events is needed. The reports written should be used at the county's start-up days at the beginning of the year and at follow-ups after the end of the year. Ideally, [these] should be new reports. What has worked and what do we need to improve? It should be up to the divisional management to organise these days so that they are based more on the experience of the year. Many called for a national system for surveillance, documentation, and investigation – for instance, photo documentation and written reports must be improved, as well as the willingness and ability by all officers to contribute.*

Clearer support should be provided to the division commanders from RKP or NPB. *For example, the*

county police in Stockholm are now working on a separate staff regulation for their SPT organisation. Moreover,... a recent decision by NPB [determined] that it will be up to each county to decide which uniforms they want to use in SPT. The same question arises regarding the decision on purchase of new vehicles. We run the risk of ending up with officers dressed very differently from each other. Moreover, tactical advisers are used on too few occasions, respondents submitted, and there is no job description or competency profile for this function.

Other needs that interviewees prioritised are intelligence (especially regarding football and other sports events), tactics for work in bleachers, appraisals, and a new SPT project to identify development needs.

11. Other comments

Two interviewees asked when the next SPT project would begin. *It is healthy to let someone from the outside observe what you are doing so that we can improve. [It is] strange that the NPB has not taken responsibility for continuing the work through field studies and workshops. Workshops are extremely important. The police organisation seems to have forgotten what fantastic development SPT has entailed for the Swedish police. Another point involves skills. We are at different skill levels throughout the command structure. We have commanders who have not undergone any training since 2006. This makes cooperation difficult and contributes to sprawling efforts, affecting public trust and trust within the police. Perhaps there should be a recertification as a requirement to maintain a position after a number of years – similar to the requirements for keeping your firearm. The need for competency is another recurring theme. Development has come at a positive and fast pace. This means that knowledge differs between individuals. No further training has taken place at a national level in order to put pressure on individuals who hold commanding ranks.*

One respondent raised the question of what happens when the police force reorganises itself to

become a single authority, a development slated for 2015. *[It is] even more important that we have a national concept now. Without clear leadership we run the risk of ending up with many local [manifestations of SPT] concepts. The different counties are not able to assume responsibility for the type of evaluation that the project stood for. They tend to focus on other priorities. Therefore, the NPB should take responsibility for a national system.*

Other questions that emerged in the interviews are the following: *How is new knowledge – for example, GODIAC – disseminated in our own organisation? How deep really is the knowledge of the principles? What sort of demands do we face today, and do our job descriptions and competency profiles match them? How do we manage the need for rapid response when there is social unrest?*

4. Concluding Discussion

After analysing the evaluation of the SPT project, the five field studies carried out after the project ended and the interviews we conducted December 2012-January 2013 we have come to the following conclusions.

4.1 Project Period 2007–2010 – a Strategy for Long Term Knowledge Development Is Tried Out

Looking back the SPT project is perceived as a positive period for the Swedish police. This became evident when we asked individuals to take part in our interviews; everyone took of their own time for this to contribute to a continued positive development.

A majority also express a feeling of being proud of the development that has taken place in SPT and are of the opinion that Swedish police, in an international comparison, have a prominent position in an important area. The project work led to the identification of factors for effective operations: the application of the principles for conflict reduction and for command as well as the competency of those working in the operation. An increased integration of practical and theoretical knowledge was achieved.

4.1.1 What was developed?

The interview answers are coherent in what was developed during the project, what created motivation, learning and led to a knowledge-based application of SPT.

During the project field studies observations were made of how the conflict reducing principles became more applied. One area of importance identified was the knowledge of counterparts: by understanding their goal and intentions, history of different groups that police encounter during operations conditions are created to facilitate, communicate and differentiate in order to reach self-policing. The uniformed police started to communicate more and inform on the intentions of the police to demonstrators/ supporters and general public. The development of the dialogue police was evident and the understanding for the importance of communication in the operation for the long term contact building and preventive work.

Regarding the command process, gold and silver commanders became more consistent in their intentions and goals, which became visible to others as operational documents were more coherent and seemed to build on one another. Focus in the next part of the development work (in 2009) was on the conditions that would allow group commanders to effectively lead their groups well and to make accurate situational and risk assessments. This was necessary in order for group commanders to more effectively communicate their aims and intentions to every level of the NFO.

The process of event planning changed, and group commanders were invited to take part in the preparation work. New forms (e.g., scenario planning) were used during planning days as well as during evaluations of operations. The results of this development are evident in the increased quality of communication and interactions within the chain of command. Several interviewees reported that they had changed the way they command after reading the field-study reports or participating in field-study groups.

Finally, the competency profiles produced through the project were applied in recruitment and in the development of the SPT course curriculum. New knowledge and insights gained in the SPT project also influenced the content and structure of SPT training in order to create better conditions for cooperation along the chain of command.

4.1.2 *How did learning take place?*

Participation in the field studies, workshop discussions, and SPT training courses, in addition to cooperation between the practitioners and the researchers, proved to be extremely educational both during and after the project. The field studies created opportunities for participants to step aside and observe others in the function they might usually fill themselves, and it also allowed them to experience the work of other positions. These opportunities provided participants with a broader picture of a given operation.

One challenge was that the police officers and instructors taking part in the field studies were not used to carrying out evaluations; however, daring to leave the police role, which felt safe and familiar, resulted in positive experiences for most.

In addition, observations led to the insights that the police did not always clearly communicate their intentions, that they did not necessarily implement clear goals or methods in event organisation, and that police action could easily be misinterpreted during an event – something that could lead to unnecessary friction between the police and those they meet. These experiences led to increased watchfulness and to productive discussions about other people's experiences of the perceived legitimacy of police activities.

The interviewees were of the opinion that focusing on positive examples created a sense of increased professionalism. Further, this focus made it easier to interview colleagues. That officers from every level of the operational organisation were interviewed during field studies added to the reports' credibility. The project workshops also contributed to a sense of

participation. The interviewed officers stressed the strength of meeting one another and conversing with colleagues of different functions and ranks.

The cooperation between researchers and practitioners was also considered important since it provided opportunities for each group to learn from the other's perspective. Theories had been introduced in SPT basic training, but relating those theories to practice allowed police to fully absorb them. This took place through discussions of observations made during field studies and through identifying good practices and development needs from the perspective of research-based knowledge and principles. Contact with researchers and research outside the project also increased.

Although there was no tradition of relating police work to research results, the SPT project was successful in doing so. One possible explanation is that the theories and research results that the project introduced were perceived as practically useful for the organisation and for the police officers in their operational work. Central to the project work was analysis of situations, of event development, of problems that should be handled, and of observations regarding effective and ineffective tactics. This is something that other researchers have empathised as crucial for development within an organisation that has not previously cooperated with researchers.⁴⁴

The connection to research is a reoccurring element in the interviews. Using published articles and reports shifted the focus from individual opinions to broader principles. The instructors and other communicators in the organisation strengthened their arguments for sometimes controversial positions by referring to the field-study reports in discussions with others; in this way, the typical "I think" approach decreased in importance. According to some, this

44 W. A. Geller, "Suppose We Are Really Serious about Police Departments Becoming 'Learning Organizations'?" *National Institute of Justice Journal* 234 (1977): 2–8.

was a shift from earlier practice, when strong individuals could take over a discussion and push it in a direction the instructors had not planned for. Through the use of field-study reports, discussion could be carried out on a different level.

Another related strength of the project was the connection of key individuals to the project, people who had mandate in their own counties. When such individuals took part in field studies or workshops, others could not easily ignore the conclusions. In other words, practitioners contributed to interpretations and conclusions of other practitioners beyond Swedish circumstances. Further, additional research literature within the field also gained attention from project participants as a result of their experience.⁴⁵

Our conclusion is that the SPT project contributed both to a developed command process in practice and to a changed culture that can still be noted. That is, a learning organisation (NFO) was developed through this strategy and in the way the project was designed. A *learning organisation* is one that (1) is continuously open to internal and external evaluation of its work and to carrying out improvements and developments on the basis of the evaluation findings, (2) follows the developments of knowledge in its field of activities nationally and internationally, (3) disseminates and applies new knowledge, and (4) initiates and supports research and development work within its field of activities.⁴⁶

45 S. Holgersson, *Dialogpolis: Erfarenheter, iakttagelser och möjligheter* (Växjö: Växjö Universitet, Polisutbildningen, 2008); Granström, Guvå, Hylander, and Rosander, *Riots and Disturbances*; K. Granström, ed., *Demonstrationer och sporthändelser – En bok om poliser, demonstranter, idrotts-supportrar, kravaller och folkfest* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2010); J. Knutson and T. Madsen, *Att förebygga våld i folk-samling*, Rapport 1010:1 (Stockholm: Rikspolisstyrelsens utvärderingsfunktion, 2010).

46 D. A. Kolb *Experiential Learning* (London: Prentice-Hall International, 1984); P.-E. Ellström and G. Hultman, eds., *Lärande och förändring i organisationer: Om pedagogik i arbetslivet* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004).

4.2 After the Project (2010–2013): What Has Happened and What Is Happening Now?

The final SPT project report submitted proposals for action at a national level that would ensure that the initiated developments continued. The measures focus on both a strategic approach to policing crowds and measures for continued learning – that is, on implementing the proven long-term strategy for the development of knowledge.

4.2.1 The national level

Those interviewed stated that a strategic direction for the management of crowds had yet to be outlined by the NPB and called for clearer guidelines and visions for implementing the SPT concept. Which issues should be prioritised, and which directives must be respected? The distance between NPB and those who work in the various counties seem to have grown, according to interview data. In addition, several respondents expressed a desire that the role of the division commanders be clarified. Can division commanders take clearer responsibility for future development? As we see it, these questions arise owing to a lack of clear definitions of national and local responsibilities.

The interview responses indicate that no action has been taken to implement the SPT project recommendations regarding continued learning and development through the establishment of national systems of field studies connected to seminars. The NPB organises an annual seminar for operational SPT commanders, and although the forum is perceived positively, it is considered to have a narrow focus on mainly strategic issues.

One positive development, however, is the RKP's introduction of a "reviewer group" that is used in connection with a police jurisdiction's request for an NFO. But the proposed national command resource with tactical advisers has not been realised. The NPB gave the RKP responsibility of conducting field studies within the framework of the NFO using the peer

review method. In 2011–2012 such field studies were conducted on five occasions in relation to ten NFO operations that took place during that period.

According to the interviewees the Swedish police lack a framework for knowledge sharing, a circumstance that complicates the exchange of good practices between counties. Another remaining need is a scientific foundation that would develop knowledge of demonstrators and protest movements.

4.2.2 *The local level*

The police authority of Stockholm initially planned to conduct two seminars per year for operational commanders. A one-day seminar for this target group now takes place annually. Ambitions to implement theme days for bronze and group commanders, however, have not been realised. The same authority also proposed evaluations of all SPT events, and the interviews show that this has been done with the support of the planning and evaluation model PUM-A. We are, however, uncertain whether the authority had envisioned this type of evaluation or whether the ambition was, in fact, to conduct field studies with the peer review method.

The police authority of Skåne intended to follow up each SPT event with a meeting of involved commanders. These meetings have been carried out, and the number of participants and represented police functions varies depending on the event's size and complexity. The authority also intended to organise an annual conference based on these meetings. A forum for each management function (staff managers, gold commanders, and silver commanders) has been established in which current issues are discussed. The results of these meetings are later collated in an annual forum for all operational commanders within the county.

The police authority of Västra Götaland planned to employ a division commander, a goal that has been met and expanded upon with the adding of a part-time deputy division commander.

In light of the interviews, we conclude that there is a strong will and motivation for continued development within the SPT organisation. This drive may explain why local concepts emerge to solve identified challenges. However, it is unfortunate that this development apparently occurs without national guidance or support. The interview data indicate that conflict-reducing principles are applied in operations and are increasingly used to explain the aims and objectives of an operation. The perceived problem is that skills and competency vary from individual to individual. These differences reportedly result when a person has not undergone SPT training or has not received sufficient education for a particular position.

Operation management became an important issue for the project, and this area has continued to develop in a positive direction. Increasingly, commanders at different levels try to ensure that their preparation will benefit all involved in the operation. Even during the project period, the function of group commanders was identified as key, and several efforts are now being made at the local level to strengthen their capacity for effective management.

All respondents said that the introduction of the conflict-reducing principles had led to largely improved handling of public gatherings; however, it seems that this positive progress has not extended to sports-related events resulting in calls for more development in that area. Finally, the competency profiles that were developed are now used in recruitment and in the development of SPT curricula.

4.3 **Considering the Future: What Needs to Be Done?**

From the interview responses concern is apparent that development and evaluation will stop and that the culture of learning that the project fostered will disappear as the enthusiasts grow tired and less motivated. Interviewees expressed their apprehension that the SPT concept is evolving and diverging across jurisdictions according to specific local needs and problems. In the long run, this may cause man-

agement problems when officers from different parts of the country must work together to police difficult events in the context of an NFO.

A significant lesson from the SPT project is that clear decisions on regularly implementing the experiences and developments achieved in the project work are vital. If unequivocal decisions are not taken, it consequently becomes unclear (as it currently is) who is responsible for continued development in many areas.

In summary, it appears that there is a need for action at a national level to ensure the continued development of the SPT concept. Interviewees pointed out that the Swedish police force has gained much experience since the introduction of SPT; we therefore agree with their assessment that the organisation is ready to deepen its knowledge of the conflict-reducing principles. A national system of evaluating practice (field studies) in relation to theoretical knowledge is needed. These analyses should return to the organisation in the form of workshops in which evaluation of practices is further processed. Such a system would create involvement in further development, while the focus and priorities of development become clear, and would also provide national support for the process of integrating practical and theoretical knowledge through the collaboration of practitioners, researchers, and educators.

Further, interviewees suggested the establishment of regular forums in which practitioners, educators, and researchers in various matters could exchange experience and knowledge – in which, for example, the ways SPT basic training is conducted could be discussed. In conjunction with these meetings, new knowledge through research could be presented, and it could eventually be included in relevant curricula. Among the methods proposed are workshops, seminars, and training sessions. A related practical question is how new research and experiences collected through the European Union GODIAC project can be disseminated within the SPT organisation. At the same time, demand for a new SPT project has risen,

since the working method is perceived to have been successful and important to the Swedish police.

One of the strongest reasons for the introduction of SPT was a desire for increased prosecutions. This was not, however, an explicit goal of the SPT project, though several interviewees cited a need for a national framework for reconnaissance, documentation, and investigation.

An important factor in effective operations is competency within the operational organisation. A review of all existing curricula needs to include identifying how well these align with each other and how well they match the needs and challenges the SPT concept faces today. During the interviews the question of individual skills was raised; many we spoke with were concerned about differing abilities and understandings, especially regarding the conflict-reducing principles in the SPT organisation. SPT's competency profiles and job descriptions would benefit from the same type of analysis applied to the curricula in order to ensure that they accurately outline the requirements of various functions. We suggest a system of time-bound certification, which would ensure that individuals would receive the latest knowledge relevant to the positions they hold.

Another critical factor that needs to be addressed is how scientific anchoring is to happen. Researchers constitute one of the three groups that are necessary for the continued scientific development of SPT. Research and researchers must be incorporated into future developments. For example, the proposed national resource for commanders whereby participants rotate between the reviewer group, the tactical advisory group, and the field-study group at NFO events would provide opportunities to build new knowledge if linked to a research resource.

There are several key areas where additional knowledge is needed, such as knowledge of social identities and the counterpart strategies, and awareness of how new social media affect the protest landscape. If there is no continuous updating of

various focus areas, the police risk losing the public trust that has developed over time. Actively supporting research could be a way to gain new and updated knowledge.

Finally, we note the reflection that was also raised in the SPT project's final report – namely, that this proven strategy for knowledge development could be applied in other areas of police work. This is also true of the conflict-reducing principles, which have proved effective in preventing and in de-escalating conflict. These principles could be useful in dealing with social unrest or with conflicts between ethnic and social groups.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: SPT Project Reports

Field Study Reports

Swedish National Police Board. *Demonstration Stoppa matchen, Malmö, 7 mars 2009*. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Demonstration Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (SAC), Stockholm, 1 maj 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Ekofin-mötet, Göteborg, 1 oktober 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Ett lokalt derby med en ny evakueringsstrategi, Stockholm, 20 april 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

European Social Forum, Malmö, 20 september 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Folkfrontens demonstration, Stockholm, 30 november 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Football Match IFK Gothenburg – AIK, Gothenburg, 1 november 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Fotbollsderby Djurgårdens IF – Hammarby IF, Stockholm, 7 maj 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Fotbollsmatch IFK Göteborg – GAIS, Göteborg, 1 september 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Fotbollsmatch Malmö FF – Djurgården IF, Malmö, 10 augusti 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

The Gymnich Meeting, Stockholm, 5 September 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Nätverket mot rasisms demonstration och Folkets marsch, Stockholm, 6 juni 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Reclaim the Street Manifestation, Malmö, 19 september 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Salemfondens demonstration och Nätverket mot rasisms motdemonstration, Salem, 6 december 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Svenska motståndsrörelsens demonstration, Stockholm, 28 november 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

The Salem Foundation Demonstration, Salem, 12 December 2009 (2009). Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Yearly Analysis Reports

Swedish National Police Board. *Det kommunikativa samspelet mellan demonstranter och polis. Fältstudier 2007*. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Special Police Tactics Peer Review Field Studies, 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2009.

Special Police Tactics Field Studies, 2009. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010.

Competency Profiles

Swedish National Police Board. *Kompetensprofiler*. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Kompetensprofiler för dialogpolis och civila gripare, 2010. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010.

Seminar Reports

The Use of Dialogue and Communication in Preventing and Management of Public Order Disturbances. European Seminar. December 2008. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2008.

Minnesanteckningar från avslutande workshop i SPT-projektet den 24–25 februari 2010. National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010.

Yearly Project Reports

Swedish National Police Board *Årsrapport 2007*
Årsrapport 2008
Årsrapport 2009

Other Reports

Swedish National Police Board. *Fältstudiemetod – Peer review metoden*. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010

Knowledge Development within Special Police Tactics, 2007–2010: Final Report. Stockholm: National Police Board/SPT Project, 2010.

Later Field-Study Reports

Moskédemonstrationen, Göteborg, 21 maj 2011.

Sverigedemokratisk ungdoms demonstration, Malmö den 15 oktober 2011. Stockholm: National Police Board, 2011.

Ishockeyderby mellan AIK och Djurgården den 26 januari 2012 på Globen i Stockholm. Fältstudierapport 1 av 3. Stockholm: National Criminal Police, 2012.

Ishockeyderby mellan Djurgården och AIK den 16 februari 2012 på Globen i Stockholm. Fältstudierapport 2 av 3. Stockholm: National Criminal Police, 2012.

Fotbollsderby GAIS och IFK Göteborg, Gamla Ullevi den 21 maj 2012. Fältstudierapport 3 av 3. Stockholm: National Criminal Police, 2012.

Appendix 2: References

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Appendix 3. Interview investigation

Questionnaire – A follow-up of the SPT project Instruction

The interview is based on your experiences of the developments that took place within the special police tactics (SPT) during the SPT project (2007–2009), how you look at developments since then (2010–2012) as well as your understanding of the challenges that remain (2013 –).

Before the interview, you need to read through the questions and think through your responses. You will have the opportunity to develop your response further during the interview that we estimate will take one hour.

During the processing of answers the interviews will be depersonalized. If you have further questions regarding the interview or article, please contact Christian Wessman.

Background facts

1. How many years of service do you have, including the police academy?
2. What of the following courses have you completed?
 - a) Basic training, mobile operation concept (Delta)
 - b) Basic training, plain clothed arrest units (Romeo)
 - c) Group commanders training for SPT
 - d) Bronze commander training for SPT
 - e) Operational commander training for SPT (chiefs of staff, silver and gold commanders)
 - f) Instructors training, mobile operation concept
 - g) Instructors training, plain clothed arrest units
 - h) Peer-review methodology

The SPT project

1. Have you been in a field study group during one or more peer reviews carried out by the the SPT project?
 - a) Number of studies?
 - b) What is your strongest memory?
 - c) What did you learn?
2. Have you read any of the reports written by the SPT project (individual reports or the final report)?
 - a) Which? Highlight in the list below;

Individual field study reports

- i) Demonstration (SAC) Swedish Workers Central Orga-nization, Stockholm, 1 May 2008.
- ii) Football Derby Djurgården IF – Hammarby IF, Stockholm 7 May 2008.
- iii) Network against rasisms demonstration and People march, Stockholm 6 June 2008.
- iv) Football Malmo FF – Djurgården IF, Malmö 10 August 2008.
- v) Football IFK Gothenburg – GAIS, Gothenburg 1 September 2008th

- vi) Reclaim the Streets demonstration, Malmö 19 September 2008.
- vii) European Social Forum (ESF), Malmo 20 september 2008.
- viii) Popular Front demonstration in Stockholm 30 November 2008.
- ix) Salem fund demonstration and Network Against rasisms counter-demonstration, Stockholm, 6 December 2008.
- x) Demonstration “Stop the game” during the Davis Cup, Malmo 7 March 2009.
- xi) A local derby with a new evacuation strategy, Stockholm 20 April 2009.
- xii) Gymnich meeting during the Swedish EU Presidency, Stockholm 5 September 2009.
- xiii) ECOFIN meeting during the Swedish EU Presidency, Gothenburg 1 October 2009.
- xiv) Football IFK Gothenburg – AIK, Gothenburg 1 November 2009th
- xv) Swedish Resistance Movement demonstration, Stockholm 28 November 2009.
- xvi) Salem fund demonstration, Stockholm 12 December 2009.

Summary analysis reports

- xvii) The communicative interaction between protesters and police. Field studies in 2007 (2008).
- xviii) Special police tactics, Field Studies 2008 (2009).
- xix) Special police tactics, Field Studies 2009 (2010).

Final report

- xx) Knowledge of special police tactics 2007–2010. Stockholm: Swedish National Police Board / SPT project. Reg PoA-109–4499/06.

Methodological report

xxi) Guide to the peer-review method 2010–2012.

3. Have you used the SPT project reports (individual or final report)?
 - a) Which?
 - b) How and in which / what context?
4. Have you participated in any of the workshops that the SPT project organized?
 - a) Which? Highlight in the list below;

National SPT seminars

- i) Experience from the 2007 field studies, 30–31 January 2008.
- ii) Experience from the 2008 field studies, 12–13 November 2008.
- iii) “Left and right manifestations over time”, 25–26 March 2009.
- iv) “Football, a question of order and security?”, 1–2 April 2009.
- v) “Left and right manifestations over time”, 26 May 2009.
- vi) Patterns in field studies 2007–2009, and an evaluation of the project, 24–25 February 2010.

International seminars

- vii) Nordic seminar under the theme “Public order management”, 17–18 October 2007.
- viii) European seminar “Dialogue and communication as a preventive tools in the management of major events”, 8–9 October 2008.

- b) What did you learn?
5. What importance do you think the SPT project has had for the development of special police tactics? How and why?

Present day

6. How are the conflict reducing principles implemented at a strategic level today? For example, in the decision at large, in the planning of an operation, etc
7. Is there a national concept for evaluation of SPT events built on the peer-review method? If so, describe what it consists of.
8. Is there a national concept for dissemination of knowledge based on experiences from SPT events? If so, describe what it consists of.
9. What challenges do you think the SPT concept faces today?
10. Which development needs do you consider to be the greatest?
11. Other questions

Thanks for your participation!

Christian Wessman and Marianne Hilton

1.2 Inquiries into the activities of law enforcement forces at mass demonstrations – Methodology and experiences

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Introduction

It is possible to choose among several indicators that can show the culture of an agency. A possible feature – and in our view a very enlightening one – of the culture of a hierarchised law enforcement agency with a staff of about 40,000 could be how the corps, its leaders, and the staff receive and respond to the continuous and marked attention of another agency, one which at times criticises their activities, professionally and clearly.

In January 2008, Dr Máté Szabó, Hungary's Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights, or Ombudsman, informed his staff that he was going to launch three projects on fundamental rights, includ-

ing one on the freedom of assembly. A heated debate ensued on the methods for successfully conducting such a project. Over the course of these discussions we were able to convince the Ombudsman and our colleagues⁴⁷ who were participating in the project that the success of the projects would be best ensured via a series of inquiries initiated ex officio, based at least in part on experiences gathered on-site.

Acting on this decision, in March 2008 the Ombudsman informed the chief of the national police by letter that he was ordering the first inquiry, an approximately ten-day investigation into events in public places. We soon realised that such an inquiry into mass events was a far more complex issue than we had thought in our initial enthusiasm and eagerness to act.

Should we simply go to the events ourselves? If we were in the crowd, how would we be able to get information about police measures? How would we avoid the appearance that the Ombudsman or his staff agreed with the aim of any given demonstration? Would it be necessary to keep in touch with the police continuously during the events? If so, then from what time on, until what time, and how? Would an inquiry be more effective with or without previous notification? Would it be necessary to keep in touch with the organisers? What kind of information should we ask for during the preparatory phase, and from whom? How would we be able to make sure to receive the most important information concerning the event or police activity on the spot? What should the starting and ending points in time be of an inquiry related to a given event in a public space; in other words, what should be the first and last elements to be included in our observation?

There was no established methodology, in Hungary or abroad, for such regular (or as some people saw

⁴⁷ The colleagues involved in the on-site inquiries were Zsolt Halász (2008–2010), Attila Láposy (2008–2012), László Tóth (2008–2012), Péter Seres (2010), Ágnes Lux (2011–2012), Katalin Szajbély (2012), and András Magicz. All inquiries were led by Barnabás Hajas.

it, almost permanent) inquiries or investigations in public spaces. The only research we could find that might offer a possible blueprint was one that had a similar subject but different features (i.e., it was social science research and not an inquiry into a public agency): this was research on a demonstration in London in the early nineties.⁴⁸

The peer-review method developed by Adang and Brown for investigations into football matches could not be followed here because of the different aim and the different makeup of the inquiry team. There is, however, similarity between the methods, because the main tool of our inquiry was on-site monitoring.

The most significant difference is the aim of the Ombudsman's inquiry, which is more than a simple observation or scientific evaluation. According to Article 30, paragraph 2 of Hungary's Basic Law, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights shall inquire into those improprieties related to fundamental rights that come to his or her knowledge, or have those improprieties inquired into, and initiate general or specific measures to remedy them.

In order to be able to fulfil his or her constitutional responsibilities, the Ombudsman has a wide range of investigatory powers. In the course of his or her inquiries, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights or Ombudsman

- ◆ may request data and information from the authority under investigation on the proceedings it has conducted or failed to conduct and may request copies of the relevant documents,
- ◆ may invite the head of the authority, the head of its supervisory authority, or the head of the agency otherwise authorised to do so to conduct an inquiry,
- ◆ may participate in a public hearing, and
- ◆ may conduct on-site inspections.

A nongovernmental agency could never even dream of the kind of possibilities that are open to the Ombudsman's office during an observation or survey. In the course of an on-site inspection the Ombudsman or members of his or her staff who are authorised to conduct the inquiry

- ◆ may enter the premises of the authority under investigation, unless a provision of a legal rule says otherwise,
- ◆ may inspect all documents which may have any relevance to the case under inquiry, and may make copies or extracts thereof, and
- ◆ may conduct a hearing of any employee of the authority under investigation.

In the interest of the planning and conducting of the Ombudsman's inquiries, everybody (not excepting even authorities such as the police or governmental agencies) shall cooperate with the Ombudsman.

According to Section 24, subsection 1 of the Ombudsman Act, if there are substantiated grounds for belief that if a measure proposed by the Ombudsman is delayed, the fundamental rights of a large group of persons will be seriously infringed, the person conducting the inquiry on the authority of the Ombudsman may draw the attention of the head of the agency under investigation to the danger of infringement and shall simultaneously initiate the measure proposed by the Ombudsman. The indication of such danger shall be recorded in the case file.

The Ombudsman shall make a report on the inquiry he or she has conducted; it shall contain the facts that have been uncovered and the findings and conclusions based on these facts. The reports shall be public. Published reports may not contain personal data, classified data, secrets protected by an act of government, or secrets restricted to the exercise of a profession.

As a consequence of this legal authorisation, during the inquiries all police video records and documents were available to us as the Ombudsman's agents.

48 P.A.J. Waddington: *Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City*. London: UCL Press, 1994.

1. Legal Context Determining the Methodology of the Inquiries

We had to draw attention to the legal context during the preparatory work. To begin with, we mean by this the possibilities and limitations laid down for the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights, or Ombudsman, in the constitution and in Act LIX of 1993, and since January 1, 2012 in the new Hungarian Basic Law and the new Act CXI of 2011. We also drew special attention to the legal rules determining the frameworks within which events could be investigated and to other legal means of governmental control, particularly the following Acts and Decrees:

- ◆ Act LVII of 2006 on central state administrative agencies and on the legal status of government members and state secretaries (Central State Administrative Agencies Act 2006),
- ◆ Act XLIII of 2010 on central state administrative agencies and on the legal status of government members and state secretaries (Central State Administrative Agencies Act 2010),
- ◆ Act XXXIV of 1994 on the police,
- ◆ Decree 16/2008 of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement on the organisational and functional rules of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement,
- ◆ Decree 62/2007 of the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement on police regulations (Police Regulation 2007),
- ◆ Decree 30/2011 of the Ministry of the Interior on police regulations (Police Regulation 2011),
- ◆ Decree 12/2006 of the Chief of National Police on the dress code of the police staff (Dress Code 2006),
- ◆ Decree 10/2010 of the Chief of National Police on the dress code of the police staff (Dress Code 2010), and
- ◆ Decree 11/1998 of the Chief of National Police on field service regulation.

Fortunately, the law ensures that the Ombudsman has much broader opportunities than do other public agencies to initiate inquiries *ex officio*, so that the existence of a complainant or a complaint is not a necessary precondition for the Ombudsman's procedure. It was also not unheard-of for former Ombudsmen to initiate comprehensive investigations with a preventive aim, in which they visited many different institutions so that they could see for themselves the living and working conditions of regular soldiers, fire fighters, and the professional members of law enforcement, along with observing the enforcement of detainees' rights.

Another feature of the institution of the Ombudsman is that he or she has rather broad authority to make inquiries during his or her investigation. The agencies under investigation are required to give the Ombudsman meaningful answers to every question, to cooperate with the Ombudsman and staff acting on his or her behalf, and to endure the monitoring process. In the past, it was not unusual for inquiries to be initiated on the spot or without any previous notification. During our inquiry into the living and working conditions of fire fighters, we appeared without previous notification at almost all fire stations to check the enforcement of fundamental rights. We used our experiences in that inquiry in our preparations for other on-site inquiries.

Presumably, if we had been acting as part of a civil rights organisation or a research institute, we would have acted from different perspectives and applied different methods. (Of course, this does not mean that we were not governed by scientific interest or the requirement to process the experiences gathered within the framework outlined above in a scientific manner.) At the same time, we enjoyed a great advantage in comparison to human rights NGOs: we possessed much broader background information and much greater authority to investigate, so we could uncover a fundamentally more complex picture

than what would be available as a result of the kind of inquiries an NGO could undertake.

2. Preparatory Phase

Every on-site inquiry was preceded by a process of precise information gathering. We obtained information about the events in advance not only from the police but also, especially from the second – more eventful – half of the year on, from Internet news sites and from community websites, the kind that are not usually very well known outside of the community involved in a particular event such as a demonstration. These pieces of information were typically related to the date, location, organiser(s), itinerary, agenda, and expected attendance of public figures, sympathizers, or counterdemonstrators.⁴⁹

The obvious question arises of how the events were chosen to be monitored on-site. There are some dates on which it is by now almost traditional, unfortunately, for the participants in the events to create dilemmas to do with fundamental rights or simply to create a “difficult” situation for the agencies of law enforcement. We could therefore usually prepare in advance, as was obviously the case for events related to our national holidays: March 15, paying tribute to the 1848 revolution, and October 23, paying homage to the 1956 revolution and war of independence. We also prepared to monitor the demonstrations following the “three-yes” referendum of 2008.⁵⁰ In addition, we were

able to plan weeks in advance to participate in the marches of the Law Enforcement and Public Services Trade Unions in 2008 and 2011, and in the LGBT(Q) (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender [and queer]) Pride Marches in 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012, especially because the organisers and participants had been threatened ahead of time on certain radical websites.⁵¹

There were also cases, however, when the Ombudsman’s investigations had to involve very rapid responses: for example, when a “flash mob” event was convened in Hollán Ernő Street,⁵² and on the occasion of the April 11, 2008 demonstration⁵³ which started from Hollán Ernő Street and marched through the inner city, reacting to rapid announcements, until it was dissolved at Clark Ádám Square. Similarly, there was no way for us to prepare ahead of time for the sit-in of the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda) on July 4, 2009, when police dispersed the demonstration and arrested more than 200 people. During the student demonstrations of December 2012 (against government education policy, restric-

49 Some of these websites (such as the radical right-wing site www.kuruc.info) are known to the public. We found other sites run by various extremist organisations (such as <http://kitartas.mozgalom.org/>, <http://paxhungarica.org/>, <http://sutto.mozgalom.org/>) using search engines.

50 The so-called “social” or “three-yes” referendum of March 8, 2008 was a referendum on three governmental measures which were not very popular. (The three measures were: 1. a one-euro fee for visiting the family doctor; 2 a compulsory financial contribution to university studies; and 3. a hospital fee.) In the referendum, 82% of the participants voted in favour of rescinding the measures. On the evening of the referendum, some groups started demonstrations against the government.

51 www.kuruc.info and www.barikad.hu

52 There is a ticket office on Hollán Ernő Street where someone wanted to buy tickets to a concert by a nationally known radical rock band (“Kárpátia”), and the office assistant reportedly would not sell him the tickets. In response, a radical nationalist group organised a “flash mob” event in April 2008, descending on the ticket office in order to buy tickets for that concert en masse.

53 The same radical nationalist group organised a demonstration at the ticket office, in compliance with the legally mandated notification period (requiring that the authorities be notified of the demonstration at least 72 hours before the event). A counterdemonstration was then organised against this group and its radical nationalist visions (a further impetus was that the flat of a former national socialist leader was in the same building as the ticket office), but only a few hours ahead of time. The police did not dissolve the counterdemonstration (which was attended by the prime minister and many other public personalities, as well as the former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder); the radical nationalist groups then tried to do the same thing (in other words organise demonstrations without notifying the authorities as far ahead of time as required) and organised a number of demonstrations very quickly.

tions, and fees), there were so many elements arising spontaneously that the police did not always have all the necessary information.

For specific time periods (such as the days immediately preceding and the days of the Pride marches or the national holiday), the police supplied us, on our request, with a detailed list of all the events that had been planned for public places that came under the Freedom of Assembly Act. Based on the information we had collected, we then made a proposal to the Ombudsman for on-site investigations at specific events and drew up our plan of investigation. During our planning and the setting of priorities we also considered our previous experiences. Thus, in an ideal case, we would know weeks ahead which events we would be attending. Naturally, and unfortunately this was more frequently the case, we sometimes got the information not weeks in advance but only a few days or even a few hours before the actual event. In these cases, planning was of necessity slapdash; the only information we had was, at the most, the location and the organisers, so all we could say was that “we would go there, look around, and then we’ll see”.

Looking back at our on-site inquiries now, five years later, we do believe that the method of on-site inquiries ensured adequate flexibility for us. In fact, our plans for the on-site inquiries were basically flexible to begin with, so adapting them to circumstances as they changed did not cause any difficulty.⁵⁴

3. Cooperation with the Police

In order for our investigations to be successful, it was necessary for us to cooperate with various police departments, and especially closely with the Budapest police headquarters and the national police headquarters. Consequently, as already mentioned

above, the common feature of the investigations was that our participation was preceded in almost every case by personal consultation with the police.⁵⁵ Initially, just in the interest of ensuring our personal safety, the main issue was the manner of cooperation. Later on, a kind of preliminary exchange of experiences was also carried out.⁵⁶ The designated police contact person⁵⁷ or police chiefs usually informed us how and with how much force the event would be secured or how the previous reports and recommendations of the Ombudsman had been incorporated into crowd management, security, and the practice of identity checks for a given event.

In establishing this cooperation, theoretical and practical questions arose over how to choose the best manner and form for keeping in touch with the police during the course of the event itself. Between the two extremes, namely no communication between us and the police during our observation at one extreme or our being integrated into the police’s own communication channels at the other, we were able to find the level of cooperation that worked best: when needed, we would call the contact person by mobile phone (for instance, if we needed updated information or to ask to be allowed to enter an area that had been closed off), and when it was appropriate (as when new information developed that was directly related to

⁵⁴ For example, the organiser of one demonstration did not announce the location of the demonstration (an April 11 demonstration for a well-known radical blogger) until the end of the previous event, so without the flexibility we had we could not have conducted our inquiries at all.

⁵⁵ There were just a very few cases (the demonstration for the liberalisation of light drugs, the Trianon march, the demonstration in Spring 2009 against the government in Kossuth Square, and the demonstrations on April 14, 2009 in Kossuth Square) in which we did not notify the police ahead of time about an on-site investigation. In every case, though, we mentioned our observation to the police when it began if we had not notified them earlier.

⁵⁶ Before events that had been heavily publicised (such as the demonstration for light drug liberalisation and the Trianon commemoration), we did not exchange information ahead of time.

⁵⁷ In most cases, the contact person was also a police chief (such as the chief of the Budapest police or his deputy).

our work,⁵⁸ or to ask for information) he would also contact us by phone.

It was repeatedly suggested to us that we would receive more precise information, and receive it continuously, if we could also send observers to the Police Administration Centre next to the Operational Corps. It was also suggested, for the same reason, that it would be expedient to use a “Unified Digital Radio” (TETRA Police Radio) set during our observations. We discarded both ideas, however, because they would have meant merging different constitutionally based functions. We are convinced that, in order to preserve the separation of the branches of state power, the Ombudsman and his staff should only be present in or next to the Operational Corps in extraordinary cases.⁵⁹

The issue of the police radio (and we wish to stress that this is completely theoretical) raised serious questions to do with the safety of the observers. On the one hand, there is no doubt that in cases of trouble the police radio would have been the fastest way to ask for help. On the other hand, possessing a police radio set in a dangerous context in which there is animosity and aggression towards the police itself seemed to pose an unacceptable risk. And thirdly, and this was perfectly supported by practice, the police radio system, ensuring the possibility of precisely determining location, would not have served the success of our observations.

For our very first inquiry, the Chief of the National Police appointed an officer of the police corps as the contact person; we were then in direct commu-

nication with that officer, could ask him for all the information we needed in every situation, and could tell him immediately if we experienced a problem anywhere. To be very clear, we want to stress that the only way we exchanged any information with the police during any of the announced investigations was through this contact person. In addition, based on our experiences in these investigations, we can say that it was definitely unfortunate for us when it was the commander responsible for the safety and security of the event who was also appointed as our contact person, because his ability to give us information was then naturally limited due to his own executive tasks.⁶⁰

The designated contact person received precise information about our movements, including which of us would participate in which event and when,⁶¹ in almost every case. It was obviously a priority to ensure that the observation should in no way disturb or obstruct police measures (especially the dispersion of the crowd or the use of coercion). It was also very important that, aside from what was required for the concerns of the inquiry, our presence not create further tasks for the police or, as they put it, that we should “take care of yourselves and not make trouble”. In the interest of fully observing these priorities, we tried to respect all the security recommendations given to us by the police. And we kept our contact person informed about our accurate location except when it seemed expedient to carry out the observation without disclosing who we were.⁶²

As a general rule, we received all the information about a given event that was necessary for our obser-

58 One such instance was when we received information in this way about an event planned by a radical nationalist youth organisation on the evening of October 23, 2008; this group was armed and the police was to block them in the city, and this measure was likely to be interesting for us.

59 Such extraordinary cases would include situations in which the bodily safety of the associates could not be ensured by other means, situations in which there was wide scope for street fights, or when information could not be acquired from any other source.

60 This only happened once, when the Ombudsman requested information directly from the chief of the national police headquarters.

61 It was quite simple to identify us, and for the police to inform us about safety measures, because the members of our inquiry team (3 or 4 people), as well as the staff of the Operational Corps, are permanent staff members.

62 We only did this three times during our inquiries.

vation from our contact person. So for instance, when we got information that the police were expecting to apply means of coercion (especially crowd dispersal by means of tear gas or water cannons) in the place where we were, we could then safely leave the place and continue our observation from a short distance away, or we could then also observe the event from the Police Administration Centre. Luckily, respecting these safety rules and exercising the necessary caution proved sufficient to keep us safe, and no assault, threat, or insult, excepting some eggs thrown at the LGBT(Q) March, reached any of us.

When, in certain situations (for example to pass through a police blockade or to enter a closed area), it became necessary, we identified ourselves with our official identification cards and our mandate explaining the aim of our presence. The commanding officers, or sometimes their associates in charge of security measures, often recognised us, and even took care of us, even without our disclosing our identity or wearing any identifying marks on our clothes.

4. On-site Inquiries

It was not always easy to choose a convenient observation point at the demonstrations, partly because we had to consider how best to follow the events while also keeping our own security in mind and partly because it was imperative that, as impartial observers, we avoid getting mixed in with either the demonstrators or the police forces. Right from the outset, however, we often had to carry out our observations from the vantage point of the police's closed-off safety-operations area because from this position we could follow the events, the attitude of the demonstrators and counterdemonstrators, and the reaction of the police. In addition, especially at dynamic events such as marches, we often had to change our position several times (at the LGBT[Q] march, for instance, we first observed from the back, but then, because of the egg throwing, we had to find another position to continue the observation). Naturally, it also happened

that for shorter or longer periods of time we would have to position ourselves among the participants of an event without revealing our identity in order to observe the circumstances of the entry procedure for a particular demonstration.

Observation is an even narrower category than monitoring. We believe that observation is mainly an on-site inquiry for the purposes of collecting our own information and that, as such, it must remain a one-way process. In particular, we did not want to act as "police advisers" or "supervisors", and took pains to avoid any such appearance, though if it became necessary in order to point out a breach of fundamental rights, we would avail ourselves of the opportunity to do so. One such case was after the dispersion of the demonstration at September 20 in 2008 then, partly because of the lack of a cordon, a few hundred demonstrators escaped into an open church (the Church of Homecoming⁶³) where a mass was already in progress. The police then surrounded the area around the church with a cordon and, using the loudspeaker of a police car and indicating the route of withdrawal, asked the crowd to disperse. On that occasion we called our contact and told him that we regarded these measures as extremely risky from the point of view of fundamental and other rights, particularly because the Office of the Ombudsman was also in the background of the event. After this warn-

63 A few demonstrators went into the church, where a mass was already in progress. This church is a symbolic place for radicals, because the priest is a well-known public personality with extreme right-wing (radical nationalist) political ambitions. The police forces wanted to go into the church, but it was unclear how many demonstrators were in the church and how they could be separated from people who were merely attending the mass. The Ombudsman's staff found it possible that this plan would violate fundamental rights (such as the freedom of conscience). The police decided not to step into the church, and in answer to our inquiries, the priest responded that he did not want any investigation into this incident and that he had a good relationship with the police.

ing from us the decision to disperse the crowd in that way was withdrawn and the police forces safeguarded the free withdrawal of demonstrators and others from the church.

This direct intervention by the Ombudsman's agents, including a warning in real time, was exceptional;⁶⁴ it was done with the aim of preventing a grave violation of fundamental rights and was carried out exclusively through the contact person, parallel to asking for information. On several occasions, in addition, it was clear that the simple fact of the personal presence of the Ombudsman's staff had a positive restraining influence on the police; we could see that whenever the police officers at a given event learned of our presence, they started to implement the required measures – which they had taken more lightly before they became aware of our presence – more seriously, and in keeping with the rules.

We documented our on-site inquiries with digital cameras, video recorders, notes, and sometimes with PDAs (personal digital assistants) equipped with GPS. Thanks to these methods of documentation we were able to perfectly reconstruct our activities after the fact, and if anyone tried to challenge our findings (though that never happened officially), we had all the documents to support them fully.

Because we could basically move around and act freely at the events, and pass through blockades to continue our observation from closed security operational areas not accessible even to journalists, we also possessed much more information, or at any rate information gathered from a broader range of perspectives, than did any other party.

5. General Features of the Inquiries

A basic feature of the inquiries was that, as with every procedure of the Ombudsman, they focused only on fundamental rights, which meant that we carefully

refrained from assessing professional police matters or judging their expediency and efficiency, and though we did occasionally have our own views on those issues, we had no competency or special skills and therefore we never mentioned our opinions on such matters. The series of inquiries we undertook was focused not only on the enforcement of the freedom of assembly, right from the planning phase, but also on the protection of all fundamental rights related to events in public spaces (the right to hold them, to participate in them, etc.). Therefore, while human dignity was the basic norm during our inquiries into police procedures and measures, further on, the framework of our inquiry was established around the ban on cruel or humiliating treatment, the ban on discrimination, the right to remedy, and the right to fair procedure.

The scope of our observations covered the whole spectrum of events held in public spaces, irrespective of their dynamic or static character (marches or walks), and also extended to events, such as celebrations held by state or local authorities, that were open to all and did not fall within the scope of the law of assembly. In the latter cases the freedom of expression and the right to self-determination (privacy) were part of our focus, so that our inquiries concentrated on the procedures not only of the police forces but also of other agencies concerned with security. We paid special attention to the identity checking and to entry procedures, the checking of garments, and the safeguarding of the events.

During our on-site inquiries it was not merely our personal presence that was important; we also devoted time to inquiring into the circumstances of arrest for demonstrators who were arrested, hearings for the arrested persons, and the conditions of detention. This meant that our work did not stop at the end of the demonstration, whether it ended early or as planned: if the demonstration was dispersed by the police, or if numerous people were arrested in relation to it, then that evening or night or early the

⁶⁴ See Section 24, subsection (1) of the Ombudsman Act. This case was the reason for the 2011 legislation.

following morning we would visit the police stations that were responsible for the arrests, or the main detention facility of the Budapest police, where we could hold hearings for the arrested persons, monitor the conditions of detention, and ascertain whether the detainees had been given information about their rights to redress and their right to complain.

There were several cases, among them arrests of juveniles under the age of 18; in those cases, we paid attention to the special obligations of the police force (such as rapid notification of relatives and adequate separation from adults).

As far as the events in public spaces were concerned, we can say that in many cases, the information we obtained from interviews added to what we had learned from personal observation. These hearings were free of all formalities: we met all the people arrested in connection with a given event in the detention rooms and asked them about their experiences before the coercive measures. We ensured an opportunity for them to tell us anything they wanted to tell, next we inquired about their experiences of the demonstration and the police measures. The detainees were cooperative and served us with useful information in every case.

All that does not mean that we made our inquiries only on the basis of our experiences on the spot. An indispensable element was to know the opinion of the Chief of Budapest police and of the National police, and to obtain the existing documents (including video recordings). The Ombudsman's request, based on the experiences of the inquiries on the spot, the complaints received, and other information related to the events usually contained concrete questions about police measures, the reason of those provisions and the manner of their implementation, at the same time creating the opportunity for police chiefs to expound their views as well. Though inferences could be drawn from the questions of the request concerning the pieces of information available to us the questions put could not in any way be called as of

some conception but served the possible most profound exploration of facts. It happened practically in every case that the answers received did not, or only partly corresponded to the results of observations on the spot. In these cases we reassessed the available information.

We asked extensive and various questions which were different from inquiry to inquiry, but the sphere of documents we worked with was almost always the same: particularly the summary report, the police report on the coercive measures against personal freedom, documentation related to arrest, and the video footages of locations deemed as crucial by us. In some cases the Budapest Police sent us these usual documents without any request, as a result we could cut the time needed to draw up our report to a fragment of the usual.

During the course of inquiries occasionally we received dozens of complaints, sometimes with extensive video/photo recordings added which also offered further useless information that could not be regarded as impartial.

In addition to the above mentioned ones we also used all available "documents" such as newspaper articles, coverage, television transmissions, web pictures, video broadcast sharing websites, etc. During the preparatory phase of the Ombudsman's report we assessed all these pieces of information individually and then as a whole.

6. Cooperation Following the Inquiries

In several cases, our inquiry was closed with no report because fundamental rights had not been violated or there was no danger of them being violated. Whenever a report was produced, the Ombudsman sent it to the heads of the National police and the Budapest Police and in addition, depending on the findings of the inquiry, to the Minister of Justice, to the head of the prime minister's office, to the heads of the relevant parliamentary committees, and to the Speaker of Parliament.

For the purposes of this paper, it is not the reception of the Ombudsman's measures in general but the responses given by the police that are important. In relation to his inquiries into the enforcement of the freedom of assembly, the Ombudsman's recommendations, mainly to the police, were most often about protecting fundamental rights. In general, it can be stated that over the last five years, the practices of the police at any given time continually showed that they were changing in response to the Ombudsman's findings for events previous to that time, even if in their written responses, the national chiefs of police rejected the recommendations given by the Ombudsman's office. One striking example of this is that our manuscript summarising the results of our inquiries into the enforcement of the right to assemble was incorporated into the educational plans of the police and made freely available to the staff.

On the whole, however, the reception and effects of the various recommendations have been rather mixed.⁶⁵

7. Summary

Our experience of cooperation with and from the police chiefs as well as the security experts working at the events can be described as absolutely outstanding and exemplary, with only very minor initial hitches due to mistrust and misunderstandings which, however, steadily decreased during the course of our cooperation. Unfortunately, this kind of cooperation cannot be taken for granted in the context of the current dominant legal culture; therefore, it was most welcome that a state agency, especially the closed and hierarchical law enforcement body, did not reject the Ombudsman's suggestions but instead accepted them constructively and inclusively.

The obvious advantage of the inquiries conducted on-site is that we were able to receive direct information, with the help of which we could decide whether there had been any violation of fundamental rights and hence whether an ex officio inquiry should or should not take place. In addition, the immediate observations and first-hand experiences gathered at the event itself (reporting on such things as whether the dispersion of the event was legal or not) could be published rapidly in press releases, emphasizing the fact that these were only preliminary statements and not the findings of a comprehensive inquiry. Intensive use of communication media also made it possible for the procedures and the results of the inquiry to be followed not only by the narrower professional public but by the broader public as well, in somewhat the same way as a novel is sometimes published in instalments. Thus, the Ombudsman kept sight of the fact that his strongest weapon, next to the soundness of his professional arguments, was publicity.

A further advantage was that when it was reasonable to initiate an inquiry, the request to the police could be focused and would consist of a concrete checklist inquiring about specifics rather than probing questions. The speed of the procedure was further enhanced by the fact that the Ombudsman's staff asked for all the documentation (prohibition by the police, scenario, etc.), including video and sound recordings if necessary, which then arrived within a couple of days due to the high degree of the cooperation of the police. The video and sound recordings made by the staff during the on-site inquiries were also immediately available to the Ombudsman. It is also due to this fact that the reports were able to be completed in a couple of weeks, in even less time than required.

Nevertheless, the inquiries needed to be balanced; they therefore covered not only the police measures but also the legal background and the enforcement of the freedom of assembly, and we also monitored the constitutionality of the norms that regulate police

⁶⁵ Please see about these mixed reaction Barnabás Hajas, "Does the Godiac Project Have any Impact on the Keeping of Public Order in Hungary?" In this volume xy chapter

procedures. When the problem was framed in this way, that defined some questions pertaining to certain fundamental rights, dilemmas (such as the extent of the obligation to protect institutions, how to assess competing events, or the content of the obligation to notify) which could then be judged much more easily and more profoundly. In addition, when his staff had been investigating on-site, the Ombudsman could not be accused of judging from his desk, as he often was early on. The Ombudsman and his staff are of course lawyers and not heroes, and thus their primary domain continues to be their desk, but it is always good to observe events in their totality, including from the practical side.

During the course of this work we attended almost 50 demonstrations and other events in public spaces. The events investigated usually fell within the scope of the Freedom of Assembly Act or were closely related to it. Participation in events organised by the state or local authorities was also justified by the different forms of the expression of opinion accompanying them, in addition to the fact that the police acknowledged them as events within the scope of the Freedom of Assembly Act.

So far the Ombudsman has summarised his experiences of on-site inquiries into more than 150 events between 2008 and 2012 in fifteen reports and has examined several complaints related to the freedom of assembly.

1.3 Dialogue police work: a balancing act on a slack tightrope

Ola Österling, Police Superintendent, Stockholm County Police, Sweden

Stockholm has had Dialogue Police since the spring of 2002. The decision of the Police Authority in the County of Stockholm to try working with Dialogue Police is a direct result of their observation of developments occurring at the Police Authority in Gothenburg. This Authority achieved good results, despite having few police, in connection with the European Council's summit in Gothenburg in June 2001, where chaos prevailed during long periods. The meeting was also visited by George Bush, then President of the United States. Some Stockholm police who were in Gothenburg for the summit, brought back their impressions.

The Swedish Government then in power appointed a parliamentary committee to evaluate the events. The committee was led by former Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and about a year after the events, arrived at the following conclusions:

- ◆ “We regard the Police Authority's effort to use dialogue to establish cooperation and collaboration with those who organized and participated in demonstrations and the other manifestations, as a good initiative”.
- ◆ “We are convinced that the dialogue conducted by the police with political organizations and other interest groups is of great significance in preventing serious disruptions of order in connection with demonstrations and other expressions of opinion. Through dialogue, the police and organizers can discuss, and find common solutions for, various practical issues concerning the organization of the event. Our opinion is that the police should develop dialogue as a method. Since every event, together with its various actors, is unique, we do not think that it is possible to use the same

dialogue model or method in connection with all events. There are, however, certain basic principles that should be followed.”

- ◆ “The experiences from Gothenburg show that it is important that the dialogue be initiated well before the event. It takes time to break down mutual suspicion, and requires, on the part of all participants, a good ability to communicate. Representatives of the Police who are entrusted with the responsibility to conduct a dialogue ought to have thorough training and be suited for, and thoroughly familiar with, the assignment. The Police should work actively towards adopting the method of dialogue as a self-evident part of the organization of the event. It is furthermore valuable that the police deepen their understanding of the society outside of their own organization. The roles of the parties participating in the dialogue and the purpose of the dialogue must be made very clear.

Furthermore, it is important that any agreements made are clear and unambiguous so as to avoid misunderstanding and distrust, and that the parties also follow these agreements.”⁶⁶

These conclusions, which were formulated by Ingvar Carlsson and his Gothenburg committee, and which he brought up in a lecture to the Dialogue Police in Stockholm, are something that I, as coordinator of the Dialogue group, always try to follow. These, together with some other documents, express a number of basic values, which I feel should always be observed.

Another important factor when we started to systematically work with the concept of Dialogue Police around 2005 was to formulate goals and perspectives. We who worked on this at that time were given a good amount of freedom to formulate the basic documents that can today be found in manuals for Special Police

66 Gothenburg 2001. SOU 2002:122 p. 22–25

Tactics (SPT). The basic document was drafted by the Dialogue Police from Stockholm and the region of Västra Götaland for those who were then formulating SPT tactics. The document was, appropriately enough, completed in connection with a meeting at a hotel room during an assignment in connection with a NATO meeting. The purpose of the work of the Dialogue Police was, primarily to ensure that the basic human rights which are set forth in our constitution, such as freedom of expression, religion, assembly, demonstration and association, are protected from the perspective of the police.

The dialogues that police conduct with groups, individuals, and parties discussed above should be used by the police to guarantee the opportunity for everyone to engage in the activities protected by our constitution. Democratic human rights are also formulated in the European Convention and the Charter of the United Nations. This perspective is also included in the first SPT handbook.

Prioritizing this purpose is an important principle, since previously, the main focus would have been on disturbances of the peace. Although it is self-evident that the police should work with preventive measures in order to avoid crimes and breaches of the peace, if it is possible to get citizens to feel that the State protects the rights of all individuals, we should be able to eventually arrive at a sustainable democracy where demonstrations are free from crime and disturbances of the peace. The Dialogue Police unit in Stockholm also believes that it has seen this kind of progress in the past few years. If the Police instead were to use repressive measures to avoid all risks of breaches of the peace from occurring, this position would lead to onerous restrictions on the individuals' opportunities to exercise their basic human rights. It is difficult to find the correct balance between freedom and security, and it is important that the discussion about this continue and be kept alive within a modern police force. There are many outsiders, for example, politicians, who often try to pressure the police regarding

this very issue, and it is therefore particularly important that the question be kept alive. Another important factor is an inherent paradox of democracy that enables even those holding anti-democratic views to enjoy the same rights regarding freedom of expression and assembly enjoyed by everyone else. Carried to its logical, albeit extreme, conclusion, democracy has the possibility of doing away with itself. The Dialogue Police very often get questions about just this perspective.

Sweden has no illegal demonstrations. However, there are demonstrations for which permits have been issued, and those that have no permits. Demonstrating without a permit means that the organizer breaches the Law and Order Regulation ('*Ordningsslagen*'). As a result of this, police investigators often want to identify those persons who engage in a dialogue with the Dialogue Police before and during a demonstration, in order to report these persons as the organizers. However, those with whom the Dialogue Police communicate may be spokespersons and not organizers. Over the years, this had led to certain conflicts within the Police. Reporting spokesmen as organizers may result in minor short-term advantages, but may also cause major long-term



losses, since eventually, no one will be willing to talk to the police. It should also be noted in the context that in the event of a dispute between a demonstration with a permit and another without one, the former should always be given preference. By issuing permits, the Police may well be assuming the responsibility for conducting a public assembly in a safe manner.

The Dialogue Police conducts a dialogue with ethnic, religious and political individuals and groups that often represent parties or interest groups. A continuous dialogue is conducted with certain groups, such as neo-Nazis, provided these have an organizational structure, as well as with Muslim organizations, Iranian organizations and other groups that have an established structure.

Before the Dialogue Police systematically initiated their work and developed their concept, the Criminal

Intelligence Service of the Police often took care of this job. This led those who did not automatically and naturally trust the police to refrain from communicating with the Police. When the Dialogue Police took over this function, it became self-evident that efforts were needed to increase trust in the police among groups who lacked it. When the Dialogue Police began its work, we communicated most often with neo-Nazi groups and their allies, as well as with their opponents on the radical left.

Very often, the Dialogue Police must attempt to explain the Swedish constitution and, in connection with this, stress the advantages of conducting activities in compliance with the law. To give advantages to those who follow the law creates a very good opportunity to conduct a dialogue. Actually explaining how actions and consequences are connected has resulted in applications for permits from many groups that never requested permits previously. The Dialogue Police have developed five principles to increase trust in the police. These are for the need for Dialogue Police to be knowledgeable about the surrounding world, transparent, predictable, approachable (to those who want to engage in a dialogue) and, to possess social competence, to the extent possible. These principles require the taking of references in connection with choosing these police officers.

If the police in, general, and the Dialogue Police, in particular, always take these principles into consideration, explain the role of the police in society relative to the laws, and give preference in decisions to those who obey the law, this will gradually increase dialogue between the police and the citizenry. Even the most radical forces in society will realize the benefits of conducting a dialogue with the police, built on honest and mutual respect.

The formation of a dialogue group, whose duties were previously carried out partly by other police units, has not been entirely free of friction. The Criminal Intelligence Service and the Dialogue Police have



had some conflicts, which to a certain extent have been due to different perspectives on what information is, what intelligence is, and how the police should gather these. At the Stockholm Police Authority, there have been on-going discussions about these topics. What are these differences actually? This will always be a lively topic for discussion. It is, nevertheless, entirely clear that to be a Dialogue Police officer is not to be a procurer of intelligence.

An instructor involved in the national training of Dialogue Police said something very memorable: “the police, in general, and the Criminal Intelligence Service, in particular, have assumed the investigative perspective with regard to the world around them, while the Dialogue Police have assumed the interpretative function”. There is much to consider in this quote. The discussion about the difference between investigating and interpreting can be just as persistent as the one regarding the different interpretations of intelligence and information.

As part of the police organization, the Dialogue Police have the role of representing the operational management in dialogues with individuals or groups who wish to exercise their human rights. As the committee in Gothenburg has indicated, removing mutual suspicion should be one of the objectives. Both the police and the demonstrators can very easily lapse into stereotyped views of each other. Therefore, one of the tasks of the dialogue police has been, and still is, to eradicate these models of interpretation by providing knowledge.

Before each demonstration, the police should produce a threat analysis of anticipated incidents. One aim of this is to ensure that correctly dimensioned resources are employed. It is very easy to use stereotypes in making these analyses. However, this is a dangerous path to take as it means letting history govern analyses of future events. That can lead to the police creating self-fulfilling prophecies. On the basis of their knowledge of the facts, the police must judge each event and demonstration as something unique



with unique contexts. The Dialogue Police here have an important role in providing the other party’s perspective in connection with preparation of police decisions. The Dialogue Police officer is a communicator who is not empowered to make decisions. But on the other hand, the Dialogue Police have considerable opportunities to influence decisions by virtue of their understanding of the other party’s perspective. This aspect must be spelled out and the position and role of the Dialogue Police in the organization must, therefore, be completely unambiguous.

Especially important is also the manner in which the Dialogue Police express themselves. To be able to present the other side’s needs and objectives is at times a difficult task. The Dialogue Police have tried to develop the art of criticizing a draft of a decision in a constructive manner. Therefore, an important task is to make threat analyses dynamic through knowledge of the surrounding world. It is very easy to make static assessments of a coming course of events, but doing so would create a very simplistic, and perhaps also naïve, model of explanation of the world around us. In my opinion, the police have enormously improved their capacity to consider more values than they did 10 years ago. Today we are able to judge an event in a nuanced way, and arrive at what is hope-



fully a correctly drawn conclusion of the existing circumstances. Placing events in their correct context is perhaps one of the most important tasks a modern police force can have in the context of their acting on behalf of the citizens.

The breakthrough for the Dialogue Police came in 2008. In connection with the publication in Swedish of the article “Maintenance of law and order through knowledge-based police work” written by Reicher, Stott, Adang, et al., the Dialogue Police definitely found their role. In this article conflict-reducing principles were given models of explanation and the Dialogue Police were provided with an opportunity to explain their role using terms other than those they had previously used. Tasks such as explaining how social identities arise through collective memories and how individuals perceive the police are among the most important tasks in our organization. As mentioned, the article about knowledge-based police work signified a breakthrough for the Dialogue Police. Once it became possible to relate to the conflict-reducing principles and theories about social identities (Elaborated Social Identity Model – ESIM), the Dialogue Police went from having been a unit whose value was questioned, to one with a self-evident role. With this, our work at the Swedish Police

became a natural part of the Special Police Tactics – SPT.

In my opinion, since 2008, the Dialogue Police have been extremely receptive to reports published by researchers. The Dialogue Police have had enormous benefit of being able to access results of research in allied fields. Guest lecturers have relatively often been invited to talk about areas that concern cooperation between states and their citizens. These lectures can deal with topics such as the view of a gathering of a crowd from a historical perspective or political extremism during the post-war period. Dr. Clifford Stott is a frequent lecturer in the national Dialogue Police course. He gives lectures that deal with his ongoing research regarding collaboration and the relation between the police in various European countries and various types of expressions of opinion.

The foremost characteristic of a Dialogue Police officer is to be genuinely curious about the surrounding world. To be a Dialogue Police officer is to continually be in training. Gathering knowledge about the surrounding world and presenting this as a foundation for decision-making are activities that Dialogue Police officers engage in virtually every day.

As mentioned earlier, when the Dialogue Police started up its work, their opponents consisted primarily of groups and parties who belonged to neo-Nazi movement. At the time, there was also a dialogue with the opponents of the neo-Nazis, who came mainly from the radical left. During the ensuing years, there has been virtually constant communication with these groups. The opponents that we have communicated with the most in recent years have been sympathizers of parties involved in the conflict in the Middle East, and the interest groups belonging to the Arab Spring. Furthermore, during the past four years, we have continually maintained a dialogue with various interest groups representing Iranians in exile, belonging to the political opposition. In the year after the 2009 presidential election in

Iran, there were about 1,000 events of varying size in the city of Stockholm expressing the opinion of their participants. Interest groups in exile who oppose a current regime can be very complicated to place in a Swedish context.

History, religion, politics and ethnicity are mixed in these conflicts regarding foreign affairs. Bonds of loyalty and rivalry arise and are demolished. The Dialogue Police are continually forced to familiarize themselves with these relationships and the consequences of these circumstances on public gatherings. This has resulted in our being dynamic in our analyses of situations that otherwise would have been completely impossible to assess beforehand. The situations can be a demonstration at an embassy, or two processions with demonstrators who, due to infrastructural reasons, must be placed close to each other.

The social media and their effectiveness in reaching citizens is another challenge for the Dialogue Police. During the past few years the police have seen how demonstrations quickly can gather between 5,000–10,000 individuals from one day to the next. Swedish research assimilated by the Dialogue Police has found that the political parties and trade unions, which for a century were the backbone in the creation of Swedish public opinion, have lost members and now instead attract citizens who are interested of matters other than party politics. The Dialogue Police are very much involved in communicating with participants in protests against matters such as the felling of trees in urban areas, mining near nature reserves, and the closing down of a local public swimming pool facility. The above-mentioned research asserts that the middle class has been put on stand-by. This implies that although the middle class is passive when it comes to creating so-called prevailing public opinion, it is willing to express its opinion regarding issues that cross party lines, and at times, does so with exceptional vigour.

In conclusion, this article has briefly illustrated the journey which the dialogue group of the Stockholm Police has undertaken since 2005. The police authorities in the regions of Västra Götaland and Skåne also have dialogue groups, and together with them, the Stockholm group offers a basic course at the national level. These dialogue groups, however, do not conduct identical police activities. I have wondered very much about why this isn't the case. I think the reason that the groups have developed in slightly different directions can be found in cultural variations within the country as well as the fact that the police authorities are not organizationally or culturally identical.

Every city and county is unique and should be judged in a unique way. A method of communication that is used in Malmö may not automatically work in Stockholm, and one that works in Gothenburg may not necessarily work well in Malmö. However, it is very interesting that Dialogue Police units in a country with a national police force do not use the same methods. Although the similarities are greater than the differences, Dialogue Police units function in different ways and have different positions within each organization. With this in mind, I believe every country must find its own solutions in creating police communications. Whether a unit is called Dialogue Police, Event Police, Anti-Conflict Police or Collaborating Police is of less importance. There are, however, as the former Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson wrote in his committee report, "certain basic principles which must be followed". Lastly, I also want to stress that a modern police force must always strive to ensure that "the police gain a greater in-depth understanding of the larger society outside of their organization".

1.4 Does the GODIAC project have any impact on the keeping of public order in Hungary? Trends in the policing of mass events in Hungary, 2008–2012

Dr. Barnabás Hajas, Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, Hungary

Since 2008 the Hungarian Ombudsman and his staff⁶⁷ have conducted innumerable on-site inquiries into different mass events and political manifestations in Budapest.⁶⁸ According to Section 28 of the Ombudsman Act, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, or Ombudsman shall make a report on the inquiry he has conducted; it shall contain the facts discovered and the findings and conclusions based on the facts. All these reports are public, but the published reports may not contain personal data, classified data, or protected secrets. Because the documents (including video footage, pictures, and notes on interviews) and material evidence obtained in the course of the proceedings of the Ombudsman may not be made public, during my research I could use only the Ombudsman's reports, press releases, publications, and other open sources.

The focus of the Ombudsman's inquiries was the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly the freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression, not the evaluation of police operations in general, but several pieces of information about the policing of public order can be inferred from the Ombudsman's reports and recorded facts. Though the freedom of assembly has some characteristics of a political right, one cannot disregard the fact that it is also one of the most significant communicative

rights, in part because the implementation of such an event has a kind of communicative content, and in part because the event itself may ensure an opportunity for expressing opinion.

With this research, I seek to answer the following research questions: First, has police practice changed in recent years? And second, if there has been any change, was it due to the impact of the GODIAC project?

Before GODIAC

Until April 14, 2009,⁶⁹ the police used large forces to secure nearly all anti-government demonstrations: the demonstrations almost all took place between fences and the policemen were deployed in tactical uniforms, often in riot gear with protectors, batons, helmets, and shields. The events often ended in clashes between the protesters and the police. In such cases the police dispersed the crowd – not a peaceful one – with water cannons and all available tools.

At the time, police crowd management was permeated with the “more is better” approach. Before and during the operations, the police sought to achieve numerical and technical superiority over the crowd. This tactic can be described as a legacy of traditional infantry fighting procedures, several hundred years old and in many aspects out-dated. The superiority in forces and in technique was seen as useful in the “battle” for the victory. The clearly visible “battle lines” (the police line) moved during the “battle”, hand-to-hand fighting (the use of physical coercion or batons) was used, and prisoners were taken (arrests were made).

In such situations, characteristically, the police agencies responsible for maintaining public order will employ a range of technical tools (such as water

⁶⁷ Barnabás Hajas, Zsolt Halász, Attila Láposy, Ágnes Lux, András Magicz, Péter Seres, Katalin Szajbély, and László Tóth.

⁶⁸ On the methodology, see Barnabás Hajas and Ágnes Lux: “Inquiries into the Activities of Law Enforcement Forces at Mass Demonstrations – Methodology and Experiences.”

⁶⁹ On that day, Ferenc Gyurcsány was formally replaced as prime minister by Gordon Bajnai after parliament voted on a so-called constructive no-confidence motion. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7972214.stm>

cannons, vehicles, and fences) and deploy a considerable number of police officers in riot gear and shields, and/or mounted police and canine units, close to the demonstration. Simply put, we can say that this is the traditional, or classic, method of crowd management. Either the protesters will behave well at the mere sight of the police forces, or the police will use all available tools and powers – following the appropriate requirements of the principle of gradualism – and disperse the crowd.

This tactic is typically based on one-way communication (in other words, the police commander on-site instructs the crowd), and is reactive, because it is adapted to the crowd's behaviour, follows it, and responds to it. From a different perspective, the police shows strength and power to solve the problem. If the police forces are unable to obtain that superiority, they will be unable to deal with the problem successfully. This explains why many police officers use the phrase "crowd control" as a synonym and a euphemism for "riot control".

Otto Adang's research findings substantiate the fact that during protest events, coercive police measures in response to blockades were often associated with violence by protesters.⁷⁰ We observed a case in 2009 in which the police forces arrived from behind the crowd and moved through the crowd. This operation whipped up the crowd's emotions, and the demonstrators considered it to be an obvious provocation.⁷¹

Last but not least, traditional crowd management tactics, used by themselves, are less and less practical. Fifty or a hundred years ago, such tactics were the most efficient way to protect and keep public order and the peace. But the police cannot use this

approach to prepare for today's events, organised online and through mobile communication devices. When traditional crowd management tactics were developed, demonstrations were much more homogeneous. It was known well in advance how many citizens would participate in an event. Participants would probably never have travelled hundreds or even thousands of kilometres.

The following examples illustrate trends in the behaviour of the protesters and in the strategies and tactics used in public order policing:

In his report, about the LGBT march in 2008 the Ombudsman stated that throwing various objects (such as eggs, stones, or Molotov cocktails) as a form of expressing opinion could not under any circumstances enjoy constitutional protection. He also stated that when the area of assembly (or the route of the demonstration) is hermetically blocked, communication rights are violated because the message cannot reach the addressees, the viewers of the process of communications. Thus, vacating the area of the demonstration carries in itself the direct danger of an anomaly related to the freedom of expression. In the case under survey, it was the participants in the LGBT(Q)⁷² march of July 5, 2008 who were attacked by those standing along the route, throwing things at the marchers, despite the fact that in most places, the police had totally sealed the event off from the street environment. The Ombudsman studied how the police could have secured the march so that the participants did not suffer from atrocities while still allowing the opinions that the marchers wanted to express to reach their addressees. The Ombudsman sent his report to the Deputy Chair of the Supreme Court, who was acting as its chair, and to the Chief Prosecutor, for their information and to ask them to consider his proposal that there should be a unified legal process so that procedures would be uniformly

70 Otto Adang: "Initiation and Escalation of Collective Violence: A Comparative Observational Study of Protest and Football Events." In: Tamara D. Madensen and Johannes Knutsson, eds.: *Preventing Crowd Violence*, Criminal Justice Press, Monsey, NY 2010.

71 See Ombudsman Report Nr. 6021/2009.

72 The July 5 March was organised by the Rainbow Mission Foundation.

carried out in the case of objects being thrown. The Deputy and Acting Chair of the Supreme Court informed the Ombudsman that the Penal College of the Supreme Court had discussed certain questions to do with the legal interpretation of the criminal act of truculence in their session of September 29, 2008, and created Criminal College Position No. BKv. 71. According to that ruling, throwing objects (such as eggs) that are typically unsuited to do harm to other persons may constitute an act of slander. Furthermore, an act of slander committed in a public place, if its performance is conspicuously directed at a particular community, may be appropriately identified as truculence; therefore, it should be examined whether the conditions of this criminal act have been fulfilled.⁷³

The legal definition of truculence was modified by the Act on the Modification of Certain Acts in the interest of protecting public order and the operation of the administration of justice. The lawmaker, in addition to making the serious disturbance of public order, committed in a group, a qualifying condition of truculence, and ruling that it should be punished more severely from February 1, 2009 on, supplemented Article 271 of the Penal Code with a regulation according to which “a physical impact in the nature of an attack qualifies as violent behaviour even when it is not of a kind to cause bodily harm”. (The Ombudsman did not comment on the proposed bill.)

The report studying police procedure was also directed at communication carried out within the framework of the freedom of assembly, in which context the Ombudsman stated that it might have an effect identical to that of prior control of communication, otherwise known as censorship, if the announcement of an event to be held within the framework of the freedom of assembly would also have to contain a description of the manner in which

opinions were to be expressed. In his complaint, the representative of the social action group “Politics can be different!” objected to the police prohibition on the use of onstage laser light techniques in their previously announced event. The policemen who were acting on-site gave no legal justification for the prohibition and refused even to take minutes. According to their oral communication, it would have disturbed the work of members of Parliament if they had projected anything onto the walls of Parliament. The Ombudsman found that the procedure followed by the police was anomalous with respect to the requirement of legal safety, deriving from the principle of a state under the rule of law, as well as to the freedom of opinion, and he requested that the Chief Commissioner of the national police take measures to teach skills related to the freedom of assembly and to call the attention of policemen and their immediate superiors to the fact that the constitution protects opinion irrespective of its content of value or truth. The Chief Commissioner of the national police partially challenged the Ombudsman’s findings, but accepted the initiatives.⁷⁴

At the state celebrations on October 23, 2008 the police officers on-site received a clear order to check the identity of persons expressing their opinions (shouting, using rattles, carrying fliers, etc.) outside the police cordons and others who had “tricolour bands or whistles hanging around their neck” and to conduct them out of the area. The Ombudsman stressed that wearing a tricolour band or a whistle was itself sufficient to qualify as a kind of expression of opinion (or protest) in the public events of our big cities. He pointed out that the effect of the police measure implemented against the expression of opinion by wearing a tricolour band or a whistle would be assessed similarly to the (prior) prohibition on communication, in other words it is to be considered as a measure with an effect equal to censorship.

73 OBH 3262/2008

74 OBH 5593/2008

According to the Ombudsman, the order issued to the security officers concerning identity checks and escorting certain people out of the area did not meet the requirements set against the limitations on the freedom of opinion and elaborated in detail by the Constitutional Court, and the police had therefore imposed unnecessary restrictions and hence violated the essential content of the right to the expression of opinion. The Chief Commissioner of the national police challenged the Ombudsman's findings, but the Ombudsman rejected the challenge and maintained his position unchanged; furthermore, he requested that the Chief Commissioner of the national police reconsider his stand.⁷⁵

In early July, 2009, the Ombudsman's staff conducted investigations into the fulfilment of the freedom of assembly at several venues. At one of these events, the police took measures against three people who wanted to fly black balloons representing terrorist heads. The police report says that "what the balloons represented was suited to creating fear and anxiety" and therefore the three "culprits" had to be taken into custody for truculence.

The police had taken another person into custody for being suspected of committing a criminal act because "a hood, anti-police leaflets, and a list containing policemen's identification numbers" were found with him. The Ombudsman's investigation, however, concluded that the balloons, as well as the leaflets, clearly belonged to the protected sphere of the freedom of expression and that the mere possession of those objects would not have offered grounds for taking those persons into custody. On July 4, 2009, in a park in downtown Budapest, the former members of the dissolved "Hungarian Guard" engaged in a sit-in. The police arrested more than two hundred sympathizers and members of the dissolved organisation. The operation was not officially classi-

fied as crowd dispersal, but the police used tear gas, batons,⁷⁶ and physical coercion.⁷⁷

The Ombudsman also investigated the case of the events of March 15 in 2009 at Kossuth Square, when the police took measures exclusively against persons airing opinions deemed "anti-governmental" and not against people expressing their opinion in general, at the state events held on that date.⁷⁸ The Ombudsman reached the conclusion that the expression of opinion of those who were criticising the prime minister and calling on him to resign did not qualify as a criminal act, nor even a petty offence, and therefore there was no foundation for the police measures. He also mentioned in his report⁷⁹ that the sphere of the free expression of opinion as it relates to politicians with public visibility, such as the prime minister, is broader than it is in other cases.

Several plaintiffs mentioned that court procedures of major interest are usually held in rooms with a small holding capacity and that participation is only possible with prior registration. There is no public rule to be found, that is accessible to all, about the process of registration itself. In addition, the law courts often violate even their own "conditions of announcement" when they close registration after a certain number of places are filled while allowing some individuals and members of the press to register before registration has even been announced.

⁷⁶ See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E8q30gDfMy4>

⁷⁷ See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w9Sefypgz-jA> and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S6BEy4k-Gd6M&>. for more about the course of events. See also the Ombudsman's report in cases AJB 4721/2009; 4789/2009; 4800/2009; 4803/2009; 4806/2009; 4840/2009; 4848/2009; 4872/2009; 4875/2009; 4881/2009; 4882/2009; 4892/2009; 4960/2009; 4966/2009; 4984/2009; 5040/2009; 5048/2009; 5117/2009; 5134/2009; 5139/2009; 5140/2009; 5154/2009; 5155/2009; 5178/2009; 5228/2009; 5229/2009; 6759/2009. (The report is downloadable: <http://www.ajh.hu/allam/jelentes/200904721.rtf>)

⁷⁸ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4PfWYAo9rs4>

⁷⁹ www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/200902624.rtf

According to the Ombudsman, the problem is that the general and uniform procedural rules covering all judicial procedures define only the basic principles. They do not give adequate guidance either to the judges preparing court procedures in cases evoking great interest or to the representatives of the press who are required to fulfil the obligations of information. The Ombudsman has stated that the procedures of law courts constitute a special context in which a balance has to be created among several laws and constitutional principles. Such a balance is unimaginable, however, without legal rules establishing a framework for it.

The prior registration I have described offers an opportunity for arbitrary legal interpretation; in addition, there is no authorisation for its use. The Ombudsman recommended to the Minister of Justice and Law Enforcement that a uniform legal regulation be developed for the public announcement of law court procedures, including participation in the court room, and also including press participation in particular.

A New Style in Policing? – 2010

As a consequence of all above, one might come to the conclusion that the handling of mass demonstrations was rather uneven. In some cases police secured the demonstrations with great forces and sufficient equipment, while in some others the police's presence was hardly visible. I would like to demonstrate this statement with several examples.

The "Comradeship Day"

On 4 July 2010 some six-hundred members of the Hungarian National Guard Movement⁸⁰ held initiation ceremonies and commemorated the demonstration of the previous year. That earlier demonstration celebrated the "Comradeship Day", a radical right event. The demonstration was dissolved by the police

and more than two-hundred people were detained (among others, Gábor Vona, president of a non-parliamentary party that time); later on the court pointed out that the dissolution was unlawful.⁸¹

The organiser, leader of the legal group of the Jobbik, stated that he had conciliations with the police before the demonstration. Participants were explicitly asked to keep the laws on assembly and not to possess tools that may be deemed as arms. Participants were also asked to follow the orders of the organisers and not to obstruct the operation of the local restaurants. Both in their announcement and at the scene they stated that "trouble-makers and provocateurs were given to the police".

Sándor Pörzse MP informed that the police detained 74 people who possessed alarm weapons, subjects imitating weapons and attack helmets. According to the available videos, the police continuously pulled out from the crowd those, who throw glasses and who reviled the police.

Several MP-s of the Jobbik gave a speech at the demonstration. They doubted the lawfulness of the police actions both in their speeches and they communicated their view to the members of the police staying officers patrolling the demonstration. Several press releases reported that police officers had gone through the crowd, people were crushed, and some were tear-gassed.

Participants in the commemoration took an oath as members of the Hungarian National Guard. Gábor Vona, president of Jobbik and founder of the Hungarian Guard, set forth the words of the oath before a copy of the Holy Crown.⁸²

⁸⁰ Although there are similarities, the situation was not identical to that of the dissolved Hungarian Guard demonstration of 2009.

⁸¹ See above for a more detailed description of the 2009 demonstration.

⁸² Előd Novák, Member of Parliament (Jobbik), said in an interview: "Maybe it differs only in that this is a new organisation. I do not think the idealism or the purpose are different." For the interview, see http://index.hu/video/2010/07/05/vona_melegeket_akatrak_a_gardistakra_uszitan/ [2013.02.01.]

LGBT(Q) March, 2010

The massive police presence at this event could be justified by the fact that the opening ceremonies of the Budapest Pride (LGBT[Q]) march were held not far from the National Guard demonstration. The LGBT(Q) march started from Hősök tere (Heroes' Square), proceeding to the Octagon and then back to Hősök tere. Unlike in 2008, the march was not attacked, nor did the police cordon off as large an area as they did in 2009. There were some incidents, but they were much less serious than in previous years and no physical harm occurred. One of the incidents involved some members of a radical right youth group (Hatvannégy Vármegye, "Sixty-four Counties") who tried to hold up the march but were moved aside by the police. Consequently, there was only a small group that disfavoured and tried to disturb the participants of the march.

For both demonstrations (the LGBT[Q] march and the National Guard demonstration), security was similar to what it had been at the previous events. The head of the Budapest police ordered strict control and police officers wore riot gear and put on a large show of force.

National Day, October 23, 2010

In contrast, for the demonstration of October 22–23, the contrast to previous years seemed to be that there was hardly any police cordoning and that only a small number of police officers appeared. Moreover, a group of policewomen handed out national flags to the people. There was also a less significant police appearance at the Jobbik demonstration on those dates; no fences or cordons, no riot gear.

In the "marketplace of demonstrations", winter brought a bull market. First, former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány demonstrated against the limitations on the Constitutional Court's jurisdiction in

Vértanúk tere (Martyr's Square),⁸³ which is a symbolic place where demonstrations had been held to call for his own resignation. Later on, the liberal green party LMP held a demonstration at the Constitutional Court, followed by a demonstration by Jobbik, a demonstration in reaction by the anti-fascist organisations demonstrated at the statue of Mihály Károlyi⁸⁴ and finally the civilians for the freedom of the press demonstrated at the Kossuth tér.⁸⁵ The crowd management of the police was similar to the ones of the autumn; fewer officers, no riot gears, no fences and no units with horses and dogs. Although the number of the participants were not so high than previously, it was still significant that the different news agencies reported different numbers of participants (some reported twice as big crowd than the others).

Common experiences

It is noteworthy that despite the Jobbik's demonstration of 4 July 2010, no-one was detained after demonstration, the police did not limit the personal liberty. (Admittedly, some people were picked out from Ferenc Gyurcsány's demonstration, those who disrupted the event but they were not detained, only directed out from the demonstration).

To sum up, one might realise significant changes at the security of mass demonstrations. Instead of the

83 Vértanúk tere is a symbolic place because a radical right-wing anti-government group held a daily demonstration there from 2006 to 2010.

84 Mihály Károlyi (March 4, 1875 to March 19, 1955) served as prime minister from November 1 to 16, 1918 and as president from November 16, 1918 to March 21, 1919. In July 1919, Károlyi went into exile in France; during World War Two, he was in exile in Britain. He was in a state of official disgrace in Hungary until the end of World War Two. In 1946, Károlyi, who by that time had become a socialist, returned to Hungary and from 1947 to 1949 served as the Hungarian ambassador to France. In 2012, as part of the renovation of Kossuth Square beside the parliament building, Károlyi's statue was moved to Siófok.

85 This is where the Hungarian parliament building is.

traditional tools, officers did not wear riot gears and did not intend to demonstrate (or to display) force. The national practice followed the international trend in this respect. However, I presume that the low-profile crowd management of the English, Dutch, German and Swedish polices and the Hungarian is similar in the externals only. In other words: not one of the concepts was adapted but only some apparent elements of a concept. The main element of the strategy seems to be that no fences, water-cannons or riot gears would appear at streets. Such a solution is similar to the Western-European paradigm shift; where demonstrations turning to serious (sometimes lethal) clashes show that the days of high-profile crowd management are over.

On the other hand, foreign police forces focus on the non-traditional tools while making their strategy and tactics: education, facilitation, communication and differentiation.⁸⁶

I doubt that the members of the police dealing with crowd management and the leaders of such police groups know the particular groups to a great extent; and especially the relation of these groups to the police and to other groups. In 2010 there appeared previously unknown left-wing groups or people seeking for conflicts. For instance, the content of the demonstration organised on the Net for the freedom of the press was unknown to the police. Similarly, at the LGBT march of 2011 the police identified the flag of the combative foreign anti-fascist group only at the end of the march; therefore the police could have no information on the group.

The police's view on facilitation has not changed either. Neither at the preparation nor at the conduct of the demonstration could be observed that the police would facilitate.

The situation is much the same concerning differentiation, despite the LGBT march and one of the Jobbik's demonstration the police's principle seemed to be the "anything but riot gears or fences".

Some imperfections could be observed concerning police communication: it was mostly unilateral and its efficiency was reduced by the fact that the organisers and participants of the demonstrations still did not trust the police.

2011–2012: The communication as strategic principle? – Not in all case

The Firemen-protest

In 2010 the police apparently followed the trends of the modern public order policing. But this change was enough to get rid of the citizens' complaints related to crowd control measures. The trade unions of police officers, customs officers, prison officers and firefighters organized demonstrations in Budapest in April. More thousands of firefighters wore so called structural turnout gear, boots, balaclava, and helmet. We observed many demonstrators on the 16th April event carrying the special firefighter-axe. During an ex officio inquiry we were even informed that some trade unions were expressly encouraging their members to carry this special axe in the demonstrations. The law explicitly prescribes to disperse the crowd in this case. According to the opinion of the ombudsman the police gave an appropriate and basic-rights friendly response when they didn't disperse the crowd as it is regulated by the relevant law, but they cooperated with the organizers of the demonstration to put the firemen's axe away. This and similar basic-rights friendly attitude support the practice of the right to assembly. Moreover it serves to maintain the peaceful characteristic of the demonstration.⁸⁷ In this case the

⁸⁶ Stephen Reicher, Clifford Stott, Patrick Cronin, Otto Adang (2004), "An Integrated Approach to Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing", *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management*, Vol. 27 Iss. 4, pp. 558–572.

⁸⁷ Report Nr. AJB-5595/2012 can be downloaded at www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201205595.rtf

“Rendbiztos⁸⁸ Unit” of the Budapest Police used consciously the communication as crowd management tool to keep the peace during the event. We hoped that this was the first step on a long way to the knowledge based crowd management.

The National day

During the National day (23rd October) in 2011 the GODIAC team members were present at seven events.⁸⁹ The field study had basically positive experiences, the events were held without any disturbances or public disorder.⁹⁰

The police communication in social media

In Despite the positive experiences the Commissioner criticized the police communication with the protesters and with the general public. According to the ombudsman’s opinion The Hungarian police are not yet prepared for the info-communications challenges of the 21st century – this has been revealed in an international project which focuses on elaborating new methods for dealing with demonstrations by the police.⁹¹ Because many protests and other mass

events are organised by using the social networks on the internet, the police must be able to communicate effectively on such sites, like Facebook or Twitter, with the organisers of mass demonstrations organised on the internet. Such methods were in January 2012 not used by the Hungarian police, and the experience gathered in the GODIAC project shows that domestic police practice is not aware of the possibilities of using these social networks for transmitting messages.

Occupation of the Mayor’s Office

Few weeks after the field study, the ombudsman conducted two ex-officio inquiries, and found infringements of the freedom of assembly. According to the opinion of the Ombudsman the sit-down strike started on 11th November 2011 in the 8th district Mayor’s Office against the criminalisation of homelessness⁹² was in conformity with the lawful conditions of peaceful assembly, but it was also lawful to break it up, since the exercise of the right of assembly infringed the rights and liberty of others. So the demonstrators should have been removed from the building; the police, however, in addition to breaking up the event employed other measures as well: they took the protesters to the police station, which infringed their right to peaceful assembly and to liberty of the person.

The Ombudsman Prof. Máté Szabó noted that the Act on the Police emphasises the requirement of proportionality, meaning that police measures shall not cause harm which is obviously out of proportion to the lawful purpose of the measure. From among several possible and appropriate police measures the police have to choose that one which, while still ensuring an adequate outcome, entails the least restriction, injury or damage for the person(s) concerned. Pursuant to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court, the proceedings for depriving a person of his or her liberty may only be regulated

88 *Rendbiztos* can be translated as Order Commissioner. The task of the Rendbiztos Unit is somewhat similar to that of the Swedish Dialogue Police, the German Conflict Management Team, and the Czech Anti-Conflict Team. They negotiate with protesters before the event (at pre-event meetings) and during the event. In addition to conducting negotiations, they are responsible for the preparation of decisions prohibiting a demonstration. (The chief of operations can also be assigned to the Rendbiztos.) It follows that the relation between the rendbiztos and the protesters is asymmetric.

89 Flag ceremony, the Roma commemoration ceremony, Jobbik meeting and torch march, The Milla demonstration, (a spontaneous demonstration breaks away and starts to walk towards the old TV building), Pax Hungarica rally at Corvin Square.

90 Details are in the Field Study Report.

91 In the same press release the commissioner told that his staff have been actively participating in the GODIAC project for two years already, and they are making use of newly acquired information for studying demonstrations in Hungary.

92 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zUUIZkJsP0>

in such a way that they should not unnecessarily or disproportionately restrict the right to liberty of the person.⁹³

The hunger strike front of the Hungarian Public Service Television

Those taking part in the “rolling” hunger strike⁹⁴ started on 10 December 2011 in front of the Budapest building of the Public Service Television protested against the fact that in a news report a public figure, the former chief justice, Zoltán Lomnici, was blocked out. The demonstrators demanded the naming and holding to account of those responsible. The site of the hunger strike was an unfenced area where anybody could enter without any restriction, i.e. according to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights the police should have considered the area as public domain. The police did not even make an attempt at resolving the conflict and they justified their omission by saying that the event took place outside the public domain. Both the protesters and the management of the television asked the police for help, but the latter did not take any action because they did not recognise that the demonstrators were exercising their right to peaceful assembly and therefore the police had an obligation to act. As a consequence, both the protesters and the management of the television tried to settle the situation as best they could, by putting up mobile fences and by trying to prevent the building of fences, respectively, according to their interests. On the site the police did not consider whether the event restricted the right or liberty of others or whether the right of the protesters to assembly was infringed.⁹⁵

In both cases the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights turned to the Chief Commissioner of the National Police asking for his opinion and inviting him to ensure that similar situations be settled in conformity with the provisions of the Act on the right to assembly.

Sitting blockades on Danube-bridges

At night 30th March 2012 two different groups on two bridges⁹⁶ over the Danube started sitting blockades and demanded the resignation of the President of Hungary.⁹⁷ The protesters went to the roadway of the bridges, sat down and chanted slogans.

The sitting blockade on the Széchenyi Chain Bridge began at 20.45 (in the police reports 20.49). Although the police knew what the protesters plan, the Rendbiztos Unit were not deployed there. Long before the blockading were the arresting-teams and the CCTV Surveillance-bus deployed on the Pest-side bridgehead. Contrary to the police reports the police forces did not order properly the crowd before the arrests of thirteen sitting-demonstrators. Neither on the video records of the police, nor on YouTube videos⁹⁸ can be heard any police ordering the crowd to disperse. The ombudsman’s inquiry found that

93 See the report AJB-730/2012 (<http://www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201200730.rtf>)

94 It is not a really hunger strike because the strikers eat at home.

95 See the report AJB 1690/2012 (<http://www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201201690.rtf>)

96 On the Széchenyi Chain Bridge were activists of the youth organisation of the Jobbik, and on the Szabadság hid (Liberty Bridge or Freedom Bridge) were the members of the Hallgatói Hálózat (Student’s Network).

97 After a formal investigation, a fact finding committee at Semmelweis University delivered a report about the academic misconduct concerning the 1992 doctoral thesis (dr. univ.) of Pál Schmitt on 27 March. The University Council advised the University Senate to withdraw Schmitt’s doctorate title. The University Senate withdrew Schmitt’s title on 29 March. On 30 March 9 pm the Hungarian Public Service Television aired a 15 minute, pre-recorded interview in which Schmitt announced that he would not resign from office. After this interview were several un-notified demonstrations in Budapest. On 2 April, Schmitt announced to the Hungarian Parliament that he would resign as President.

98 <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWLRp-wojzc> and <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahTFtsh-XmA>

the first protester was arrested twelve seconds after the arrival of the police forces. During the whole operation was not evaluable communication between the police and the protesters. The police also did not facilitate the event.

At 22.09 a smaller other group sat on the roadway of the Szabadság-híd. The arriving police forces ordered the sitting people to leave the road. The protesters obeyed the police instruction and left the road, and went together with the police officers to the sidewalk on the bridge. After the identification, body- and pack-searches the protesters were arrested. On this event were the Rendbiztos Unit also not deployed.⁹⁹

On the both places the police officers wore tactical uniform, on the Chain Bridge with hand-held tear-gas bottles. The police did not detect that the sitting blockades are protected by the freedom of assembly. In both cases were launched infringement procedures against the protesters because the violation of the Road Traffic Rules. In these cases the lack of communication clearly led to the Infringement of the freedom of assembly.¹⁰⁰

*LGBT-March 2012*¹⁰¹

After such cases, the police strategies and tactics during the LGBT(Q) march¹⁰² were a real surprise.¹⁰³ The police secured the route of the march with fences and mobile units and deployed forces along the route according to risk: close to the hot spots (such as unregistered counterdemonstrations), units in riot gear were deployed. Unlike in the previous several years, the LGBT(Q) March in 2012 was not escorted

by hundreds or thousands of police officers in riot gear. Only at the front and the rear of the rally were there police officers in light tactical gear (without helmets). The Rendbiztos Unit had intensive and serious contact with the organisers before and during the event. The police apparently attempted to provide security for the events according to the principles of knowledge-based crowd management and differentiated their handling of the different crowds depending on risk. At this event, the police had a much better knowledge of the aims of the different organisations involved and, based on this knowledge, was able to choose an effective and differentiated method of crowd management. In his report, however, the Ombudsman pointed out that the actual staffing numbers of the Rendbiztos Unit are lower than required, and that half of the positions in the unit are vacant.¹⁰⁴

Radical Right-wing Rally in the Countryside

On August 5, 2012, an event called “Live and Let Live – Demonstration for Legitimate Hungarian Self-defence”¹⁰⁵ was organised in Devecser¹⁰⁶ by the Jobbik members of Parliament. All major radical groups¹⁰⁷ were in attendance at the event, and because of the higher risk the police used high-profile crowd management methods. The Veszprém county police requested additional forces and technical equipment from the riot police and fences from the Budapest police, but neither of those requested the cooperation

99 http://index.indavideo.hu/video/Lezarta_a_Szabadsaghidat_a_Hallgatoi_Halozat

100 See the report AJB-3673/2012 (<http://www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201203673.rtf>)

101 See more: Ágés Lux: LGBT marches

102 http://index.hu/video/2012/07/08/bp_pride_12/

103 Immediately before the event were personnel changes in Budapest Police on the field of public order

104 See the report AJB-5595/2012 (<http://www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201205595.rtf>)

105 Devecser is a small town in Veszprém county, 165 km away from Budapest

106 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3akDfwyf_O4

107 These groups were Jobbik, the New Hungarian Guard (Új Magyar Gárda), the Hungarian National Guard (Magyar Nemzeti Gárda), the Civil Guard Association for a Better Future (Szebb Jövőért Polgárőr Egyesület), the Sixty-Four-County Youth Movement (Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom), the Motorcycle Guard (Gárdamotorosok), and the Outlaw Army (Betyársereg).

of the Rendbiztos Unit of the Budapest police nor commanders experienced in low-profile crowd management techniques. In fact, there was no communication during the event between the police and any other parties (organisers, protesters, counter-protesters, or the general public). The designated Rendbiztos was unprepared enough; for one thing, he or she was not present at the event. In his ex officio inquiry, the Ombudsman found several infringements of human rights and freedoms. In this report, the Ombudsman summarised the tasks of the Rendbiztos.¹⁰⁸

The Student Demonstrations

The police gave all possible assistance at their disposal to those exercising one of the most fundamental human rights while handling the student demonstrations of Monday, December 10, and Wednesday, December 12, 2012, which consisted of marches through the capital's major thoroughfares. The Ombudsman cited the Constitutional Court's statements according to which events held in the spirit of the right of assembly are linked to the values of democratic publicity, enabling citizens to criticise political processes and influence them through protests.

The police proceeded in the spirit of the aforementioned statements of the Constitutional Court when they did not take action against the participants in the unannounced but peaceful demonstrations but merely followed their movements, securing unrestricted traffic. The Ombudsman stressed that the police's practices concerning the right of assembly had significantly evolved in recent years. Compared to the indifference of earlier years, this time the police exerted themselves – within and, sometimes, even beyond the legal boundaries – to make it possible for the young organisers of the events to proceed with the demonstrations. According to the Ombudsman, one cannot emphasize enough the importance of infor-

mation and communication in the consensual settlement of disputes and conflicts.

In his earlier reports, the Ombudsman had criticised the police for not having properly utilised the institution of the designated police representative. What was positive in the experience of the demonstrations of December 10 and 12, 2012 is that the cooperation and communication between the designated police representative in attendance and the organisers, who were occasionally difficult to find, played a major role in successfully maintaining the peaceful character of the events.

As on-site experience shows, there are more and more minors and young adults participating in events that fall under the Freedom of Assembly Act; protecting their rights and security was a primary consideration. That is why the Ombudsman deems cooperation, the promotion of communication and, on the police's part, the rendering of continuous assistance and the observation of proportionality in police actions to be important.

Notes in Lieu of Conclusions

After this research I can give an affirmative answer to the first research question: yes, police practice has changed in many aspects. As a result, Budapest does not seem like a besieged city during every political protest or other such public demonstration. The commanders and chiefs of police have learned from experience that high-profile crowd management is not the only viable option.

The second question was whether such change was due to the impact of the Godiac project. Since the beginning of that project, the Ombudsman has considered it a priority to implement the principles of knowledge-based crowd management. He uses what we learned in the project in our inquiries and also reports on the knowledge gained from the project. In addition, the Ombudsman's office has organised a conference on communication as a strategic principle in crowd management and we have given pres-

¹⁰⁸ See report AJB 6234/2012 (www.ajbh.hu/allam/jelentes/201206234.rtf)

entations at different conferences on police science. During the handling of the student demonstrations in December, I felt that there was a desire to reform public order policing in Hungary. The police chiefs know that it does not imply weakness or incompetence to use these different and kinder tools. On the contrary, using the elements of knowledge-based crowd management requires more strength and self-discipline than do other methods. I am convinced that the Godiac project has changed the Hungarian police, in some direct and some indirect ways.

The change in attitude and the impact of the Godiac project can also be seen in the fact that the newly appointed Chief Commissioner of the national police, Major General Károly Papp, recently set up a working group to examine the possibility of adopting the concept of Dialogue Police. At several events in March, some of which had not even been registered, the police ensured the exercise of the freedom of assembly by using crowd management solutions that were flexible and that respected fundamental rights. Of the public order policing tools that were used to maintain the peaceful nature of the events, judging by their results, proactive communication was one of the key elements of the police's strategy and tactics.

1.5 Tactical communication in Germany: An overview and future prospects

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Introduction

Dialogue policing, police liaison, tactical communication, conflict management – these labels are as manifold as the concepts behind them. Europe is home to an increasing variety of communicative approaches to managing critical crowd situations, and it is fair to say that the crowd-communication approaches implemented by the police are in an exploratory state. It is not surprising, then, that concepts differ even within single European countries and are rarely stable or standardized. In this respect Germany can be regarded as an apt example: a multitude of crowd-communication concepts unite here under the name *tactical communication* (taCom) and are described in the following pages. But before attending to the characteristics of and differences within German taCom, it is necessary to define what taCom means to the German police.

Generally, taCom entails communication in order to reach a certain intermediate target that is consistent with the primary strategic aim. In the past this was primarily military communication in battle (by flags, flare signals, or radio). However, during recent years the term has been increasingly used in police circles to refer to communication facilitating the peaceful management of mass events. To this end, mainly part-time police officers have been trained and deployed in order to communicate with the public and to de-escalate tensions in potentially violent crowd situations, thereby preventing or at least slowing the escalation of a potential conflict. In Germany two types of events normally involve such situations: political demonstrations and football games. Given the framework of this anthology and the principal objective of GODIAC, this article

focuses exclusively on taCom in relation to demonstrations.

Communicative approaches in Germany have received increasing attention since the assembly-friendly decision of the Federal Constitutional Board in 1985 and the Interior Minister's conference in 1989, which granted applied public relations a higher priority (Neutzler 2004). The implementation of these decisions in police practice is still a controversial issue, but applied public relations for the police these days tends to highlight operational communication as a major tactical possibility that enables the police to respond to mass events in a more nuanced and stabilizing way. By putting more effort into these specific communication approaches, the police have endeavored to become more transparent and therefore more likely to gain support while enforcing the law within the crowd ("Die neue Polizei" 1993, 572; "Die Polizei" 1991, 50; cited after Winter, 1998).

Tactical Communication in Germany

Different concepts have been put to the test, but two major developments have influenced the field of communicational tactics as no other factor has. Both emerged from escalated mass events in the federal states of Berlin and Hessen in the late 1990s, and each was implemented as a counter tactic in order to regain control. The police in Hessen had to fight a growing number of delinquents who were seeking cover among the peaceful mass (e.g., stone throwers). As the police started advancing with quick pushes into the mass in order to arrest single individuals, their action was perceived as an infringement by the remaining demonstrators. As a result, the demonstrators felt solidarity with the delinquents, leading not only to the obstruction of justice but also to a severely damaged image of the police. In the aftermath, Hessen developed the "preservation of evidence and arrest" concept and a framework for tactical communication as new options for law enforcement and

image correction. In this respect Hessen's main goals for taCom were and remain (a) to induce a prerogative of interpretation, so that bystanders interpret an event from a police perspective, and (b) to actively motivate people to either participate in certain actions or refrain from them (Neutzler and Schenk 2007). These goals were to be realized in the newly formed tactical loudspeaker units (TLUs). In 1987 the first tactical loudspeaker vehicle was deployed (see figure 1).



Figure 1. Tactical loudspeaker vehicle.

In 2001 TLUs were used successfully for the first time in the larger context of a right-wing political gathering (Neutzler 2004). Since then TLUs have been used more frequently in escalating situations. However, the TLUs initially missed their objective; people among the crowd mistrusted the police, who were seen to communicate only in ambiguous situations and were therefore hard to validate. Hence, the police in Hessen started to accompany crowd events with their TLUs right from the events' inception. The police code of action was thereby made clear, and congruence between announcements made by the TLUs and police behavior on the ground became apparent. Demonstrators experienced a legitimate and respectful police force, not only leading to greater acceptance of police proceedings but in fact facilitating it because citizens now supported the police against delinquents. Essential in reaching this public support is the use of "specific" communica-

tion. Single individuals or groups that exhibit disruptive behavior must be addressed personally, thereby giving all who are not addressed the opportunity to distance themselves psychologically and physically from those behaving illegally (Neutzler and Schenk 2007).

All announcements from the TLUs are either preemptive and unbound from events or immediate interventions in response to a specific situation. In either case, the construction of the announcement follows a fourfold pattern.

1. Situation description – At the beginning of the announcement, a description of the situation's details informs all in the area, even those who may not be able to see the police about the facts of the situation. This helps avoid misinterpretations caused by rumors.
2. Target audience – In order to differentiate between certain groups or individuals and to reduce the anonymity of delinquents, the announcement identifies the intended audience as precisely as possible.
3. Judgment – Presenting a line of argument makes police behavior more understandable.
4. Appeal – A request in the form of a positive statement asks that members of the target audience change their behavior in a certain way.

As the TLUs started operating this way, the police in Hessen finally benefited from their experimental attitude and could improve their image and criminal proceedings without putting their officers at greater risk. Consequently, the Central Psychological Service of the police in Hessen now organizes systematic education spanning several weeks, programs that train and improve the work of TLU officers. Moreover, it is worth noting that Hessen is the only federal state in Germany that employs full-time communicators. The practical success of Hessen's de-escalatory concept made taCom more attractive to other federal states, as well. As a result, collaborative programs involving Baden-Württemberg, Lower

Saxony, and Rhineland-Palatinate have evolved, aimed at improving crowd management in these states (Knapp 2009).

A similar export story also exists for the concept developed by the second taCom pioneer, Berlin. As an example, consider the approximately 130 communication officers of Brandenburg, who are trained precisely in the “Berlin concept” (Central Service of the Police of the country Brandenburg, personal communication, 11 June 2010). However, whereas the TLUs are used during football events in Hessen (e.g., the 2006 World Cup), in Berlin no deployment occurs for football events. This may be because the two concepts have different focuses: while Hessen uses indirect communication through TLUs, Berlin communicates directly, face to face, with people in the crowd through units called anticonflict teams (ACTs). This direct approach is quite similar to the indirect one created in Hessen in terms of pure practical experience. Driven by the violent excesses of Beltaine in Berlin, in 1999 the work commission called AG 1. Mai developed the AHA approach, which now serves as the basis of the Berlin taCom concept (Matzdorf 2005). The acronym AHA stands for three basic principles: attention, help, and appeal. This approach represents a process of positive knowledge production because it aims at increasing the attention and sensitization of both, the police and people of the crowd, to the common concern. This concern, or goal, is a peaceful demonstration in which all parties can spread their message to the broader public. The police force needs the help of the demonstrators to show the public that it is able to maintain law and order, while the demonstrators at the same time depend on the help of the police to achieve their political aims. Hence, the police make a proactive appeal, striving to unite all parties in working toward a successful event for everyone involved. In the context of Berlin’s new AHA approach, the first ACTs were trained to prove the communicative willingness as well as the communicative ability of the police to

contribute to the success of a crowd event. Since the development of the AHA concept, ACTs have particularly been used in significant national or regional mass events with high conflict potential. The tasks of the ACTs are

1. to prevent/decrease conflicts between oppositional parties through proactive dialogue that overcomes communication gaps and rituals of violence,
2. to contribute to conflict resolution by means of empathy and alternative proposals for a solution,
3. to make the role of the police transparent and to promote a positive police image among the public, and
4. to lower public pressure on operational action forces (i.e., riot police).

To meet these objectives, the voluntary candidates for ACTs are qualified for the work through a five-day practical training sessions in conflict management, self-protection, and self-reflection, as well as in coping with stress and in dealing with emotions, communication disturbances, and the press. In addition, Berlin regularly organizes three-day refresher seminars. The qualified ACTs work in a standard uniform with an additional baseball cap and yellow vests (see figure 2). Hence, for safety reasons and to justify the trust the population places in them, ACTs do not arrest participants. Instead, they retreat if they get the information that hostile offenses against the police increase thus endangering their safety. Considering their low level of protection, the communication officers are deployed only in teams and only during daylight hours. Further, each team maintains constant radio contact with the police commander (J. Schönberg, personal communication, 11 March 2010). The perceived success of this operational concept has made ACTs an established instrument of crowd policing that commanders in Berlin now deploy as a matter of course (Matzdorf 2005).



Figure 2. Exemplary version of face-to-face taCom gear.

Even though Berlin's focus is on direct communication, there is a new effort to integrate indirect communication through TLUs into Berlin's AHA concept (C. Ziegler, personal communication, 17 January 2013). A parallel development is taking place in Hessen, where direct communication teams are occasionally deployed.

Based on Hessen's and Berlin's approaches, the police force in Baden-Württemberg is moving to implement taCom as successfully as both pioneers have done. Preparations for the 2009 NATO summit in Baden-Baden and Kehl triggered a systematic implementation of a new concept involving TLUs and ACTs (German College of the Police, personal communication, 22 July 2010). Because Baden-Württemberg expected large-scale counterdemonstrations, it requested taCom units from Berlin, Hessen, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria. For the entire event Baden-Württemberg then provided a phase model for the deployment of taCom units (see table 1). Feedback from participating parties

regarding the graded police tactic was very positive; as a result, the Baden-Württemberg authorities decided to integrate taCom as a standard procedure for major events (spokesperson for the Police College of Villingen-Schwenningen, personal communication, 3 August 2010). As the protests against the reconstruction of the main train station in Stuttgart reached national proportions and escalated violently in September 2010, the implementation of taCom was accelerated until objectives and tasks for taCom were officially defined in May 2011. In each governmental district and in the city of Stuttgart, there are now two coordinators for taCom. More than eighty officers were trained for deployment as ACTs, and eighteen riot police officers are placed in TLUs. Generally, the communication officers operate in teams of three and only exceptionally in teams of two.¹⁰⁹ As in Hessen and Berlin, these units endeavor to explain the behavior of the police and facilitate legitimate demonstration goals. The choice regarding who will be a communication officer is made by the department superintendents (see table 1).

Communicators from Bavaria supported the police in Baden-Württemberg during the NATO summit. The participation of communicators can be interpreted as the ambiguous aspiration of the Bavarian police force to modernize its public relations work. Since the assembly-friendly decision of the Federal Constitutional Board in 1985, the Bavarian police have invested, mainly through the work of the newly formed Central Psychological Service, in public relations but have invested very little in communicative crowd policing (Schmalzl 1990). Apart from the already ended ambitions of the Munich police to build up a communication command, the

109 "Das Prinzip der Taktischen Kommunikation," *Südwest Presse*, 11 August 2012. Accessed 15 January 2013. <http://www.swp.de/ulm/nachrichten/suedwestumschau/Das-Prinzip-der-Taktischen-Kommunikation;art4319,1582642>.

Table 1. Phase model for deployment of taCom units at the 2009 NATO summit, Baden-Wurttemberg.

Phase	TLUs	ACTs
1. Peaceful course	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Approach DP via loudspeakers ◆ Inform DP about course of event ◆ Inform about behavioral norms 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Establish contact with DP ◆ Inform DP about course of event
2. Sporadic interruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Explain situation ◆ Provide direct information about police behavior ◆ Make behavioral appeal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Explain situation ◆ Provide direct information about police behavior ◆ Make behavioral appeal
3. Increased interruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Make standard loudspeaker announcements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Explain situation ◆ Provide direct information about police behavior ◆ Make behavioral appeal
4. Massive interruption	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Make standard loudspeaker announcements with exclusion of certain individuals/groups ◆ Declare an end of demonstration ◆ Ban certain individuals/groups from premises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ End communication ◆ Retreat

Note. Table derived from personal communication with spokesperson for the German Police College, 3 January 2010. TLUs: Tactical loudspeaker units. ACTs: Anticonflict teams (three officers each). DP: Demonstration participants.

police force in Bavaria tends to manage crowd events in a relatively rigid way.

Police forces from Lower Saxony also deployed communication officers to the NATO summit. But unlike Bavaria, Lower Saxony has a rather complex taCom concept. Like development in Hessen and Berlin, development of the concept in Lower Saxony arose from an urgent need to change police tactics after various escalated crowd events. Following the massive riots on the occasion of the Cask for Storage and Transport of Radioactive Material (CASTOR) transports to Gorleben between 1997 and 2001, Lower Saxony authorities decided to change their master

plan for policing major crowd events (cf. AHA in Berlin). Their new master plan, Leine (“long leash”) is intended to show active de-escalating police behavior at gatherings and events characterized by a high potential for violence. Within this new master plan a face-to-face taCom concept called conflict management (CM) was integrated in 2005.

CM is differentiated on three levels. On the first two levels, two separate but interdependent taCom approaches were developed for demonstrations and for football matches. On the third level, CM was promoted within the police force itself so as to create acceptance. The Social Scientific Service of the

police in Lower Saxony qualified thirty CM officers, similar to the ACTs in Berlin, with the aims of establishing contact with groups in order to support their legitimate behavior and to reveal boundaries to those behaving unacceptably. These CM officers are deployed in teams of two and wear eye-catching vests. But in contrast to ACTs, the conflict managers are not only deployed at demonstrations but also at football matches. Another difference is that Lower Saxony, in contrast to e.g. Berlin or even Hessen, puts substantial effort into the run-up to crowd events. Lower Saxony communicates systematically with specific participating groups with the intention of arranging the terms for a successful event. These preparations are extensive but contribute significantly to preventing critical situations during the event.

Since 2007 the CMs have participated in twice-yearly, week-long advanced training courses. So far the training has covered (a) how to take a position between police commanders, riot forces, and demonstrators; (b) how to behave in difficult conversation situations with politically extreme and/or violence-prone groups; and (c) how to communicate nonviolently according to M. Rosenberg (spokespersons for the Social Scientific Service of the Police of Lower Saxony, personal communications, 28 June 2010, 2 April 2013).

Compared to the complex taCom concept deployed by Lower Saxony, other Saxon neighbors use taCom in a much less systematic way. Even though Saxony has several tactical loudspeaker vehicles at its disposal, their use is limited to sporadic events. In a cooperative effort between the urban administration and the police, in 2009 Leipzig created the first applicable concept for crowd-communication teams in Saxony. Afterward, urban officials, police psychologists, and police officers were trained during a three-day basic education program. The content of the qualification course was of a rather general nature and were intended to prepare officers for their first operations in TLUs or ACTs. Like the

concepts used in Hessen and Berlin, that of Leipzig aimed at early and long-lasting communication offers in order to meet the communication needs of the demonstrators and to prevent or resolve conflict. Because police officers were trained alongside civilians, the teams all appeared at the events unarmed and in civilian clothes, each wearing a baseball cap, vest, and radio equipment and using town maps, flyers, and other public relations material as their gear (spokesperson for the Advanced Training Institute of the Police of Saxony, personal communication, 23 August 2010). As a matter of fact, Saxony's few taCom units are not adequately prepared for deployment at critical crowd events. Consequently, taCom units from Berlin and Lower Saxony are often requested in cases of major events, such as a march of extreme right-wing demonstrators.

Saxony-Anhalt also commands some communicators who constitute what are called de-escalation teams. However, there is no special framework for the qualification or the deployment of these teams. TaCom contents are partially taught during the basic police training, even though the team members are mainly recruited from among operational trainers and other officers with higher qualification (spokesperson for the Police Academy of Saxony-Anhalt, personal communication, 2 August 2010).

The taCom concept of the free Hanseatic city Bremen, surrounded by Lower Saxony, follows much of its neighbor's approach as well as those of Berlin and Hessen. On account of the particularly increased safety requirements set following the lasting success of the football club Werder Bremen, the taCom concept in Bremen focuses exclusively on football events and is therefore not treated in this article.

Germany's second Hanseatic city, Hamburg, employs a unique taCom concept. Because of annually occurring riots in the inner city, taCom became part of the coalition agreements of the black-green government formed in 2008. To reassert police control over the problem of violence, the government

extended the operational tools of the police to include one that had already been used successfully in other federal states. As a result, extensive financial resources were invested in a tailor-made training program and in the operational application of taCom for demonstrations.

A specific feature of Hamburg's concept is its different distribution of priorities. Even though de-escalation is one of the main goals, it is subordinate to the task of enforcing law, order, and self-protection. Explaining police behavior is imperative, but even more important is recognizing hostility and demagogues within the mass. Therefore, communication teams act in groups of three – a communicator, a radio operator, and a close-protection guard. If the third of these perceives the situation as dangerous, the team retreats immediately, using personal protection techniques. High-risk groups, such as the black bloc and other violence-prone groups, are for safety reasons never addressed. The communication teams do not act autonomously but are deployed tactically by the police commander. Tactics and the code of action for direct communication officers were part of the ten-day training program of the first cohort. These approximately twenty communicators participated in major exercises with the riot police so as to coordinate their courses of action. Another specific feature of Hamburg's taCom training is the improvement of intercultural competence in order to meet intercultural conflicts with the same professionalism. Even though Hamburg has a cohort of well-trained taCom officers, the jurisdiction's deployment rate is very low despite a huge number of major events (Police College of Hamburg, personal communication, 9 July 2010). A main reason for this may be the ambivalent position of the police commanders vis-à-vis taCom. A minority is convinced of this new tool and quite a number of commanders feel patronized by the politics. As a result, many do not request communicators when policing a crowd event.

After the assembly-friendly decision of the Federal Constitutional Board in 1985, one of the fastest changes in crowd policing occurred in North Rhine-Westphalia. In 1987 the police presidium of Dortmund installed a communication platoon with the same aims that motivated the creation and training of taCom units in Berlin and Hessen. Since 1994 police officers are trained during several weeks for work specifically in this platoon. While policing an event the various communication teams either are requested by police commanders for relevant conflict situations or operate independently to de-escalate local conflicts (Engels 2004). After the success of Dortmund's communication platoon, the police in North Rhine-Westphalia developed a national de-escalatory operational model for the basic education of all their police officers. The stages shown in figure 3 are part of the theoretical and practical basic education (Kraft 2002).




Figure 3. Graded use of communication in interpersonal interaction between police officers and citizens as part of basic police education in North Rhine-Westphalia.

Moreover, at the level of the riot police, the Advanced Training Institute offers voluntary advanced training for TLUs. Riot police platoons are obliged to train qualified speakers for their loudspeaker units in order to guarantee the communicative support at critical mass events (Advanced Training Institute of the Riot Police of North Rhine-Westphalia, personal communication, 20 September 2010). Anyhow, it should also be mentioned that North Rhine-Westphalia has no actual or systematic approach to meeting the characteristics of taCom as they are discussed here; indeed, it seems that the operational use of communication there is still in an experimental state.

One of the most systematic and most extensive taCom frameworks is implemented by the police in Thuringia. As in Hessen, the Psychological Service of Thuringia is involved in the operational planning and realization of so called “communicative conflict resolutions” as part of the master plan. For each crowd event the Psychological Service creates a separate communication plan that is integrated into the master plan of the police commander in charge of the specific crowd event.

During the crowd event itself, ACTs and TLUs can be deployed. To join one of these groups, experienced officers may participate once a year in two different assessment programs. If they succeed, they receive three weeks of training and an annual supervision session. All communicators are equipped with headsets and act to a large extent independently. Thus, they are addressing not only demonstrators but also their own colleagues. Overambitious or stressed colleagues can be supported in this way, preventing not only any escalation caused by demonstrators but also any incited by the police force itself (spokesperson for the Psychological Service of Thuringia, personal communication, 29 July 2010).

Good neighborly relations between Mainz and Wiesbaden led to the first deployment of TLUs in Rhineland-Palatinate, following the example of Hessen. In 2005 the first football matches were accom-

panied by TLUs; thereafter in 2008 demonstrations were managed with the support of TLUs, a task that proved much more difficult using only the indirect communication option of the TLUs. For the public viewing events during the football world championship in 2010 in South Africa, the Ministry of the Interior gave the order to qualify taCom officers on a national level. Accordingly, eighty-eight officers volunteered to be trained in a five-day course to work both as indirect loudspeaker communicators and as face-to-face communicators.

The knowledge that Mainz had acquired in the TLU test phase was subsequently shared with the police of Saarland. However, systematic training did not take place, and thus the taCom experiences of Saarland are limited to some example experiences in which behavioral trainers were used as communicators and to the superficial learning experiences with the TL-vehicles (Ministry of the Interior, Department of Advanced Police Training, personal communication, 21 June 2010). Yet it needs to be noted that Saarland, like Rhineland-Palatinate, is among Germany’s smaller, rural federal states and is not a frequent host of major events. As a result, violence as a problem has not created the pressure necessary to motivate the systematic implementation of new crowd policing structures like taCom.

Almost the same status can be attributed to Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. However, the 2008 G8 summit in Heiligendamm posed a challenge for the police in which all crowd-policing options were deployed, including taCom. Part-time hostage negotiators and behavioral trainers were briefly prepared and then used as conflict advisers. But apart from this event, no other taCom experiences took place in the meantime (Institute of Advanced Training in the Advanced Technical College for Public Administration, Police, and Judicature of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, personal communication, 3 June 2010). Schleswig-Holstein is the only federal state that has no concepts, ambitions, or experience whatsoever in

terms of tactical communication (Police Head Office for Education and Advanced Training, personal communication, 31 May 2010).



Figure 4. Approximate levels of taCom development in Germany's federal states.

New Trends and Future Prospects

The spectrum of Germany's taCom is highly uneven (see figure 4). Several federal police organizations have no frameworks at all and teach only general knowledge about communicating with citizens. Some elaborate their own ideas in their applications of taCom; many follow the examples of Berlin and Hessen. But all have one thing in common: they have advanced exclusively empirically based procedures in order to manage their football matches or demon-

strations. This means that all the taCom systems work according to best practices and trial-and-error methods. As a result, the German police force trains its crowd-management officers in either general face-to-face communication training (GCT) or in empirically based crowd-dialogue training (ECDT). Therefore, with the progression of Rhineland-Palatinate's taCom efforts, a new dialogue training (NDT) manual for taCom officers was introduced in 2010 (Brunsch forthcoming). The principal purpose of NDT is to train and certify police officers in the positive exertion of influence on members of a crowd and the police force. In this way the dialogue training is intended to modernize police knowledge of crowd structures, primarily through implementation in light of research and scientific information, as well as the practical handling of crowd members itself. That means that for the first time, a German police organization has qualified its officers with crowd-communication training based on practical experience as well as on theoretical evidence. Hence it has been assumed that NDT qualifies officers more successfully than GCT and ECDT do. Because there were no standardized manuals for ECDT available to German police organizations, it was possible to test only an actual GCT; however, the specific GCT used covered in most instances the same content included in comparable ECDTs. Through the procedure described below, the success of this GCT was compared with that of NDT.

At first, success was defined through common objectives of taCom (de-escalating conflict, preventing solidarity with disruptive individuals, increasing police action transparency, and improving police image). Then eighty-eight randomly distributed police officers were qualified through either NDT or GCT; subsequently, both dialogue trainings were evaluated in three consecutive phases. In the first phase, called pre-evaluation, the two samples were examined for any preexistent differences (e.g., participants' age, professional experience, training motiva-

tion). In the following post-evaluation phase, subjects were asked about their perception of the training's effects. The third and final phase questioned whether there was a practical use for the elements learned in training (transfer evaluation). While the officers perceived both training programs as effective opportunities to enhance face-to-face communication in a tactical way, comparison of the surveys shows higher effectiveness for the NDT. Analysis of the post- and transfer-evaluation questionnaires shows in each case evidence supporting this (see figure 5).




Figure 5. Findings of the comparison between the perceived quality of the new and the general communication training in two evaluation stages after the trainings.

Note. 1 = lowest rank, 4 = average rank, 7 = highest positive rank. GT = General communication training in transfer evaluation. NT = New dialogue training in transfer evaluation. GP = General communication training in post-evaluation. NP = New dialogue training in post-evaluation.

Although it is too early to interpret the findings as proof that reform is needed in Germany's crowd management, these results nevertheless indicate the importance of applied science information in crowd policing. This is of particular significance considering the effect that classic crowd knowledge has in Germany. Owing to the widely accepted perspective that a crowd is either peaceful or unruly, many police commanders tend to treat all the people in a crowd either supportively or with repressive force. Recent research shows, however, that a crowd is not homogeneous but consists of various groups. As a matter of fact, classic knowledge becomes a self-fulfilling

prophecy. If a police commander, for example, assumes that a crowd is homogeneous and therefore treats everyone within that crowd in the same way, whether they are unruly or not, the officer will actually unite the factions in the crowd against the police. Consequently, "the psychology and social processes that [make] a 'riot' possible emerg[e] as the outcome of specific forms of group level interactions that were largely and inadvertently initiated by police tactical responses" (Stott 2009, 8). That means that "policing practices based on the classic crowd psychologies may not only be misinformed but actively counterproductive" (Reicher et al. 2007, 6). Nevertheless, police commanders in Germany often give their orders based on this classic perspective. Relying on this premise, police commanders cannot anticipate the positive effect of deploying taCom officers to prevent potentially moderate groups from showing solidarity with unruly groups instead of aligning themselves with the police (e.g., hiding stone throwers instead of distancing themselves from the delinquents). To a greater extent these commanders see taCom officers as a weak point in their formation, one vulnerable to assault during unpredictable escalations. As a result, many do not request the support of tactical communication, even though well-trained TLUs and/or ACTs may be at their disposal. Thus, it is the responsibility of ministries and police headquarters not only to qualify crowd communicators in the future but also to improve the skills and knowledge of police commanders regarding the deployment of these units. In addition, it is conceivable that taCom be named an obligatory operational tool at all major events and within a specified time frame in order to allow taCom to be more fully integrated into daily routines.

However, whereas the theoretical base of taCom still needs more consideration, the practical development has received increasing attention in the last few years. In 2009 the first German taCom conference took place in Hessen and offered participants oppor-

tunities to inspire each other and connect outside the often quite long official channels. The third conference in Lower Saxony in 2012 hosted international communication specialists from police organizations in Poland, the Czech Republic, England, and Hungary, which presented new national developments in taCom. Thereby it is striking that more and more border-crossing collaborations are developing between European countries and regions, such as those between Hessen and Turkey, Berlin and the Czech Republic, and Lower Saxony's participation in GODIAC. Mentioning GODIAC in this context emphasizes that even at the level of the European Union, police communication during crowd events has been granted status as an eligible tactic. It should be a major priority not only to discover the best practices for successful crowd dialogue but also to set great value on the promotion of the project discoveries within the European police forces. Of course, tactical communication has to develop in ways that respect the cultural and political characteristics of each country, and not all practices highlighted by GODIAC or by a cooperating country will be appropriate in every European state. Even so, these collaborations advance dialogue policing on a national level and increase the compatibility of the different approaches that might be employed simultaneously, for example, in transnational demonstrations.

To sum up, Germany's taCom is in practical terms relatively advanced compared to parallel structures in other European states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy, and France. Nevertheless, it lacks a theoretical substructure, a circumstance that impedes the extensive and sustainable implementation of taCom because neither police nor demonstrators accept it completely. Perhaps no other example illustrates this better than the term *tactical communication* itself. The police want to achieve demonstrations with decreased rates of violence. Recent research findings indicate that this can be accomplished through a differentiated and

transparent course of action – supporting all lawful demonstrators and reprimanding only unruly participants – thereby strengthening the solidarity of peaceful participants with the police rather than with the delinquents. Communicators are able to mediate between the police and the demonstrators in order to reach commitment to this course of action from both sides. But how can a participant trust someone called a *tactical communicator*, a military term implying an “us versus them” situation in which only one side can win? Similarly, why are the officers called tactical communicators if the authorities are truly prepared to foster a mutual connection with a respectable counterpart? The question demonstrates that taCom in Germany is in need of further development. Even federal states with quite sophisticated approaches use their resources to expand their practical knowledge on a basis of trial and error instead of by investing in systematic evaluation – partly because police commanders even now rarely see the potential of this new operational tool.

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1.6 The possibility of using the private security services in Slovakia to ensure local and state public order

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Introduction

During on-site observation in the GODIAC project's eighth field study in Slovakia, Pride Parade 2012, the researchers' attention was attracted by the fact that several units and several types of police and semipolice forces were deployed there, each characterized by different uniforms, equipment, tasks, and responsibilities. Their common objective – to ensure public order and the safety of participants – enabled those various security structures to exploit their resources in an effort to achieve the goal.

The main entity performing tasks of maintaining public order there was the police force, the Slovak Republic's national security force and also its largest. Its role in securing major events of mass character, including political events, is tertiary in terms of the legal protection of the right to assembly. The police force is deployed only when the primary and secondary entities responsible for ensuring public order and security will not fulfill or are not able to fulfill this task.

The role of the national police force is therefore minimal in terms of this study. If private security services (PSS) are to be deployed to maintain public order and security during major events, according to theories of public order police activities and theories of police science, properly conducted and supervised training by police is necessary for those elements of the PSS that will work at major events. Even so, considering the police force a primary entity charged with ensuring public order and security at major events remains valid, partly because these tasks are set out in the Act on the Police Force and also

because the aforementioned tertiary duties are part of the force's mandate. Moreover, the police force's responsibility in this arena issues from the laws regulating the right to assembly and other mass activities. But as a tertiary actor in protecting this right, again, the police force acts to ensure public order and security during major events in cases only when all others – those holding the primary and secondary responsibilities – have not met their obligations.

A municipality holds secondary responsibility in maintaining public order and security during major events when such an event takes place in its territory. In addition to formal duties and authorizations in this regard, the municipality has at its disposal its executive branch, the municipal police. The role of a municipality and of the municipal police in such situations involves upholding the citizens' right to participate in assemblies of all kinds, mainly by supervising such events but also potentially by terminating and prohibiting an event – and, in particular, by ensuring public order and security during major events. Only after the municipal police have fulfilled their obligation using their own resources is it the police force's turn to perform its duties.

The organizer of the event carries primary responsibility for ensuring public order and security and is expected to deploy the group's own resources. This is a logical and a common duty in democratic societies because the one who organizes an activity can on no reasonable grounds expect other people to cover the costs of such a service. The organizers may for this purpose make use of various instruments and methods in order to ensure public order and security during their major events.

Event organizers have several options for meeting this obligation. They can do so utilizing the participants in the event, but this option is the least effective because the participants are neither trained nor qualified for such work, and they lack the necessary equipment and experience. A more efficient option is to use stewards, usually recruited from among the

organization's volunteers or from volunteers trained specifically for this purpose. The qualifications, preparedness, competence, equipment, and experience of these stewards do not differ significantly from volunteers. In order to develop the competence of this group of people, police science recommends at least minimum training in examples of good practices and guidelines for ensuring public order and security during major events. Professional training of stewards should be undertaken by the police force at the organizer's cost.

The most effective – but currently the least utilized – way an event organizer can ensure public order and security during major events is to engage the services of qualified private security agencies. A PSS is a fully paid service governed by a contract. This study explores the viability of deploying PSS forces so as to maintain public order during major events by comparing these forces with the municipal police.

Conditions of Use of Private Security Services¹¹⁰

Society in its evolution has gradually developed appropriate standards of behaviour, nowadays laid out in the form of laws and other legal norms. This standardization allows for the creation and operation of services that ensure the protection and security of the property, life, and health of individuals and groups of people. One entity that provides this service is a private security agency. In the Slovak Republic, regulation of private security issues is provided by a particular law that in practical terms is complemented by regulations set out by the Ministry of Interior. PSS forces therefore represent a legitimate approach to solving problems related to protecting the property, life, and health of individuals and groups living in a relevant territory of the Slovak

Republic. The law is based on a commercial provision of security services.

The services outlined in the Act on Private Security¹¹¹ involve at least two parties – namely, a natural or legal person who requires a service, and an agency that provides services in this field and holds licences to do so (that is, a private security service). Business licences in this area are strictly controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The main precondition for obtaining a licence is that the applying agency must have the required theoretical knowledge and practical experience in providing services in the private security sector. It must be an organization that possesses basic organizational and personnel potential to develop and implement security projects.

What prevents greater use of PSS forces in the process of protection of property, life, and health not only of citizens but also of public authorities and local governments? That a need exists is reflected especially in situations in which a state or municipality is not able to adequately protect the interests of citizens, whether individuals, groups of citizens, or legal entities. The alternative to contracting a PSS is effective, low-cost management of the security functions of the state and municipalities.

General Political Circumstances

In a democratic society, the state is at the forefront of the organization of life and work within its territorial unit, which is defined by national borders. The state is the main actor, bearing full responsibility for creating a system characterized by the basic attributes of legitimacy and democracy, and outwardly it maintains the character of a state unit. Depending on the type of management and organization of the state, one can speak of various state organizations in terms of law – a state, a union of states, a federation, a confederation, a constitutional monarchy, and so

110 J. Metenko, J. Hejda, "Alternatíva privátneho sektora a preventívnych policajných činností," kap. 3.11, in J. Dušek, L. Pána, R. Svatoš, *Udržitelný rozvoj a funkce moderného státu 1* (České Budějovice: Vysoká škola evropských a regionálních studií, 2012), 263–273.

111 Act no. 473/2005 Coll., paragraphs 3 and 4 on private security, as amended.

on. In terms of the basic political system of governance, one differentiates between a parliamentary state, a presidential state, a kingdom, and others. The organization of the state and the management system of state authority determine the boundaries and capabilities of nonstate structures in performing the state's tasks.

One of the fundamental responsibilities of a sovereign state is providing internal security for its citizens. This is accomplished primarily by setting legal standards, such as the national constitution and constitutional laws, other laws and standards, and government regulations, as well as generally binding decrees issued by local authorities and regulating relations in this area. The legal and legislative role is inseparable from the task of creating a system that can apply the laws in these basic documents regulating relations in internal security. For someone other than a citizen to have the opportunity to apply these standards of conduct and supervise their implementation, there must exist, under the auspices of the state, an authority that is by law given the authority to implement the management, control, and enforcement of the state's security policy. This is fulfilled by the state's executive branch, the government. The government authoritatively enforces security policy inside the country and implements the state security policy developed particularly, in the case of the Slovak Republic, by the Ministry of Interior.

The state makes full provisions in the Constitution to protect citizens' property, life, and health using the standard management of protection provided by the state. But it is also possible to increase the protection of people and property commercially, by engaging professionally trained and managed security agencies. These agencies operate under commercial law, while their expertise is guaranteed by the Ministry of Interior through licensing.

The Municipality

The municipality may establish a municipal police force to oversee security in municipal territory. Municipal police powers are defined in the Act on Municipal Police.¹¹²

Thus, for the security of life, health, and property of citizens there are, in addition to state (national) authorities, two separate structures – PSS and municipal police forces – both of which can operate and assure security within the municipality. Each of these structures has its advantages and disadvantages. Those who want to provide this service must decide, whether for economic or other reasons, which variant best suits them. A PSS is less expensive for municipality, and there is no employment relationship with the municipality; it is more flexible and operational, and liability for damages rests with the party supplying the service. Sometimes, a PSS may enjoy wider authority than the municipal police do because PSS officers do not work only desk jobs but instead spend all their time in the field and in touch with citizens, and they do not exercise the same repressive methods often applied by municipal police. If authorized by generally binding regulations, a PSS may also perform additional tasks that initially fall under the responsibility of the municipal police. Another advantage of a municipality's engaging PSS is that the funds are used in boosting employment within the region and in the development of technology and services for the municipality, while the service itself lies outside the financial care and responsibility of the municipality. PSS activities of protection of property and people can be stopped at any time, or they can be expanded for a particular individual, resident of the municipality, or citizen. Competences granted under the Act on Private Security are, in relation to the client, similar to those of a citizen.

112 Act of the National Council of the Slovak Republic No. 564/1991 on municipal police, as amended.

Setting Objectives in Organizing Services of Private Agencies

The primary goals of a municipality's hiring PSS are protecting property owned by the municipality, troubleshooting disturbances of public order, and preventing and detecting illegal activities by legal and natural persons in the municipality through forms and methods that entail applying knowledge of police science and employing managerial systems of leading and organizing a security agency. Briefly, a municipality that contracts such services knows what it is paying for and requires the contractor to comply with contractual rules. With regard to the municipal police, this option is controversial or at least problematic owing to certain personal relationships to employees.

Nowadays, a secondary reason (though no less fascinating) that municipalities might contract a PSS is to achieve a relatively satisfactory state of security in their territory at lower cost, in a manner at least as effective as that used by the municipal police. The effect of use of these private services for citizens and not against them should be experienced at the same time because the service performs only activities related to prevention and acts repressively only against violators of the law. This is a disadvantage of a PSS in comparison to the municipal and national police forces. PSS forces may operate only in compliance with the Act on Private Security, and those powers are restricted solely to the protection of individuals and property as defined by a contract.¹¹³ This means that the sphere of its activities is very narrow and can lead to increased legal reasons. Thus, despite their positive elements, PSS activities may not adequately fulfil the task of maintaining general security in a large territory. Instead, a PSS force may participate in typical police activities in cooperation with national or municipal police; the national police

force manages and coordinates the activities with support of other entities, ensuring security in the given territory.

Addressing Issues in Organizing Protection and Security Services

Issues regarding private protection and security services can be summarized in the possibilities that the regulatory act provides to such agencies, which seek to fulfil contractual claims. The Act on Municipal Police¹¹⁴ regulates the development, operation, and supervision of such entities by the state, and on the other hand, it provides opportunities for the protection of individuals and property in a way that is fully accessible to the citizen as customer. This act regulates the provision of private security services, state supervision by the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic, and the exercise of control by the police force in the arena of private security. Under this act, private security operates as a PSS or as a technical service for the protection of property and individuals. This act does not apply to security activities undertaken by a state authority for its own use, such as the National Bank of Slovakia, the Slovak armed forces, armed security forces, the rescue corps, guards established by law, diplomatic missions, consular offices, or local governmental bodies carrying out tasks of public administration.

According to this act, types of security services mainly include a guard service, a detective service, and specialized training and consultancy. The act governs the operation of a security service, and for this purpose it authorizes natural and legal persons who have met the requirements of the act and of other regulations to provide security for others or for themselves.

The act further delineates the content of individual types of security services. Under this regulation,

¹¹³ Act no. 473/2005 Coll. paragraphs 3 and 4 on private security, as amended.

¹¹⁴ Act no. 564/1991 of National Council of the Slovak Republic on Municipal Police, as further amended.

guard service entails protecting property at a public place; protecting property at a nonpublic place; protecting a person; protecting property and a person during transportation; protecting transport of property and a person; ensuring public order at an assembly place; or operating a security or alarm system, running its parts, assessing a protected premise or place, or developing a plan of protection.

As defined by the act, *detective service* involves searching for a person; searching for property; monitoring activities of a person indoors or in an enclosed place; obtaining information that may serve as evidence in court proceedings or before an administrative body; collecting data on the marital status of a natural person and gathering information on the acts or means of a natural or legal person; obtaining information related to the recovery; or collecting data on offences threatening a trade secret. According to the act, detective service does not include activities performed under special provisions.

It is necessary to emphasize the differences in the authority granted PSS personnel, municipal police, and national police in protection of property, life, and health; these have not changed during the last seven years. Consequently, it is not the usual practice to consider these three police entities as a group or to examine cooperative action between them in protecting the rights of citizens, although this study demonstrates that this is possible. For a brief analysis, it will be sufficient to consider the topic of physical protection, which in content is the PSS task most closely related to the tasks of municipal police.

First, consider the differences in the authority of an organization acting in the sphere of protection and security. PSS authority in the territory in question is determined by the party commissioning the service. Private security services may guard *only* the place of a particular facility, a specific person, or a specific person and piece of property during transit. Municipal police authority, on the other hand, covers the territory of the entire municipality; meanwhile, the

municipal police fulfil the duties of securing public order; protecting municipality and private property from damage, destruction, loss, and misuse; protecting the municipal environment; and maintaining order, cleanliness, and street hygiene. Municipal police also enforce generally binding municipality regulations and levies, and they collect penalties levelled for delicts in the block procedure stipulated by special regulation and for traffic delicts related to security and the smooth flow of traffic. A municipality may assign further tasks to the municipal police if special laws apply.

Based on the foregoing, the basic tasks of the municipal police may be performed also by a PSS. The question is whether a PSS has adequate authorization by law to perform the given tasks with the requested result, based on its contractual relation with the municipality – since the very concept of ensuring public order, for instance, encompasses a number of areas that a PSS has no authority to safeguard.

Another important difference between PSS and municipality forces concerns the use of coercive means. According to the Act on Private Security, *coercive means* are defined as material security means, including using an animal as a weapon, forcing the subject to halt, or restricting the features of technical equipment. In this case, the law does not specify the concrete coercive means that may be used by a PSS. This general formulation means that PSS workers can be equipped and armed while all legal conditions are fulfilled by all legally obtainable measures. In contrast, in the case of municipal police, the coercive means are specific: strokes, grips, punches, and self-defence kicks; tear gas and similar implements; truncheons; handcuffs; and service dogs. The Act on Municipal Police, further, states under which conditions a member of the municipal police may use these coercive means.

Thus, the Act on Private Security neither specifically regulates coercive means nor regulates when

a PSS force may use them. It can be clearly deduced, then, that coercive means may be used by a PSS officer only in accordance with conditions of necessary self-defence and extreme urgency (i.e., in the scope valid also for a common citizen). Authorizations of PSS workers are regulated by the same act regarding physical protection and are hence dependent on people and objects, so a person authorized to perform physical protection or an investigation may carry out the action only if the interest protected by the security service is infringed or threatened, and then only in accordance with the act and other generally binding legal regulations. Further, other actions requiring the cooperation of third parties may be carried out only with their agreement.

Individuals authorized to perform physical protection according to this act are entitled to do the following:

1. Check by sight, touch, or other technical means whether the person entering or exiting the protected facility or site is carrying or wearing objects with which illegal activity could be committed, and confiscate any such items.
2. Prohibit unauthorized persons from accessing the protected facility or site.
3. Prohibit persons carrying a weapon from accessing the protected facility or site if entry with a weapon is forbidden.
4. Keep entry and exit records on people and vehicles at the protected facility or site; for this purpose authorized workers are entitled to request proof of identity.
5. Record by technical means entry and exit of people and vehicles at the protected facility or site.
6. Require identification of a person caught committing a delict or a criminal offence that relates to the performance of physical protection or of a person stopped immediately after committing such an act.
7. Require proof of the identity of a person caught illegally entering or exiting the protected facility or site.

8. Check whether the person entering or exiting the protected facility or site with a vehicle has in or on the vehicle objects or animals as a result of illegal activity related to the protected person or the protected site, or any objects by which illegal activity could be committed, and confiscate such objects.
9. Detain at the guard post until a police officer, the military police, or the municipal police arrive any person who refuses or is unable to reliably prove his or her identity or who was caught committing an offence or immediately afterwards, or was caught illegally entering or exiting the protected facility or site.

These provisions make clear that PSS workers do not have a broad scope of authorization within the framework of PSS task performance to intervene in fundamental rights and freedoms. Their authority is strictly defined in terms of the very specific activity or space agreed upon with the party that has commissioned service.

In contrast, a member of the municipal police force is authorized to act throughout the territory of the entire municipality; moreover, the function performance of municipal police has a more significant character than that of a PSS in interventions related to human rights and freedoms – for example, municipal police have the authority to open an apartment (§11), the authority to seize a possession (§12), the authority to require an explanation (§10), and the authority to check whether a detained individual is armed or is carrying an object that might threaten life or health and to seize such an item (§8.1.d).¹¹⁵

The third important differentiating factor is the institution of the title *public official*,¹¹⁶ the aim of which is to protect a person who is fulfilling tasks

¹¹⁵ Act no. 564/1991 of National Council of the Slovak Republic on Municipal Police, as further amended.

¹¹⁶ Act no. 300/2005 Coll. on the Penal Code, as further amended.

of the state. Such a position is given by law only to a member of the municipal or state police;¹¹⁷ a municipal police officer holds this position only while on duty and performing work activity within the municipality.¹¹⁸ The penal code defines as a criminal offence any attack on a public servant, providing a certain form of protection and prevention against attacks on public servants.¹¹⁹ If such an attack occurs, the offender is punished with longer imprisonment than in case of normal bodily assault.¹²⁰ However, this protection also sanctions, in a way, abuse of the public official's authority; this sanction would automatically be a part of the institute transferred to PSS workers hired to maintain public order in the municipality.

Conclusion

Slovak legislation recognizes the problems inherent in protecting the public order, individuals, and property within the framework of the municipalities' autonomous position. The municipalities may, for the protection of their citizens and of public and private property, use the forms and means prescribed by law under strict adherence to the knowledge of police science in the practical application of legally available protection services.¹²¹ For the same purpose, these services can also be used for keeping order during major events.

Based on this brief analysis, one major fact should be highlighted: during the selection of a relevant security service, the valid legal restrictions and limits in expertise determined by the acts discussed here apply mainly to PSS. At present, these restrictions cannot curtail the activity of municipal police; they have neither the authorization nor the legal means to do so.

Whether a municipality uses a PSS therefore remains a decision each local authority makes for itself, depending on which individual elements, services, or activities it finds useful for protecting property, people, and municipality territory, as well as for guarding state bodies and entities. Based on the foregoing analysis, the services of municipal police cannot be replaced by PSS services; PSS workers do not have the breadth of legal authorization necessary to meet a municipality's needs.

In regard to maintaining public order and protecting people and property as enacted by organizers of major or large events, however, this restriction does not apply. The theory of police science allows us to apply its findings to the deployment of PSS for the protection of public order at such events. Granted, not only the reasons that municipalities contract PSS services but also the economic aspects of such protection should be considered. Such cases of selective, targeted, purposeful use of PSS services by municipalities are attested.

Owing to its highly targeted purpose, a PSS force should be regarded not as a universal solution to the problem of safeguarding citizens' property and health but as single-purpose service to the municipality. It would be interesting to consider the possibility of extending PSS authorizations and the specifications of coercive means, specifying their exact use only in cases in which the municipality has contracted an agreement with the PSS for protection and for keeping order in the municipality. These extended authorizations would apply solely during the time of task performance and only in the area of maintaining public order.

117 Act no. 564/1991 of National Council of the Slovak Republic on Municipal Police, as further amended; Act no. 473/2005 Coll. on Private Security, as further amended, paragraphs 3 and 4.

118 Act no. 564/1991 of National Council of the Slovak Republic on Municipal Police, as further amended.

119 Act no. 300/2005 Coll. on the Penal Code, as further amended.

120 Act no. 300/2005 Coll. on the Penal Code as further amended, § 155, 156.

121 J. Metenko, "Policačné vedy a policačné činnosti, výskum a vývoj metód," in J. Metenko and I. Bačíková, *Policačné vedy a policačné činnosti, zborník z medzinárodnej konferencie konanej dňa 14. novembra 2007* (Bratislava: Akadémia PZ, 2008), 37–42.

I recommend preparing a detailed analysis of specific extended PSS authorizations for consideration because the state cannot afford to disparage the activity of other security services, subordinating a private company that performs state activities on a contractual, commercial basis. Further, it seems that this option would be effective as the service of choice for organizers of important events, mainly because it would lower the cost of the national police force. This analysis should address the conditions needed for mutual cooperation between PSS and municipality police forces when the two are obliged to cooperate in keeping the public order.

As for legislative changes in the stated direction, the exact conditions under which PSS workers are to act must be defined such that they can effectively perform tasks to protect municipal public order. This legislation would also allow the formation and operation of mixed municipal police and PSS patrols; that would lead to an increase in the number of people keeping public order in the municipality during, for example, political, athletic, social, and other events. Current legislation does not prefer such cooperation, nor at practical level does it allow it, because of the unequal mandates granted these two services. This inequality, moreover, renders impossible mixed patrols of state and municipal police – cooperation is not feasible owing to the differences in each force's authorized tasks, in the performance of individual services, and in relation to the conditions for use of coercive means and the types of coercive means each is authorized to use. However, the importance of mixed patrols consisting of state police and municipality police is not so significant in connection with increased public order and improved municipality protection.

The amendment to the Act on Municipal Police that extends the authority of municipal police officers from one municipality, making it valid also in another municipality based on a written agreement between the two, is in principle moving in the same

direction.¹²² This legal option allows the municipality to protect public order without necessarily forming its own municipal police force; this approach may save financial burdens, as the two municipal budgets could be recalculated jointly so that the two jurisdictions share both the costs and the benefits. However, in cases of municipal police forces with few members, such an arrangement does not provide for the sudden appearance of an urgent security situation in one of the cooperating municipalities. Precisely such a situation could be temporarily addressed through the use of PSS forces granted the relevant authority to act.

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¹²² Amendment no. 105/2011 Coll. of Act no. 564/1991 on Municipal Police.

1.7 Learning and special events

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Introduction

Special events can be anything from previously known major events, e.g. high-risk football games or political demonstrations, to unanticipated events, such as terrorist attacks, serious crimes or major accidents. Common to them all is that they break the everyday patterns of policing and require other measures, not least with regard to cooperation with actors other than the police. In everyday policing, usually the police response unit's knowledge, equipment, and authority are enough to solve most acute problems. One well known fact is that the largest challenge with special events for the actors involved is to go from everyday trot to alert. In spite of this, we will in this article not discuss the whole organizational context of special events and all of the problems related to them. Instead, we will concentrate on one aspect of the difficulties with organization for special events, namely, learning. After every special event the remark usually comes, not at least from the media or from the political level, that "we have to learn from this event for the future."

Since the 1990's, the concept '*learning organizations*' has been popular to refer to when discussing organizations and learning.¹²³ In this article, the perspective will be different from that of organization

theory; the point of departure will be 'institutional' that is, based on institutional theory. An institution is, in this sense, as North expresses the matter, "the rules of the game of a society composed of the formal rules (constitutions, statute and common law, regulations), the informal constraints (norms, conventions, and internally devised codes of conduct) and the enforcement characteristics of each. Together they define the way the game is played."¹²⁴ The entities, which are referred to as institutions, have the capacity to do two things which are of special interest for this paper: one, limit possible courses of action and ways of acting; two, facilitate alternative actions that would not be available without the existence of a certain institution or several cooperating institutions. Below, the difference between the police as an organization and as an institution is discussed in more detail. The focus of the discussion is the process of institutionalizing and change.

Problem

The problem which will be addressed in this article is "How can we learn from previous special events" and "how can learning become an integral part of working with special events."

¹²³ Senge is usually said to be the father of the concept of "learning organization"; see P. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York: Doubleday/Currency, 1990). But the concept of organizational learning also occurs in the debate; see, for example, C. Argyris and D. Schön, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978). One problem with the concept of learning organizations, as many have pointed out, is that organizations themselves do not learn it is people who learn, and therefore the concept of organizational learning is more accurate.

¹²⁴ D. North, "The Process of Economic Change," UNU/WIDER Working Paper no. 128 (Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, 1997). In police research has so far, institutional theory been is equivalent to that which in the organizational theory is named as *institutional theory*, see e.g. J. P. Crank, "Institutional Theory of Police: A Review of the State of Art in Policing," *An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 26 (2003): 186–207. The main difference in approach lies in how the concept of institutionalization is interpreted, and in that no clear distinction is made between *organization* and *institution*. For example, Meyer and Rowan makes a difference between technical and institutional organizations. For them, the institutional rules are "myths." J. W. Meyer and B. Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83, no. 2 (1977): 340–363. See also R. Granér, *Patrullerande polisens yrkeskultur* (Lund: Socialhögskolan, Lunds universitet, 2004), 47–48.

In order to further chisel out the problem to be addressed and by that the purpose of the article something must be said about education and training in relation to specific events. Education and training are key elements for creating a robust framework around special events. Equally important are realistic exercises to maintain a capability that exists and to identify weaknesses and deficiencies. Furthermore, supervisory activities, such as inspections, investigations, special commissions, should be mentioned and their impact on the development of strategies and tactics.¹²⁵ Even so, no matter how hard you educate, train, exercise, and monitor, there is an element that is difficult to capture, the unforeseen. But the unexpected always happens. It is also in the very essence of special events that they escape everyday life and routine. When learning is discussed below, it is with departure from this insight that the discussion takes place.

Method

The overall “method” that will be used is inspired by an IAD framework (institutional analysis and development framework).¹²⁶ The IAD framework is a diagnostic tool used to investigate broad subjects where human interaction is guided by rules and norms for their choice of strategies and behaviours. Most importantly it has the capacity to show the way to get out of path dependence and bring about change. A fundamental concept for such a framework is the “action arena: This “consist[s] of participants making decisions within a situation affected by physical,

community, and institutional characteristics that will then result in varying patterns of interactions and outcomes.”¹²⁷ The action arena in this case is policing special events, and the relevant actions are those the police use to control a specific action situation. The IAD is often represented graphically by Ostrom in this way:




Figure 1. IAD.

Source. E. Ostrom and C. Hess, “Analyzing the Knowledge Commons,” in *Understanding Knowledge as Commons*, ed. C. Hess and E. Ostrom (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 54.

An IAD consists of three parts; part one, the biophysical characteristics; part two, the action arena with an action situation; and part three, the outcomes and serves as a basis for change. Below we will translate this pattern and adapt it to the analysis of special events. If we want to simplify the IAD and adopt it to our purposes we can say that the IAD’s three parts temporally represent “before,” “during,” and “after” a situation. The situation in our case is a certain special event, e.g. a high-risk football match, a political demonstration, a terrorist attack, a serious crime, or a major accident. The action arena is the institution-

¹²⁵ On supervisory activities, see W. D. Loh, *Social Research in the Judicial Process: Cases, Readings, and Text* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984), 273–342. Also see group exercises for testing candidates to determine which is best suited for a position or for advancement: J. L. Coleman, *Police Assessment Testing: An Assessment Center Handbook for Law Enforcement Personnel* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 2010), 115–134.

¹²⁶ E. Ostrom, *Understanding Institutional Diversity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

¹²⁷ E. Ostrom, *Understanding Knowledge as a Commons* (Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 2011).

alized way for dealing with special events like that. Below we will discuss the special characteristics for action arenas in the area of policing.

To summarize, the three major building blocks of the modified IAD analysis that we will be interested in on a focal level are “exogenous factors,” “the action arena,” and “outcomes.” From a learning point of view, the most important of these is that outcomes will in the end influence coming exogenous factors so that also the action arena can change and the same mistakes are not made again and again. In this way learning and development are linked together.

The Police as an Organization and as an Institution

In everyday contexts a distinction between the concepts of organization and institution is rarely made. The two are often used synonymously. In social science research, however, the difference between these two concepts is of immense importance. Here, *institution* is often used to describe an arrangement or a particular way to solve a certain problem, and the arrangement refers to more than just the organizational part. To take an example from another field, banking can be said to be an institution and as such, banking is more than banks; it is a whole arrangement with formal rules, informal constraints, etc. which determine, what North above called, “how the game is played”. Such arrangements are often nearly invisible for us when they are in use, we take much for granted, but they become visible for us when, for example, when they are changing. The most classic example of an institutional change in this area was when northern Italy’s bankers during the 1100’s and 1200’s issued bills of exchange, *litterae cambii*. These created not only an effective means of payment, but also transformed the prospects for commerce in that, among other things, the expensive and dangerous transportation of money was avoided. One can speak of an institutional change which took place through the creation of the draft and similar means of pay-

ment. The “police”, as an institution, are also part of an institutional arrangement within the whole area of safety and security and is, as such, not only an organization, e.g. the Swedish police. To understand this better we can say that institutions “do” and allows things, e.g. conducting health care, building systems for medical benefits, agricultural subsidies, etc. But in our discussion we are not interested in the whole institution of “police.” We want to zoom in on a specific part of this institutional framework – special events – and see how this specific area is institutionalized. The IAD, described above, can be a way of zooming in on a specific institutional arrangement.¹²⁸ In so doing, we have to discuss the way that special events has been institutionalized, e.g. in Sweden, and through that get a better under-

128 The problem with this kind of zooming is though that human interaction and institutional relations are multi-leveled. Governance can be taken as an example. In a globalized world with open borders and by the weakening of the nation states traditional ‘top down’ descriptions does not fit any more. For example, many of the public tasks that used to be managed by one single agency are today managed in cooperation with several authorities, or in cooperation with other actors. This cooperation tends to create complex hierarchies. Understanding how these new configurations work is a fundamental challenge for research today. L. Hooze and G. Marks, “Unraveling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-Level Governance,” *American Political Science Review* (2003): 233–243; B. Wennström “The Horizontal State: States and Agencies in a World without Boundaries,” in *Aspects of Sovereignty*, ed. P. Sevastik Brill, forthcoming). Also see G. F. R. Ellis, “Physics and the Real World,” *Physics Today* 58, no. 7 (July 2005): 49, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1063/1.2012463>.

standing of the action arena in question.¹²⁹ But first a few words about rules.

Policing and Rules

It is often said that police organizations are rule-based hierarchical organizations. Such a proposition is, however, highly contested. If we again differentiate between organizations and institutions, the question about “rules” in relation to the police can become clearer.

Rules can be classified in many different ways for different purposes. Legal scientists, for example, often discuss rules based on their origin.¹³⁰ Doing so indicates that the starting point is a legal positivistic one, and that legal rules are those which are formulated by “legislators” who have the authority to promulgate them.¹³¹ Such a classification leads often to a distinction between legal rules and moral rules and also between legal rules and conventions.¹³² How-

ever, for the discussion here, the distinction between formal rules and informal rules is sufficient. What we foremost want to achieve with a classification of rules is a better understanding of the constraints that special events organizations have on them.

If we pursue the distinction made between formal and informal rules we also have to introduce the concept of “constitutional” rules here.¹³³ *Constitution* is not used here in the same way as in constitutional law where it denotes the rules that constitute, for example, a legal system. However, we can use the term “*constitutional rules*” also for a specific area, e.g. an action arena, in that these rules are constitutive for such an area. Such rules can be formal or informal, but are mostly a mix between these types. But different governance situations have different constitutive rules. If we take a typical limited company as an example, the constitutive rules of formal origin are fewer than those for a police force. In most private settings it is not forbidden to adopt rules of one’s own which determine some fundamental questions about who is to be included, the purpose, the decision-making process, etc. Within the police force many of these ways of dealing with fundamental questions would be considered illegal. Despite this, there is also here in the example of a special events organization, room for “self-organization”.

Why it is so important to differentiate between different rules in an action situation is because they are the only source for understanding why individuals in a certain situation act in a certain way, e.g. when making decisions. When asked, individuals will not always be aware of which rules they have adopted; the rules have many times become a “social habit.” This can be all right in most daily activities, but not those in a setting that is governed by the rule of law, as the situations we are interested in here are. What we ultimately want to do with our framework analysis here is to understand the real nature of the “rules in use”

129 History and social and political development is of interest in such a discussion. Take Sweden as an example: one can see how the institutionalization of the framework of special events has developed historically. Important milestones are the aircraft hijacking at Bulltofta Airport in 1972, the Norrmalmstorg drama of 1973, the assassination of prime minister Olof Palme in 1986, the assassination of two police officers in Malmö in 1999, and the Gothenburg riots of 2001. Important also is the history of football hooliganism in Sweden, as well as the tactics that have been developed for dealing with it. It would be interesting to examine all these events and trends in order to gain a broad understanding, but space here does not allow a proper treatment. For a snapshot from 1999, see SOU 1999:88, “Granskningsskommissionens betänkande. Brottsutredningen efter mordet på statsminister Olof Palme,” *Statens offentliga utredning* (1999): 88.

130 R. M. Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously* (London: Duckworth, 1978), 38–41.

131 J. Austin, “Lecture 1,” in *The Province of Jurisprudence Determined*, by J. Austin and W. E. Rumble (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)

132 H. L. A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” *Harvard Law Review* 71, no. 4 (1958): 593–629; R. Alexy, “The Dual Nature of Law,” *Ratio Juris* 23, no. 2 (2010): 167–182.

133 Cf. Ostrom, (2005) 16–22, 186–215.

during a special event and through that contribute to learning and in the end, to change.

The Swedish organization for special events can here serve as a good example. The high institutionalization of this organization is clearly shown by the formal framework that has been developed around it. The National Police Board has, for example, with statutory authorization issued rather detailed regulations and general guidelines for planning, management, and organization of special events (FAP 201–1).¹³⁴ This regulation starts with definitions and then describes a principle organization, a chain of command with an order template, and other detailed provisions. It has as attachments which graphically illustrate what the principle organization should look like, with details concerning the order template, the staff teams divisions in different functions, regulation of the use of language in the form of concepts and terms. The main part of the regulation and general guidelines can, with the concepts used here, be called “constitutional,” and by that also decide the room for more informal rules and for self-organization.

The Situation Centre as an Example

If we call the whole special events organization for an action arena, created in Sweden by the above motioned FAP 201–1, issued by the National Police Board, we can from that broad picture zoom in to a vital part of the organization to test our proposal to use an IAD inspired model for learning purposes. We can then choose the situation centre as a starting point for our discussion. Also, in the above mentioned attachments to the regulation, attachment no. 3, there is a proposed staff division into different functions in the situation centre. It looks like this:

- ◆ Chief of staff
- ◆ Personnel – P1

- ◆ Intelligence – P2
- ◆ Operational command – P3
- ◆ Logistics and equipment – P4
- ◆ Planning and cooperation – P5
- ◆ Operational analysis – P6
- ◆ Information – P7
- ◆ Task specific business – P8.

This division into different functions is similar to that of other areas where “special events” occur such as the military and also, to some extent, the emergency services. There is also a recognizable division of staff tasks in the international arena. This further indicates the fact that what we are dealing with here is a highly formally institutionalized situation.

If we scrutinize the functions above we will see that “learning” is not included in the functions. Closest to this is “P6,” operational analyses, but its function is, as are all the other functions, focused on the present, i.e. to solve the task.¹³⁵

An evaluation of a special event can be made in several ways, e.g. internally by debriefing. But debriefing may have many other purposes than just learning, and there is not a clear institutional link between “before,” “during,” and “after” in debriefing, which we want to achieve here. As was mentioned before, inspections, investigations, exercises, and education are also important in this context, but none of these activities can replace what we are looking for. The matrix seems to lack a vital component, seen from our point of view of learning.

What I will suggest below is that, to the functional division in functions that already exists for the situation centers, should be added a new function for “learning”. If it should be a new “P” be part of another construction will be discussed below.

¹³⁴ Rikspolisstyrelsens författningssamling RPSFS 2006:14, FAP 201–1.

¹³⁵ See more about P6 in L. Nylén, L. Operativ ledning (Stockholm: Rikspolisstyrelsen, 2006, 161–164.

"Before," "During," and "After" – The GODIAC Example

One form of special event is made up of major events such as football matches and political demonstrations. The Swedish police have during the last decades developed a method for handling major event based on the three principles of dialogue, de-escalation and non-confrontation. The method is often referred to as special police tactics (SPT), and it contains an innovation, the dialog police. The dialog police have a key function when it comes to dialogue, de-escalation and non-confrontation. The police work of the dialog police can be divided into tasks before an event, tasks during an event and tasks after an event.¹³⁶ This way of look at a certain part of police work with major events will be an inspiration for our IAD.

The GODIAC project can be said to be a continuation of the SPT in Sweden and e.g., the work in the Netherlands and Great Britain on crowd management. The interesting thing with all these examples is that there has been a close relationship between police and researchers in developing the new tactics. In the GODIAC project, and some of the other projects, this has been shown not least through the choice of research method. A peer review method has been selected. The idea behind it is to use police officers, who with the support of researchers, evaluate other police officers before, during and after major events.

Here we are not proposing a research program but a framework for development and learning. Because of this, the mixture of researchers and police officers is not relevant. But the GODIAC project can serve as a source of inspiration also for a framework for development and learning in other ways. I will highlight in what ways. Firstly though, I have to admit that I am

not a great friend of peer review in general.¹³⁷ Peer review can easily become home for undisguised subjectivism and, e.g. nepotism. Especially unstructured peer reviews have this danger. The GODIAC method of peer review, developed by Adang et. al., is, however, semi-structured.¹³⁸

In the field study reports from the GODIAC project, it is possible to learn a lot about data gathered from different sources before a major event, such as from police command orders and plans, Internet pages, press releases, announcements. If we dress this in IAD-terms, it belongs to the domain of gathering exogenous factors – above described in the matrix of an IAD as biophysical characteristics, attribute of the community, and rules in use – that affect the action arena. One critique that can be made regarding the “before-stage” in the GODIAC field studies is that the gathering of the “rules in use” – in this case, the legal rules about the right to assembly – is sometimes poorly executed.¹³⁹

If we now turn to the “during stage” of the field studies from the GODIAC project we can see that

136 Cf. Adang O. & Stott C. Evaluation of Public Order Policing during Euro 2004 *Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid en Veiligheidszorg* 2004 pp. 46–47, and Adang O. & Brown E., *Policing Football in Europe: Experiences from Peer Review Evaluation Teams*, (Apeldoorn: Politieacademie Apeldoorn, 2008).

137 What we are dealing with here is often described as *professional peer review* or self-regulation. Nursing is an area in which peer-review has been used extensively; see, for example, B. Haag-Heitman and V. George, *Peer Review in Nursing* (Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2010). On policing and peer review, see Adang and Scott, “Evaluation of Public Order Policing”; Adang and Brown, *Policing Football in Europe* Peer review have also been used in disciplinary reform – for instance, the Peer Review Panel of the Kansas City Police; see T. Pate et al., *Kansas City Peer Review Panel: An Evaluation Report* (The Police Foundation, 1976). In the European Union a special form of self-regulation has been developed for policy review and development: the open method of coordination (OMC). It consists of three steps, the third of which often uses peer review as a method. For an overview of the OMC, see P. Craig, *EU Administrative Law* (Oxford: Oxford, 2006), 191–233.

138 Op.cit Adang 2004

139 See, for example, *Field Study Report 5/10: Catalanian National Day, Barcelona, 11 September 2011*, GODIAC project HOME/2009/ISEC/AG/182, pp. 10–11.

this has the purpose to show how police and the general public interact and communicate during the events and how demonstrators and the general public perceive the role and behavior of the police in the events. This is another purpose of the "during"-stage than the one we are aiming at here with our focus on, for example, a situation center.

The "after stage" in the GODIAC project is mostly about finalizing a report after each filed study which then can become a part of the whole project's results. A special focus is on good examples of handling the different events that are studied, but the after stage also includes feedback to the police organizations involved.

The methodology of the GODIAC will not serve as a foundation for framework that is proposed below. As mentioned earlier, it is merely a source of inspiration.

Institutionalizing Learning in Special Events Organizations

Regarding the above, I want to point out a few things which are of particular importance when we propose an institutionalization of learning in a special events organization. First will be the mentioned difference between a "situation" and an "arena." The arena, the action arena, is the institutional arrangement which provides the frame within which the specific action situation may occur. The goal for us is to include learning as an integrated part of these arrangements. What we want to achieve in the end is a circle of learning.







Figure 2. Circle of learning.

If we focus on each of these parts, "before" stands for the institutional characteristics of the institutional arrangement of the "special events" action arena.




"During," is the action arena in which the action situation is situated.





What we want to do, as is mentioned above, is to change “before” and “during” by firstly, adding one component in “during.” If we focus on the box actors and then zoom in to the situation centre, what we want to do is to add a “P”-category here. We can see this as a form of peer review, or self-regulation.



The second thing we have to do is to in the “after”-box add new forms of evaluation with the purpose of creating learning outcomes. As said before, this is not something that competes with other instruments – such as realistic exercises, education and specific events education and training, supervisory activities inspections, investigations, special commissions, and complaint management – it is a complement with special focus on learning from actual situations.

Evaluation:
 criteria a, b, c, ... relating to
 biophysical characteristics,
 rules in use etc.

Outcomes:
 criteria a, b, c, ... related to
 biophysical characteristics,
 rules in use etc.

What can then speak against a proposal such as the one given here? The most evident argument would be resources. In crisis situations, as special events many times are, most focus is on solving the actual problem, and all resources are used for that. But as it is said in the above mentioned regulations from the National Police Board in Sweden (FAP 201–1), the division of functions is a starting point from which adjustments can be made in individual cases.

The fact remains, special events organizations are highly institutionalized phenomena and, as such, are part of a whole institutional arrangement that largely rests on a formal basis. Should “learning” be able to take place within this framework it also needs to be institutionalized. Otherwise, it will easily be competed out by more, seemingly for the moment, important tasks.

2 Protesters

2.1 Before the Bombs There Were the Mobs: American Experiences with Terror

Prof. em. David C. Rapoport
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Terrorist studies rarely discuss activities before the invention of dynamite, which made modern terror possible. One important, interesting, and forgotten form is the mob terror campaign. Two significant successful American examples are examined and compared, “The Sons of Liberty” which ignited the American Revolution, and the Ku Klux Klan, which “won the peace” the South wanted after it lost the Civil War. The study concludes by briefly comparing modern with mob terror.

Introduction

Shirked by our historians, the subject has been repressed in the national consciousness. We have been victims of what members of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence have called a ‘historical amnesia.’ Yet it is not simply that historians have found a way of shrugging off the unhappy memories of our past; our amnesia is also a response to the experience of a whole generation. For the long span from about 1938 to the mid-1960s... the internal life of the country was unusually free of violent episodes. Americans who came of age during and after the

1930s found it easy to forget how violent a people their forebears had been.

*Richard Hofstadter*¹⁴¹

Alfred Nobel’s invention of dynamite in 1866 made modern terrorism possible. Fourteen years later revolutionary pamphlets were published to show how the new tool enabled small groups, and even individuals, under the cover of surprise to frighten and influence masses¹⁴², which is why the first modern terrorists virtually worshipped dynamite.

In giving dynamite to the downtrodden millions of the globe, science has done its best work. The dear stuff can be carried around in the pocket without danger, while it is a formidable weapon against any force of militia, police, or detectives that may want to stifle the call of justice that goes forth from the plundered slaves... It brings terror only to the guilty.¹⁴³

After two frightening decades of modern terror, German newspapers, expressing a widespread anxiety felt in the West, proclaimed: “Society dances on a volcano... a small group of fanatics terrorize the entire human race.”¹⁴⁴ Explosives continued to be

¹⁴⁰ I am indebted to Barbara Rapoport, Marc Sageman, Jeff Kaplan, Clark McCauley, Leo Snowiss, Jeffrey Simon, Michael Barkun, Richard Jensen, Rogelio Alonso, Nina Rapoport, Gary Nash, and Audrey Cronin for useful comments on earlier drafts. The flaws remaining are my responsibility.

¹⁴¹ “Reflections on Violence in the United States,” in Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, eds., *American Violence: A Documentary History* (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 1970), 3–4.

¹⁴² The pamphlets (N. Morozov, *Terrorist Struggle* and G. Romaenko, *Terrorism and Routine*) were published in Geneva in 1880 by Russian émigrés. Both were members of the Russian Narodnaya Volya, the first modern terrorist group. See Zeev Ivianski’s “The Terrorist Revolution” in David C. Rapoport and Y. Alexander, eds., *The Morality of Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 128–149.

¹⁴³ Letter in the American anarchist journal *Alarm*, Feb. 24, 1885, used later at the Haymarket Trial in Chicago 1886, reproduced in Paul Avrich, *The Haymarket Tragedy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 170.

¹⁴⁴ See Richard Bach Jensen, “Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* (TPV) 16, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 116–117 and Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, “From the Dagger to the Bomb,” *TPV* 16, no. 1: 97–115.

a cardinal feature of terrorist activity throughout the next century, a pattern likely to remain with us for the foreseeable future.

But terrorism did not begin with explosives. It existed for at least two millennia before that date. Earlier it took various forms.¹⁴⁵ This paper focuses only on one, “mob terror,” modern terror’s immediate predecessor which curiously has not yet been discussed in terrorist studies. We will focus on two very familiar American examples: The “Sons of Liberty” (1765–1776), which precipitated the American Revolution, and the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) (1867–1877), which emerged after the Civil War and was an indispensable ingredient in successfully resisting efforts to “impose” democracy on the South. The KKK was revived several times later, but our concern is limited to this decade only.¹⁴⁶

Neither group had an international dimension. The KKK functioned only in the territories of the South. The Sons of Liberty operated only in the colonies making no move to seek international help, although after the War for Independence broke out and a legitimate government emerged, international support was sought and materialized.

The mobs, in striking contrast to modern terrorists, always greatly outnumbered potential victims. They were not unique to America, as Benjamin Franklin’s experiences in London reveal.

I have seen within the year riots in the country about corn; riots about elections; riots about

work-houses, riots of colliers, riots of weavers; riots of coal-heavers; riots of sawyers, riots of Wilkesites; riots of government chairmen; riots of smugglers in which customhouse officers and excise men have been murdered, and the King’s armed vessels and troops fired at.¹⁴⁷

But there was a striking difference between the Americans and their European contemporaries. The Americans organized campaigns that persisted for a decade, while European riots were episodic.¹⁴⁸

The American cases have rarely been compared.¹⁴⁹ One reason for that omission may be our “historical amnesia” that Hofstadter emphasizes. A second, probably more compelling, reason is that few imagine (or want to imagine) the Sons of Liberty as a terrorist group, while today we are all comfortable in seeing the KKK that way. The radically different purposes and achievements of the two are what we remember, or perhaps more precisely want to remember most about them. The problem represented here is familiar and has plagued terrorism discourse since the 1940s and has led to the cliché, “One man’s terrorist

145 The most notorious examples were the Zealots (Judaism), the Assassins (Islam), and the Thugs (Hinduism); the terms zealots, assassins, and thugs are often used to describe terrorists today. Sacred precedents prescribed the tactics and weapons. See my “Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions,” *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (September 1984): 658–677.

146 When the KKK revived in the early twentieth century, mobs again were its principal weapon. Explosives were used occasionally during a second revival in the 1960s. The most important example was the KKK Birmingham church bombings (1963) during the Civil Rights Movement.

147 Cited by Schlesinger, “Political Mobs and the American Revolution, 1765–1776,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 99, no. 4 (August 1955). Franklin refers to riots not mobs, though the term mob was more common then.

148 George Rude, *The Crowd in History* (Revised) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981) describes the crowd activities as lasting a few days normally, though in a few cases like the Gordon Riots of 1780 rioters were out on the streets for several weeks.

149 Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr, eds., *The History of Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (New York: 1969) (A Report Submitted to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence) contains a chapter with information about the Sons of Liberty and the KKK. But the two are not compared with respect to methods and organization. Paul A. Gilje, *Rioting in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996) is a much better and more recent effort treating the subject.

is another's freedom fighter."¹⁵⁰ The Sons of Liberty were "freedom fighters" and the KKK terrorists. But the issue is more complicated than the cliché suggests. Freedom fighter refers to an end, while terror is a means. One can be both a freedom fighter and a terrorist. The two groups used very similar methods, namely violence unrestricted by the rules of war to pursue political agendas, and those methods are our subject.

Our principal concern will be with the methods employed, but some attention will be paid to the ends

served.¹⁵¹ First we will provide separate descriptions of the two groups; Section B examines the Sons of Liberty and Section C treats the KKK. Section D compares the two groups. Section E revisits the initial issue raised in the introduction, namely, the significance of comparing mob and modern terror.

The Sons of Liberty 1765–1776: Initiating a Revolution

They trusted to horror rather than homicide.

*Arthur Meier Schlesinger*¹⁵²

"I was engaged in a famous Cause...of Scarborough vs. a Mob that broke into his House...The Terror and Distress, the Distraction and Horror of this Family cannot be described by words or painted upon Canvass. It is enough to move a Statue, to melt a Heart of Stone, to read the Story. A Mind susceptible of the Feelings of Humanity...must burn with Resentment and Indignation, at such

150 Surprisingly, that issue did not exist in the first sixty-five years of modern terror, because early modern groups proudly identified themselves as terrorists, a description their opponents were pleased to use too. Today no one calls himself or herself a terrorist. The first person to reject the term was Menachem Begin, the leader of the Irgun, an Israeli terrorist group. One should focus on purpose not method, he explained. Thus, Irgun members were "Freedom Fighters." A splinter group of the Irgun, Lehi (the British called it the Stern Gang), was the last group to identify itself as a terrorist one, but ironically. Lehi is an acronym for Freedom Fighters for Israel. Begin was more astute in abandoning the term terrorist; he used it only to describe British activities. Subsequently, virtually all terrorist groups saw the political value in changing descriptions of their activity. Governments preferred to retain the "traditional" term, and sought to expand it to describe every rebel or non-state group that used violence. By the late 1960s, the mass media, presumably to protect their reputation for "objectivity," confused or corrupted the language further by obscuring the distinction between ends and means altogether, using terms freedom fighter and terrorist as virtually interchangeable. See my "The Politics of Atrocity," *Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, Yonah Alexander and Seymore M. Finger, eds. (New York: John Jay Press, 1977), 46–63.

151 Certainly, the Sons of Liberty and the KKK qualify as terrorist groups under the definition proposed by the U. S. State Department. "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." — 22 United States Code, Section 2656 (d) — cit. United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, 1999. Dept. of State Publications: Washington D.C., April 2000, p. viii. They certainly qualify under my definition too. Terror is violence with distinctive properties used for political purposes both by private parties and states. That violence is unregulated by publicly accepted norms to contain violence, the rules of war, and the rules of punishment. Private groups using terror most often disregard the rules of war, while state terror generally disregards rules of punishment, i.e., those enabling us to distinguish guilt from innocence. But both states and non-state groups can ignore either set of rules.

152 Schlesinger, "Political Mobs" (see note 8 above), 249.

outrageous Injuries. These private Mobs, I do and will detest.”

*John Adams*¹⁵³

The colonial legislatures were fiercely opposed to the Stamp Act of 1765, a form of taxation they had never experienced before. When the Crown could not be persuaded to back down, a series of riots erupted. The Crown finally developed an alternative tax policy, but mob violence continued for a decade. The cleavages developed new political dimensions never anticipated by the initial participants themselves.

“When the troubles began some ten years before no one could have foreseen this outcome and few if any could have desired it. Virtually everyone believed that the difficulties could be and should be developed within the framework of the Empire. Hence, opinion had been divided even among patriots in the use of (mob) violence. Men like James Otis and John Dickinson earnestly counseled against it as not only unworthy of the cause, but... far far more likely to alienate England than induce concessions.”¹⁵⁴

Over time, Governor Morris noted the mobs began to “think and reason” in order to move the resistance in ways that surprised all observers.¹⁵⁵

“Mob violence,” an eighteenth century term still used by some historians, has connotations that do not fit the Sons of Liberty experience well. For the OED a mob is a “disorderly crowd” (emphasis added). The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences concurs:

“A mob is an angry crowd that attempts to inspire or destroy an object” and its activities do not involve “an implementation of a rational policy... Mob spirit refers to highly emotional and poorly coordinated behavior and expression” (emphasis added).¹⁵⁶ Webster stresses the Latin origin of the term, *mobile vulgus*, to explain that mob moods change rapidly and that most members come from the “lower classes of a community” (emphasis added).

But these characterizations do not fully describe the American experience which was much more complicated and interesting. Most participants in the American mobs were tradesmen and artisans as the definitions suggest. But organizers often came from the “better” classes, i.e., professionals, merchants, and some were even local officials.¹⁵⁷

A hierarchy of mobs was established during Sam Adams’ domination of Boston politics, ‘the lowest classes’ – servants, negroes and sailors were placed under the command of a ‘superior set consisting of the Master Masons’ carpenters of the town’ – above them were put the merchants’ mob and the Sons of Liberty, known to the Tories as Adams’ ‘Mohawks.’¹⁵⁸

The “lowest classes” were always more visible.

When the resistance to the Stamp Act was at issue, the uprisings demonstrated a remarkable political extremism on the part of colonial crowds. Every-

153 Quoted by Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action in Revolutionary Massachusetts* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), 83.

154 “Political Mobs” (see note 8 above), 249 (emphasis added). Schlesinger provides an extraordinarily candid account of a very delicate subject.

155 Quoted by Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 37. Gilje defines a riot as “any group of twelve or more people attempting to assert their will immediately through the use of force outside the bounds of law,” 4.

156 See L. L. Bernard’s discussion in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* in 1933. Subsequent issues (1968 and 2001) ignored the subject! The 1968 edition, in particular, seems to have eliminated most articles on violence including terrorism, deep concerns of the first issue.

157 Each colony produced variations in the social mixture. An analysis of the available information is in the Appendix “The Sons of Liberty 1765–1766,” Pauline Maier, *From Resistance to Revolution* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1972).

158 John Miller, *Sam Adams* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1936), 79.

where ‘followers’ proved more ready than their ‘leaders’ to use force...’the better sort are defending (English liberties) by all lawful means in their power,’ Thomas Hutchinson explained perceptively, and the most abandoned say they will do it ‘putas aut nefas’ – at any cost.¹⁵⁹

The Boston “patrician” Samuel Adams led “The Loyal Nine” (which later became the local Sons of Liberty) to organize a number of mobs. “They kept their identity secret and wished it to be believed that the mobs they set in motion were really spontaneous outbreaks of violence from the ‘lower sort’... Boston was controlled by a ‘trained mob’ and Sam Adams was its keeper.”¹⁶⁰

The mobs had important features that conflict with the standard definitions of mobs. Consistency was pre-eminent. The political purpose remained the same, namely “no taxation without representation,” a principle that after eleven years of violence finally became the essential inspiration of the Revolution. The course of the violence normally was carefully planned and exhibited considerable restraint. Sometimes, it seemed that every likely contingency had been considered to prevent the violence from getting out of hand as the Boston Tea Party (1773), perhaps the most famous incident in the period, demonstrates vividly. Several thousand colonists watched silently from the shore, while 342 chests of tea were seized and thrown into the water. Still, no one was hurt, and the property of the sailors (as distinguished from that of the East India Company) was respected; even a broken padlock was replaced!

A more highly disciplined demonstration would be hard to find anywhere at any time. Indeed, since the incident was called a “Tea Party,” is it

appropriate to speak of this and other comparable demonstrations as expressions of mob violence? Yes, because one cannot isolate the incident from the campaign in which it occurred, namely the series of violent riots over the decade organized by those who put the Tea Party together. Furthermore, one reason that the Tea Party did not become violent was that the government did not or could not use force in this case to resist the effort. The failure to use force certainly did not mean that in principle the government spurned it, and the same is true for those who organized the Tea Party. They generally preferred peaceful demonstrations, but did not reject violence in principle.

There were no pacifist rebels like Ghandi or Martin Luther King believing that no matter what the circumstances one could and should conquer by one’s own suffering or martyrdom.

Occasionally a plan was flawed, and sometimes the emotions aroused made many explode “spontaneously.” But most “spontaneous” outbreaks were still restrained in important respects, at least with respect to committing fatal casualties.

The mobs:
trusted to horror rather than to homicide. Though occasionally brandishing cutlasses and muskets, they typically employed less lethal weapons like clubs, rocks, brickbats, and clods of dung. ‘In truth’ wrote the English historian Lecky in the 1880’s, generalizing upon this curious phenomenon, ‘although no people have indulged more largely than the Americans in violent, reckless and unscrupulous language, no people have been more signally free from the thirst for blood which, in moments of great

159 Ibid., 59–60. Hutchinson was the Lieutenant Governor and then the Governor of Massachusetts during the period.

160 Ibid., 53.

political excitement has been often shown both in England and France.¹⁶¹

To force Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson to resign as stamp distributor, a mob burned his home and stole his personal papers. The attack on personal property “startle[d] men accustomed to venerate and obey lawful authority and [made] them doubt the justice of the cause attended with such direful consequences.”¹⁶² But the unanticipated event occurred after mob members got drunk from rum discovered in the cellar. Sam Adams, who organized the mob, publicly expressed dismay. Fortunately for the cause, “Boston patriots deprived Hutchinson of the sweets of martyrdom by the circulation of a story that letters...found in his house... proved him to be responsible for the Stamp Act.

161 Schlesinger, “Political Mobs” (see note 8 above), 246. To do justice to the experience, one would need a new, more pertinent, term to replace mob. That task cannot be addressed here, but as long as one is clear about the limitations of conventional language, the word mob can be used. Many historians follow the convention of the period and speak of mobs, though in recent years more historians are likely to refer to mob activity as riots, demonstrations, and crowds. Tilly argues that the term mob is used by “elites for actions of other people and often for actions, which threaten their own interests.” Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (London: Addison Wesley, 1978), 227. The term “crowd” may be most appropriate, especially as George Rude redefined it. In *The Crowd in History* (Revised) (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1981), Rude stripped the concept of its more invidious and irrational connotations. For an interesting use of the crowd concept to explain the American experience, see Dirk Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above). Other prominent historians put the term “mob” in quotation marks and speak of crowds without explaining why they think the term should be preferred, i.e., Gary Nash, *The Urban Crucible* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).

162 Quoted from a contemporary Massachusetts newspaper *The Constitutional Courant*, by Pauline Maier, *From Resistance* (see note 18 above), 61.

Sam Adams, one should note, never produced these incriminating letters.”¹⁶³

A similar attack went amuck in Newport, Rhode Island soon afterwards. The proximity of the occasions demonstrated how necessary it was to assure the public that the restraints would be mandatory and clear. Important Boston and New York papers published directives for mob “Leaders and Directors,” emphasizing that their mission was to redress grievances, not create new ones.

No innocent Person, nor any upon bare Suspicion, without sufficient Evidence, should receive the least Injury.” They should recall “that while they are thus collected, they act as a supreme, uncontrollable Power from which there is [no] Appeal, where Trial, Sentence and Execution succeed each other almost instantaneously,” so they were “in Honour bound to take Care, that they do no Injustice, nor suffer it to be done by others, lest they disgrace their Power, and the Cause which occasioned its Collection”... The greatest care was necessary “to keep an undisciplined irregular Multitude from running into mischievous Extravagancies.”¹⁶⁴

In the nine months the Stamp Act was in effect, over sixty riots occurred in twentyfive different locations. “During some of these months in port cities like Boston and New York, mobs were in the streets almost every night and government ground to a halt.”¹⁶⁵

163 Miller, *Sam Adams* (see note 19 above), 66. There is some evidence that merchants induced the mob to steal the papers so that smuggling charges against them would be dropped. Maier, *Ibid.*, 58. On the other hand, several days after the event Hutchinson said that Sam Adams did not organize the second mob to do what it did. Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 92. Liquor was often supplied to mob participants. See Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), 349.

164 Maier, *From Resistance* (see note 18 above), 66.

165 Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 38.

There was such chaos in 1766 that most royal governors had gone into hiding. The Stamp Act also provoked considerable ambivalence in Parliament; Pitt and Burke, major figures, were strongly opposed. But if the riots had produced many casualties the consequence could have mitigated that opposition and weakened the rebel claim that they were fighting for their traditional rights as Englishmen and not a new order.

The victory in getting the Stamp Act repealed gave the rebels enormous confidence in their strength and virtue.

The successful attack on the Act... was of great importance in subsequent periods of agitation when the opposition was not so universal. The experience of working together, the ideas that were inculcated during the agitation and the sense of accomplishment resulting from united efforts were indispensable. The agitation of each period, in fact, made easier the work of the next.¹⁶⁶

It seems odd to describe this mob activity as terrorism; the self-imposed limits were so conspicuous. Still, when Schlesinger describes the victims' emotions, he repeatedly refers to "terror," "horror," and "fear";¹⁶⁷ and contemporaries often spoke of "terror," as the quotation from John Adams introducing this section illustrates. No one was called a "terrorist" because the word became part of our language two decades later in the French Revolution. Two centuries

passed before some academics referred to the Sons of Liberty as terrorists.¹⁶⁸

If so many mobs were so restrained, why were victims terrorized? One simply could not know ahead of time what one's particular fate was going to be and there was little reassurance during the process that one would not be killed or seriously harmed. Grotesque effigies of leading Stamp Act administrators were beaten or whipped, and then carried through the streets to a hastily constructed gallows to be hung on a "liberty tree" or to a funeral pyre to be burned. In the first significant Stamp Act uprising in Boston (August 14, 1765), this scene, followed by the destruction of a building designated as the future Stamp Office, convinced the chief stamp distributor for Massachusetts that he ought to resign.¹⁶⁹

A mob confronted Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Thomas Oliver demanding that he resign and denounce the Stamp Act. He heard "voices swearing they would have my blood" and complied because his wife and children in the next room were "frantic with fear." Later, away from the scene, he thought he should renounce his acts made under duress and that they lacked moral or legal weight. But renunciation could be costly. "A hard alternative 'tis true; but still I had it in my power either to die or make the prom-

166 Phillip Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution 1763–85* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941), 41.

167 Schlesinger published his essay in 1955 when terrorism was not as conspicuous or odious as it is today. Would his language be different now?

168 Richard Hofstadter and Michael Wallace, eds., *American Violence: A Documentary History* (New York: A. Knopf, 1970). Section I, "Political Violence," contains a piece entitled "Terrorism against Loyalists," 76–79. Despite the fact that he included the piece, Hofstadter's interesting introduction quotes Howard Mumford Jones' very different view. "American mobs were curiously lacking in furious, deep-seated and blood thirsty resentment. No royal governor was hanged or shot...No stamp collector or custom official was summarily executed, although some of them suffered physical injury," 14. Hofstadter finds the description apt, but fails to explain the conflict between the two in his volume.

169 Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution* (New York: Viking, 2005), 45 ff.

ise. I chose to live.”¹⁷⁰ His subsequent history of the period described a mob as a “volcano,” “hydra,” etc., words reflecting a victim’s view that they were uncontrollable.¹⁷¹

A Connecticut mob threatened to bury the [stamp] distributor alive when he insisted on remaining in office. [They] put this stouthearted soul inside a coffin, nailed the lid shut, and lowered him into a grave. They then began shoveling dirt on the coffin. The official called for release and thereupon submitted his resignation.¹⁷²

A besieged Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor determined to save his rather splendid home from being burned and refused to leave. His family fled the scene, but a daughter “refused to leave unless he accompanied her. She probably thereby saved his life.”¹⁷³ “Mobs used whatever force necessary to produce resignations. In several cases, they scarcely had to flex their muscles to frighten distributors into sending in their resignations.”¹⁷⁴

One historian’s description of the experience of Edward Stow is interesting. Stow was a Boston merchant-captain, who was granted a personal guard for his safety, reported ‘I have been mobbed and Libeled ever since the Stamp Act’....A mob of near 300 Men severely injured him and ‘bedaubed my House with Excrement and Feathers, because I seized for His Majesty two Gun Carriages, a pair of Swivels, and a Cow Horn.’ Compared to other instances of violence, the persecution of Edward

Stow was so unimportant that the papers did not even report it.¹⁷⁵

In 1771 the Commissioner of Customs’ sister described an employee’s experience:

“stript [sic] stark naked one of the severest cold nights this winter. In a body covered all over with tar then with feathers, his arm dislocated by tearing off his cloaths [sic] he dragged in a cart with thousands attending, some beating him with clubs and throwing him out of the cart then in again. They gave him severe whipping at different parts of the town. This spectacle of horror and sportive cruelty was exhibited for about five hours...They brought him to the gallows and put a rope about his neck saying they woud [sic] hang him...The doctors say that it is impossible this poor creature can live. They say his flesh comes off his back in steaks [sic].”¹⁷⁶

In describing modern terror, one always refers to the crucial importance of those beyond the immediate victim of the violence. In the Sons of Liberty case, two principal audiences were very visible.

One audience of potential supporters saw the government as being so contemptibly weak and the people so superior to the royal authority that they [were]...elated upon their triumph over the defenseless officers of the Crown.¹⁷⁷

A second audience contained opponents who had to be intimidated and /or provoked to react in excessive ways that will enrage the community.¹⁷⁸

170 Quoted by Robert M. Calhoon, *The Loyalists in Revolutionary America* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), 273–274.

171 *Ibid.*, 240–243.

172 Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious* (see note 24 above), 105–106.

173 *Ibid.*, 92.

174 *Ibid.*, 94.

175 See Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), 340.

176 Quoted by Hofstadter, *American Violence* (see note 29 above), 71.

177 Davidson, *Propaganda and the American Revolution* (see note 27 above), 113.

178 See my “Politics of Atrocity” (see note 11 above).

An attack obviously could affect both audiences simultaneously.

Whatever their origin, they [mobs] furthered patriotic purposes, in several essential ways. They highlighted grievances as mere words could never have done; they struck terror into the hearts of British adherents; and, as notably in the case of the Boston Massacre, they fashioned folk heroes out of street loafers and hoodlums.¹⁷⁹

Consistency and discipline in a dangerous period which lasted for more than a decade require a formal organization, one would think. But it is surprising to realize that no formal organization can be found here. Certainly, historians have not found it. The leaders of the first American mobs (1765) called their groups “The Sons of Liberty,” and some individual entities, like the ones Sam Adams helped organize, did have some structure. But no organizational connection existed between the groups, and most of the initial groups disappeared a year or so after the Stamp Act was repealed. The Sons of Liberty name survived to describe other mobs with similar ends; ultimately it became a synonym for “patriot.”¹⁸⁰ Groups not connected with the Sons of Liberty used the name to wreak vengeance and to secure other ends that were not connected with the cause. “In South Carolina a group of sailors calling themselves the Sons of Liberty, formed a mob to coerce money from people on the streets” and they were curtailed by people calling themselves “True Sons of Liberty.”¹⁸¹

The Sons of Liberty at its height was an informal network of autonomous societies, which flourished largely in the seaport cities in the separate colonies. Members in one colony established rudimentary communication with similar elements in other colonies, largely through letters written by “Committees of Correspondence,” essential parts of each independent unit. One unit could not make a decision that would bind other groups, for there was no way to enforce such decisions, a necessary feature of an organization. The decentralized structure on the national level was reproduced in each participating colony, and The Sons of Liberty provided a model for resistance emulated later throughout the decade and intermittently later after the constitution came into play. We know little about how its various activities were related to each other. The records are very incomplete partly because many participants were so ambivalent about their activities. Those indicted invariably claimed to be innocent and when arrested escaped conviction. Few mob participants “admitted complicity until more than a half century had elapsed” (emphasis added).¹⁸²

The Stamp Act was enacted because the Seven Years’ (French and Indian) War ending in 1763 exhausted the British treasury, and efforts to pay the debts occasioned significant British taxpayer protests. All newspapers, legal documents, and commercial papers had to bear a stamp paid for in species, a rare commodity in the colonies. The British argued that the tax was just because it fell equally on all. The colonies benefited greatly from the French defeat and contributed very little to it. This made Parliament believe that they would accept a significant tax burden especially since Parliament pledged that the money raised would be devoted exclusively for military expenses necessary to defend the colonies. But the colonies had only experienced taxes levied on foreign trade. The tax’s very novelty and universality

179 Schlesinger, “Political Mobs” (see note 8 above), 244.

An earlier very comprehensive discussion can be found in Davidson, *Propaganda* (see note 27 above), especially the first 12 chapters

180 Davidson, *Ibid.* and Maier, *From Resistance* (see note 18 above).

181 <http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/sons.htm>

182 *Ibid.*, 247.

provoked widespread unanticipated resistance. The British made no effort beforehand to consider how to enforce the law if armed resistance materialized, especially if all the colonies were involved.

Clear-sighted observers on both sides of the Atlantic believed colonial unity impossible because of the great differences between the provinces in manners, religion and interest. Nevertheless, when confronted by the Stamp Act, colonial particularism began to crumble and America was awakened, alarmed, restless and disaffected.¹⁸³

British resources were very meager. No professional police force existed in Britain or the colonies.¹⁸⁴ In Britain, the army could be called out to subdue a mob. Normally, the government preferred to let the rioting alone in the hopes it would burn itself out. But that was not always possible. When the anti-Catholic Gordon Riots persisted for over a week and over a hundred houses were devastated, the army was called out. 285 were killed, 170 were wounded, 25 hanged, and 12 imprisoned. The rioters themselves had not caused a single casualty!¹⁸⁵

In the colonies very few troops were available, and the government's inability to use force gave the riots their special flavor. "It was," one historian wrote, "apparently more the restraint and timidity of the British authorities, and less the moderation of American crowds that prevented a serious loss of lives during the American rioting."¹⁸⁶ The British could call a posse comitatus and/or colonial militias to deal

with violence, but those bodies were so deeply rooted in the local community and so committed to the mob's cause they usually refused to come or would not obey orders. It is worth noting too that the mobs consisted of persons from these two legitimate groups accustomed to using their own initiative to deal with community threats. The mob, therefore, had a semi-legitimate status embodying "the people."

The weakness of the British government naturally made it contemptible in the eyes of Americans who were frequently permitted to run roughshod over British authority. When the Sons of Liberty stormed the fort at Charleston, South Carolina, they found only one private awake and the other eleven members of the garrison were sound asleep, at Fort Johnson, North Carolina a garrison of two British troops were besieged by five hundred heavily armed Sons of Liberty, and in New York, the headquarters of British military authority in the provinces, the troops were unable to keep order in the town. General Gage informed royal governors who clamored for military aid...that no military force could be collected within a month, and even then it would be at the expense of strategic posts (along the frontier) which would be seriously weakened if their garrisons were removed.¹⁸⁷

The tiny military detachments proved to be a boomerang, John Adams emphasized. "Soldiers quartered in a populous town will always occasion two mobs where they prevent one. They are wretched conservators of the peace."¹⁸⁸ Insults and beatings provoked British troops in America "beyond endurance." Juries consistently refused to convict rioters. Considering the repeated provocations, one historian writes, the wonder is that the troops did not kill much

183 Miller, Sam Adams (see note 19 above), 50–51.

184 The first British professional police force was established in London in 1829 after Lord Wellington warned that the army would dissolve if it could not be released from dealing with mobs. Some American cities began establishing professional police forces in the 1840s.

185 George Rude, *The Crowd* (see note 9 above), 59–60.

186 Gordon Wood, "The Crowd in the American Revolution," in James K. Martin and K. Stubas, eds., *The American Revolution: Whose Revolution* (Huntington, NY: 1977), 60.

187 Miller, Sam Adams (see note 19 above), 71.

188 David McCullough, *John Adams* (New York: Simon Schuster, 2001), 67.

more often, “but this fact naturally failed to impress the colonists.”¹⁸⁹

Impotent military forces provoked the notorious “Boston Massacre.” On the icy cobbled square... a lone British sentry was being taunted by a small band of men and boys. [Suddenly] crowds came pouring into the streets... brandishing sticks and clubs. As a throng of several hundred converged... the lone guard was reinforced by eight British soldiers with loaded muskets and fixed bayonets, and their captain with a drawn sword. Shouting, cursing, the crowds pelted the despised redcoats with snowballs, chunks of ice, oyster shells and stones.¹⁹⁰

The soldiers suddenly opened fire killing five. Those arrested asked John Adams (Sam Adams’ cousin) to defend them in court, and the aftermath was full of ironies indicating how vulnerable the public was to conflicting emotions. John Adams originally believed that the soldiers were guilty, but became convinced that they acted in self-defense and organized a brilliant and successful defense. After the acquittal John Adams was elected to the Massachusetts legislature for the first time.¹⁹¹ On the other hand, even though the court did not hold the soldiers responsible, the fact that the incident was called the “Boston Massacre” makes clear that victims were celebrated as heroes!

“On each anniversary the bells of the town tolled intervals during the day, and at night lighted transparencies near the site of the bloodshed displayed tableaux of the ‘murderers’ and the dead perhaps with a symbolic America trampling a supine red-coat. The crowning event was the declaration by a well-known figure who pulled out all stops to do justice to his theme.... The yearly orations continued... until the town authorities in 1783 substituted the celebration of the Fourth of July.”¹⁹²

The killings were most probably unintended events, though the victims did really stimulate opposition to British policy. Most victims during the Stamp Act crisis were individuals directly responsible for administering the law and the rioters did intend to hurt them. General Gage reported that the “Officers of the Crown grew more timid, and more fearful of doing their Duty every Day.”¹⁹³ “Not a justice of peace, sheriff, constable or peace officer in the province...would venture to take cognizance of any breach of law against the general bent of the people,” Massachusetts Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson complained.¹⁹⁴

The English government tried to re-establish its authority by passing the Townsend Acts to tax foreign trade, a traditional source of income.¹⁹⁵ Resistance materialized again but the victims were different, mainly private parties engaged in international trade and individuals buying imported goods. Those “believed” to be loyal to policies of the Crown were a third target. Finally very late in their campaign,

189 Ibid. loc. cit.

190 Ibid., 65. There were two trials. In the first, the officer was acquitted of the charge that he ordered the men to fire. In the second trial, six soldiers were declared innocent by virtue of self-defense. Two were found guilty of manslaughter and their punishment were tattoos printed on their hands to indicate that offense. The evidence presented indicates that there was a conspiracy to make the soldiers fire. See Miller, Sam Adams (see note 19 above), 184–188.

191 Ibid., 66–68. Oddly, Sam Adams asked John to take the case!

192 Schlesinger, “Political Mobs” (see note 8 above), 247.

193 Ibid., 246.

194 Ibid. loc. cit.

195 Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), particularly Ch. 4. The original Sons of Liberty lasted about a year. It was revived in three cities two years later for a short period, but even then there was a “gradual tendency to drop the name. It was almost never used after 1773 and during the decade of resistance it did not refer to a society, it was simply another name for patriot.” Davidson, *Propaganda* (see note 27 above), 76.

mobs prevented Tories from taking their seats in the legislatures lest they vitiate the strong support the rebels were generating.

Convinced it had no alternative, the Crown finally decided to send an effective troop force to cope with the mobs. But by the time the troops arrived, the colonists cemented their political union, organized their military forces, and the Revolutionary War ensued. During the war itself, the significance of the mobs diminished, but they were active in driving large numbers out of the country to Canada where the refugees found a new home.

C. The Ku Klux Klan 1867–1877: Winning a War But Losing a Peace

“We have closed the War but we have not yet made a peace.”

New York Herald Tribune, April 29, 1874

“As election day drew near, violence and intimidation reached epidemic proportions in another reign of terror. The whites with guns in their hands and murder in their hearts were intent on control.”

*William Gillette*¹⁹⁶

“Vote Blacks Down or Knock Them Down”

Rallying Cry of Mississippi Democrats, 1874

The Ku Klux Klan (1867–1877) emerged in a context that seems very different from the one that nourished the Sons of Liberty. After a bitterly fought Civil War, both parties had to agree on the conditions for peace, namely the kind of state government most appropriate for the South. More specifically, what would that new government need to do to prevent a renewal of the war with the political problems generated by the presence of large numbers of recently freed slaves.

¹⁹⁶ William Gillette, *Retreat From Reconstruction 1860–79* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 162.

Deep differences divided North from South; indeed, a deep ambivalence existed within both the North and South on these matters too, resulting in the “most violent and nastiest rioting in American history.”¹⁹⁷

Lincoln’s assassination gave Andrew Johnson, a Southern Democrat and Lincoln’s choice for a running mate, the opportunity to take charge of reconciliation efforts. Johnson believed that the country would be brought together again if the two sides agreed that the right response was that no state had the legal power to leave the Union. All state constitutions would remain valid; the only basic change was Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation abolishing slavery.

White Southerners generally accepted these conditions, and fifty-eight former Confederate Congressmen, nine Confederate generals and admirals, six Confederate Cabinet members, and the Confederacy’s Vice President won Congressional seats in the first national election (1866).¹⁹⁸ Confederate leaders still dominated various state governments too.

Most Unionists did not anticipate that reinstating the old constitutions would deny freed slaves voting rights, an issue two very bloody riots several months before the 1866 election made clear. “In both instances the riots opened with blacks aggressively advancing their claims to equality in the face of opposition by local officials and white police.” In Memphis white residents and the police went wild and killed forty-six blacks. In New Orleans Unionists and Republicans called a political convention of “dubious legality” to enfranchise blacks. Whites rioted for three days killing some forty-six supporters.¹⁹⁹ The fury pro-

¹⁹⁷ Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 94.

¹⁹⁸ William Loren Katz, *The Invisible Empire* (Washington, D.C.: Open Hand, 1986), 17.

¹⁹⁹ George C. Rable, *But There Was No Peace: The Role of Violence in the Politics of Reconstruction* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1984), 59. Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 96. One reason the Memphis riots got out of control was that the police were largely Irish immigrants who had a special antipathy to blacks. Richard Hofstadter and M. Wallace, *American Violence* (see note 29 above), 15.

voked “created a unity among Republicans that had not existed even during the war,” where major cities witnessed fierce riots against war policies.

The New Orleans atrocities “proved” to Northern voters that Johnson’s plan betrayed the enormous sacrifices made to win the Civil War. They became a valuable campaign issue for Republicans in the 1866 election, allowing “Radical Republicans” to dominate the new Congress, aiming to “reconstruct” the South or make it “democratic.”

Congress excluded Southern Congressional representatives by annulling their state constitutions, dividing the South into military districts, reinforcing garrisons, and creating black militias; the last decision greatly frightened most white Southerners. Strenuous efforts were made to make blacks a major political force, hoping they would give the Republican Party a clear national majority over time. Johnson resisted, Radical Republicans organized mobs to compel compliance, and his vitriolic responses provided the occasion for the first President to be impeached (1868).²⁰⁰

Reconstruction “demonstrated” to Southern whites that they were being “occupied,” not reconciled. “The South,” one wrote, “is no more a real partner in the so-called Union than Poland is part of Russia or India of England or Cuba of Spain. Why should this country be called a Union? The very term signifies equality of parts. Let it be called ‘Yankeeland.’”²⁰¹ At first many Southerners refused to participate in the elections ordered for fear of legitimizing them. But their refusal simply handed many Southern state governments to Republicans dependent on black voters. At the same time, Con-

gress mustered the two-thirds majority necessary to propose the 14th and 15th Amendments to the Constitution (1868) designed to guarantee equal rights for blacks.

A variety of mob terror groups emerged to show uneasy Southerners another way to resist, a way that had proved successful in dealing with Abolitionists before the Civil War.²⁰² The KKK was the first and most important. Later the Knights of the White Camellias, the Red Jackets, Native Sons of the South, Society of the White Roses, White Liners, White Man’s Party, White Leaguers, White Brotherhood, the Seventy-Six Association, etc., emerged. The public “lumped those groups all together...as the Klan. Their costumes, rituals, tactics, and purposes were so similar, there is no practical way to distinguish them,” and so they “must be treated as part of a generic Klux movement.”²⁰³ In the eleven

200 In the U.S., the House votes on the charges for impeachment but conviction requires 2/3 of the Senate, and the Senate was one vote short. Under the succession law governing the process, the President of the Senate (a Radical Republican) would have replaced Johnson

201 Quoted by Rable, *But There Was No Peace* (see note 61 above), 8.

202 In the 1830s the rage against Abolitionists created more mobs in the Northern states than it did in the South! But the Southern mobs were successful in moving the South to secede. See Clement Eaton, “Mob Violence in the Old South,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 29, no. 3 (1942): 351–370.

203 Everette Swinney, *Suppressing the Ku Klux Klan* (New York: Garland, 1987), 46–47. “Historians rightly differentiate between the Klans of the 1860s and the 1920s for the purpose and character of the two are as different as the two periods are. Perhaps it is now time to acknowledge that in the course of the last century there have been three different Klans. The third is the modern group left over from the mighty Klan of the 20 s.” Carl N. Degler, “A Century of the Klans: A Review Article,” *Journal of Southern History* 31, no. 4 (1965): 435–443. Oddly, though the original Klan had a much greater political effect, the secondary literature devoted to it is much slimmer than that concerned with the two much less significant twentieth century experiences. See, for example, the bibliographical listings in William Fisher, *The Invisible Empire* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1980). We are not concerned here with the four revivals later when the KKK became active outside the South, i.e., 1915–21, during the 1930s in the Depression, during the 1960s civil rights movement, and finally once again in the 1980s.

years of Reconstruction (1865–1876) at least 375 riots occurred, organized largely by KKK elements.²⁰⁴

KKK groups in various states merged,²⁰⁵ and former Confederate Lieutenant General Nathan Bedford Forrest, the South's most distinguished cavalry officer, became the Klan's first and only "Grand Wizard."²⁰⁶ The aim was to make sure that Johnson's original reconciliation plan was revived, and Klansmen normally identified themselves as Democratic Party members.

Although the mystic syllables Ku Klux Klan were on people's lips everywhere, most night riders were unwilling to concede that they went by any other name than 'The Young Men's Democratic Clubs.'²⁰⁷

On paper the KKK had an elaborate formal hierarchy led by a Grand Wizard presiding over an Empire divided into realms, dominions, provinces, and dens, headed respectively by Grand Dragons, Titans, Giants, and Cyclops. But the structure never functioned as designed; perhaps it was never meant to work that way. The den or basic unit established in the local areas of all relevant states operated with

little or no central direction. "A group of young men would form a den after hearing of the organization elsewhere."²⁰⁸

The KKK claimed to be restoring order from the dreadful chaos that swept the South after its catastrophic military defeat, a context in which courts and police rarely functioned and considerable corruption prevailed.²⁰⁹ But the ultimate object clearly was to bring down the "democracy" that Reconstruction policies aimed to create. The terror was thus intimately linked to the electoral process, i.e., keep the blacks from voting and force their "friends," "scalawags" (Southern renegades), and "carpet-baggers"²¹⁰ (immigrants from the North) to flee the area.²¹¹ The KKK decimated the black militias and the various Republican secret societies (the Lincoln Brotherhood of Florida, the Heroes of North Carolina, etc.) serving as the candidates' chief protection during campaigns.

The KKK was most vigorous in the Piedmont and Appalachian highlands of northern Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and western North and South Carolina where race numbers were more even, areas in which Republicans, overwhelmingly supported by the black population, had a good chance to win.²¹²

204 Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 210. Estimates vary. Gilje's statistics are culled from secondary sources, but his book shows a deep concern with counting riots.

205 The organization originated in December, 1865 in Pulaski, Tennessee when "six young men decided to form a club. Mainly college men, they had been officers in the late War. Their problem was idleness; their purpose was amusement. They met in secret places, put on disguises, and had great fun galloping about town after dark...They soon discovered that their nocturnal appearances had an unexpected effect and they capitalized upon it." David M. Chalmers, *Hooded Americanism* (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 8–9. Why they named themselves the Ku Klux Klan remains a mystery. Ku and Klux are variants of the Greek word meaning circle or band.

206 Forrest served two years only, resigning apparently because KKK elements became too difficult to control.

207 Gillette, *Retreat From Reconstruction* (see note 57 above), 18

208 Rable, *But There Was No Peace* (see note 61 above), 71.

209 Initially, the KKK claimed to be vigilantes enforcing the law, merging police and judiciary functions

210 "Scalawags" are venomous, shabby, scabby, scurvy cattle! "Carpetbagger" refers to the common belief that the immigrants brought all their belongings in a "carpetbag." Some carpetbaggers were blacks from the North

211 The Klan's most important political purpose was to make it impossible for blacks to vote, but secondary discussions of the KKK only began to focus on that question a century later and after the Civil Rights Movement developed in the twentieth century. Three important works treating the question are William Gillette, *Retreat* (see note 57 above), especially Chapters 2 and 6, "Bullets and Ballots" and "Politics or War?"; Allan Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (New York: Harper's, 1971); and Rable, *But There Was No Peace* (see note 61 above).

212 Swinney, *Suppressing the Klan* (see note 65 above), 49.

In states like Virginia, where the Democratic Party was firmly in control, the KKK did not function.

Armed with the ballot to make them more secure in their freedom many blacks found that the privilege in fact jeopardized their lives and their livelihoods. When the blacks were slaves they were mistreated but rarely killed because they were property; but when they were free they became more vulnerable to a new form of violence.²¹³

The campaign against black suffrage was quickly and remarkably effective as shown by the voting statistics in Georgia after the Klan emerged. In Oglethorpe County, the Republicans received 116 votes, but eight months earlier they had ten times as many votes (November, 1869). In Columbia County, the difference in the same period was even starker. Republicans got only one vote, though they had 1122 votes in a previous election that same year!²¹⁴ But the task was a large one and took time because so many voting districts in so many different states were involved, and after President Grant was elected (1868–76), the federal government only used its military and legal powers intermittently to help assure the electoral process.²¹⁵

“As Election Day drew near, violence and intimidation reached epidemic proportions in another reign of terror. The whites, with guns in their hands and murder in their hearts, were intent on control. Most Republican meetings were broken up or cancelled out of fear. Republican nominations were often not made, the candidates didn’t

campaign, and some Republican nominees and officials even fled their homes...Economic coercion was added to physical intimidation as the whites refused to lease land, give jobs, or provide credit to blacks. Whole counties were virtually under military siege: the Democrats wore red shirts, symbolizing bloodshed. In some towns graves were dug for those Negroes who might vote Republican. As a clear warning, whites shot guns into the night before and cannon, manned by uniformed volunteers were stationed in front of polling places, on Election Day. Many blacks, fearing for their lives, did not dare to vote, and most of those who tried either did not receive ballots or were driven from the polls. Ballot boxes were seized and stuffed. The Democrats had realized their rallying cry and either had voted the blacks down or had knocked them down.”²¹⁶

The extraordinary impact the violence had on Republican voting statistics cited above in Georgia occurred later elsewhere even though the army arrived to guarantee fair elections. In Yazoo County, Mississippi, the Republicans only had seven votes in 1875, but several years earlier when most blacks voted, the Republican majority was over a thousand.²¹⁷ Before the 1875 election took place, Mississippi’s Republican Governor Ames asked President Grant to send federal troops; otherwise “election day may find our voters fleeing before rebel bullets rather than balloting for their rights.” When it was clear that the troops would not arrive, he proclaimed, “Yes a revolution has taken place – by force of arms – and a race

213 Gillette, *Retreat* (see note 57 above), 37, and Swinney, *Ibid.*, 47.

214 Chalmers, *Hooded* (see note 67 above), 15.

215 The Radical Republicans organized secret societies too, i.e., Lincoln Brotherhood in Florida, Heroes of America, North Carolina, etc., but their presence only intensified sentiment supporting the KKK.

216 Gillette, *Retreat from Reconstruction* (see note 57 above), 162. This description in various forms appears again and again when Gillette discusses particular elections. We do not know the precise number of casualties but it must have numbered in the thousands. Two 1868 elections in Louisiana alone produced 1,081 deaths; most were blacks. See Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 99

217 *Ibid.*, 163.

are disfranchised – they are to be returned to a condition of serfdom – an era of second slavery.”²¹⁸

The next year South Carolina’s governor asked President Grant for troops to help police an election. This time the soldiers were sent, partly to avoid another sordid, disgraceful scene, and because this election was a national one where the fortunes of the Republican Party in Congress and the Presidency were at stake. Violence was reduced, and the local population seemed largely hospitable. But the force of only 1000 men was too small to cover the entire state. Furthermore, before the soldiers arrived, an effective terror campaign had been waged against potential black voters,²¹⁹ and federal officials discovered that the voter’s rolls were fraudulent, a problem that the army had neither the legal authority nor the skill to rectify.²²⁰

As the examples indicate, one surprising, important, and usually neglected reason for KKK success was its restraint! Conspicuous atrocities, comparable to the New Orleans riot in 1866, most probably would have provoked fierce concerns in the North again. The logic of the campaign was to “foment just enough terror in the strong Republican counties to demoralize and defeat the black Republicans, but not enough to provoke (serious) federal reaction.”²²¹ Striking targets in the North would have been a political disaster. In the northern state of Indiana in 1869 a group with views similar to the KKK (and oddly called the Sons of Liberty!) developed, whereupon the Klan quickly used its influence to shut it down.²²² Republicans, well

aware of the North’s ambivalence, generally exaggerated the reports of outrages to increase support for Reconstruction policies. But in time the “policy” backfired. More and more Northerners believed that most atrocity stories were manufactured for partisan advantages.²²³

The federal government found it too costly to create necessary tools to enforce the constitution in Southern states. A serious shortage of judges in the South created excessive delays in adjudicating claims, and delay exposed potential witnesses to extraordinary abuse. Few federal marshals were available because most were employed in northern and “border” states where serious problems of electoral corruption prevailed and where Republicans were more likely to win, and thus have an immediate national impact.

Ultimately, federal election enforcement had much more significance as a campaign document than as a genuine effort to do something, a “salvage operation (rather) than a permanent reform.”²²⁴ Everything depended on the troops, but there never were enough available. The troops also used martial law and other measures curtailing civil liberties and suspending habeas corpus. Suspects were frequently thrown into jail without trial for long periods because juries would not convict. “Excessive vengeance by lawlessness was now replaced by excessive vengeance by law.”²²⁵ That activity provoked serious national discontent and demoralized the army.

Most officers detested service below the Mason-Dixon Line. Conservative generals such as George G. Meade, Winfield Scott Hancock, and John M. Schofield disliked interfering with civil government and their inevitable entanglement

218 Ibid.

219 Ibid., 317–318.

220 For a general discussion of the ballot fraud problem, see David C. Rapoport and L. Weinberg, “Elections and Violence,” in *The Democratic Experience and Violence*, Rapoport and Weinberg, eds., (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 15–51.

221 Gillette, *Retreat* (see note 57 above), 154

222 In the KKK’s second phase, which began in the 1920s, it operated in many states outside the South. Indiana seemed to be the center of its activity. But during Reconstruction, the KKK discouraged sympathetic efforts in Indiana fearing that they would create a backlash in the North.

223 Ibid., 274–275.

224 Ibid., 51.

225 David Annan, “The Ku Klux Klan,” in Norman MacKenzie, ed., *Secret Societies* (New York: Collier Books, 1967), 227.

in southern politics. The incessant requests by Republicans for assistance drove many soldiers into the Democratic camp. The army's effectiveness was further limited because its superiors in Washington discounted reports of southern outrages and favored a restrained use of military force. After struggling with maddening complexities of Georgia politics, General Alfred Taylor informed General William T. Sherman, 'I would not again go through with a job of this kind even if it would make me a Marshal of France'. The common soldiers shared many of their commanders' prejudices, were often hostile to the government's Reconstruction policies, and were seldom radical egalitarians...When the War Department became preoccupied with the Indian Wars on the Great Plains, the army's position in the South grew more precarious...Commanders moved slowly against the Klan and opposed military trials for these outlays. As General Phillip Sheridan, an advocate of vigorous federal action in the South, lamented in 1867 many crimes and outrages were beyond the reach of military power.²²⁶

Two important decisions in 1878 enabled the KKK to accomplish its mission. Congress passed the Posse Comitatus Act, which prevents the military from getting involved in civil affairs, and in this case that meant the voting rights of blacks would not be protected.²²⁷ The House of Representatives resolved a disputed presidential election in favor of the Republican candidate Rutherford Hayes, after he agreed to withdraw troops from the South.

Comparing Mobs

Both groups were successful. The Sons of Liberty were an essential ingredient in bringing the colonies together or in helping to create a nation, a nation that created a "regular army" necessary to win independence. The KKK "achievement" was less durable. It demolished the Reconstruction program and made blacks "second-class" citizens. That status, which was also punctuated with intermittent terror attacks, lasted until the non-violent Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s reversed the condition.²²⁸

In both cases potential sympathizers and opposition elements were ambivalent. The British government faced opposition at home, was unclear about what the colonial situation required, and the efforts to make military commitments were so minimal that they aggravated rather than reduced the unrest. Many colonists initially lacked resolve, unity, confidence, and were apprehensive that the mobs would get out of control and in the process demolish all respect for law. In the KKK case, white southerners feared a new war might be provoked, and the North was unwilling to keep troops in the South indefinitely. That reluctance was related to the fact that blacks were allowed to vote only in a few Northern states. Elsewhere, serious hostilities to blacks existed, especially among immigrants who competed with them economically.²²⁹

It took time to dissolve and/or exploit the ambivalences, and the structures of the two groups helped each persist and gain the time needed to accomplish that end. Like the Sons of Liberty, KKK groups were autonomous and related to each other informally. Decentralization made it very difficult for govern-

226 Rable, *But There Was No Peace* (see note 61 above), 109.

227 We now see the Posse Comitatus law as a protection against military interference in civil affairs. Michael Barkun pointed out the irony to me in an e-mail.

228 It is doubtful whether a terror campaign by blacks in the 1960s would have achieved a victory comparable to that of the Civil Rights movement. This interesting issue cannot be addressed here.

229 Irish immigrants were particularly hostile as the police activities in Memphis and the anti-draft riots in New York indicate.

ments to get the leverage needed to break the groups up and they were deeply embedded in local populations. The original Sons of Liberty groups lasted for a year or so, the KKK was officially disbanded after four; but each remained a model for successive groups and the public discourse rarely distinguished the successors from their model.

Members of both groups always denied involvement, and the KKK made recruits swear oaths never to reveal any information concerning the organization.²³⁰ Courts generally found it extremely difficult to convict those charged because juries were either too sympathetic and/or too frightened. Mob activities were planned well. Unlike many mobs we know today, KKK and Sons of Liberty mobs never intentionally destroyed properties and lives of potential supporters.²³¹ Some KKK members were involved in ordinary criminal activity, and the Sons of Liberty occasionally produced counter-productive criminal abuses, but only against those previously identified as political enemies.

Mobs always outnumbered their victims, but Klan mobs were much smaller enterprises. A small Klan mob might consist of six or seven; larger Klan mobs usually numbered forty or fifty.²³² Darkness reduced the need for larger forces, making it easier to get away, and attacks at night were always more frightening. There are instances of two hundred or more, and

the figures are probably higher for a few urban riots. The Klan stayed largely in rural areas.²³³ It is impossible to establish the number of KKK victims though it was probably more than 20,000. A Senate investigation found that in nine rural counties in a six-month period, the Klan had lynched “35 men, whipped 262 men and otherwise outraged women, shot, mutilated, raped, burned out 103 other people.”²³⁴

Sons of Liberty mobs, largely urban affairs, usually numbered several hundred; occasionally one might have a thousand, and once or twice the number cited is ten thousand. Supporters also came to watch them, and as the years passed the number of spectators kept increasing.²³⁵ The populations of Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were fifteen, thirty, and fifty-five thousand respectively, and thus the turnouts reported were enormous. Commenting on Boston mobs, one historian noted, “if the reported numbers are correct [they] would have consisted of half the city’s adult males.”²³⁶ Large turnouts helped convince all interested parties that mobs truly commanded popular support.

The KKK reduced mob sizes partly to avoid provoking clashes with veteran, well-armed Union forces. The Sons of Liberty situation was very different. The meager British forces could not cope with mobs, but the casualties soldiers inflicted could be exploited as massacres to transform the victims into “martyrs.”

The different disguises of each group are revealing. KKK costumes became notorious. The group

230 The oath is reproduced in Stanley Horn, *The Invisible Empire* (Cos Cob, Conn: John Edwards, 1969), 54

231 In the last half century (i.e., Watts, Detroit, Chicago in the 60s and in Paris 2005) mobs burned property in their own neighborhoods, making it more difficult for the communities they wanted to represent to support them enthusiastically.

232 Dictionary definitions of mobs or riots do not specify the minimum number, and certainly the common impression is that the number of participants would have to be greater than the numbers given for most KKK activities. But, alas, no useful alternative term comes to mind. The fact is that victims understood themselves to be greatly outnumbered, the defining characteristic of mob terror

233 “From November 1870 to September 1871, the Ku Klux Klan sallied forth virtually every evening in York County, South Carolina, committing at least eleven murders and tallying approximately six hundred cases of whipping and assault.” J. Gilje, *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 99.

234 Annan, “The Ku Klux Klan” (see note 88 above), 225.

235 Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), 233. The statistics are informed estimates. Sons of Liberty mob estimates are always very much higher than those offered for KKK mobs.

236 Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution* (see note 30 above), 53.

wanted the black population to see them as ghosts carrying crossbones, coffins, and skulls of Confederate soldiers returning from another world. Those “ghosts” wore long robes and masks with “horns, beards, and long red flannel tongues”; their horses were covered down to the lower legs and their hoofs muffled. Klan disguises reflected Klan beliefs that the ex-slaves were excessively superstitious and easily terrified.²³⁷ Victims were described as being not “respectful” or “criminals.” Large proportions of the black victims were or had been members of political or militia organizations.²³⁸

Sons of Liberty mob members did not always dress alike, though the need to intensify psychological effects sometimes made organizers insist they do so. In the Boston Tea Party, for example, all participants dressed as native Indians. But different mobs chose their own dress; the common feature was that leaders on the scene were always disguised. Initially, they blackened their faces. Later they appeared as “strangers” or persons not known in the local community. The disguise mandate for leaders represented something important, beyond the desire to escape prosecution.

The... emphasis on strangers as the main agents was a means to reachieve unity... Their actual influence in riots was sometimes high, because crowds repeatedly selected strangers to act as ad hoc leaders for direct confrontations with other members or sectors of the community. This facilitated subsequent reunification of the community while making prosecution more difficult.²³⁹

237 Allen W. Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (New York: Harper's, 1971), 53.

238 Gillette, *Retreat* (see note 57 above), 9

239 Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), 374. It is unclear from Hoerder's account whether the leaders really were strangers or were only dressed as strangers.

Unlike the Sons of Liberty, KKK activities were designed to kill as well as intimidate, a difference illustrated by the transformation of “lynch law” practices, a peculiar and unique feature of the American scene in the Revolutionary Period. Charles Lynch, a member of Virginia's House of Burgesses, established the precedent of lynching in 1774 in a context where a dangerous terrain made it extremely difficult to transfer prisoners to a regular court. A few prisoners were “tried” in ad hoc “courts” instead. None was killed, but those deemed guilty were tarred and feathered. During Reconstruction, the practice changed greatly. Lynch mobs generally hung their victims, and in fact the term lynching changed its meaning to mean “the infliction of the death penalty in summary fashion, usually by hanging.” The number of victims is unknown, but it may have been near a thousand.²⁴⁰ Even though whites controlled the legal machinery as the years rolled on, the numbers lynched kept growing throughout the nineteenth century: a way, Ida B. Wells-Barnett notes, “to get rid of Negroes, who were acquiring wealth and property, and thus keep the race terrorized and ‘keep the nigger down.’”²⁴¹

240 The observation about the change in meaning is made in J. E. Cutler's classic study, *Lynch Law* (New York: 1905, Longmans Green, reprinted 1969), 276. He also points out that “the sentiment frequently expressed in a community where a lynching has occurred is to the effect that the victims got what they deserved.” Ibid, loc. cit. Although no reliable statistics on the number of victims lynched during Reconstruction exist, statistics were kept for the periods afterwards. Cutler's statistics cover the period from 1882 to 1903. During that 22-year period, 1,985 blacks were lynched in the South as opposed to 600 whites and others. If the same proportion were lynched during the Reconstruction Period, the number of blacks lynched would be 990. The general view is that lynching became more common after the Democrats took over, but no one knows what the previous figures were. Estimates are that some 3000 blacks from the 1880s to the 1960s, when the practice stopped, were lynched. Lynching, of course, was a problem in the Western states too.

241 Ida B. Wells-Barnett, *Crusade for Justice: The Autobiography of Ida B. Wells*, Alfreda M. Duster, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 61–66.

Restraint is not normally a theme in discussions of the KKK. Still, the KKK restricted itself; as mentioned earlier, it avoided compelling Union troops to produce casualties, it avoided very conspicuous atrocities during election periods, and it prevented sympathizers from using KKK tactics in the North.

Attitudes towards victims were significantly different. The KKK aimed to keep the blacks “in their place” largely by enhancing fear of consequences if they tried to assert their rights. The Sons of Liberty’s concern was more complex. The first mob introduced tar and feathering to the colonies (1766) representing an effort to transform victims. Tar was known for its curative effects. Victims were often ducked in water, and sometimes transferred under the keel of a ship from side to side, practices suggesting religious baptism or symbolic purification. Significantly, if a potential victim confessed and recanted, he could be “re-admitted” to the community.

Tories had to recant before committees, by published statements or in front of crowds [which] drew up in two files and ordered a victim to pass through the lane, hat off, proclaiming his allegiance and better conduct in the future.²⁴²

The recanting had to take place under a “Liberty Tree” (usually an elm) or a “Liberty Pole” (a tall wooden flagstaff), which virtually every town established after resistance to the Stamp Act. The initial meeting of the Sons of Liberty occurred under a “Liberty Tree.” Participants “imagined” it to symbolize the generative powers of their activity. Effigies of potential victims were hung on the tree in advance of an attack, mobs continued to meet under it, and it was sustained as the symbol of the “new pure order”

242 Hoerder, *Crowd Action* (see note 14 above), 340. King Richard I apparently introduced the tar and feather practice during the Crusades.

throughout the Revolutionary War. In 1770 British troops attacked the symbol in New York, provoking an infuriated mob. The riot known as the Battle of Golden Hill was the first one in which the casualties were inflicted on the Sons of Liberty. The site of that battle was later known as “ground zero” for the 9/11 attack!²⁴³

There were other manifestations of the impurity theme.

Fumigation, used in colonial Massachusetts against smallpox and against Tories was supposed to have cleansing affects... Noises and fires were designed to exorcise evil spirits. Public exhibition of offenders, usually explained by its deterrent effects had a parallel in the belief that evil spirits, once brought into the open, lose their powers.²⁴⁴ Doctors suspected of Tory sentiments were occasionally, especially during the 1775–6 epidemic, accused of spreading smallpox...Rumors prevailed...at Roxbury in 1775 that Loyalist inhabitants of Boston infected of smallpox were deliberately spreading it.²⁴⁵

As British policies changed, new victims were sought. Private persons engaged in foreign trade or consuming its products replaced administrators as victims. Tories increasingly became targets as the years went on, and when the war did break out mobs pushed many colonists out of the country into Canada. In the very last phase of the conflict before the Revolutionary War began and during the War’s course, mobs for the first time struck at the electoral process, albeit in an unsystematic manner. Their aim was to diminish the Tory voice in the colonial legislators by preventing

243 Sandy Yang, “The Other Ghosts of Ground Zero,” *Village Voice*, Jan. 1, 2002, p. 26.

244 *Ibid.*, 81.

245 *Ibid.*, 338. The symbol was incorporated by the French Revolution.

elements from voting or keeping some elected Tories from taking their seats.²⁴⁶

Klan tactics were more uniform. Blacks and their white supporters in the South were always victims. Election periods produced the most attacks, and the military forces available could not protect the enormous number of voting locations spread over a wide geographic area. Occasionally, a tar and feathering occurred, but intimidation not transformation was the object.²⁴⁷

Mobs and Bombs

Now we will revisit our initial question, i.e., how did the bomb transform terror? It affected group sizes, tactics, relationships, and successes. It did affect other matters too, but space constraints preclude treating them.

In modern as opposed to mob terror, the international dimension, for example, is most conspicuous. President Theodore Roosevelt, for example, launched an international “crusade” against terror after his predecessor was assassinated in 1901. Then there is the story of the Terrorist Brigade of the Russian Socialist Party (1905). Its headquarters were in Switzerland, Finland provided the staging grounds for operations, and an Armenian group, trained by an earlier Russian terrorist organization, supplied weapons. The group refused funds the Japanese government offered, money American millionaires

were supposed to launder!²⁴⁸ A second characteristic worth noting is that while mobs are associated with groups only, the modern form is characterized by waves consisting of a variety of similar groups. Modern state terror began in the 1870s and produced four successive overlapping waves. The “Anarchist” wave was basically completed by the 1920s; the “Anti-Colonial” wave succeeded it and lasted until the 1960s. The “New Left” wave then began and was virtually over by 2000, and the “Religious” wave began in 1979. Each completed wave lasted approximately forty years or a generation.²⁴⁹

But to return to our initial point. The bomb made it possible for very small groups to exist simultaneously with different purposes at the same time,

246 Secondary sources generally ignore the activities of the Sons of Liberty during elections, suggesting perhaps that it was not an important concern because the colonial assemblies supported the Sons of Liberty as long as they were restrained. Hoerder notes that Tories sometimes were prevented from taking their seats, and Gilje refers to election violence occasionally

247 Most secondary accounts ignore KKK tar and feathering incidents, and the few referring to them do not elaborate. In the KKK’s first revival in the early twentieth century, the process became more prominent, especially when white members of offensive religious groups were attacked.

248 Besides the bomb, other technological changes were relevant for modern terror’s international character. The telegraph and the daily mass newspapers transmitted information virtually overnight to all parts of the world. The transcontinental railroad enabled large numbers of people to move quickly, a condition necessary for large Diaspora communities to flourish, communities deeply interested in the politics of both their old and new homes. It is also important to emphasize that European mob insurrections were becoming increasingly internationalized. They were still episodes not campaigns, but they occurred at the same time in the capital cities of non-Protestant Europe in 1820, 1830, 1848, and 1871, aiming to fulfill one or more of the French Revolution’s various promises. In the last two insurrections immigrants from various parts of Europe participated. But all efforts failed and the aftermath, especially the one which followed the Paris Commune (1871), proved so disastrous that some revolutionaries were stimulated to produce a new method, one that would be less bloody (!) and more successful. See my “Modern Terror: The Four Waves,” in Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2004), 46–73. Ironically, one reason advocates offered to potential recruits was that fewer lives would be lost in the revolutionary process. Morozov, however, did express some anxiety that because the weapon was so easy to transmit it might be abused, making those like himself who championed it “ashamed”; see Zeev Iviaski’s “The Terrorist Revolution,” *op. cit.* (see note 3 above), 78–79.

249 See my “Modern Terror,” *Ibid.*

groups which both cooperated and competed with each other. Plurality had a very different meaning in our mob examples. The similarities were so great and the rivalry so muffled that outsiders used one term to describe the many different groups associated with the Sons of Liberty, a pattern repeated in the post-Civil War period. It is not clear why tensions between mobs were so insignificant. Perhaps, the significant popular support that a prolonged campaign of mob activity requires makes it difficult to move easily in different directions.

Small groups soliciting public support need “credit” for their activities, a requirement that becomes more urgent when groups compete against each other. The search for “credit” is pursued in various ways. Groups announce their activities in ways that demonstrate their claims to be accurate, and this may have contributed to the fact that the first modern groups developed a culture of martyrdom. The most desired form occurred in a judicial proceeding where prisoners affirmed their acts and refused opportunities to repent and /or reduce their sentences, a concept, ironically, crafted from early Christian experiences!²⁵⁰ Martyrdom in one form or another remained an important feature of modern terror. Islam generated the latest example, one that has been extraordinarily significant, i.e., “self martyrdom” or “suicide bombing.” Martyrs are *inter alia* recruiting agents; “the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church.”

Mob practices were radically different. Bizarre and terrifying costumes provided evidence for the identity of assailants. But a bomber dressed in such a manner forfeits the surprise necessary for the attack. Mobs selected their victims, a circum-

stance that made the mob’s purpose clearer; news accounts in local papers seemed to know what body was responsible and why particular persons were attacked. But a bomb usually creates a very different situation. Explosives can kill anyone in the neighborhood, and the number of “unintended” victims may be quite large and indiscriminate. Consequently, the relationship between the deaths and a particular cause often requires clarification; several groups may claim responsibility, and it is also possible that if responsibility is not claimed the assailants may not be known. Finally, there is the striking crucial fact that mob members charged with crimes always denied allegations. “Massacres” by British soldiers seemed to produce all the visible heroes or martyrs the Sons of Liberty needed (if it needed any), while the KKK had no desire to encourage that sort of martyrdom because it wanted to avoid serious clashes with federal troops. *En passant*, one should note that the two groups always had sufficient recruits, and consequently this reason for seeking martyrs became irrelevant.²⁵¹

The different attitudes toward publicity are illustrated in other ways too. The Anarchists who “created” modern terror named it “propaganda of the deed.”²⁵² Each wave produced its own special texts describing how to assemble and use appropriate weapons, and the various tactics to be employed, i.e., Nechaev’s *Revolutionary Catechism*, Grivas’ *Guerrilla War*, Marighela’s *Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla*, and Bin Laden’s *Training Manual*. The texts are efforts to make terror more effective and inspire others to learn the “trade.” The Sons of Liberty and the KKK produced nothing comparable; they

250 Some twelve percent of the Russian terrorists who “invented” modern terror were children of priests. Albert Camus’ fascinating play, “The Just Assassins,” based on a real incident, shows how deeply implanted the desire for martyrdom was. Different forms of martyrdom developed in other groups, i.e., hunger strikes in the first and third wave.

251 We are not arguing that a desire to gain recruits is the reason martyrdom develops or is encouraged. But a relationship exists, which should be noted and in certain cases may be important.

252 In Islamic parlance, Marc Sageman informs me in an e-mail, the “scream for God” performs the same function

did their dirty work in secret, and kept their mouths shut afterwards.²⁵³

Most modern terrorists have been professional or engaged in the activity fulltime.²⁵⁴ The group subsidizes members and their equipment, via contributions from outside sympathizers, bank robberies, etc. Mob members, on the other hand, are engaged normally in civil occupations to support themselves and their families; their mob activities are “part-time.”²⁵⁵ This professional /part-time difference is related to the very different group sizes and geographies. Mob members were virtually all residents of the locality in which they struck. Sons of Liberty mobs could number several thousand, and every city produced mobs. Information about KKK numbers is more difficult to fathom but they appear much larger than any modern terrorist group. Modern group sizes clearly vary; most have several hundred who use weapons, a number that can increase to a thousand or two. Only in very special cases will the numbers get much larger, like that of the PLO

where a particular territory (in Lebanon) is controlled and an aspiration to create a “regular” army exists.²⁵⁶

Both American mobs were successful, though the KKK achievement was less durable.²⁵⁷ Success is very rare in the history of non-state terror, no matter what the form or time examined. Despite their successes, the American examples apparently inspired no subsequent movements. Modern terror yields a more complicated, but in some ways complementary, story. The first “Anarchist” wave lasted some forty years, but produced no successes or changes in political life which in some sense legitimized the terrorists.²⁵⁸ Common sense suggests that the later rebels would reject this new form of terrorism. But when the first wave dissipated, another wave (“Anti-Colonial”) materialized and produced the first few successes. Failure in the third (“New Left”) wave was virtually as conspicuous as that of the first.²⁵⁹ The fourth (“Religious”) wave has produced some extraordinary and destructive events, but not many political successes. Despite the much larger number of failures, terrorist activities still persist and it would be difficult to find any serious

253 The secret constitution of the KKK, written after the first Grand Wizard was chosen, does not describe tactics either, although references are sometimes made in the trials of offenders. The purpose of the Klan is not really described beyond protecting the “weak the innocent and the defenseless” and the “Constitution of the U.S.” (Horn, *The Invisible Empire* (Appendix 1) (see note 93 above)). In the second phase of the Klan in 1925 the constitution was rewritten, published, and sent out to potential members. The major change was that it defined itself as a “military organization” and included a detailed number of commitments to protect the “weak,” especially women. See David and Sheila Rothman, eds., *Sources of the American Social Tradition, Volume II, 1865 to Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 166–172. I am grateful to Jeff Kaplan who made me aware of the 1925 publication.

254 In the first wave, those who actually were anarchists operated more informally and were usually associated with an immigrant social center. In the fourth wave, Al Qaeda has a mixture of the professional and non-professional elements.

255 Unemployed sailors and journeymen were conspicuous in many mobs. Were they subsidized?

256 The PLO in Lebanon had around 25,000 when it was trying to transform itself into a regular army; but most members were not engaged in terrorist operations. The numbers in Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda are unclear, but most informed observers believe that the numbers were less than a thousand. For more discussion of modern terror group sizes, see my “Modern Terror: The Four Waves” (see note 111 above).

257 Although we cannot deal with it here, it is worth pointing out that some dimension of the Reconstruction effort to “impose democracy” has resonance in the present situation in Iraq.

258 One could argue that changes like the 8-hour working day were due to anarchist activity. But many others were involved in that process and the anarchists have not received credit.

259 The PLO is the only third wave group to achieve some success; the Oslo Accords enabled it to return to Palestine. Ironically, Israel accepted the Accords because the PLO’s capacity to generate terror had been enormously reduced.

observer who imagines that we will soon see an end to terror.²⁶⁰

Why were our two mob terror campaigns successful? “Violence,” Richard Hofstadter says, “can only succeed in a political environment like the United States under certain conditions. Those who use it must be able to localize it and limit its duration. They must use it in circumstances in which the public is either indifferent or uninformed or heavily biased in their favor.”²⁶¹ Certainly, the cause in both instances was very popular; also, the government and its supporters were ambivalent about the wisdom or validity of state policies. The rebels clearly understood that this favorable situation depended on their abilities to restrain themselves.

There are no reliable statistics to show how many people supported the mobs. One scholar states that some 550,000 were involved in KKK activities, an unlikely number because it would embrace virtually the entire white male population in the South.²⁶² Still, the number though exaggerated suggests that a considerable proportion of the white population was involved in one way or another. With respect to the Sons of Liberty, large majorities in various colonial assemblies denounced the Stamp Act prior to the

inception of mob activity, and the immediate effectiveness of the mobs in having the Stamp Act rescinded suggests their popular backing was considerable. When the Revolutionary War materialized, some two-thirds of the American population supported independence. One major contributing factor to the mobs’ successes not mentioned by Hofstadter is that they did not encounter professional police establishments, which were created later in the nineteenth century. (Parenthetically, one should note that the police all wore uniforms to deter potential mobs, but when modern terror developed an element of the police took their uniforms off, developing a pre-emption policy enabling them to penetrate the small groups.)

How does the success of the two mobs relate to those very rare successes modern terror achieved? In the latter case, the most durable and successful groups espoused separatism (or nationalism). But none of the many nationalist groups succeeded in the first wave. The anti-colonial wave from the 1920s to the 1960s produced the first and most significant successful campaigns. The reason was that the principle of self-determination introduced by the French Revolution finally became a principle of the international order established at Versailles largely through American influence. A crucial ambivalence was created in the homelands of the Western empires and in the international world as a whole. Terrorists were able to use that ambivalence to achieve at least some of their ends, at least as long as terrorists restrained themselves in significant ways as indicated by their refusal to strike at the colonial power’s homeland.²⁶³

260 The number of fourth wave groups has varied but it is usually in the mid-forties in any given year. See Ami Pedahzur, William Eubank, and Leonard Weinberg, “The War on Terrorism and the Decline of Terrorist Group Formation,” *TPV* 14, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 141–147. But an e-mail from Alex Schmid suggests the number is higher.

261 “Reflections on Violence in the United States,” in Hofstadter and M. Wallace, eds., *American Violence* (New York: Vintage, 1971), 31.

262 See the Ku Klux Klan article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1933). General Forrest first gave the figure in an interview the *Cincinnati Commercial* published, April 28, 1868. But when he was summoned to testify before a Congressional Investigating Committee, he denied making the statement and said he knew nothing about the organization. The original interview is published in Appendix III, Horn, *Invisible Empire* (see note 93 above). Horn discusses Forrest’s denials, 316–321.

263 The principal exception occurred during the Algerian struggle against the French (1954–1962), an undertaking that divided the Algerian leadership and probably prolonged the campaign too. For a very interesting discussion of the problem, see Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson, *Revolutionary Terrorism* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1978), especially 86–129.

That success was so striking that an “anti-colonial” cause has become an aspect of the terrorist ethos ever since, because virtually all modern groups afterwards described governments opposing them as colonial or “neo colonial.” The claim, however, was intertwined with other objectives (i.e., New Left and Religious themes) which produced conflicting responses vitiating the colonial claims. A more important fact was that those attacked later did not consider themselves as maintaining an empire. The very long 40-year struggle of ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) in Spain illustrates the point. The Spaniards do not consider themselves a colonial power, and with the exception of the Basque Diaspora the rest of the international world agrees.

The more limited six “successes” in the fourth wave reflect similar themes. In the first two cases, the defeated parties had placed their armies in what they knew to be foreign territories and only intended to stay briefly. Thus, Hezbollah compelled UN peace-keeping forces (i.e., U.S. and French troops) to leave Lebanon quickly (1983). The attacks ceased after the withdrawals; the French and American homelands were not assaulted when the violence between the parties ended. The case of Israel in Lebanon had some different elements. The Israelis stayed much longer partly because their country shared a border with Lebanon making Israel to attacks from its neighbor. But the Israelis finally did withdraw.²⁶⁴ In 2006 Israel’s effort to push Hezbollah back from border areas was frustrated. Somalia produced the fifth example (1994). U.S. forces sent for humanitarian purposes withdrew, after several attacks. Signif-

icantly, no mutual agreement was signed to seal the decisions in both countries.²⁶⁵

The sixth case, the Palestinian, transcends the 3rd and 4th wave, and is the most complicated. The UN Resolution dividing the Palestine Mandate (1948) aimed to establish two independent states. But Jordan and Egypt occupied the Palestinian portion, territory they lost to Israel in the 1967 Six Day War. Then the PLO, largely because of very strong international support, was recognized as the legitimate heir to the Palestinian territory even though it functioned abroad. Three decades later, after the PLO lost its striking power and Israeli settlements were planted in Palestinian territory, the Oslo Accords were signed wherein Israel invited the PLO to come to Palestine if it agreed to recognize Israel and work out a final settlement. But (interalia) the settlements have made the struggle more costly for both parties, and a solution has not been found yet. The continuing struggle has created a new Palestinian group, Hamas, which has won support of the Palestinian majority. Inspired by religion, Hamas is unwilling to accept Israel as a legitimate negotiating partner.

The colonial context and/or alternatively a situation in which the “stronger” party perceives itself in foreign territories helps explain our mob terror successes too. The British had honored the no taxation without representation principle in the original colonial settlements, which suggested that a mutual understanding existed that in some important sense the parties were separate peoples. Southerners constantly referred to the federal government’s presence as an occupation, one that denied them their right to choose the kind of government they wanted, an autonomy they argued that the U.S. constitution was devised to guarantee. The North itself was divided

264 The Israelis also wanted to form an alliance with Lebanon’s Christian elements living near the border, which contributed to their willingness to stay longer. The achievement of Hezbollah enabled it to become a major party in the Lebanese parliament.

265 The KKK victory was never sealed with a formal agreement. In fact, the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution highlighted a serious discrepancy in the situation which ultimately led to the successful Civil Rights movement a century later.

on the issue, making it more difficult to keep troops in the South policing elections, especially in the face of allegations that the army's election activities were fueled by the desire to increase Republican national power.

It is difficult to explain success thoroughly without more cases to examine. Perhaps, the peculiar American context (i.e., the semi-legitimate status of mobs) was a major reason for mob success.²⁶⁶ More mob examples to compare American experiences with would help one address the question. Beyond that, a systematic study of success and failure among modern terror groups is long overdue; and should that study materialize someday, we would have a better grasp of the peculiarities of the American mobs too.

²⁶⁶ Paul Gilje notes that he has examined 4000 American riots, "a number that does not come close to the total of all rioting." *Rioting* (see note 10 above), 183.

2.2 A changing landscape of protesters

*Dr. Ass. Prof. Heléne Lööw, Associate Director
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Sweden*

Around me there is an inferno of screaming people, barking police dogs, and sirens. The crowd is screaming *murderer, murderer* against the police officers, who are trying to clear the area. A young man completely dressed in black remains standing between the crowd and the police with his right arm lifted. The dogs are clinging to his arm, but the expression on his face is motionless. His blank face and the look in his eyes, which seem to glow with a strange frightening power, will remain in my mind for a long time. Later I see him, bleeding heavily, being led away from the area by a young girl, his face still motionless – his eyes still burning. At Riddarholmbron [Riddarholms Bridge] a smaller group suddenly breaks from the line of police officers and disappears towards the nearby channel. And suddenly I find myself once again swept away in the mass of screaming people that has time after time broken from the police lines. Everyone is running at the same time, trying to avoid bottles and stones that are flying in the air and smashing down around us and the barking police dogs.



Charles XII commemorators at Riddarholmen

It was 30 November 1991, and the extreme nationalist Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats)²⁶⁷ were preparing for the commemoration of the death of King Charles XII in Stockholm. In the early hours of the day, a young activist from an underground white supremacy group was shot and killed by the Malmö police. Since then, the media had been reporting on preparations for the evening's commemoration ceremonies in Stockholm and Lund. Hour after hour of live footage was broadcast from the headquarters of various activist groups likely to take part in the upcoming event, including white supremacy groups, extreme nationalists, anarchists, and antiracists – and the newspapers were full of maps showing areas where the expected riots were likely to occur.

I found myself running and running, trying to avoid being hit by flying objects – suddenly someone was running beside me, smiling and saying, “Don’t run; the dogs will get you. Don’t panic; be calm.” Suddenly, I realized that I was part of a group of people about to reach Kungsträdgården (King’s Garden). We ran over the bridge, and directly in front of me was Kungsträdgården, where counter-demonstrators had gathered earlier for a rally and then refused to leave when their permit expired. A smaller group of 30 November commemorators – the first group to break away from the police barriers – had already reached the counterdemonstrators, violently clashing with them. And there, hidden behind some half-thrown-down riot fences, was yet another group of 30 November commemorators; they had arrived too late to join the march towards the Kungsträdgården and believed their comrades were already there; they were wrong. One of them

²⁶⁷ Sverigedemokraterna (SD), the Swedish Democrats, the largest nationalist party at present, was founded in 1988. In the election in September 2010 the SD received 5.7% of the votes and 20 seats in the national assembly..

had not managed to get away, and a group of antiracists was senselessly hitting this figure in dark clothes lying on the ground. The crowd that had gathered around the statue of Charles XII, the end point of the commemorators' march, was screaming "Kill the fascists! Kill the fascists!" Together, some others and I managed to escape into one of the surrounding backyards.

In the alleys surrounding Kungsträdgården, the police had rounded up various activists – they were sitting in rows against the walls – and had directed intensely bright flashlights at them. I keep running towards the subway station, where a group of people of different ages had gathered behind the counterdemonstrators. At first glance, until they suddenly started to change clothes, they appeared to be counterdemonstrators or ordinary people caught up in the chaos. A man with a camera was approaching the group, believing that they, like him, were counterprotesters; but he realized his mistake and disappeared into the alley. A younger man, suddenly dressed in camouflage gear and a black military-style beret turned towards me, laughing: "You didn't recognize us either, did you?" For him it was part of his identity as an white supremacy activist, and he had extensive experience with riots and activism across Europe; he was skilled in the art of changing identity during an event, skilled in planning events and controlling riots, as far as possible.

That night's riot was part of a yearly ritual – part of a long tradition: riots have occurred at the same place since 1853. King Charles XII is one of the most controversial figures in Swedish history.



Antiracist activists climbing the statue of King Charles XII.

My colleague Anders Lange, who was among the counterdemonstrators, described them in this way: "When on 30 November 1991 I witnessed the confrontations between demonstrating "racists" and counterdemonstrating "antiracists" in Kungsträdgården in Stockholm, this note came to mind – the behavior of the antiracists made me very ambivalent in a way that could not be reconciled with their so-called progressive goal. In many heated speeches the racists were called "slimy, vulgar, primitive characters" that should as soon as possible be "smashed," "exterminated," and "cleaned away" from "our streets." The more I listened, the more the racists took on the face of almost subhumans with certain phenotypic characteristics. A race?"²⁶⁸

²⁶⁸ Anders Lange, *Reflektioner kring rasism*, Fest serien (Stockholm: CEIFO, 1994), 13.

I felt the same kind of ambivalence as I walked, late that night, from the center of Stockholm, where demonstrators and counterdemonstrators remained, still clashing occasionally in further disturbances. Earlier that day I had attended the Föreningen Sveriges Framtids (the Association for Sweden's Future) meeting in Medborgarhuset. It was a quiet event visited by a huge crowd of representatives from various media outlets and a smaller group of activists – ranging from older people who had once been active in the National Socialist parties of the 1930s to members of the younger generations. During the meeting there was a moment of silence to remember the dead Malmö activist, and the participants sang the old battle songs of the 1930s. After the meeting, I headed to Hjöder Dart at Fryshuset, where some of the Charles XII commemorators were gathering.²⁶⁹ The atmosphere was very tense, and activists from various parts of Sweden, as well as from foreign countries, were constantly arriving. Many of them had been stopped and had their weapons confiscated by police en route to the gathering place. Some activists opened a secret stash of supplies hidden under the floor and started to hand out various tools that could be used in street fighting, while others were selling so-called battle gloves reinforced with iron over the knuckles.

There was a never-ending stream of TV teams coming and going, interviewing selected spokespeople about their expectations for the evening. After some time I followed the activists on their way to the Narvaförbundets traditional ceremony held at the tomb of King Charles XII at Riddarholms kyrkan (Riddarholms Church). It is an almost religious ceremony with a guard of honour dressed in the uniforms



TV teams interviewing a spokesperson for the white supremacists at Hjöder Dart.

used by Charles XII's armies; speeches are made, religious hymns are sung, and it all ends with a flower offering at the Iron Gate outside the king's tomb. That part, which in many ways is the commemorative act, is held far from the location of the riots and political statements. This has always been so, mainly because very few, if any, of the counterdemonstrators have any idea of its existence.

After the ceremony the younger participants in the church commemoration change clothes – this time they dress for battle – and leave the church to join the final event of the evening, while the older men join the general public to observe and instruct and pass information to the younger activists. The younger activists had started out in civilian clothes, in which they attended the rally organized by Föreningen Sveriges Framtid, then donned the garb of skinheads or media spokespeople to join the preparations at the Hjöder Dart, only to transform themselves some hours later into Carolinian soldiers in an honour guard outside the king's tomb. Finally, they became street warriors dressed in black, their faces covered with balaclavas.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁹ Fryshuset is a youth activity house administered by an independent association. It runs schools and sports activities and provides space for numerous youth groups and organizations. In the 1980s and early 1990s Fryshuset also provided a separate clubhouse for skinheads and members of the white supremacy subculture, an initiative that was questioned and intensely debated at the time.

²⁷⁰ Heléne Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige, 1980–1997* (Stockholm: Ordfront, 2000).

Activists on the “other side” underwent similar transformations during the course of the event, and that night the counterdemonstrators became known to the larger public as AFA/Antifa. The riot would become part of the collective memory of activists on both sides, as the stories would be told and retold in numerous articles and at multiple sectarian gatherings, eventually becoming one of those moments that change the history of movements – and individuals’ status within the two movements would be determined by their actions on that day. A major riot sometimes serves as a radicalizing factor for individuals and movements, giving rise to legends and myths that can live on for an extremely long time. Some riots, like those in Seattle, Gothenburg, and Geneva, have become iconic moments, inspiring numerous books, articles, eyewitness accounts, movement literature, and even films.²⁷¹

The foregoing description illustrates the complexity of an event – which itself contains a number of sub events – and highlights the multifaceted nature of the actors involved, the activists on different sides, the police, and the media. Such an account illustrates the various identities an individual can take on during an event like this. The setup is basically the same over time, but modern communication technology has been added to the old tactics. Today the flyers that activists distribute bear the name of a Facebook group or a website instead of a post-office box; today the events are publicized on the Internet and through social media, and internal communication during the event is done through text messages, Twitter, smartphone apps, and so on; sympathizers all over the globe can follow developments in real time on the Internet. Today the older men and women on the sidewalk are armed with smartphones instead of

a signing system, or they use both means of communication instead of the older one alone.

In the same way a police force evaluates a deployment, activists do the same, making adjustments and sharpening their tactics for the next demonstration. This article addresses the activists’ perspective, aims, and tactics in terms of what they want to achieve through the protest event. This paper also addresses the tactics and goals of several key groups and the changes that have occurred in the landscape of protest during the past decade, as well as the new elements that social media and the communication revolution have introduced as they have slowly but surely been integrated into the old tactical frameworks and have given rise to completely new ones. From a policing perspective it is essential to know who the protesters are, why they are there in the first place, and what their goals and tactics are in order to manage the demonstrators, endeavouring to avoid confrontations between groups and between demonstrators and police.

A Changing Landscape

The landscape of protest today is in some ways fundamentally different from that of earlier decades like the 60, 70 and 80s. This section addresses these similarities and changes, the impact of the changes, and several major movements – in the broad sense of the word – that are active today.

The antiglobalization movement

Changes evident among today’s landscape of protesters are in many ways linked to globalization and resistance against it. The globalization process that started after the end of the Cold War has created independent economies that have rendered national borders irrelevant. Today multinational companies control larger economical assets than most states do. This, however, is nothing new historically speaking; it was also the case during the Hansa era, during the time of the East Indian Company, and during the colonial era.

271 For the Gothenburg riots see for instance, Göteborgskravallerna, vittnesmål, dokument, kommentar. Sammanställning och kommentarer av, Erik Wijk, Bjärnum Manifest 2001, Mikael Löfgren & Masoud Vatankham, (red), vad hände med Sverige i Göteborg (Stockholm Ordfront 2002),

In many ways, then, the financial sector has returned the world to an earlier historical stage. Globalization has given rise not only to an intense public debate but also to an oppositional subculture whose constituents either resist globalization in all its forms²⁷² or favour an alternative form of globalization that is developing today. These people are labelled (and label themselves) *global fairness activists*. Their main goals are the democratization of large international institutions and fair, democratic globalization.²⁷³

Some researchers would argue that antiglobalization movements first came to light with the protests and riots that accompanied the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) meeting in Seattle, while others trace their roots to the gay movement in the United States during the 1980s and to the “reclaim the streets” actions in London and New York during the same era. Still others argue that antiglobalization can be traced to the protests and riots against the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Africa, Asia, and Latin America during the 1970s, and some trace it as far back as the earliest resistance against the European colonial powers.²⁷⁴

The antiglobalization movement resembles in some ways the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s – but there are also significant differences. The 1960s and 1970s saw the birth of a wave of protest movements against the Vietnam War, an incipient environmental movement, growing feminist, civil rights, and minority rights movements, and increasing radical leftism. It was an era of myriad ideas – political, religious, and ecological, some simply oppositional or

generally antiestablishment – ideas that were communicated through underground publications, music, posters, and art. The 1960s and 1970s represent the golden age of street-corner activism and underground mail-order firms. Today’s antiglobalization movement has much in common with these earlier protest movements; it is a bricolage of submovements, each characterized by different ideas and methods – a fact that was manifest in the huge demonstrations at the beginning of the twenty-first century against institutions like the IMF, the Bilderberg Group, and the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which had become symbols of globalization.

There are, however, differences between today’s protest movements and the earlier ones. For one thing, the movements of the 1960s and 1970s helped end an unpopular war in Vietnam, created a mass movement of young people in the Western world around a set of core issues such as peace, equality, environmentalism, sexual revolution, and a movement that dreamed of a collective green utopia.²⁷⁵ Another difference is the absence of collective leaders in today’s movements. They lack a Martin Luther King Jr. or a Cesar Chaves; instead, they comprise more or less autonomous global networks of equally anonymous activists.²⁷⁶

There were no mass movement in sight in April 2000 when the WTO had its meeting in Seattle and the city was flooded with antiglobalization activists representing a wide variety of organizations with different positions and tactics. Here were anarchists of different kind: environmental organizations, the Mexican Zapatista guerillas, trade unions, charity organizations, human rights activists, and religious organizations. Owing to the presence of a large group of black bloc anarchists, splinter groups from the animal rights movement, and radical environmental groups, the protests took a violent turn, spark-

272 Jeffrey Kaplan and Heléne Löw, introduction to *The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in the Age of Globalisation*, ed. Jeffrey Kaplan and Heléne Löw (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2002).

273 Magnus Wennerhag, “En annan värld är möjlig,” in *En ny demokrati*, ed. Erik Amnå (Stockholm: Global utmaning, 2007).

274 Luis A. Fernandez, *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 36.

275 Kaplan and Löw, introduction.

276 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 6.

ing huge riots, substantial destruction of property, and violent confrontations with the police force as a result. It was in Seattle that this mixture of groups – or rather, this mixture of oppositional belief systems – first caught the attention of the general public on a large scale.²⁷⁷ During the year that followed, similar scenes could be seen in Prague, Gothenburg, and Geneva. It was through this series of violent confrontations that the antiglobalization movement would gain public as well as political interest. In September 2001, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the United States, the meetings of the World Bank (WB) and the IMF in Washington, DC, scheduled for 29–30 September 2001, and the meeting of the Transatlantic Business Dialogue in Stockholm, scheduled for October 2001, were cancelled. And the G8 meeting in Italy in September 2001 was relocated to a remote part of the Canadian mountains in order to avoid violent confrontations.

What surprised police organizations in different countries was not the number of violent protesters or the intensity of the riots but rather the fact, already mentioned that the protesters came from such a wide variety of groups: groups that normally would have clashed with each other were now appearing side by side. In the words of the Canadian police:

“The global parameters have encouraged different groups and individuals to participate in the demonstrations. In Seattle and Washington, for example, the wide variety of parading malcontents evoked the eclectic ambience of a “protest county fair.” Circumstances also have promoted the involvement of fringe extremists who espouse violence, largely represented by *Black Bloc* anarchists and factions of militant animal-rights and environmental activists.”²⁷⁸

277 Kaplan and Löföw, introduction.

278 “Anti-Globalization: A Spreading Phenomenon.”

<http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200008-eng.asp>

Another striking characteristic of the antiglobalization movement is that it seems to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Aspects of antiglobalization sentiment can be found in a large variety of protesting groups – for instance, the Mexican Zapatistas, opponents of genetically modified plants, farmers occupying banks in Brazil, and trade union members protesting free-trade agreements and bad working conditions.²⁷⁹

The Occupy movement

During recent years yet another global movement with similar characteristics has come to the surface: the Occupy movement. It began in September 2011 with the Occupy Wall Street action. On 17 September 2011 hundreds of people marched into an empty square in Lower Manhattan to camp out on the concrete. They were joined over the next two months by thousands of others, and a camp city began taking shape. The aim was to protest the growing gap between rich and poor and the fact that money, in the protesters’ view, seemed to be taking over every sector of society. It was a movement with a wage agenda, without leaders; many of its core activists were anarchists who did not believe in the concepts of leadership and organizational structures in the first place. Some of the activists who started the movement claimed that they had been inspired by the Arab Spring and the Spanish *indignados* movement. In an interview in *Vanity Fair* Vlad Teichberg, one of the cofounders of the Occupy Wall Street movement, stated:

“I’d been a Wall Street person and a revolutionary. It was like a double-agent thing. I’d make a few hundred grand and then do another project. My last job for a big bank was in 2008 for HSBC. Before that I was running structured-credit trading for mortgages for this big German bank,

279 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 35.

WestLB. I was managing a \$30 billion book. It was ground zero for the financial explosion. We knew [the revolution] was going to happen. We just thought it would take a little longer. We decided to set up a base in Spain, because we thought it was going south to sub-Saharan Africa. Then suddenly the Spanish revolution started.”²⁸⁰

In May 2011 Teichberg watched tens of thousands of protesters storm into Madrid’s Puerta del Sol. The demonstration, which became known as the *indignados* movement, quickly spread to dozens of Spanish cities and became a prototype for Occupy Wall Street. The Occupy concept quickly spread from country to country.²⁸¹ The history of the Occupy movement is an example of the way ideas travel, change, and return once more to the place where they originated in slightly modified forms.

The Occupy movement and the antiglobalization movement are, as already pointed out, not movements in the traditional meaning of the word, with fixed organizational structures; instead, they are forever changing shape. For every event a new temporary organization is created, and websites, Facebook groups, Twitter feeds, and YouTube channels are created for each specific protest action. When the event is over, these disappear or drop from public view on the Internet.²⁸² Key sites often remain, however, and function as a kind of think tank and franchising operation – on these sites interested activists can find ideological material, chat rooms, practical advice on how to set up an operation, information about ongoing campaigns all over the globe, and links to

related think-tank websites. One site for the Occupy movements includes the following statement:

“What is occupying? It’s more the just peaceful assemblies. When we occupy a space, or a topic, we spotlight it. We encourage people to investigate, understand, act, and change something. What do you want to occupy?”²⁸³

Visitors who click on the statement in order to receive information are asked to submit information about what they intend to occupy and why.²⁸⁴ This concept of nonorganization is of course not new, historically speaking, nor is it bound to any ideology or religion; it can be found in many movements, including those of anarchists, white supremacists, and environmentalists groups etc. etc. which will be addressed further on. What one sees here is, again, not movements in the traditional meaning of the word but rather subcultures, or networks of networks, which in themselves harbor a number of groups with different agendas and different tactics bound together by a common goal. That every subculture comprises a number of groups makes each one difficult to describe – and they are also, as already mentioned, constantly changing.²⁸⁵ What is new, however, is that sometimes subcultures with completely different ideologies appear side by side at the same event, even if they normally would clash (sometimes violently) with each other. Nowadays the issue, not the ideology, determines who might show up. Some activists even reject ideology per se – only the current issue and their personal stand on it determine whether they will join a protest event.

280 Max Chafkin, “Revolution Number 99,” Report from Zuccotti Park, *Vanity Fair*, February 2012, <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/02/occupy-wall-street-201202>.

281 Max Chafkin, “Revolution Number 99,” Report from Zuccotti Park, *Vanity Fair*, February 2012, <http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/2012/02/occupy-wall-street-201202>.

282 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 37.

283 <http://www.occupy.net/>.

284 <http://www.occupy.net/>.

285 Fernandez, *Policing Dissent*, 37.

A Diversity of Protesters: Empirical Data

A 2004 study based on a survey of 1,066 Swedish activists participating in the social forums in Lund, Gothenburg, and Stockholm provides some insight into how activists in the antiglobalization movement view politics, what the movement means to them, and how they feel it should be conducted. The survey shows that these activists differ from the general population in a number of respects. First, the activists in the global fairness and antiglobalization movement have far more experience working within political parties, participating in consumer boycotts, collecting names for petitions, and similar activities, than the average member of the population has. The movement, further, attracts groups who are less active than average within *traditional* political parties, particularly young people, women, and immigrants.

An individual's personal opinion and personal engagement is substantially more important for the activists than joining an organization is. In this respect, it is paradoxical what while the traditional political parties, not least their youth organizations, are losing members, large numbers of young people join new political arenas; the global fairness and antiglobalization movement is one such arena. But although the activists have low confidence in the core institutions of democracy, they tend to vote in general elections; in fact, their participation in general elections is substantially higher than that among the general public. Only 4 percent of the activists in the survey claimed that voting in general elections ran counter to their political opinion. The activists' critique of democratic institutions seems to centre more on the way they function and on today's political agenda than it does on the institutions themselves.²⁸⁶

A German study of protestors at the 2007 G8 summit (based on a survey of 3,578 participants between

15–24 years of age) offers further insight. The survey identified eight main reasons for participating:

1. Acting together against global social problems, such as human rights violations and poverty (13.6 percent)
2. Using violence against state power and out of general frustration: "only violence can change society"; violence is a way of "letting off steam" (11.8 percent)
3. Demonstrating as a fun experience, a "party-style event" (8.1 percent)
4. Curiosity aroused by information attained through media and school: they had heard about the event and wanted to gain firsthand knowledge by participating (5.0 percent)
5. External motivation from others: they had joined more active friends at the protests (4.7 percent)
6. Demonstrating as an experience of collective resistance: the feeling of being part of a movement (4.6 percent)
7. Nationalist and protectionist motives: fear of Americanization, of "loss of national identity," of immigrants (3.9 percent)
8. External influence: expectations of others that they should participate (3.3 percent)

The study also identifies two main groups of activists. The first comprises nonviolent political idealists driven to protest against human rights violations, poverty, and corporate power. To be part of collective resistance is important to this group. Three-quarters of the individuals in this group are active in other political organizations. These activists generally take part in protest events, such as demonstrations, public discussions, street theatre, protest concerts, and distributing leaflets. But their participation in blockades, spraying protest graffiti, and other acts of civil disobedience was disproportionately high, and a large number of individuals within this group expressed approval of violent actions such as dismantling fences and barricades, frowning paint bombs, defence

²⁸⁶ Magnus Wennerhag, Hilma Holm, Johan Lindgren, Henrik Nordvall, and Adrienne Sörbom, *Aktivister* (City: Atlas bokförlag, Stockholm Publisher, 2006).

against police attacks, and destruction of corporate property – even if they did not necessarily participate in such activities themselves. For instance, 47 percent of this group was in favour of dismantling barriers, and 15.8 percent had participated in such actions themselves. Again, 50.2 percent were in favour of mounting a defence against police attacks, and 21 percent had done so; 38.8% supported the destruction of corporate property, and 9.9 percent had taken part in such activities. This group had a slight overrepresentation of males and the highest proportion of university graduates among parents of all the subgroups identified in the survey. This segment of the survey population also included the highest number of highly qualified school leavers; 57.8 percent held university entrance qualifications.

The second cluster of individuals in the survey was composed of politically idealistic individualists who were not motivated by a desire to take part in collective movements. They evinced no interest in collective action and no desire to belong to a movement – they might show up at mass events but reject the idea that they should be inspired by others in any way. They were slightly older, predominantly well-educated males, and most came from a family background of higher-than-average education.

A third category comprised politically idealistic individuals seeking information, fun, and new experiences. This subgroup, like that last, could be labelled politically idealistic, but they explicitly cited the “fun and experience” aspect of the demonstration as a reason for participating. They wanted to join a party, find out more, and feel that they were part of something bigger – a movement of some sort. The individuals in this group were below average in terms of political activity in a more organized form. They rejected violence as well as any nationalistic or protectionist motives for participating. And they had taken part in violent actions to a lower degree than average. This group was less male dominated than the other groups.

Another cluster that can be identified in the survey was made up of politically idealistic and peer-oriented people. Members of this group might join protests because they belong to a group of friends who also participate, and it is because of these peers and their power to persuade that these actors join protest events. This group rejected violent actions but was decidedly prodemonstration; they might hand out leaflets or participate in street theatre, discussions, and other forms of political activity. This group was the only female-dominated group in the survey and included the highest number of university students. Its constituents participated slightly less often in violent actions but supported them slightly more than average.

Yet another subgroup comprised the politically idealistic activist with nationalistic tendencies. This group travelled to the G8 summit in Rostock with no intention of participating in violent protests. This group’s members were not necessarily extremely right wing, though they feared an Americanization of society and a loss of national identity, and they feared losing their jobs or chances of obtaining one to immigrants. This segment of the survey population was the only gender-balanced one, and it included the highest number of employed young people. This group exhibited the highest proportion of individuals who had left school with nonuniversity qualification exams.

Then there is the politically idealistic, potential violent subset of respondents. This cluster represented 11 percent of those surveyed, and 20 percent explicitly favoured violence. In this group a mixture of motives can be found. Its members “knew their enemy,” and violence played a major role in their political activity – but they had also participated in nonviolent protests. Here one finds the black bloc and the anarchists. They seemed to believe that nothing could be achieved or would even be noticed without the use of violence. This was the youngest group in the study, with 40 percent under twenty years of age; its

members reported a higher unemployment rate than average and fewer parents with higher education.

Another subgroup was the violent but nonpolitical – the “riot for fun” participants. They reported attending protests with like-minded friends primarily in order to riot. They obtained information about the event through various media outlets. This group was dominated by males, and the level of education was below average. In addition, it included a small group of nonviolent, nonpolitical individuals more of the character of curious bystanders.²⁸⁷

These two surveys underline the argument regarding the diversity of people who participate in these events and the mixture of reasons they give for participating. The protesters are not in any way homogenous but represent diverse groups and individuals who reject any form of organization and resist being labelled as belonging to any particular movement or ideology.

Oppositional Subcultures and Networks of Networks

In the 1970s sociologist Colin Campbell came up with a theory about how cultic milieus can be understood, and the scenario one observes today, rife with different kinds of protest movements, bears some resemblance to what Campbell described in his study.²⁸⁸

Now, as then, ideas travel from milieu to milieu; they are debated, analysed, rejected completely or partly,

and gradually changed. There is constant conflict, moreover, between those who oppose violent action and those who argue that the only way to change society is through violence. This conflict seems to be present in every belief system, political as well as non-political, and in turn, along with an endless internal struggle over the “right interpretation” of beliefs, it results in endless splinter groups dedicated more to fighting each other than to resisting their opponents or society. The cultic milieu is oppositional in its nature, and at its core is the belief that each group is somehow the carrier of a hidden or suppressed truth. The cultic milieu is part of a world in which suppressed knowledge is key, in which ideas, theories, and speculations are traded among numerous small groups, a world where leaders and groups come and go but its core members, the “true believers,” remain. Their loyalty might change in their constant search for the truth, but they remain in the milieu.²⁸⁹

With the arrival of the technological revolution these milieus moved onto the Internet, creating communication systems through e-mail, websites, and technology, and they created virtual communities as well as physical ones – communities of people exchanging information through underground zines and letters. And more recently, they have moved into the world of social media and cheap communication technology, such as Skype. Others have disappeared completely or partly into the virtually unknown world of the “dark web,” an Internet estimated to be at least five times the size of the public one.²⁹⁰ The more or less closed world that previously existed in networks of mail-order firms, underground magazines, and secret meeting places now exists also in virtual form. And that in turn presents a historically unique opportunity to gain a more detailed picture of the

287 Renate Möller, Uwe Sander, Arne Schäfer, Dirk Villányi, Matthias D. Witte, “Motive Structures and Violence among Young Globalization Critics: A Statistical Typology of the Motives for Protest at the 2007 G8 Summit,” *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 3, no. 1 (2009): 124–142.

288 There are, of course, numerous theories regarding understanding social, political, religious movements, but for this purpose, I have used Campbell’s theory as a starting point, building on an earlier project by the National Council of Crime prevention in Sweden that resulted in the study *The Cultic Milieu*. See Colin Campbell, “The Cult, the Cultic Milieu and Secularization,” in Kaplan and Löw, *The Cultic Milieu*.

289 Campbell, “The Cult,” 120–124.

290 <http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/5650/cyber-crime/what-is-the-deep-web-a-first-trip-into-the-abyss.html>

ideas and milieus below the surface of the mainstream debate. Subcultures have in many ways gone public.

Some of the ideas that originate from the cultic milieus in time become part of mainstream culture, but long before that they have been debated, analysed, and modified by the milieus themselves. What unites individuals within these milieus, no matter the nature of the milieu in question, is that they reject society; they are antiestablishment in nature. But apart from the search for a higher meaning, these milieus are strangely mixed and tolerant. Ideas that would never be accepted in mainstream society can find a place in these milieus. That does not, however, mean that the ideas are accepted; most are heard and rejected, many are criticized, and many more are ignored. But the ideas are being listened to and travel from group to group, from leader to leader, from searcher to searcher. Campbell's research deals with religious movements that emerged and disappeared and resurfaced, slightly changed, slightly modified as part of the wave of alternative religious movements that arose during the 1960s and 1970s.²⁹¹ Campbell stated that the new religious movements were not only a product of the liberation movements of that time but in fact a constant factor throughout history. He wrote:

"Cults must exist within a milieu which, if not conducive to the maintenance of individual cults, is clearly highly conducive to the spawning of cults in general. Such a generally supportive cultic milieu is continually giving birth to new cults, absorbing the debris of the dead ones and creating new generations of cult-prone individuals to maintain the high level of membership turnover. Thus, whereas cults are by definition a transitory phenomenon, the cultic milieu is, by contrast, a permanent feature of society."²⁹²

291 Kaplan and Löw, introduction

292 Campbell, "The Cult," 121–122.

This milieu of cults, oppositional in nature and in search of "ultimate truth," strikingly resembles the landscape of protesters that the Canadian police described as a "protest county fair."²⁹³

Campbell's theory provides one possible key to understanding why groups that under normal circumstances are ideologically opposed can suddenly appear side by side in a demonstration – white supremacy groups, for instance, normally do not get along with radical black bloc activists or with equally radical environmental groups, and neither of these groups has much in common with the Roman Catholic church or mainstream trade unions. Yet they can march together during antiglobalization protests. Sometimes, however, such groups still try to separate from the others physically during a rally. One example of this is the anti-NATO protests in Lisbon during the 2010 NATO summit, when antiwar activists, trade unions, and communists asked police that anarchists and black bloc and Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) protesters not be allowed to join the main march. Police then created physical space between the two demonstrating groups, separating them with lines of police officers. The anarchists and black bloc and CIRCA protestors, however, wanted to join the main demonstration – probably in order to present themselves as one part of a larger movement. The anti-NATO protests followed the pattern described earlier, having attracted a huge variety of groups present from Portugal and abroad.²⁹⁴

The same pattern can be seen in anticut protests. One example among many is the 2012 London TUC March for the Alternative. This anticut protest was organized by the Trade Union Congress (TUC), a union congress with fifty-eight member unions. The march also attracted disabled individuals, teachers,

293 "Anti-Globalization: A Spreading Phenomenon." <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/prspctvs/200008-eng.asp>

294 GODIAC Field Study Report 2/10: NATO Summit, Lisbon, Portugal, 19–20 November 2010.

university students, child-welfare organizations, artists, employees of the National Health Service, unemployed people, people incapable of work, low-wage workers, and public sector employees – but also anarchists and anarchist affinity groups that tried to join the main protest march through “feeder” marches from side streets along the primary march route. The TUC distanced these groups, stating that for organizational reasons no official feeder marches would be organized in cooperation with the TUC. But a variety of groups either joined or organized feeder marches, among them the Militant Workers Bloc, the anarchist bloc, Revolution (a socialist youth movement), the Pink and Black bloc, queer resistance groups, dissidents, CIRCA, Operation Dual, Climate Camp, UK Uncut (which launched the campaign for feeder marches), and Occupy for the Alternative.

During the London protest a new element was introduced: Sukey. Developed by a group called Team Sukey, this is a tool participants can use to stay informed during demonstrations and to avoid containment by the police. The name is meant to be a reference to the nursery rhyme “Polly, put the kettle on; Sukey, take it off again.” There is a Sukey app for smartphones and a Sukey SMS feed for users whose mobile phones lack a GPS function. Sukey is an open-source interactive system that enables protesters to communicate and share updates via Twitter, SMS, and e-mail. The app works with the GPS on smartphones. Users can look at their phones while demonstrating and see a GPS icon with green, yellow, and red dots. This traffic-light system, in combination with detailed instructions available on YouTube, helps the user avoid police barricades. Team Sukey also spread information during the demonstration via its Twitter account.²⁹⁵

This bricolage pattern of protest groups has been observed during environmental protests, as well,

including the one during the Cask for Storage and Transport of Radioactive Material (CASTOR) transport in November 2010, when nuclear waste was moved from France to Germany. The protests have a long history that goes back more than thirty years. A few days after plans were announced to build a reprocessing treatment complex for nuclear waste in Gorleben in 1977, the citizens’ initiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg was founded. Protest soon spread countrywide, when “rural protest mixed with the radical opposition in the cities.” Those opposing the CASTOR transport are a diverse group covering a wide range of ages, income levels, educational backgrounds, and political attitudes. Over the past several years, numerous German organizations and parties have joined local residents for the CASTOR protests: trade unions, Social Democrats, the Green Party, the Red Cross, feminist and youth NGOs, as well as activists and organizations from abroad. In the 2010 protests groups of activists from Greece, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Russia, and Belarus took part. Over the decades the people of Wendland have protested and demonstrated against the storage site and against the transport of CASTORs to Gorleben. Their constituents generally reflect average society, ranging from young children to elderly people, but there are also many farmers in particular who engage in such protest activity. The people organize themselves into resistance groups and initiatives – for example, X-tausendmal quer, Widersetzen, Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft, and Prayer for Gorleben. Some demonstrator groups use the Internet and social media to call for participation months before the event, to provide information about how to get to the protest site, where to stay, and how to participate in available training sessions before the events (addressing, among other things, blockading techniques). Other groups broadcast the event live on radio or via the Internet.

295 GODIAC Field Study Report 4/10: TUC March for the Alternative, London, England, 26 March 2011.



The symbol of Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft.

Source. www.castor.de.

The Bäuerliche Notgemeinschaft (Farmers' Emergency Association Against Nuclear Power) Lüchow-Dannenberg was founded in 1977 as an informal organization (i.e., lacking a formal structure) of farmers in the rural county of Lüchow-Dannenberg. The farmers felt their existence would be threatened should Gorleben become a final storage place for the radioactive waste. The group claims to be nonviolent, although in the past conflicts with the police have occurred during blockades in which the farmers blocked roads and railway tracks with tractors.

Another important group – or rather, network – is X-tausendmal quer, which presents itself as the “the official organizer of the anti-CASTOR campaign.” The network was founded in 1996 and claims to unite thousands of individuals and groups, as well as NGOs and partly affiliated participants. The organization does not counter the CASTOR transport as such but opposes nuclear power in general. X-tausendmal quer advocated an act of civil disobedience in the form of nonviolent sit-down blockades of the CASTOR transport. According to the group, a nonviolent sit-down blockade is not a criminal offence in Germany; it is considered an administrative offence and can be sanctioned with a penalty charge. Constituents

organized training all over Germany and also in their camps during the days before the transport. The content of the training addresses democratic grassroots decision making and organization, dealing with fear and anger, and includes information about how to get to the blockades, how to act during eviction by police, and legal matters. X-tausendmal quer has developed a federal network of activists from the antinuclear movement.²⁹⁶ The antinuclear and environmental movements differ to some extent from, for instance, the antiglobalization and Occupy movements. Many of their activities, including the CASTOR protests, started out as local initiatives regarding specific issues (e.g., transportation of nuclear waste, a nuclear power plant, a factory) and attracted vast numbers of diverse people from the beginning.²⁹⁷

The pattern in which various groups with different agendas and tactics converge can be seen among both demonstrators and counterdemonstrators during the counterjihad rallies held in Aarhus and in Stockholm (the counterjihad movement is addressed in a later section). It can be observed, too, during anti-Israel and anti – United States rallies.²⁹⁸ This observation indicates that the reality is more complicated than Campbell outlined in his 1972 article. Cults and underground movements are a constant factor in society over time, but today they have taken the form of a kind of urban landscape with numerous

296 GODIAC Field Study Report 1/10: The CASTOR Transport, Lüneburg, Germany, 6–7 November 2010.

297 See for instance Martha F Lee, *Earth First! Environmental apocalypse* (New York: Syracuse University Press 1995) *Ecological resistance Movements; The global emergence of radical and popular environmentalism*, Brpn Raymond Taylor (ed), (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995)

298 See, for instance, Heléne Löw, “Islamofobi och antisemitism efter den 11 september,” in *Arbete, kultur, politik: En vän bok till Lennart K. Persson*, ed. Maria Cavallin Aijmer, Göran Malmstedt, Kenneth Nyberg, Adam von Schéle, and Monica Weikert, *Skrifter från Historiska institutionen i Göteborg 7* (Göteborg: Univ. Historiska institutionen i Göteborg, 2007).

neighborhoods. That formation can collaborate on one issue, but sometimes violent internal clashes may arise regarding another issue. The arrival of the Internet and later the further development of new communication technology have completely changed the picture. Today ideas travel faster than at any time in history – new ideas, tactics, and images travel around the globe in seconds. Ideas migrate from group to group; events are marketed to larger and larger groups, which in turn join the movement, interpreting a cause from their own ideological standpoints. The homogenous mass movements of earlier times have been transformed into even larger waves made up of numerous smaller movements, subcultures within subcultures.²⁹⁹

The Autonomous Milieu

The group that is often labelled “autonomous” in public discourse is not a group at all, nor is it an organization but a bricolage of autonomous milieus – milieus that sometimes agree with each other and sometimes do not. In fact, these individuals and groups strongly object to being described as an organization. As stated in one of the many manuals for direct action produced within this milieu, “The organization and the views of the organization become more important than the people belonging to it and their opinion. It is so easy to feel solidarity with the organization, rather than with the people within it.... When it comes to resistance this is a particular problem because it is all about solidarity and direct action. The only solution is to let the group responsible for the actions in question speak publicly about it. Organizations’ opinion of the action is not relevant or seen as a principal interest. The dangers of condemnation of de-solidarisation are mainly to their goals.... Critics belong to internal discussions and forums. Given of course that the operation in question is not completely insane – this on the other hand is the

obligation of the responsible group. The guiding principles for all kinds of action must be equality and mutual tolerance.”³⁰⁰

The manual also underlines that organizations can be banned by the state and that the police can hold individuals responsible for a specific action if there is a formal organizational structure with a clear chain of command. Another reason for a banning the organizational form is that the activists claim that it is a failed concept of the left that has weakened ideas and their potential impact on society through endless internal struggles and splinter groups.³⁰¹ This does not, however, mean that autonomous groups lack organization; instead, their form of organization is based on informal structures determined by each group individually.

The manuals produced within this milieu are surprisingly open, particularly compared to the manuals from the underground realm of white supremacy, for example, in which access to manuals and instructions is restricted to those who truly belong to the milieu. Manuals from the autonomous milieu contain instructions on everything from how to start and run campaigns, feminist groups, café groups, book and information groups, environmental groups, websites, antifa groups, antiglobalization, and animal rights groups to practical hands-on advice regarding street fighting, demonstration tactics, and blockades, as well as on dealing with police horses and police dogs, practising self-defence, building barricades, committing sabotage, and avoiding prison. They also contain recipes for Molotov cocktails and paint bombs, legal rights manuals, and detailed suggestions on preparing a proper evaluation form to distribute after a direct action or demonstration in order to obtain the best possible feedback for improving the

299 Kaplan and Lööw, Introduction, *The Cultic Milieu*.

300 Handling organiser, motstånd” [Handling resistance, organizing], movement handbook, 6

301 “Handling organiser, motstånd” [Handling resistance, organizing], movement handbook, 16.

tactics.³⁰² The autonomous milieu comprises widely diverse groups, initiatives, campaigns, and syndicalist and anarchist groups – and more or less tied to it are also alternative news agencies on the Internet.³⁰³

Black Bloc

The term the *black bloc* refers in most cases to a specific demonstration tactic used by autonomous anarchist and anarchist affinity groups. The activists dress entirely in black; in many cases they also wear masks to avoid being identified.



Black Bloc activists at the Counter Counterjihad rally in Aarhus, Denmark.

The mass of individuals dressed in black is said to signify unity, first of all, but another reason behind this tactic is visibility. A third contributing factor is that black is the colour of anarchism, as is red; banners and flags in red and black are often used during demonstrations. To quote the activists themselves,

302 “Handling organiser, motstånd”; A. K. Thompson, *Black Bloc, White Riot: Anti-Globalization and the Genealogy of Dissent* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2010). In this context, the classic *Anarchist Cookbook* should also be mentioned; the manual is, however, used by a number of groups and individuals. <http://www.scribd.com/doc/387846/The-Anarchist-Cook-Book>.

303 See <http://motkraft.net/>; www.indymedia.org.

“Masks promote anonymity and egalitarianism. Instead of a “leader” yelling instructions to a protest group via a megaphone, those in the bloc make decisions among themselves. They also protect the identities of those who want to engage in illegal acts and escape to fight another day. Finally, as Subcommandante Marcos once wrote: “There are some black bloc anarchists who don’t wear masks during blocs. These are usually the folks who are ‘out of the closet,’ so to speak.”³⁰⁴

The black bloc tactic was first used in Germany in the 1980s and has since spread around the world. It was after the riots during the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle that the term *black bloc* reached a larger audience and became in many ways a collective label for anarchist protesters.³⁰⁵ Some claim that the term was coined by the German police in the 1980s and not by the activists themselves;³⁰⁶ some argue that the tactic itself is much older, having developed in the antiwar demonstrations in the United States in the late 1960s but without the specific label. Certainly, the tactic goes back to the SA in the late 1920s and was old even then.

Black bloc tactics can be used both in a violent and confrontational way and in a nonviolent, nonconfrontational way, depending on the situation and the views of the individual group conducting the demonstration. Thus, contrary to the popular image, the black bloc tactic is not necessarily violent and confrontational; rather, each black bloc group decides on its own tactics during a demonstration. This means that if several black bloc groups participate in the same demonstration, each might choose different tactics vis-à-vis the police. This is a function, on the one hand, of anarchist ideology and, on the other

304 www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq.

305 For more information and research on the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting, the riots, and policing, see, for instance, “The WTO History Project,” <http://depts.washington.edu/wtohist/>.

306 www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq.

hand, of the fragmentation of protest movements mentioned earlier – that is, what was earlier a large protest movement is now a conglomeration of many independent movements. Despite this variety, common tactics exist among the various black blocs, including linking arms in order to hinder the police from breaking up the demonstration and freeing people who have been arrested (“unarresting”). Black bloc tactics are in some cases also used by radical right groups and white supremacy groups.

The Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA)



CIRCA logo.

An antiauthoritarian organization built on local groups, CIRCA exists in many countries. The various groups organize workshop seminars and meetings in the art of clowning. The concept of the Rebel Clown Army is to bring back the essence of clowning in its historical sense – namely, the clown as a disruptive force that simultaneously ridicules, exposes, and critiques society.

The clowns claim that they are rebels “because we love life and happiness more than ‘revolution.’ Because no revolution is ever complete and rebellions continue forever.”³⁰⁷ They are clowns “because what else can one be in such a stupid world. Because inside everyone is a lawless clown trying to escape. Because nothing undermines authority like holding

it up to ridicule. Because since the beginning of time tricksters have embraced life’s contradictions, creating coherence through confusion. Because fools are both fearsome and innocent, wise and stupid, entertainers and dissenters, healers and laughing stocks, scapegoats and subversives. Because buffoons always succeed in failing, always say yes, always hope and always feel things deeply. Because a clown can survive everything and get away with anything.”³⁰⁸

And they call themselves an army “because we live on a planet in permanent war – a war of money against life, of profit against dignity, of progress against the future. Because a war that gorges itself on death and blood and shits money and toxins, deserves an obscene body of deviant soldiers. Because only an army can declare absurd war on absurd war. Because combat requires solidarity, discipline and commitment. Because alone clowns are pathetic figures, but in groups and gaggles, brigades and battalions, they are extremely dangerous.”³⁰⁹

The Rebel Clown Army first appeared in the United Kingdom during the 2003 visit of US president George W. Bush and the accompanying protest actions against the war in Iraq. The clown marches could be described as mock military parades; the participants are sometimes armed with water guns, mimicking soldiers. Another strategy CIRCA groups employ is following police officers and other state officials and mimicking them.

The Subculture of White Supremacy

In most European countries one finds a racist subcultural milieu that is a mixture of National Socialism and esoteric groups and social movements inspired by the American white supremacy ideology.³¹⁰ In the

308 <http://www.clownarmy.org/about/about.html>.

309 Ibid. <http://blog.groundswellcollective.com/2008/05/27/ clandestine-insurgent-rebel-clown-army>

310 For an overview, see, for instance, Bertelsmann Stiftung, *Strategies for Combating Right-Wing Extremism in Europe* (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009).

307 <http://www.clownarmy.org/about/about.html>.

late 1980s this underground element started to find an organizational form not as political parties in a traditional sense but as loosely knit networks of activists; the movement turned more and more towards the concept of leaderless resistance, organized around networks of the “white noise” music industry, publishing companies, cultural associations, and clothing companies marketing outfits for activists. The key topics within the racist underground that bind its various parties, organizations, networks, and social movements together are anti-Semitism, racism, and homophobia. Anti-Semitism is the most basic and significant of these; it is as central for present-day activists as it once was for the Nazis of the 1930s.

Activists of the racist underground believe that the world is controlled by an “international Jewish conspiracy” or by what they have dubbed the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). According to this demonizing perspective, the ZOG includes the media, police, administrators, intellectuals, and so on. It is the ZOG, not individual immigrants, that represents the primary enemy of the racist counterculture. ZOG represents corrupt society, which “poisons the white race through immigration of racially inferior elements, homosexuality and moral disorder” in order to “destroy the white race.” The so-called members of the ZOG are referred to as “Jew lackeys” or as “race traitors.”

The idea of the history of mankind as a never-ending struggle between races is as central to the ideology of the revolutionary racists today, just as it was to the early National Socialists. The various belief systems within the racist counterculture are all in some sense apocalyptic. Notions of the final battle, Judgment Day, and Ragnarök (the “final destiny of the gods” in Norse mythology) are to be found in the world of the Nazis and the neopagan world of racist Odin worship.³¹¹ The common enemies of racist underground are society as a whole and individuals

from minority groups – such as Jews, homosexuals, and blacks – as well as political opponents, mainly those on the extreme left. The white supremacists’ attitude towards Muslims, however, is complex. Whereas one segment of the racist ideology underground is clearly anti-Muslim, another sympathizes with radical Islamism because it shares the ideology of anti-Semitism.³¹²

But the political strategy of the racist subculture differs in a number of important aspects from the strategies employed by the National Socialists of the twentieth-century interwar period. First, the modern-day racists are not party builders; their primary goal is not to form strong political parties in order to gain power. Instead, they organize in loose networks of small, independent groups. Second, the Führer cult – central to original National Socialism – is lacking in the modern groups, which adhere to the principle of leaderless resistance.³¹³

One important strategy of the subculture of white supremacy is widening support through local and national campaigns, often on the issue of crime,³¹⁴ often propagating anticapitalist and antiglobalization arguments. In 2009 these groups launched anticapitalist and antiglobalization campaigns, following a pattern that can be observed in a number of European countries among them Sweden and Germany. White supremacy groups adopt the rhetoric and symbols of the left but deploy them from their own ideological standpoint. Another important part of their strategy is to present themselves as victims of political oppression and harassment at the hands of both the state and political adversaries. A number of campaigns and demonstrations have been mounted over the years to gain support for imprisoned activists and to draw attention to violent incidents involving

311 Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige*

312 Lööw, “Islamofobi.”

313 Lööw, *Nazismen i Sverige*.

314 http://www.svenskapedofiler.se/e107_plugins/locator/locator.php (04.10.2010).

political opponents of these group members.³¹⁵ The technological revolution triggered by the Internet and e-mail has opened up a new arena of communication, on both the domestic and the international level. The Internet, moreover, has substantially altered the recruitment processes of these groups, as it has become possible for the organizations and networks to reach out to ever greater numbers of potential members and sympathizers. The modern world of white supremacy activism is one without clearly definable borders because adherents travel around Europe to join the confrontations that occur almost routinely during large demonstrations and commemorative events staged by extreme nationalists or by the militant racist underground itself.

The European Counterjihad Movement

The so-called European counterjihad movement is not a movement in the true sense of the word but, once again, a mosaic of different movements bound together by opposition to the idea of an ongoing “Islamization of Europe”. In this milieu the established political parties are looked upon as traitors who have “sold Western civilization to the Muslims.” It is mainstream society – politicians, bureaucrats, and the media – that is the target of the movement, for those elements are believed to be behind the purported “Islamization of Europe”. The movement is in no way homogenous; on the contrary, it harbors everything from extremely radical Christian millenarian factions – i. e. the belief in the return of Jesus to judge the World, lead the final war against sinners and unbelievers, and create a utopia of a thousand

years ruled by Jesus himself, – to groups mainly concerned about immigration issues, militant Islamic groups, Sharia laws, and so on.³¹⁶ The milieu is traditionally neither extremely right-leaning nor part of the subculture of white supremacy. Rather, counterjihadists are often opposed to white supremacy movements owing to the fact that the white supremacists are predominantly anti-Semitic and not anti-Muslim. National Socialists and white supremacy organizations have collaborated with radical Islamist movements since the 1930s.³¹⁷ The counterjihad movement in its broad sense is part of a third frontier that has been established in Europe in recent years.³¹⁸

The counterjihad milieu attracts people from a number of different movements, such as extreme nationalists, former white supremacy activists who have left that milieu in favor of the counter jihad movement, conservative Christians, and people not previously politically active. The milieu itself has not yet formed a clear ideology or a fixed organizational structure. It consists, on the one hand, of a number of so-called defence league organizations and anti-Islamist organizations, and on the other hand, of a subcultural online world of blogs, chat rooms, and social media.³¹⁹ The most influential blog portal for this milieu is Gates of Vienna (<http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.se/>). Other important portals are Vladtepesblog (<http://Vladtepesblog.com>) and the EuropeNews web page (<http://europenews.dk/de>).

315 See, for example, Blind rättvisa i Nyköping, 2007–03-11, Blind justice in Nyköping <http://www.info14.com/inrikes.php?id=1541> (04.10.2010), Tumult i nordstan, 2007–01-16, Trouble in Nordstan; Henrik Pihlström, trakasserier inför Salemarschen, Henrik Philström harassed before the Salem demonstration Nationellt Motstånd, 11 December 2006, <http://www.patriot.nu/artikel.asp?artikelID=791> (04.10.2010).

316 Millenarian factions of Christianity believe that Jesus will return to judge the world, lead the final war against sinners and unbelievers, and establish a utopia that he will rule for one thousand years.

317 Heléne Lööw, ”När våldet blir ett sätt att leva,” *Axess* 6 (2011), <http://www.axess.se/magasin/default.aspx?article=1047>.

318 Fleischer Rasmus, <http://copyriot.se/2011/09/14/ps-3-om-extremhograrna-tankesmedjan-mansklighet/>.

319 Heléne Lööw, ”Rasismens exploatörer,” *Bohuslänningen* 13, no. 4 (2012) 2:



Counterjihad rally in Aarhus, Denmark

Recent years have seen attempts to form a unified movement. In 2007 a UK and Scandinavia counterjihad summit took place in Copenhagen, and since then several similar meetings have been held across Europe.³²⁰ The Aarhus meeting in March 2012 is one in this series of meetings, but it differed from the others in that it was the first attempt to gather movements from all over Europe; in addition, it was an open meeting. The August 2012 counterjihad meeting in Stockholm broadened the scope even further, as it was marketed as a global counterjihad conference.

The English Defence League (EDL), formed in the UK in 2009, has become the model for the various defence leagues that have since then been created in a number of European countries. The English group has seen some success in the UK through the extensive use of social media for recruitment and for publicizing the organization's events and demonstrations. The EDL is best understood as a social movement that, through social media, has developed

a “march and grow” strategy that enables it to grow and benefit from anti-Muslim attitudes in society. Most EDL events are marketed via social media, such as Facebook. In this context it should also be noted that Facebook was used extensively to attract people to the Aarhus counterjihad meeting, and during the event information about activity at the scene was posted on the page of the European Counterjihad Facebook group. The information posted was gathered from a number of Twitter feeds, Facebook accounts, and web pages belonging to a variety of organizations, including those taking part in the counterdemonstrations.³²¹

Many of the various defence leagues have special female subsections called angel divisions;³²² women are considered an important recruitment base for the movement, along with the LGBT and Jewish communities. Some counterjihad activists present themselves as “defenders of women, Jews and the LGBT community against Muslim aggression.” Others, in contrast, are anti-Semitic and homophobic as well as anti-Muslim. The EDL and other defence league groups describe themselves as antiracist and antifascist, while the rhetoric of the movement labels Muslims as racists and fascists.³²³

In 2012 the group Stop Islamization of Nations (SION) was founded as an “umbrella network of counter-jihadist organizations across Europe and the United States, which includes Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) and Stop Islamization of America (SIOA).” The most prominent figures of SION are also involved in other anti-Islamization organizations. SION president Pamela L. Geller also functions as executive director of and the American Freedom Defense Initiative. Vice-president Robert B. Spencer is also associate director of SIOA and

320 David Lagerlöf, Jonathan Leman, Alexander Bengtsson, *The Anti-Muslim Environment: The Ideas, the Profiles and the Concepts*, Focus Report 2011:1 (Stockholm Expo Research 2011).

321 After the event the Facebook group was closed, but before that I had downloaded the contents for this report.

322 In some countries the female subsection is called Valkyria.

323 Marta Hannus, *Counterjihad rörelsen: En del av den anti muslimska miljön* (Stockholm Expo Research, 2012).

the American Freedom Defense Initiative, and he is the director of Jihad Watch, an anti-Islamic website. SION cofounder Anders Gravers is the organizer of SIOE, of Stop Islamisation of Denmark, and of SIOE Denmark and is considered the “mastermind behind the pan-European, counter-jihadist movement.” SION has pledged to publicize “the names of politicians, academics, journalists, artists and their networks that promote the Islamization of Western policy and culture.”³²⁴

SIOE has its roots in Denmark and England. “It originated with the joining of Stop Islamificering af Danmark (SIAD), a political party dedicated to stopping the Islamisation in Denmark, with a loose association of people in England... who want to maintain English law and want to stop the creeping growth of sharia law in England.” SIOE members describe themselves collectively as an “action group determined to prevent and reverse the implementation of sharia law in Europe”; they argue that “Muslim leaders use our own virtues of tolerance and freedom against us to establish Islam’s own intolerance and oppression.” SIOE considers it a duty to criticize Mohammed and Islam. “SIOE has regular anti-Islamist demonstrations and intends to up its activity in the future.” According to SIOE, its constituents are criticized by the two poles of the political spectrum: they see themselves accused of being fascist nationals by antifascists and of being left-wing liberals by neo-Nazis and fascists. SIOE, however, regards itself as a nonparty organization that “does not accept the concept of left-wing or right-wing. It believes in freedom and opposes totalitarianism whether it be Nazi, Communist, fascist or worst of all Islam.”³²⁵

Shifting models

The counterjihad movement differs from white supremacy and extreme nationalist groups in more than ideology; counterjihad meetings tend to attract a far more diverse and less controllable crowd of people. The subculture of white supremacy groups changed its strategy during demonstrations in the early 1990s; gone were the violent clashes initiated by them. Instead, they adopted a strategy that could be summarized in the following principles: participants are to be sober and disciplined, only official spokespeople are to communicate with the police or media, and there are to be no attacks on counter-demonstrators (unless they attack first and the police are not able to hold them back). These activists want to present themselves as part of a disciplined movement – not a mass of street thugs but a political movement exercising the democratic rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. They want to create the image that counterdemonstrators, not the white supremacist activists, are violent and undisciplined, the ones who present the “real” threat to democratic rights. This is part of a strategy that has wider implications, since the rhetoric these groups employ has painted them as the true advocates for free speech and freedom of assembly – and as a group whose members are being denied their constitutional rights.

A German study by Andreas Klärner addresses the implications this strategy on a local level, dealing with the change from traditional political parties to subcultures adopting the principles of leaderless resistance. This transformation in the German case should be understood in the context of German authorities’ attempts to ban movements with a traditional organizational structure during the 1990s. Movements transformed into networks (subcultures), such as the Free Nationalists. The Swedish scene underwent the same kind of development beginning in the late 1980s, but for different reasons. Klärner outlined a pattern on a local level that can

324 GODIAC Field Study Report 9/10: Global Counterjihad Meeting, Stockholm, 4 August 2012.

325 GODIAC Field Study Report 9/10: Global Counterjihad Meeting, Stockholm, 4 August 2012.

be observed in many places in Europe regarding strategies and the subculture's relationship to surrounding society. He described the current tactic as having shifted from confrontation to nonviolence, with a focus on local issues and campaigns in order to gain legitimacy in the local community. Aggressive propaganda has been replaced with a strategy of presenting themselves as victims of violence and discrimination and as a resistance movement oppressed by society.

Klärner pointed out that the constant conflicts between white supremacy groups and militant anti-fascists on a local level are aimed at gaining literal control over the area. The constant conflicts on both sides between factions within each subculture, moreover, drive the choice of violent or nonviolent tactics. Klärner underlined that neither of them is a movement in the true meaning of the world but in fact a *social movement*, a subculture striving towards legitimacy in the local community.³²⁶ The same can also be said of Islamic groups that strive towards legitimacy in the local community. There is a current trend in Europe, owing to the economic crisis and the withdrawal of civil society from local communities, whereby extremist groups and organized crime move in to fill the void, taking over youth clubs, offering social work, and providing banking and protection, sometimes in the form of neighborhood watch.³²⁷

Conclusion

What we see today is a trend away from the traditional organizational forms; they still exist, of course, but people tend more and more to belong to wider,

more loosely formed networks of networks. These in turn may collaborate on one issue but clash violently over another. The Internet and new communication technologies have completely changed the way ideas are disseminated, transmitting them at unprecedented speeds. The mass movements of earlier times have become numerous smaller movements, subcultures within subcultures, and modern communication technology has in turn made these subcultures – which, historically speaking, have always been present – much more visible. That visibility provides a historically unique opportunity to examine in growing detail the ideas and milieus below the surface of the mainstream debate. The subcultures have gone public.

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326 Andreas Klärner, *Zwischen Militanz und Bürgerlichkeit: selbsterständnis und Praxis der extremen Rechten*, (Hamburg: Verlag Hamburger, 2008).

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2.3 Transnational Political Protest: a Portuguese Perception

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Introduction

Starting with the NATO summit held in Lisbon in November 2010, a research line was established in the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security for the purpose of better understanding social movements and their activity during major political events and in order to study movement participants' interaction with police, bystanders, and members of other groups. The general idea behind this research line was to enhance knowledge, thus enabling police to improve their security operations. A deeper understanding of these movements assumes critical importance in the planning and implementation phases of police interactions aimed at managing large political events, protecting fundamental rights, and maintaining public order and security.

Social movement figures allow us to state that researchers have become more and more interested in studying this kind of collective action. Roggeband and Klandermans (2007, 1) state that in "the last few decades social movement studies have proliferated enormously, covering a wide array of movements, issues and places, as evidenced by the rapid growth of the number of journal articles on social movements published since the 1980s." The variety of people

engaged in social movements, together with the leaderless phenomenon, globalization and transnational movements, cultural diversity, traditions, and causes, among other factors, all contribute to an extreme complexity that social movement studies must address concerning movements' aims, motivations, organization, resources, ideas, and action repertoires.

In terms of the conflict-reducing principles – more specifically, education in these principles with respect to social movements and political protest – one relevant approach to enhancing understanding is to consider three different movements that were present at the protests during the 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon: ATTAC (Association pour la Taxe Tobin pour l'Aide aux Citoyens), WRI (War Resisters' International), and the Black Bloc. We chose these particular movements because of their transnational dimensions and because, in this sense, examining them could be useful for law enforcement authorities at the European level. To accomplish this task, we describe these movements, clarifying three different aspects: resource mobilization, political opportunities, and cultural framing. Notwithstanding the intense debate on the theoretical approaches to social movement studies, our intention is to present some concrete characteristics of these movements so as to improve the general understanding of them.

Our theoretical approach merges three elements, in line with the synthesis proposed by McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald (2006, 2): "these three factors are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal) available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action."

There are some difficulties in studying social movements; according to Chazel (1995, 260), "generally, when we try to define a social movement, we face the dual problem of their empirical delimitation and

328 This paper is the result of research work developed in the Major Events Laboratory (MEL) Investigation Centre of the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Internal Security, Lisbon, Portugal, supervised by the two first authors for the master thesis in police sciences of the three other authors. MEL is dedicated to the study of major events security. E-mail: impais@psp.pt.

of their analytical definition.” The *social movement* designation opens the field to a very intense debate in an academic environment. Zirakzadeh (2006, 3) states that “the term *social movement* connotes different things to different people.” Definitions of social movements vary according to the diverse sciences involved, the wide range of theoretical affiliations that support the research, their varied methodological approaches, and some limitations in the variables considered important to understanding and describing this social phenomenon.

In order to present a taste of the scientific discussion on this topic, we present three definitions of *social movements* that we apply to this study of ATTAC, WRI, and the Black Bloc; these definitions take into consideration the influences of the adopted theoretical model. The first understands “a social movement as a formal or informal interaction between individuals, groups or organizations who share certain beliefs, a sense of identity, who mobilize on conflict issues through a variety of protest tactics and forms, and whose main goal is the defense or promotion of certain objectives towards society and/or political power” (Abreu 2012, 34). The next proposal considers “a social movement is a sustainable collective enterprise of protest and contestation with a goal of maintaining a social situation or introducing social or political changes, taking advantage of political opportunities in order to stress their identity, ideology, and culture, sometimes using unconventional means” (Rocha 2012, 27). Finally, the term refers to an effort that arises “when there is a favorable context, a social movement is the result of injustices perceived by people, characterized by an organizational structure and a shared identity, that envisages unconventional political participation” (Martins 2012, 30). Analyzing these definitions through the theoretical model that we have chosen, we identify three streamlines corresponding to the different theories and identify the various elements of the concept of a social movement.

For this paper, the operational definition of the term in question can be based on these three proposals. Thus, a social movement is a sustainable collective effort organized to change or to maintain a reality. A social movement emerges when injustice is perceived by a set of individuals who believe that informal political action can solve the identified problem and when conditions are such that those individuals share a set of beliefs, interpretations, and attributes that allow them to influence the social and political environment.

Under the scope of social movements and their repertoires, policing transnational movements presents a significant challenge for modern police organizations, particularly in terms of the need for police knowledge of movements. Considering this, we ask how one might characterize transnational social movements like ATTAC, WRI, and the Black Bloc. Awareness of social movements is the key factor for sketching police strategy during political events.

Comparing each group’s *modus operandi*, protest repertoire, campaign strategy, and opportunity perception, we discuss the main implications for policing political protest events where these three movements are present. Our intent is to provide deeper knowledge of social movements, but particularly of ATTAC, WRI, and the Black Bloc, in order to feed the concept of knowledge-led policing – assuring, in this way, the protection of human rights.

Method

The research programme of this study was designed to explore transnational social movements and their characterization regarding police planning, discussing the primary effects they may have on approaches to policing at political protest events. We bear in mind that a qualitative approach can be defined as “an interpretative approach... to the subjective matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural context, looking for the meaning or interpretation of a phenomenon in terms of the

meanings that people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 2). As pointed out by Bardin (1977), the qualitative approach leads to an intuitive, flexible, and adaptable procedure regarding categories not previously envisaged. Although debates persist about use of the qualitative versus the quantitative approach (Bardin 1977; Krippendorff 1980), the truth is that today, according to Krippendorff (1980), most scientific works opt for a qualitative approach though later, these findings are often rendered numerically. In order to organize the ideas about this debate, Bardin (1977, 114) states that “the quantitative approach is based on the frequency of appearance of certain elements of the message. The nonquantitative approach uses nonnumerical indicators, which may allow inferences.”

Seeking additional information about these social movements collected from open sources, we chose to conduct an exploratory study – more specifically, we took a qualitative approach to coding information contents and making inferences from them and thus to understanding the construction of meaning. Based on the three theoretical approaches of resource mobilization theory, political opportunity theory, and cultural framing theory, a superset model was used to identify analyzers for the content analysis, allowing us to characterize ATTAC, WRI, and the Black Bloc. We conducted three studies; the same approach was used in collecting, coding, and analyzing the content of open sources on the selected materials.

Corpus

Books, manuals, leaflets, and websites that were available in Portugal form the corpus of each study; they were all submitted to analysis. Bardin (1977, 122) defines *corpus* as a “set of documents taken into account to be subjected to the analytical procedure”. The process used to integrate these three studies was simple and coherent in that we started each from a similar dimension; this allowed us to analyze and compare the chosen social movements. These corpus-

es were considered valid because they align with the rules of exhaustiveness, representativeness, homogeneity, and pertinence (Bardin 1977).

The documentation that constitutes each corpus is the following:

On WRI, we examined the book *War Is a Crime Against Humanity: The Story of War Resisters' International* (Prasad 2005); the book *Guide for campanhas não violentas* (2010); and the WRI website (<http://www.wri-irg.org/>).

On ATTAC, we considered the article “ATTAC al ataque” [ATTAC on attack] (Cassen 2003); ATTAC’s leaflets; the ATTAC Portugal website (<http://attacportugal.webnode.com/>); and the ATTAC International website (<http://www.attac.org/>).

Finally, on the Black Bloc, we consulted the book *Black Bloc, White Riot: Anti-Globalization and the Genealogy of Dissent*, by A. K. Thompson (2010); the book *The Black Bloc Papers* (Deusen and Masot 2010); the book *Encyclopédie des terrorismes et violences organisées* (Baud 2009); the leaflet “Bodyhammer: Tactics and Self-Defense for the Modern Protester” (Sarin n.d.); the leaflet “How to Organize an Insurrection” (CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective 2008); and Black Bloc websites.

Instrument of Analysis

The data analysis instrument used was thematic content analysis. “Content analysis classifies textual material, reducing it to more relevant, manageable bits of data” (Weber 1990, 5).

Berelson (1952, 18) defines content analysis as a “research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication.” In his turn, Krippendorff (1980, 20) defines it as “a research technique allowing for replicable and valid inferences regarding data in its context,” and Bardin (1977, 42) completes these definitions by pointing out that content analysis comprises a “set of analysis techniques of communications in order to gain, through objective and systematic

procedures for the description of the message content, indicators (quantitative or not) that allow the inference of knowledge related to the production/reception conditions (inferred variables) of these messages.” This way, through the ensured quantitative, systematic, and objective description of the information, valid inferences may emerge. This is the reason why analysis of thematic content, defined by Ghiglione and Matalon (1993, 234) as “metaspeech issued by the coder on the speech,” adapts to the goals of our work.

In Bardin’s opinion (1977), overcoming uncertainty and enriching reading are advantageous factors of this research technique; Vala (1999) underlines that content analysis allows the design of inferences underpinned with systematized characteristics. It seems to us that this approach allows research to move away from the dangers that would deprive our work of its scientific nature. Vala (1999, 114) addresses this systematization in the context of “discourse and the production of new speech through a process of localization and assignment of meaning features that is the result of a dynamic relationship between conditions of the speech production to be analyzed and conditions of analysis production.” This systematization relates to our definition of the categories.

Content analysis is an analytical process of several stages. Vala (1999) suggests that the first of these stages involves defining a theoretical frame of reference that leads to the corpus definition. The next stage is the pre-analysis, “the objective of this stage is to operationalize and systematize initial ideas in order to reach a specific development schema of the successive operations, in an analysis plan” (Bardin 1977). Bardin points out three purposes of this pre-analysis: the selection of documents to be analyzed, the construction of objectives and research questions, and the creation of indicators that will allow the formulation of conclusions. Then the thematic categories are defined; the thematic contents are included in these categories. Ghiglione and Matalon (1993) argue that

all these procedures are intended to ensure that the thematic contents are included in a single category, thus ensuring their validity, which is defined as the “adaptation between objectives and purposes without distortion of the facts” (Ghiglione and Matalon 1993, 198). The same authors also defend the reliability of these procedures, meaning that they produce “results [that are] independent from those who produce them” (Ghiglione and Matalon 1993, 197). Two kinds of reliability are considered here: *intracoding reliability*, meaning that the same researcher, at different times and in different readings of the same material, obtains the same results, and *intercoding reliability*, in which different coders achieve the same results (Ghiglione and Matalon 1993).

In Vala’s opinion (1999), once the categories are defined, it is the researcher’s responsibility to ensure that all thematic contents are analyzed (exhaustiveness) and that they are all included in a single category (exclusiveness). We agree with Vala (1999), who considers the categorization process the most complex moment of content analysis. Categorization is defined by Vala (1999, 110) as “a task daily performed to reduce the complexity of the environment, to stabilize it, to identify it, to order it or to give it a certain sense,” but Bardin (1977, 103) argues that “codification corresponds to a change – made under specific conditions – of the raw text data; this change... allows one to achieve a representation of the content or of its expression, which might illuminate the analyst regarding the text’s characteristics.” The construction of categories can be done in three ways: through a closed procedure, in which the categories are predefined; through an open procedure, in which the categories are elaborated after the reading and analysis stage of the corpus (Ghiglione and Matalon, 1993); or through a mixed procedure (Pais 2004) that uses both the closed and the open approach. Our research has used a mixed procedure.

Procedure

The documentation was copied to data sheets. The analysis process was performed according to the rules described, assuring reliability and validity. Members of the research team functioned as independent judges in all the studies developed, and a high level of consensus was obtained among them. The table of categories was designed according to the dimensions of the three theories that form the theoretical framework.

The categories were reciprocally exclusive, uniform, and pertinent regarding the research purposes. The following categories were defined and used for the content analysis:

- A. Political opportunities (e.g., subcategory A.3.2: enemies – “Bush did us a favour, explaining that antiglobalization movements were anti-America.”)
- B. Resource mobilization (e.g., subcategory B.1.1: participants – “ATTAC was officially founded on 3 June 1998. Its founding members were essentially ‘legal persons’ – that is, collective entities – to whom a few individuals like René Dumont, Manu Chao or Gisèle Halimi were added for symbolic effect.”)
- C. Framing processes (e.g., subcategory C.3.2: action importance – “We are all committed in the CRISIS ATTAC.”)

Discussion and Results

Having comparing each group’s *modus operandi*, protest repertoire, campaign strategy, and opportunity perception, we are in a better position to identify the key factors and features of each movement studied – namely, their routines, tactics, intentions, and symbols.

WRI: Resources, Opportunities, and Cultural Framing
First, we turn to the classification of the social movement WRI. Martins (2012, 58) writes that “WRI is a transnational movement that brings together several peace movements from around the world

with their own cultures and formulating their own conceptions. Integration in WRI implies subscribing to their declaration; however, each movement traces its own way and sets its priorities.” Interpretation of this description demonstrates that WRI is a global platform that gathers to itself many various volunteer pacifist social movements, preserving the self-identity of each movement and enabling each to maintain freedom of governance, choice, and action.

According to Martins (2012, 59), “resource mobilization and cultural framing were the theories that most contributed to the characterization of this pacifist platform, and the political opportunities theory has proved to be less important, even though we have found some relevant information.” Nonviolence is one of the key behavioural features of WRI activists; some of them consider nonviolence a philosophy of life, while others believe that it is a tool to achieve their goals. Despite the nonviolence declaration, which all members are obliged to agree to when they come to WRI, there are some cases in which the movement’s repertoire includes active resistance, civil disobedience, and direct action, endangering public order and citizens’ rights because violence can be the result of those actions.

The formal structure of WRI is very well organized in terms of division of labour, definition of tasks, and cross-coordination. In the organization’s structure we identified the Executive Committee and the International Conference as vital elements. Diversity is a key characteristic of the group: WRI staff members must be able to speak several languages, personnel must include citizens of different countries, and gender balance must be achieved. The International Conference holds a meeting every four years, and all associated organizations of WRI and its Executive Committee must participate in this forum. The WRI’s structure is present in fifty countries around the world.

The information concerning the elements of the WRI is not extensive, but two fundamental ideas are clear: the diversity of participants and the dif-

ferent objectives behind their participation in the movement. “People have different reasons to adopt nonviolence. Some defend it because they see it as an effective technique to achieve social changes, others because they want nonviolence as a way of life. There is a broad spectrum with a whole range of postures” (Clark, Gárate, and Sheehan 2010, 13). The phrase demonstrates the different reasons people may participate in this movement, also reflecting different ways of interpreting nonviolence as a concept – “for example, while there are those who would employ the methods of nonviolence to confront [an adversary in] a conflict and win, others argue that a key attitude of nonviolence is looking for a solution that includes those who are the adversaries” (Clark et al. 2010, 13). We can then affirm that within the movement, although the idea of nonviolence is common to everyone, there are different interpretations regarding how the ideal should be realized (Martins 2012).

Despite of the lack of information about the recruitment process used by WRI, on the group’s website³²⁹ we found a job vacancy listed; the movement was seeking a full-time worker to be involved in a programme called Right to Refuse to Kill. This position was to start on 1 September of 2012 and listed an annual salary of £23,296.68 (Martins 2012). On its website, WRI stimulates cooperation and collaboration with organizations that follow similar purposes; the contact information for various segments of the movement is available online. To join WRI it is necessary to subscribe to this statement: “War is a crime against humanity. So, I pledge not to support any kind of war and to fight for the eradication of all its causes.” Interested people are asked to contact the movement in English, German, or Spanish, which are the languages of its website (Martins 2012).

Regarding the recruitment process, we collected a letter written by Runham Brown, who was the

founder of the movement, written on 14 April 1923; this letter was addressed to conscientious objectors all over the world and to defenders of nonviolence. Brown’s objective was to implement a movement that would include supporters of this idea of nonviolence. We can say, having studied the work of Prasad (2005), that this letter represents the first WRI recruitment activity, and in it, from the outset, Runham Brown stresses the importance of the nonviolence ideal for participation in the movement (Martins 2012). “I hope to establish a Cartel or a central Federation, which will associate not only the existing national organizations but also the innumerable non-organized groups around the world” (Prasad 2005, 93). Thus, support for the nonviolence ideal is a key factor in WRI recruitment and membership.

A global organization can be manifest in local and concrete actions supported by local organizations, activists, and affinity groups. Pacifist International is also made up of these small groups of people characterized by affinity in their goals, individuals who know one another’s limits and skills and who make decisions together about their participation in the movement. These affinity groups operate based on the trust that exists among their constituents. The existence of these groups underlines the fact that the recruitment of the movement is based on the relationship between activists and other people. Activists seek to integrate into the movement people whom they know and entirely trust (Martins 2012).

Considering fundraising, Prasad (2005, 345) states, “As... was the case of the volunteer radical organizations that worked for social change, the WRI’s financial condition was never satisfactory.” Financing a movement is essential to developing its actions. Through information on how the funding takes place, we were able to verify that WRI seeks economic resources through donations, the sale of products and its own publications, and the payment of quotas by affiliated organizations (Martins 2012). Through the group’s website anyone can make a donation to

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help the movement; it is also possible to send a donation via postal service. “War Resisters’ International depends on donations to carry out its task.”³³⁰ Further, in WRI’s virtual shop on the Internet, it is possible to buy books published by the movement and products related to it, such as pins bearing the movement’s symbol and music CDs. The constitution of WRI stipulates the payment of a quota in order to become a member of the movement:

“Sections, member organizations and associated publications must pay an annual membership quota based on their composition and productivity in accordance with the guidelines to be established by regulation. Individual members, whether members of sections or not, shall be asked for, at least, an annual contribution according to their capacity.” In conformity with the constitution of the WRI, not paying the membership quotas may amount to leaving the movement: “Not paying the membership quotas during one or two successive years can be considered by the Council a step for their disassociation” (Prasad 2005, 457).

WRI’s constitution also establishes the division of tasks. Affiliated organizations are those that accept the movement’s declaration as a guiding basis for action. Member organizations and associated publications do not commit themselves to the WRI declaration; however, their main goals are consistent with those of the movement. The International Conference, which represents all sections, associations, and publications related to the movement, takes place every four years. It is during this conference that the objectives and policies of the movement are defined. The council responsible for “for carrying out the decisions of the International Conference and shall act in the name of the International between Conferences” (Prasad 2005, 454). This council meets once a year

and is responsible for the election of an Executive Committee, as well as for the general management of the movement. Therefore, we find that the WRI constitution clearly establishes a hierarchy within the movement and reveals a large disciplined organization (Martins 2012).

This formal organization is also reflected in WRI protest actions, especially in events planned by the movement itself. Clark et al. (2010) set out three “moments” in a demonstration: before, during, and after. In WRI, a coordinator or a campaign organizer must be nominated before the demonstration begins, other activists are in charge of the observation and study of the location where the action will take place, a group of activists advertises the collective action, and another team manages media. It is during the collective action that people who might be arrested for civil disobedience are designated, as are the activists in charge of carrying out the protest itself, the protesters in charge of distributing leaflets related to the movement and to protest goals, and the people in charge of photographing and filming the protest action (Martins 2012). Consequently, WRI considers protest action an opportunity to promote itself and to acquire new allies. After the manifestation it is important to have a legal support team to assist any detainees and to designate movement spokespeople to deal with the media and politicians. All the information concerning its collective protest action demonstrates that organization and division of tasks are essential characteristics of WRI.

WRI is transnational because it is spread around the world; it is decentralized because each affiliated association follows its own policy. As a result of that decentralization, in WRI several interpretations of pacifist ideals converge; therefore, several ways of defending these ideals coexist (Martins 2012).

According to collected data, WRI’s organization and structure can be divided into two fields: the structural organization itself and its ramifications, and the organization of the protest actions. When

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Runham Brown wrote the letter of 14 April 1923, he did not want to simply recruit pacifists from around the world; he also defined what he wanted WRI to be, arguing that the movement should not be an administrative centre defining the action of each section and each pacifist group. On the contrary, it should strive to be a meeting place for those groups so that they could collaborate and build common projects (Prasad 2005). Brown warned that he did not want WRI to become a European movement or a movement of the Western world. Prasad (2005) writes that in 1931 the WRI was already a global organization with forty-seven sections spread throughout twenty-six different countries. Nowadays, the WRI is present in about fifty countries, some of them home to more than one affiliated organization; for example, in Germany WRI has eight affiliated organizations.

The organization and the division of tasks demonstrate the existence of several networks: “the image, from the outside, can be that of a group of people more or less homogeneous. However, with a closer look, one can see that the movement is composed of several networks that work through private constituencies of different organizations with their own themes and priorities, of various interrelated campaigns focusing on different aspects of an issue” (Clark et al. 2010, 24). Consider, for instance, the Israeli pacifist organization New Profile, which breaks with the traditional forms of organization and tries to eliminate hierarchies by promoting rotation of roles during a protest. “A good group operation is the result of collaborating structures and of the intelligent and responsible participation of the group members” (Clark et al. 2010, 76).

The importance of affinity groups is also clear in the case of WRI. Defined as autonomous groups of five to fifteen activists, such groups are characterized by an affinity among members and a perfect awareness of the abilities and weaknesses of each, allowing them to support each other when participating (or trying to participate) in a nonviolent campaign (Clark

et al. 2010). Affinity groups have been used throughout the past thirty years as an organizational model in nonviolent protests of small and large scale, in particular in protests against the use of nuclear energy in countries like Scotland, the United States of America, and Germany. This organizational model reveals the importance of trust for WRI activists. This may mean that recruitment methods for protest action take into consideration the relations of proximity and the confidence generated by it.

In order to prepare collective action, training activities are fundamental; they enhance the preparedness of every activist, the feeling of trust, and the self-organization regarding the different tasks carried out by WRI. A set of training exercises develops the group-building processes, increases group abilities, and above all improves confidence among activists. WRI’s collective action style demands that its participants be prepared to interact with police, to gain the attention of bystanders and the general public, and most important, to maximize media coverage. A collective action planned by WRI reflects high standards in its formal organization. According to Clark et al. (2010), in WRI’s organization of collective actions there is a clear concern to define tasks to be performed by the individual activists before, during, and after the demonstration, designating in particular, again, who will be in charge of distributing movement leaflets, who will take charge of the protest itself, and who will participate in acts of civil disobedience when they occur.

Preparation for nonviolence is very important for WRI. Clark et al. (2010) defend the entire process of nonviolence training – analyzing situations, seeking out alternatives, drawing up petitions, outlining campaign strategies, planning activities, evaluating actions, preparing actions or campaigns – all these things can increase the impact that the group has on others and help it to work more effectively on the ground, to better handle the risks and problems that arise, and to expand the horizon of group

actions. Consequently, it is possible to conclude that the actions carried out by WRI are well prepared and well thought out, demonstrating a high level of planning (Martins 2012). According to Clark et al. (2010), preparation for nonviolence is quite important in readying participants for public reaction, for the occurrence of a counterdemonstration supporting ideas other than nonviolence, and for the reaction of the police force – which, according to Clark et al., is often considered an enemy or at least an opponent and general adversary. “For example, we can feel the urge to start running, but if we start running, we will lose control; our opponents may be tempted to attack us at that moment. Being prepared rationally, emotionally, and also in practice is therefore very important.” (Clark et al. 2010, 68). WRI preparation exercises for collective action have three main objectives: to strengthen group dynamics, to improve the group’s functioning, and to prepare its members for interaction with possible opponents, with the public, and with the police (Martins 2012).

The interaction between WRI and civil society goes beyond political protest, for in its campaigns WRI supports conscientious objectors, individuals, and groups around the world and promotes the right to refuse to kill. This international platform provides help to people affected by war, feeding some populations, organizing some escapes from war scenarios, and rebuilding some areas affected by war (Martins 2012).

In relation to the protest repertoire, principal actions are demonstrations, vigils, petitions, peace marches, civil disobedience, and blockades. From an analysis of these actions, three questions emerge in the case of WRI: How is WRI’s media management handled? How are the police seen by the movement? What are best moments in which to implement WRI’s protest actions? “Nonviolence can combine active resistance, including civil disobedience, with dialogue; it can combine noncooperation – to remove support from an oppression system – with work to build positive alternatives” (Martins 2012).

A very important strategy is the approach to opponents; as Clark et al. (2010, 15) states, “instead of treating our opponents’ employees as inanimate objects, nonviolence tries to create opportunities for them to reconsider their options.” WRI is a movement that defends the pacifism ideal and does not look at the opponent as an enemy; on the contrary, it tries to include opponents in a wider consensus that allows the meeting of opinions.

News media are a key tool used in promoting WRI’s ideas and spreading the message around the world. Higher visibility of the group’s actions increases the number of opportunities members have to present WRI’s actions to the general public, to recruit more activists, to reinforce activism, and to enhance the protest’s impact on the political targets. In order to facilitate the journalists’ work, it is advisable that activists actively prepare to encounter the news media, and in the handbook one finds some general tips that provide a general idea about the interaction between the movement and media. According to Clark et al. (2010, 53), media management actions should “try to build good relationships with journalists; you can help each other. But remember: journalists cannot always be trusted. Always release [statements] to agencies, as you never know where in the world something will be picked up. Always have a group member on hand to deal with media enquiries. Keep press releases short and simple. Be prepared for tough questions. Stay on message. Go for local angles. Ask other campaigners, share knowledge, read manuals, or attend free or low-cost training courses.” These instructions are very clear and give some guidance to activists in preparing for their interactions with journalists, reinforcing once more that WRI actions are planned very carefully in order to achieve their objectives.

Taking into consideration the question of how the police are perceived by WRI members, Clark et al. (2010, 60) mention that “the opponents are the government and its agencies, such as the police and the

army.” The police force is seen as an adversary that controls the activists’ actions, and according to WRI, police interaction with activists can be perceived in five ways (Clark et al. 2010):

1. Police action is implemented when there are no witnesses or journalists.
2. Formal institutions, such as the government, the police, and the mass media, frame the activists’ actions in a way that presents protestors to the general public as troublemakers, scum, criminals, terrorists, professional protestors, and so on.
3. Police argue that they are doing their job and present themselves as victims, arguing that protestors engage in misbehaviour and violence, provoking public disorder.
4. “When protestors make formal complaints or go to court, seldom are there any serious consequences for abusive police. Meanwhile, the whole process takes so long that most people lose interest while activists are tied up in technicalities and distracted from activism” (Clark et al. 2010, 61).
5. Considering the adverse environment, when present in court, protestors fear being misunderstood, and for that reason they keep silent.

Despite these circumstances, WRI activists believe that it is possible to overcome police misbehaviour, and they propose that other members challenge each of these five difficulties. Bearing in mind the weight of trust among WRI members and because this is the basis for every action, it is very difficult to change the way the police are perceived by activists. However, there is no evidence proving that it is impossible for police and WRI members to cooperate during a rally, demonstration, march, or vigil, so there is always room for improvement.

In the cultural domain, WRI’s pacifist ideological perspective supports fighting against all forms of imperialism and colonialism in order to prevent and eradicate war from human life. In another direction, WRI promotes the idea of conscientious objection as

a fundamental right. The preservation of peace and principles of nonviolence are the main guidelines of this movement, and for this reason WRI considers NATO the largest war machine in the world, killing and provoking pain among several populations. The cultural framing of this movement is constructed in terms of “the great loss of human lives, the suffering of millions of people and an unimaginable degree of destruction of property [that have] encouraged sensitive people to organize themselves to prevent something similar from happening once more. For them the outcome of the Second World War was proof that an institution such as war can never be considered able to resolve conflicts” (Prasad 2005, 23). WRI emerged after the First World War, marked by immense suffering and by massive loss of human life. The intention of this movement, as Prasad (2005) describes it, is the struggle against war. However, the WRI was not the first peace movement to emerge; nonviolence as an ideal was already centuries old. As far as a movement’s relationship with the public is concerned, Clark et al. (2010) report only that members of the public can transform from a passive element that has nothing to do with the action into active protestors, stressing that media attention can be leveraged to call more people to collective action.

Prasad (2005) argues that there is a relationship between pacifism and religion; the WRI movement tries to take advantage of this in order to assemble pacifists under the WRI organization. Looking for the roots of pacifism, Prasad (2005) demonstrates that the foundations are present in all religions; he affirms that the Torah, the Jewish Bible, is based on the Ten Commandments of Moses and reminds readers that one of these commandments is *You shall not kill*. This commandment is also valid to Christianity, in which it is also understood as a rejection of war. “I am a soldier of Christ; I can’t fight... I have been fighting for you... Let me now become a soldier of God...” (Prasad 2005, 41) The story of St. Martin

shows that real Christian pacifism was the choice not of a coward but of a courageous person (Prasad 2005). Hinduism, too, seeks peace and freedom of the human spirit. Prasad (2005) points to Mahavir as the first religious leader to advocate nonviolence and notes that the Buddha argued that the man who inflicted suffering was not noble. “The Buddha’s concept of nonviolence, although obviously different from the pacifist understanding of the present resistance to war, gave a great contribution to the concepts of a world without war” (Prasad 2005, 32). He also points out that Islam has several doctrines that advocate nonviolence: “for example, Sufi philosophy generates nonviolence and human unity within and with the whole of nature and there are other examples” (Prasad 2005, 36). There is also the case of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who refuse compulsory military service. They do not acknowledge the superiority of the state and consider their men “ordered” and exempt from military service; they claim the exemption not as conscientious objectors but as ministers. As a result, many of them face prison sentences.

WRI includes an ideological component that is quite marked. Prasad (2005, 384) asserts that:

“WRI is first and foremost a movement of freedom. We work for the human right to freedom: freedom to live without hunger, war, plague: freedom to live without economic, social, cultural and racial exploitation: freedom for human beings to express themselves and develop all their powers as creative human beings: freedom to develop their social skills, which are often limited and distorted by authoritarian structures, allowing men to live in community being superior to selfishness.”

ATTAC: Resources, Opportunities, and Cultural Framing

ATTAC is a movement that originated in France through Le Monde Diplomatique staff members and their engagement with neoliberalism in the late 1990s.

“A central part of this engagement was the call for the imposition of a tax on international financial activity to fund social goals” (Chesters and Welsh 2011, 35). The main goal of ATTAC is the implementation of a Tobin tax on international financial transactions in order to prevent financial speculation. The organization protests against neoliberal globalization, and this is stated on its official website:

“Attac is a movement opposing neo-liberal globalization. Neo-liberal globalization, based on the ‘liberalization’ of trade and financial markets, started at the end of the 1970s and has led to the total domination of financial markets [in] society as a whole. It is an instrument designed to further the enrichment of a tiny minority of investors at the expense of the rest of the population and the planet”³³¹.

ATTAC’s members also believe that “another world is possible”; this statement shows that ATTAC promotes alternatives to neoliberal globalization.

In order to enhance its visibility, the ATTAC movement was founded by aggregating personalities and organizations, as Cassen (2003, 42) states: “My first move was to bring together the organizations – not the individuals – that had responded to our appeal. This was a basic strategic choice: to build ATTAC out of existing structures, whether trade unions, civic associations, social movements or newspapers.” Once some contacts were established and its intentions were clarified, “ATTAC was officially founded on 3 June 1998. Its founding members were essentially ‘legal persons’ – that is, collective entities – to whom a few individuals like René Dumont, Manu Chao or Gisèle Halimi were added for symbolic effect” (Cassen 2003, 42).

ATTAC is a formal organization that links more than two hundred organizations and supports thirty

331 <http://www.attac.org/en> (28 February 2012).

thousand activists. ATTAC has a well-defined structure and a well-defined hierarchy; decision making is a top-down process, and decisions are communicated to its members and supporters through the administrative hierarchy. The group's strategy promotes a clear understanding of the causes and of the movement itself through information campaigns, debates, colloquiums, and conferences, and it inevitably manifests its strategy through political protests. Individual recruitment is done through a registration form on the website; however, ATTAC members also endeavour to recruit organizations, significantly increasing the number of activists and strengthening internal connections with other actors in political and social life. ATTAC takes advantage of the demonstrations held by some unions or social movements to mobilize their own members to protest (Rocha 2012).

Intense mobilization was behind ATTAC's creation, as Cassen (2003, 42) states: "I was astonished by the speed with which the different organizations decided to take part, including trade-union committees not usually quick off the mark, and by the financial commitment that accompanied it, allowing us to set up an office and equip a secretariat." The normal financing for this social movement comes through the fees that its members pay (Rocha 2012).

The international dimension of ATTAC's organization gives this social movement a global approach to defining its policies and strategies, but at the same time the local structures have the freedom to establish their own plans. This idea reflects the spirit of ATTAC's slogan, "Think global, act local." Local ATTAC organizations have the freedom to decide what kind of events they will organize and support, though normally this social movement mobilizes resources for events related to globalization. Usually, members sense an opportunity when other movements organize protest actions against globalization, which are perceived as political occasions to take action. However, Rocha (2012) identifies ATTAC's relatively limited political influence as a constraint.

The division of tasks is well defined in the ATTAC organization; "the national leadership – the executive committee of ATTAC – sets the political framework, issues statements, animates campaigns, etc. But if it decides to organize a day of demonstrations against the WTO, nothing will happen unless the local committees want it to. In that sense they are the backbone of the organization" (Cassen 2003, 43). Without the support of the local platforms it is not possible to organize collective action; in this sense, those commissions constitute pillars of the organization. There is dual power because "the local committees are independent of us [the international administration]. Each has a president, a secretary, a treasurer. Likewise, we are independent of them. "A kind of dynamic tension exists between the two poles" (Cassen 2003, 43). More precisely, "there are thirty members of the national executive, of whom eighteen are elected by the seventy founders of ATTAC, and twelve by the thirty thousand membership at large" (Cassen 2003, 43).

As far as organization is concerned, Cassen (2003, 89) explains that "as I have some organizational experience, I was held responsible for this task." After this first step, and after the institutions that would compose ATTAC had been contacted, the actions to be developed had to be agreed on by all involved. "Within six weeks of our first working session in March, the organizations concerned had agreed on the statutes, a political programme, and provisional leadership" (Cassen 2003, 42).

Outside Europe, ATTAC has developed almost everywhere, including in Quebec, in Africa, in most Latin American countries, and in Japan (Cassen 2003). The committees' membership reveals a disparity in the number of members: one committee may have five hundred members and another only fifty (Rocha 2012).

In France, the social situation was vital to ATTAC's growth; an editorial by Ignacio Ramonet called public attention to *Le Monde Diplomatique*, culminating in the creation of ATTAC. Cassen

(2003, 91) states, “I call ATTAC an ‘action-oriented’ movement of popular education.” The movement seeks to keep its members and the public informed and fights for the “decontamination” of minds – its members believe that people have been contaminated by neoliberalism. In addition, we found that ATTAC wants all its activists to be prepared for any debate, capable of credibly presenting ideas, justification for their actions, and the group’s ideology. The vision for this movement is action through popular education in line with French tradition, assuring that all activists are prepared and well informed for action. According to Cassen (2003), an ATTAC activist is usually a member of the lower-middle, middle, or upper-middle class; most are civil servants, and a significant percentage are teachers and students.

In Portugal, the protest repertoire is perceived as a peaceful one in that:

“ATTAC does not present any incidents with the police, [and this is the] reason why the dialogue with its responsible elements would result in added value for both parties: the police and the movement itself; this is also possible because this movement calls itself a movement that promotes education. Contacting the members of this movement is not difficult, since their website offers their headquarters’ address and the list of social bodies. In addition to this, it is relatively easy to communicate with them during the discussions, symposiums, and training actions that they hold”

(Rocha 2012, 59).

The Black Bloc: Resources, Opportunities, and Cultural Framing

The Black Bloc phenomenon emerged in Germany during demonstrations held in the 1980s. According to some open sources, the appellation *Black Bloc* “was coined by police forces in order to describe the ‘squatters,’ young militants and autonomous groups

that fought against police forces in the streets”³³².

The social and economic climate of recession in the country at that time led to the emergence of radical movements and autonomous groups, mostly founded by young squatters unable to obtain a job, a house, and social and financial independence (Katsiaficas 1997). These activists focused on demonstrations supporting environmental and solidarity causes related to oppression and discrimination, as well as on struggles against the representative institutions of capitalism, through constant occupations and acts of vandalism committed against multinational corporations, banks, and financial corporations (Young 2001).

Facing these facts, German authorities developed a fiery offensive action, using force against those who were designated squatters in social spaces and empty houses in Berlin (more specifically, in Haffenstrasse, Hamburg, and Kreuzberg), where they had taken up residence and lived together (Rothstein 2012). At the end of the 1980s, the high level of police repression triggered the consolidation of militant groups around a collective identity anchored by a single tactic. This culminated in confrontation with the authorities through the street fighting (Mohandesi 2012), that represented “the boiling cauldron of oppression and resistance from which the Black Bloc was born” (Young 2001).

The Black Bloc is a tactic used by several social movements and affinity groups, basically forming a bloc of protestors during a demonstration. Activists dress in black and cover their faces, sometimes with balaclavas, and perform actions driven by violence against their main perceived opponents, such as the police, the state, and the capitalist class (Abreu 2012). Violent actions are one of the marks of the Black Bloc’s protest repertoire, as is making use of all kinds of objects and weapons (e.g., batons, shields, Molotov

332 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available).

cocktails, smoke bombs) that may damage the edifices of corporate and state buildings. The Black Bloc measures success by the amount of damage it inflicts within the territorial sphere where the protest action takes place (Abreu 2012).

In fact, using the social movement concept formulated earlier, one realizes that the Black Bloc does not fit into this framework. In this sense, the Black Bloc *tactic* is one of several used by social movements, groups, or activists assembled on a particular occasion and proceeding according to their goals, opportunities, and concerns against a selected target related to political power, law enforcement, or another segment of society. As Baud (2009, 212) clarifies, “The Black Bloc is neither a structure nor an organization, nor a network, nor an ideology but a functionality within a demonstration.” Considering the content analysis grid that we drafted, the inferences are that “the Black Bloc is not an organization (as in something that you join which has bylaws and a clearly defined membership boundary). It is a tactic used by anarchists and egalitarians in opposition to government-backed corporate control of people’s lives and the economy that we all exist within” (Antibody, Spazz, Sketch, and Entropy 2010, 81). We affirm, then, that the Black Bloc is in fact not a group, an organization, or a social movement; the Black Bloc is a “tactic. It helps reinforce security and execute our goal in the presence of high-profile demonstrations. From Seattle WTO to the most recent action in Genoa, the Black Bloc has certainly been the main focus by the media and the police in major demonstrations.”³³³ Based on the resource mobilization theory (Della Porta 2003; McCarthy and Zald 1977), Abreu (2012, 47) states that “the black bloc, not having an organizational structure, does not represent a social movement but rather a collection of anarchists and affinity groups that organize themselves together for a particular pro-

test action... and so as the ‘civil disobedience group’ cannot exist, the Black Bloc cannot be considered an organization.”

One Black Bloc website, states that “some people have a false belief that they can belong to the ‘Black bloc’ organization. There is no solid Black Bloc organization among protests. There is an anarchist movement that has always existed.”³³⁴ The individuals associated with social movements and affinity groups that use Black Bloc usually combine it with other direct action techniques, such as refusing to cooperate with police and sitting in or occupying particular places. However, according to the results obtained, social movements and affinity groups that often use this tactic are culturally framed between the ideals of anarchism and those of the extreme left (Abreu 2012).

Although the two can intersect and share some common aspects and characteristics, such as the recruitment of participants, the Black Bloc tactic is effectively different from the concept of a social movement as far as its shape and content are concerned. From the lack of a (formal or informal) solid organizational structure to its participants’ rejection of hierarchy (Baud 2009), the bloc distances itself from the principles postulated by the authors of the resource mobilization theory (Della Porta 2003; Tilly, 1978; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

According to Baud (2009, 213), the “strategic planning and the conduct of the Black Bloc is ensured through chat rooms on the Internet.” In fact, using the work of Deussen and Massot (2010), we found some communication prepared by anarchist affinity groups, calling the activists to mobilize through certain Black Bloc actions and providing them with several e-mail addresses through which to clarify issues and to establish communication between activists and protest organizers (Abreu 2012). At the time of

333 <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/bloc.html>, (April 2012).

334 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available).

the 2001 G8 Summit in Genoa, the Italian police tried to intercept the communications of the elements who were organizing the Black Bloc through Internet sites created for that purpose: chat rooms and e-mail. However, their attempts were quickly identified by activists, who reacted by disseminating false information, aiming to deceive security forces (Baud 2009).

We believe that the Internet is, in fact, an important vehicle of communication and transmission of information between anarchists and other protesters in social movements, and within protest and affinity groups that employ and organize Black Bloc tactics; the Web is “also used for purposes of propaganda or manipulation” (Baud 2009, 214). Several Internet sites associated with anarchist ideology are proof of this (Abreu 2012). These sites propagate detailed information about diverse Black Bloc tactics (some of them are mentioned in the corpus examined in our study). For instance, photographs of Carlo Giuliani’s death were publicized on the Internet shortly after the violent demonstrations in Genoa (Baud 2009), likely with the intention of sparking outrage and revolt against the security forces, on the one hand, and on the other hand, inspiring a feeling of solidarity with regard to the causes defended by the bloc elements. Thus, we have concluded that “increased communications abilities throughout the populace have resulted in organizational/mobilization advances amongst the social protest and revolutionary Anarchist movements” (G-MAC 2010, 345).

The lack of any kind of information related to the funding of such tactics leads us to believe that activists participating in the Black Bloc are not interested in divulging their origins (Abreu 2012). On the other hand, we conclude that the resource mobilization process inherent to protest organization is triggered through a careful selection of the elements that will constitute a particular black bloc. However, nothing prevents us from thinking that the affinity groups

and social movements from which activists are recruited are those who finance this kind of activity (Abreu 2012).

The actions of a particular Black Bloc are idealized by the intergroup relations (Della Porta 2003; McCarthy and Zald 1977) between affinity groups and social movements, mostly anarchists, with the necessary human resources to organize collective action (Deusen and Massot 2010) through violence. We believe, however, that individuals who engage in Black Bloc tactics in various protest scenarios do not adhere to those tactics for financial reasons; they are not looking for economic or material benefit (Olson 1965). On the contrary, we believe that use of Black Bloc tactics is mainly tied to ideological issues, to people’s identification with the ideals, values, and principles defended by those who use the Black Bloc (Abreu 2012). Thus, “membership” and participation of certain people in this tactic may mean not benefits but losses and personal sacrifice in various respects, such as time and money.

Nevertheless, we suggest that the motivational impulse leading individuals to proposed collective action through Black Bloc tactics may arise from their possible intent to gain recognition within the reference groups where they intend to be inserted (Abreu 2012). Similar to the way status is obtained within gangs, participation in a protest based on violent direct action against the authorities may symbolize a commendable act, and the violent individual may earn the respect and appreciation of certain groups. Then again, “the literature associated with the Black Bloc brings up hierarchy as a vehicle of violence against the individual” (Baud 2009, 213). The rejection of hierarchy, which is synonymous with inequality, is one of the basic features of anarchism as a “personal liberation process from the constraints of a hierarchical society” (Severino 2010, 365).

According to one online source, the most frequently used techniques and manoeuvres among activists

in the bloc are “unarresting” and “debloc’ing.”³³⁵ Unarresting is the practical activity of forcefully removing a detained activist from the hands of police officers.³³⁶ It mainly occurs “when one or two police officers grab a person on the front line and several arms come out of the bloc to grab that person and to take her/him back” (Hastings 2010, 296). To avoid the risk of unexpected arrests, many Black Bloc activists use the manoeuvre of linking arms, whereby several protesters intertwining their arms in order to prevent the arrest of any one of them.³³⁷

Debloc’ing is a set of techniques through which activists of a certain Black Bloc quickly change clothes and accessories in order to suddenly manifest themselves as a block or in order to become unrecognizable at a certain stage of the protest and pass unnoticed before the police’s eyes, demobilizing or integrating into the rest of the demonstration.³³⁸ To make this possible, the activists of the bloc wear black clothing under regular street clothes, or the other way around (Hastings 2010), and at a particular moment, they “take the ‘normal’ clothes off to reveal the true colours that are underneath” (Hastings 2010, 357) – or they remove the black clothing and disappear among the crowd of nonbloc activists. Sometimes, debloc’ing is done with huge banners that cover the Black Bloc activists, preventing them from being photographed or even arrested by police.³³⁹

Although most Black Bloc techniques are based on a conception of violent protest, we believe that the Black Bloc activists may also employ nonviolent manifestation techniques, such as passive resistance,

which basically consists of activists’ noncooperation with police officers trying to arrest them – for instance, activists may tie their hands and feet to those of fellow protesters or simply sit or lie down on the ground (CrimethInc. Ex-Workers’ Collective 2008).

Along with these techniques, Black Bloc activists often use several kinds of objects and tools in direct action against authorities, institutions, and companies that represent so-called unreasonable capitalism (e.g., banks, Starbucks, McDonalds). These implements include such as the “slings, boomerangs or stars,”³⁴⁰ canes, and shields (Sarin n.d.), among others. In the same line, one finds fully functional homemade explosive devices detonated in the course of manifestations; instructions on preparing these weapons are available in open sources to any individual who has access to the Internet (Abreu 2012).³⁴¹ From the wide range of devices commonly used by Black Bloc activists, the most popular ones are Molotov cocktails and smoke bombs.

On the ground, after activists have met in a place previously designated, Black Bloc tactics call for a commitment to action from small cells of between five and twenty people, often members of several affinity groups; these cells generally know about and coordinate their presence and operational strategies before the demonstration (Baud 2009). The implementation of this technique is often planned based on the principle of the swarm – that is, “individuals or small groups disseminated in a crowd or in a particular sector... quickly create fugacious concentrations capable of provoking poles of violence with temporary superiority against the law enforcement authorities” (Baud 2009, 214). In general, “Black Bloc operations do not have any material or territorial

335 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available)..

336 “Unarresting,” <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/unarrest.html>, (April 2012).

337 Ibid.

338 “Debloc’ing,” <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/debloc.html> (April 2012).

339 Ibid.

340 “Defensive Weapons,” <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/weapons.html> (April 2012).

341 “Basic Chemistry,” <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/weapons.html> (April 2012).

objective other than triggering violence” (Baud 2009, 214), mainly perpetrated for political reasons.³⁴²

The activists participating in the Black Bloc are informed and aware of the equipment and tactics used by the police to keep and to restore public order, and they know to combat them if necessary.³⁴³ “Anyone with no deeper historical knowledge is able to realize that most of the crowd control tactics are... ancestral practices,” and this is the reason why protestors analyze them and seek to find effective ways to neutralize them during an event.³⁴⁴ Rags soaked in vinegar to alleviate the effects on the eyes of tear gas released by police forces, barricades and shells to obstruct the advance of police forces – all these are useful to the elements of a Black Bloc in dealing with the police, considered by anarchists “the violent face of capitalism,”³⁴⁵ and they are consequently employed to “reveal the brutal nature of the State” (Deusen and Massot 2010, 12).

An analysis of the Black Bloc through the structure of political opportunities (Della Porta 2003; Tarrow 1998) reveals that the demonstrators who adhere to the designated tactic consider police forces their main enemy, the regime and the political system of the state their greatest embarrassment, and the people and the anarchist community their eternal allies (Thompson 2010). As far as opportunities are concerned, we found that Black Bloc tactics take advantage of demonstrations organized by different social movements more tolerant to the state, as well as of the permissiveness of the police in terms of social control and repression, in order to carry out Black Bloc operational activity (Baud 2009). At the same time, Black Bloc action creates situations that lead to violence,

provoke the police, and cause damage to corporate headquarters and to institutions representative of the state and capitalism.

The mechanism of the Black Bloc is often brought to bear on the action of pacifist manifestations (Baud 2009). In other words, pacifist protests are perceived as an opportunity for the implementation of the black bloc, for taking advantage of the situation and triggering violence through direct action and thus gaining the approval of other demonstrators, bystanders, and media. At the same time, the activists using Black Bloc tactics also create opportunities for action – consider, for instance, the way the Black Bloc developed its activity during the demonstrations in Genoa, in which it “was inserted into the main manifestation and surrounded by pink bloc members” (Baud 2009, 215). There the pink bloc functioned as a tactical group of frivolity, deceiving the police and encouraging violent acts by constituents of the Black Bloc (Abreu 2012).

Similarly, we can turn to the statement issued by the Autonomous Organizing Collective during the 2001 demonstrations in Quebec: “Friday, the 20th of April, is the day of action convened by the anti-capitalist convergence and by the Welcome Committee of the Summit of the Americas. The actions on this day will be divided into three ‘blocs’: A green bloc with a minimum or null risk of arrests; a yellow bloc, for people planning to [commit] civil disobedience; and a red bloc for the ‘disorder-oriented’ crowd” (Deusen and Massot 2010, 133). Thus, it seems clear that the strategic manoeuvres of Black Bloc tactics are not set in stone and may vary from one Black Bloc to the next; this means that Black Bloc tactics can involve several means of action depending on the purposes to be reached, the location of the protest, and the number of participants in a particular demonstration.

The creation of these opportunities has as its main objective confrontation and destruction by direct action facilitated by a collective identity, achieved by the standardization of the participants (Abreu 2012).

342 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available).

343 “Police Tactics and How to Defeat Them,” <http://mlcastle.net/raisethefist/tactics.html> (April 2012).

344 Ibid.

345 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available).

Activists expect the escalation of violence by police forces in order to restore and to maintain public order, and they expect that this in turn will provoke a sense of outrage and frustration among all demonstration participants, who will then wish to join the Black Bloc in pursuing the “abolition of capitalism, State and all forms of hierarchy and oppression” (Deusen and Massot 2010, 55).

Thus, activists have started attending protests and marches wearing black motorcycle helmets and ski masks as well as black clothing (those who are more prepared wear padded clothing and steel-toe boots and carry their own shields and batons). Black Bloc tactics based on the accomplished street protest through direct action involve the implementation of a bloc of masked individuals wearing black so that they can identify each other and at the same time differentiate themselves from other external actors. In addition to a sense of identity, the masks and clothes of those participating in the Black Bloc also guarantee anonymity, allowing violent and destructive acts without risk of being identified by the police or by the general population (Abreu 2012). However, this anonymity differs from the anonymity postulated by Le Bon (1920) since the irrationality of the crowd is not in question. Black Bloc participants think and envisage their actions in a rational way, but they need to carry them out anonymously because they are often illegal.

Depending on the theoretical model of cultural framing (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 2009), it is possible to deduce that Black Bloc the individuals associated with the social movements and affinity groups that employ Black Bloc tactics advocate implementing a collective identity that enables them to claim their ideal as a single bloc, built around a sense of solidarity and of belonging to the defended cause (Deusen and Massot 2010). In this way, we cannot fail to corroborate Simon’s (2008, 935) assertion that “the power of the collective identification to mobilize people into collective

action,... derives, at least in part, from identity-affirming processes.” Consequently, we believe that cultural framing (anarchist ideology, symbols, flags, and black clothes) represents a cornerstone within the design of Black Bloc tactics that contributes to the mobilization of resources (Baud 2009) in an unequivocal way.

As mentioned before, Black Bloc activists – characterized by black clothes and by the symbol of anarchy (the letter *A* surrounded by the letter *O*) on banners and black flags – are mostly anarchists or members of militant groups tied to the extreme political left.³⁴⁶ Activists choose black because “black is the colour of anarchism; anarchists wear black to dramatize the colour of politics”; consequently, the “movement” is called the Black Bloc.³⁴⁷ Thus, we believe that the ideological conception of the Black Bloc anarchist community (Deusen and Massot 2010) accords with Baud’s statement (2009, 212) that “its supporters are recruited from among several autonomous ecological or anarchist movements of the extreme left.”

In our opinion, Black Bloc tactics, as an “alliance of independent people and affinity groups” (Thompson 2010, 10) are designed around the convictions of antiglobalization, anticapitalism, antifascism, rejection of the established political system, defence of the working class and the oppressed, and respect for the rights of homosexuals and others (Abreu 2012). All these convictions are built upon anarchist ideals (Deusen and Massot 2010). However, we do not exclude the possibility that within a certain bloc there may be some “simply malcontent young people without a real political ideology and who sometimes are even professionally committed to the institutions they fight against” (Baud 2009, 212).

In addition to the practical aspect of homogeneity and the uniformity created by black clothes and

346 <http://www.infoshop.org/page/Blackbloc-Faq>, accessed April 2012 (site no longer available).

347 Ibid.

symbols (making it difficult to identify an individual protestor in a black bloc), the colour and the symbols also function as important pillars in the construction of a collective identity (individuals become a constituent part of a whole) inserted into the theoretical model of the cultural framing process advocated by authors such as Chazel (1995), Della Porta and Diani (2006), Melucci (1996), and Polleta and Jasper (2001).

Melucci (1996) considers that participation in collective mobilization or social movements by several means, involvement in cultural forms of innovation, and voluntary action inspired by altruism are all based on the identity need and help to satisfy it. All this explains the central importance of a collective identity, as well as the importance of the entire process of constructing a cultural framework for the involvement of individuals in collective mobilization. Thus, black hooded sweaters, black pants, black scarves covering faces, and masks are characteristic clothing of the Black Bloc that allow us to affirm the bloc's development as a mostly anarchist protest tactic (Abreu 2012).

With regard to the relationship between police forces and the activists of a given Black Bloc, we have concluded that interactions are shrouded in high animosity in most instances. Markedly anarchistic or extreme left Black Bloc participants consider authorities the "violent face of capitalism, or, in other words, the watchdogs of the rich people."³⁴⁸ Deusen and Massot's (2010, 1) statement – "*The Black Bloc Papers* is dedicated to the memory of the revolutionary Carlo Giuliani, who lost his life battling the forces of capitalism in the streets of Genoa, Italy, in 2001. His memory lives in our hearts and in our fists" – reveals the feeling of solidarity that exists among the activists. The events in Genoa lead us to the question of the repertoire and the action undertaken by the bloc. "The actions of the Black Bloc change from case to case but follow a general strategy focused on creating

a spirit of solidarity against police repression, on creating a chaotic situation leading to violent protests" (Baud 2009, 213).

In accordance with what has been said, we can establish a parallelism among the three theoretical concepts that underpin our investigation: the Internet has the capacity to mobilize resources for collective action using Black Bloc tactics (Della Porta 2003; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978) and to help create opportunities (Kriesi 2005; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tarrow 2006) for disseminating information to an endless number of people – with the main purpose of assisting in the organization of a particular Black Bloc and improving its success. The Internet can also be a cornerstone in the cultural framing process (Della Porta and Diani 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 2009; Melucci 1996), fundamentally and at an emotional level fostering feelings of revolt, solidarity, and group belonging by publicizing images (manipulated or not) and information regarding police repression or any other issue with the potential to obtain from outsiders reviews, features, and favourable opportunities to promote the values and ideals the activists defend (Abreu 2012).

Conclusions

The foregoing analyses of WRI, ATTAC, and the Black Bloc reveal some characteristics through the thematic content analyses of our corpus, which is limited in terms of the number of analyzed documents – for this reason, the results must be considered carefully. This does not mean, however, that these results should not be taken into account in future research. From the results we can sketch the main characteristics of WRI, ATTAC, and the Black Bloc.

The first issue to be discussed is whether WRI, ATTAC, and the Black Bloc can be considered social movements. According to the operational definition of a social movement, there is no doubt that WRI and ATTAC belong in this category because they involve sustainable collective action over time, have a high

348 Ibid.

level of organization aimed at changing perceived injustice, and share cultural beliefs. On the other hand, the Black Bloc is not a social movement but a set of protest tactics, for it is characterized by a lack of permanent activity, and it is used by a set of different groups or movements that opt for violent strategies in demonstrations. The Black Bloc as a tactic is available to all movements; however, we must analyze a movement's characteristics in order to determine whether they might find this approach suitable. For instance, having closely examined WRI and ATTAC, particularly the organizational structures of these groups, we can conclude that these two movements would not use Black Bloc tactics. However, given the reality of multiactivism, there is always the possibility that some protestors would follow their own will and join other movements or groups that use Black Bloc tactics.

Setting aside Black Bloc tactics, WRI and ATTAC are transnational social movements supporting different causes. WRI is a pacifist movement, and ATTAC is an alter-globalization movement that promotes social values over financial ones. These transnational movements are very well organized, with structures that reach all over the world. Another common issue relates to the dichotomy of international versus local; a two-level decision-making process is used in both movements, and this means, on one hand, that the policy and strategic issues are decided at the top level, while on the other hand, protest implementation and protest repertoire are determined at the local level.

Regarding the recruitment processes of these movements, both are open to accepting members from among individuals or within organizations; nonetheless, WRI is a pacifist movement seeking the support of conscientious objectors, and it requires that every member sign the movement's declaration.

Trust among its activists is the crucial element in the functioning of WRI, mainly in order to maintain the operation style during direct action activities, in

the planning phase, and when help is needed on the ground. Preparedness for nonviolent action is one of this movement's trademarks, even though nonviolence has different meanings for different segments of society. With a large range of protest tactics, WRI creates detailed plans for collective action that are carried out by groups ranging in size from five to fifteen activists. The plans include very particular detail, and everyone involved knows about the abilities and weaknesses of other members before each event. This enhances the tactical options, controls the fear of participants, and provides support to activists during the phases of the protest. The police force is seen as the enemy.

WRI is a global peace movement that seeks to unite the greatest possible number of sections throughout the world without following a specific policy. Although a hierarchical structure spearheads the movement, this does not mean that the several component organizations are subjected to a rigid policy. The WRI is an aggregator of several pacifist movements, a "location" for their meetings. As for the organization of its activity, we consider two ideas fundamental: the privilege of participation that is not subject to hierarchies, and the importance of affinity groups as a model of performance for collective action.

The requirements for membership in ATTAC are not so strict because its preference is to recruit mostly organizations in order to increase support quickly and because budget concerns, of course, are considerable. ATTAC is an action-oriented movement of popular education, so it aims at raising awareness about neoliberal globalization. This has a huge impact on the group's protest repertoire because the orientation to action is focused not on the street but on education. Of course, ATTAC organizes campaigns with street actions, but their priorities are debates, seminars, workshops, articles, news releases, and so on; furthermore, the notoriety of individual members enhances visibility. For these reasons, this movement

will interact with law enforcement agencies, and we must not forget that ATTAC members are identified in the movement documentation and on its website.

Knowing that Black Bloc activists belong to groups or movements with anarchistic and extremely leftist ideals sheds light on their positions regarding organization, protest repertoire, and goals. In this case, the discussion about recruitment processes does not apply; the real question is whether a group or a movement is willing and able to implement Black Bloc tactics. Some patterns, such as anonymity, dress code, tools, techniques, group size, communication, leadership, transnational dimensions, and targets and enemies, could help us to identify some signals regarding whether a given group is ready to implement Black Bloc tactics. The anonymity assured by the dress code and the deployment of a bloc of protesters provides additional confidence and a feeling of self-protection against police actions. Preparation is required when a movement decides to use Black Bloc tactics. The idea of a black bloc's success is related to the level of destruction and damage its constituents can wreak. The police are perceived as the enemy. Based on the idea that organization infringes individual freedom, the autonomous approach suits the Black Bloc tactic – but this does not mean that there is no coordination, cooperation, or objectives for a particular action.

Their transnational dimensions, the diversity of movements involved, and the tactical behaviour each of these three groups employs provide insight for better understanding the social movement phenomenon. Further studies must be conducted in order to clarify particular aspects related to resources, opportunities, and framing processes. Moreover, in our opinion, additional research should address problems like multiactivism, the use of social media, the dialogue police concept in southern European countries, and relations between movements and police, particularly those movements that perceive the police as the enemy (Abreu 2012).

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2.4 The LGBT Pride and the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

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Introduction

The following paper is based on the findings of the special project on the freedom of peaceful assembly of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (Ombudsman) in Hungary in 2008 and his investigations into the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) People's Pride Marches in Budapest.

As the freedom of assembly is a fundamental freedom in any democracy, this paper considers it not only in terms of the law (constitutional law, equality law) but also in terms of political science and the international context, primarily because the subject has its roots in political movements.

The Pride Marches have had special importance during the mandate of the Hungarian Ombudsman (2008–2012), therefore this work also focuses on the reports and findings of the Ombudsman based on on-site investigations.

I use the following categories in this analysis of the Pride Marches: authorisation/ban of an assembly; aggression/lack of aggression against a march; intervention/lack of intervention by the police; and acceptance of/protest against the march.

After a review of the relevant international and Hungarian legislation related to fundamental rights (non-discrimination and freedom of assembly) and a history of LGBT movements and Pride Marches, a separate section is dedicated to the Ombudsman's investigations.

1. Non-discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation as a Human Right

European Legislation

The freedom of sexual orientation is considered to be a special case of non-discrimination in modern discourses on fundamental rights. It began to be emphasized in the last few decades as a result of the increasing interest of NGOs and human-right movements in the topic and as a result of some new issues on political and legal agendas around Europe, such as the legalisation of gay marriage or civil partnerships and adoption.

Reviewing European case law could be interesting too, because it is a membership requirement for the Council of Europe to adopt and accept the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The case law of the ECHR, which contains no direct regulation on non-discrimination based on sexual orientation, has changed quite a bit in recent years. Article 14 lists prohibited grounds for discrimination, but the ECHR sees abuse of Article 14³⁴⁹ in relation to other rights of the Convention, such as Article 8 on the right to respect for private and family life. Many of the ECHR cases concerning LGBT human rights have contested the criminalisation of “gay behaviours”; in other cases, the complainants address the barriers to adoption.

The following table briefly summarises the most important ECHR cases of discrimination based on sexual orientation (see table 1):

349 Art 14. “Prohibition of discrimination: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/Convention_ENG.pdf

Table 1

Case	Judgment	Abused right
Dudgeon vs. United Kingdom (1981)	Sexual life is part of the private sphere of individuals, so it has to be protected.	Right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8)
Sutherland vs. United Kingdom (1994) L.V vs. Austria (2003)	It is discriminatory that the age of consent between gay men is 18 while between lesbians it is 16.	Art. 8
Smith and Grady vs. United Kingdom (1999) Lustig-Penn vs. United Kingdom (1999)	It is discriminatory that gays can be discharged from the army.	Right to non-discrimination (Art. 14)
Salguiero da Silva Mouta vs. Portugal (1999)	It is discriminatory to award parental responsibility to the mother rather than the father, who is homosexual, primarily based on his sexual orientation rather than other factors.	Art. 14
Goodwin vs. United Kingdom (2001)	It is discriminatory that the UK did not fully accept a changed gender identity.	Art. 8 and the right to marry (Art. 12)

The European Union today fights actively against all forms of discrimination and for universal respect for human rights, promoting the spirit of the ECHR and, since 2009, fulfilling its duty based on the legally binding Charter of Fundamental Rights. Article 21 of the Charter states that “any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”

It was a milestone when the Working Party on Human Rights of the Council of the European Union (EU) adopted the Toolkit to Promote and Protect the Enjoyment of all Human Rights by LGBT People³⁵⁰ on June 8, 2010. This document aims


to provide staff in the EU headquarters, EU member states’ capitals, and EU delegations, representations, and embassies with a set of operational tools to be used in contacts with non-EU-countries, as well as with international and civil society organisations, in order to promote and protect the human rights of LGBT people in the actions of the EU connecting it with the world beyond its borders. The document seeks to enable the EU to proactively react to cases in which the human rights of LGBT people are violated and to the structural causes behind these violations. By doing so, the Toolkit will further contribute to reinforcing and supporting the EU’s human rights policy in general.

Gender identity and sexual orientation continue to be used as justifications for serious human rights

350 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st11179.en10.pdf>

violations around the world.³⁵¹ LGBT people constitute a vulnerable group and continue to fall victim to persecution, discrimination, and gross ill-treatment, often involving extreme forms of violence. In several countries, sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex are considered a crime and punished with imprisonment or with the death penalty. The EU strongly supports the entitlement by all individuals, without discrimination, to enjoy the full range of human rights.

In 2010 an Intergroup³⁵² of the European Parliament was set up, now the second largest such group, whose work consists in monitoring the work of the EU with respect to LGBT rights, monitoring the situation of LGBT people in EU member states



351 Since the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international community has made some important advances in the fight against racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance. National and international laws have been enacted and numerous international human rights instruments, particularly a treaty to ban racial discrimination, have been adopted. Progress has been made (witness the defeat of apartheid in South Africa). Yet the dream of a world free of racial hatred and bias remains only half fulfilled. As technology brings the peoples of the world closer together and political barriers tumble, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance continue to ravage our societies. Even globalisation carries risks that can lead to exclusion and increased inequality, very often along racial and ethnic lines. The United Nations organised an international conference against racism in Durban in 2001. In 1998, the General Assembly decided to proclaim 2001 the International Year of Mobilisation against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance.

352 The Intergroup on LGBT Rights is currently composed of 150 members of the European Parliament and is the second largest of the European Parliament's 27 Intergroups. Members come from six political groups (EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens/EFA, GUE/GNL, ECR, as well as one non-attached member) and from 22 different member states (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). <http://www.lgbt-ep.eu/about/>

and beyond, and serving as a liaison to civil society groups to relay their concerns at the European level.

Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission, published a press release³⁵³ on homophobic violence at Pride events on May 19–21, 2012 in Kiev, Ukraine calling “on Ukrainian authorities to protect and to enforce the rights of all Ukrainians, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons, to peaceful assembly and to freedom of expression.”

Hungarian Legislation

Two articles of the recently adopted new Basic Law have provisions related to non-discrimination in general. Article II states that human dignity is inviolable. Article XV, on non-discrimination, lists the possible grounds for unlawful discrimination: one of them is an “other situation”. Based on the previous judgments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, this also includes sexual orientation.

353 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/130404.pdf

Act CXXV of 2003, on equal treatment and the promotion of equal opportunities,³⁵⁴ is a unique and broad non-discrimination law which not only provides a general obligation for the state to guarantee the non-discrimination principle but also deals separately with negative and positive discrimination. Article 8 of this law states that negative discrimination is “any action as a result of which a person or group is treated less favourably on grounds of her/his/ its actual or perceived:

- a) gender,
- b) race,
- c) skin colour,
- d) nationality,
- e) national origin,
- f) mother tongue,
- g) disability,
- h) state of health,
- i) religious or ideological conviction,
- j) political or other opinion,
- k) family status,
- l) motherhood (pregnancy) or fatherhood,
- m) sexual orientation,**
- n) gender identity,
- o) age,
- p) social origin,
- q) financial status,
- r) part-time status or fixed term of an employment relationship or other relationship aimed at work,
- s) membership in an organisation representing particular interests,
- t) any other status, characteristic feature, or attribute (hereinafter collectively: characteristics);

it is considered direct discrimination when such a person or group is treated less favourably than another person or group in a comparable situation. To guarantee this non-discrimination principle, in

2004 Governmental Decree No. 362 established the Equal Treatment Authority³⁵⁵ as a central agency, overseen by the ministry for social affairs; among their cases, we can hardly find any which concern discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity (in 2010 there were 3 cases, in 2 of which discrimination was found and in 1 of which it was not; in 2009 there were 2 cases, in 1 of which discrimination was found and in 1 of which it was not). This is also a common experience of the Ombudsman (the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights): no complaint or petition concerning sexual orientation has been submitted to the Ombudsman since the institution was established in 1995. The reasons for this lack of petitions probably include, first, a lack of knowledge about the possibility of turning to the Ombudsman, if there is any abuse of rights, and, second, the fact that the society is still not inclusive enough for people to “come out” in Hungary, and perhaps that potential complainants are afraid to complain.

2. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

The Status of the Freedom of Peaceful Assembly in Systems of Human Rights

The freedom of peaceful assembly is one of the oldest human rights. A public assembly, or demonstration, is an important tool and form for expressing an opinion, in which an individual can directly articulate his or her views together with others in a public space, participating personally and being directly involved, not through any representatives, in the democratic processes. This kind of forum can be particularly well suited to applying political pressure and expressing concerns.

The freedom of peaceful assembly is a fundamental right guaranteed by international standards and national constitutions. Based on this right, anyone can participate in or organise any demonstration,

354 http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/data/Act_CXXV_2003_English.pdf

355 <http://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/data/SZMM094A.pdf>

accepting the legal rules governing such demonstrations in order to maintain their peaceful character.

A review of international and regional human rights documents and conventions shows that it is not always easy to draw conclusions from the legal text about the position of the freedom of assembly in the system of fundamental rights. That's why it is useful to proceed from the importance and designation of the freedom of assembly itself. At first it is a *freedom*. Because of its nature as an original freedom, it is a so-called *first generational fundamental right*, a type of freedom of communication. Freedom of assembly is closely linked to the freedom of expression, in kind and historically: they are both usually regulated in constitutions along with the freedom of association. As a form of democratic participation, it is one pillar of the freedom of communication, which is what ensures the individual's ability to participate in social and political procedures. Freedom of communication is, on the one hand, an individual attitude (as a form of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression), and, on the other hand, a social procedure, because it presents the wider public opinion. The freedom of peaceful assembly is a precondition and a fundamental value of democratic society. Of course it is not only a communicational channel or form of public opinion. Specialised descriptions usually underestimate its political features, but with its geographical and spatial dimensions, the freedom of assembly shows a broader significance than that of a mere expression of opinion. This feature and the will to political pressure and to influence decision making well illustrate its status as a fundamental right.

International Standards

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948 states in Article 20 that "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly".

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1966, states in Article 21 that:

"The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognised. No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

The ECHR, drafted in 1950 by the Council of Europe, states in Article 11 that:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly [...]. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State."

The most important development at the level of the European Union is that the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force December 1, 2009, finally (!) demonstrates a strong commitment to fundamental rights, the lack of which had been a great deficiency of European integration until then. The Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Treaty of Lisbon states in Article 12 (Freedom of assembly and of association) that "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly".

Hungarian Legislation

Article VIII of the Hungarian Basic Law says that “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.”

Among the Acts of the transition period, Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly laid down the basis of the freedom of peaceful assembly beyond the Basic Law. This legislation goes beyond the guarantee of the constitutional right to demonstrate, giving provisions on the duties of the organiser to give prior notification to the police (about the itinerary of such a demonstration, its exact starting and ending dates and times, its aim, the number of possible participants, and the number of organisers). The Act also gives an exhaustive list of all the circumstances under which events can be banned by the police within 48 hours after the notification and provides the reasons that may be seen as justification for dispersing a crowd.

In relation to the freedom of assembly, as with other fundamental rights, the state has an obligation to protect its institutions; the Act on the Freedom of Assembly states that the “state has to guarantee the practice of the freedom of assembly”. In order to fulfil this task the police (acting for the state) must inform all related agencies (such as road operators) and the public, help to keep order at the events if so requested by the organisers, and provide for the removal of disturbing persons. The state also protects the freedom of assembly by means of criminal law. Section 228/A on Violations of the Freedom of Association and of Assembly of the Hungarian Penal Code states that “(1) The person who unlawfully impedes another person in the exercise of his right to association or assembly with violence or menace, commits a felony, and shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to three years.” Section 271/A. of the Hungarian Penal Code states, about disorderly conduct, that

- ◆ “(1) Any conduct of violent or intimidating resistance against the actions of security officers

to maintain order in a public event, if it does not result in a more serious criminal act, shall be construed as a misdemeanour offense and shall be punishable with imprisonment of up to two years, work in community service, or a fine.

- ◆ (2) The punishment shall be imprisonment of up to three years for disorderly conduct committed in groups or with any weapon.
- ◆ (3) As auxiliary punishment, a permanent injunction may also be ordered.”

The European Court of Human Rights, in the *Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria* case,³⁵⁶ found that the police has a “positive obligation” to protect participants in a marching demonstration against counterdemonstrators. The most famous conclusion of this unanimous judgment is that “a demonstration may annoy or give offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote. The participants must, however, be able to hold the demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by their opponents; such a fear would be liable to deter associations or other groups supporting common ideas or interests from openly expressing their opinions on highly controversial issues affecting the community. In a democracy the right to counter-demonstrate cannot extend to inhibiting the exercise of the right to demonstrate.

³⁵⁶ On December 28, 1980, the anti-abortion NGO “Ärzte für das Leben” (*Physicians for Life*) organised a religious service and a march to the surgery of a doctor who carried out abortions in Stadl-Paura. A number of counterdemonstrators disrupted the march to the hillside by mingling with the marchers and shouting down their recitation. At the end of the ceremony, special riot-control units – which had until then been standing by – formed a cordon between the opposing groups. One person caught in the act of throwing eggs was fined. The association lodged a disciplinary complaint against the police for failing to protect the demonstration, which was refused, and later a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court held that it had no jurisdiction over the case.

Genuine, effective freedom of peaceful assembly cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere: a purely negative conception would not be compatible with the object and purpose of Article 11. Like Article 8, Article 11 sometimes requires positive measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals.”³⁵⁷

In the *Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria* case,³⁵⁸ the Court also found that the freedom of assembly guaranteed in Article 11 was violated.

3. The Roots of the Gay Pride Marches

In the sixties, the movements fighting for the rights of LGBT people fitted in with the attitudes of the civil organisations that were working for the social movements for the equal rights of African Americans and against the war in Vietnam. The first great milestone in the expansion of modern LGBT movements was the Stonewall rebellion in New York City in June 1969, when a raid by police on a well-known gay bar (the Stonewall Inn) provoked a violent two-day-long riot by bar patrons. This event directed the attention of the media and of the broader public to the



situation of LGBT people and to their lack of rights. The Stonewall rebellion came to be commemorated with the observance of annual Gay and Lesbian Pride Marches in cities around the world and became a symbol of the fight against discrimination against homosexuals. It served as a catalyst for the emergence of a new breed of gay militant activists quite unlike those who had been involved in the more conventional organisations of the previous two decades; their activism became known as gay liberation. Within weeks of the Stonewall event, gay and lesbian activists had organised the Gay Liberation Front (GLF), using much of what had been built upon by the earlier groups. The GLF saw itself as revolutionary and wished to effect a complete transformation of society. It hoped to dismantle social institutions such as heterosexual marriage and the traditional family unit. It also opposed consumer culture, militarism, racism, and sexism,³⁵⁹ often quite forcefully.

The first Pride March was held in commemoration of the Stonewall riot on July 29, 1970, and was

357 European Court of Human Rights – Case Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria (app. number 10126/82).

358 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden is an association based in Southwest Bulgaria. The applicant association was founded in 1990 to unite Macedonians in Bulgaria on a regional and cultural basis and to achieve recognition of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. In 1991 the association was refused registration as the courts found that its aims were in reality directed against the unity of the nation and that it advocated ethnic hatred and was dangerous for the territorial integrity of Bulgaria. The scope of the case before the Court was limited to events between 1994 and 1997, when the authorities prohibited the holding of commemorative meetings organised by the applicant association and Mr Stankov at the same times and in the same places as official ceremonies.

European Court of Human Rights – Case of *Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria* (2 October 2001) (application numbers 29225/95 & 29221/95.)

359 See Lionel Wright: The Stonewall Riots – 1969. In: *Socialism Today* No. 40, July 1999, www.socialistalternative.org/literature/stonewall.html [2008.07.15.]; Timeline of lesbian and gay history, www.stonewall.org.uk [2008.07.10]



called the Christopher Street Gay Liberation Day. Pride Marches are now held all around the world every year on the last weekend of June, if possible, in commemoration of the 1969 riots. In many countries, these marches are colourful spectacles which include cultural events, while in other countries they are attacked by extremist counterdemonstrators and police intervention is needed to protect the marchers against the aggression of the counterdemonstrators.

Pride Day most often seems like a carnival in the United States and in Western Europe, supported by high-level politicians from different sides of the political arena, by well-known artists, and by others expressing their solidarity in the fight against discrimination against LGBT people. Pride Marches have been held in Toronto since 1981 and in London since 1985. Other big capitals have mostly been holding marches since sometime in the nineties. Since 1992, the European capitals have hosted a one-week festival called “Europride”.

Frame Analysis of the Marches

Applying frame analysis to the political discourse is a useful means of understanding the gay pride marches. In the opinion of Marco Teckenburg, the expert on frame analysis, the frame is the basic definition of

collective discourse, which also has semantic, cognitive, and social functions. Its role is comparable to that of schemes in psychology. In the case of mass demonstrations, in which protesters are often called “rebels”, one of the possible schemes that is activated is the law-and-order attitude, which divests the demonstration of its political character and causes protesters to be seen as rioters. In this scheme, the non-applicable facts and elements will be paid no mind, but others will be emphasized. The social role of frames is influence: the frame is a tool for winning potential supporters. The research differentiates between master frames linked to concrete events and meta-frames related to the content and validity of the right to assembly.

In the analysis of the relation between the gay pride marches and freedom of assembly, the attitudes of the political elite, the police, and LGBT people, the following dual argument system could provide a frame (see table 2³⁶⁰).

The FRA report on homophobia states that member states must respect the freedom of peaceful assembly, because they are all bound by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the freedom of peaceful assembly, compliance with which is supervised by the European Court of Human Rights. Of course, this freedom is not absolute; its exercise may be regulated by national authorities, in particular by imposing a requirement of prior notification or prior authorisations, in order to ensure that the authorities will be prepared to protect the exercise of said right.

In certain member states (Belgium, Greece, Cyprus, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, Sweden), public demonstrations are subject to prior authorisation. In the majority of member states,

360 Gábor Magyar: “Party Programmes and Debates in Parliament on Public Order” (“Pártprogramok és parlamenti viták a közrendről”). In: Máté Szabó and Dominique Wisler, eds.: *Demonstrations, Police, Democracy (Tüntetés, rendőrség, demokrácia)*. Villányi úti könyvek 17. Villányi úti Konferenciaközpont és Szabadegyetem Alapítvány 1999, p. 204.

Table 2

Law-and-Order-Oriented Frame	Civil-Rights-Oriented Frame
Strict legality	Proportionality
Weak supervision of the police	Stronger democratic supervision of the police
Police-friendly attitude	Criticism of the police's attitude
Importance of guaranteeing the public order	Primacy of civic freedoms and rights
Intolerance toward demonstrations without permits	Tolerance toward demonstrations without permits
Intolerance toward law-breaking by demonstrators	Tolerance toward smaller offences by demonstrators
Tolerance of smaller "mistakes" made by the police	Intolerance of faults by the police
Demand for compensation by demonstrators for losses caused by them	No demand for compensation
Stricter rules for permission	Liberalisation of permission rules
More liberal use of compulsive tools	Stricter rules governing use of compulsive tools
Increased police resources	Decreased police resources

2008 Report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) on Homophobia and Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation

no prior authorisation is needed; however, prior notification should be given to the authorities – specifying the date and duration of the event, as well as the itinerary (for marches) or the place (for assemblies) – in order to allow them to adopt the necessary measures to ensure the peaceful exercise of the freedom of assembly (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland).³⁶¹ Despite the clear legal frames, however, certain problems remain. Even where the legal framework for the exercise of the freedom of assembly is adequate, the authorities may impose arbitrary or disproportionate restrictions on the organisation of events in favour of LGBT rights. In Varna, Bulgaria, a demonstration was banned in August of 2005. In Romania, an LGBT march was initially banned in 2005, with the argument that the police would be unable to protect the participants and keep them safe.

In 2006 and 2007, the authorities seem to have had a more open attitude towards LGBT marches, despite certain irregularities in the process of authorising them. A ban was imposed in Warsaw, Poland on the Equality Parade, ostensibly on the basis of the Road Traffic Act, after a politician had expressed distaste for the public advocacy of homosexuality. This restriction of the freedom of assembly was found by the European Court of Human Rights to violate Article 11 of the ECHR.³⁶² In this judgment the European Court of Human Rights also established a new stand-

³⁶¹ The Netherlands is an exception, because in principle, neither prior authorisation nor prior notification is required under the applicable Public Manifestation Act: "Wet Openbare Manifestaties Staatsblad 1988, 157, WET van 20 april 1988, houdende bepalingen betreffende de uitoefening van de vrijheid van godsdienst en levensovertuiging en van het recht tot vergadering en betoging". www.st-ab.nl/wetten/0730_Wet_openbare_manifestaties_Wom.htm. [October 10 2008.]

³⁶² European Court of Human Rights (4th section): judgment of 03.05.2007 in the case of *Baczowski and others v. Poland*. Application no. 1543/06.

ard concerning the exercise of the freedom of speech by politicians while in office. The decision in Warsaw led not only to the abovementioned judgment of the European Court of Human Rights but also to a finding by the Polish Constitutional Court that the Road Traffic Act was unconstitutional.

Authorities often use the concepts of “(good) public order” and “public safety” in their arguments. To illustrate this, an anti-discrimination event was banned by the municipality in Vilnius, Lithuania in May 2007; the Lithuanian Gay League (LGL) was one of the groups that wanted to participate in the event. The LGL then organised an LGBT event, and the municipality amended Vilnius’s “Rules of Disposal and Cleanliness”, giving the municipality the power to require permits for all events which could cause “negative reactions” in society.

Other cases having to do with marches involve authorities who were not able to guarantee adequate protection of the freedom of assembly for LGBT people or organisations. In Latvia it was this way until 2007; then the organisers of the LGBT Pride March there turned to the court in Riga because in the beginning, in 2005 and 2006, the authorities had refused to protect the participants against counter-demonstrators. In Estonia, the Pride March organisers turned to the Chancellor of Justice with a petition complaining about the behaviour of the police and its lack of willingness to cooperate with them during preparations. The Chancellor of Justice did not find it lawful that the Northern Police Prefect required the organisers to employ a private security company to guarantee the safety of the march and found it unlawful to ban the event just because the organisers did not accept this order to use a private company.

In Germany, based on Article 8 of the *Grundgesetz* (the Basic Law), the police has an obligation to protect demonstrators in all registered cases which have a political content. The German “Love Parade”, as a “mass entertainment”, does not contain political messages or opinions, so the obligation to protect it is

not so serious. As a consequence, the safety of these events, which are mostly entertaining, is guaranteed by private companies with private financing.

Hungary was mentioned in the FRA report as engaging in bad practices: in 2007, the police was unable to defend participants in the march, which was violently disturbed by counterdemonstrators. The report also found that a so-called “preventive ban”, imposed in order to protect the participants, can be justified only in extraordinary cases.

Due to the universal ban on the encouragement of hate, violence, or discrimination, most states prohibit demonstrations which stimulate hate, violence, or discrimination based on sexual orientation. Some states (including Spain³⁶³ and Northern Ireland³⁶⁴) explicitly prohibit this kind of discrimination. Despite this, some other states (such as Romania) still authorise so-called “Normality Marches” in which overtly homophobic slogans, which can stimulate violence or hate, can be heard.

The *Eurobarometer Survey of the European Commission, No. 296 on Discrimination in the European Union (2008)*³⁶⁵ has a special chapter on discrimination based on sexual orientation. The survey found that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is seen as the second most widespread form of discrimination in the European Union, behind that on the basis of ethnic origin. Over half (51 %) of the respondents thought that the former was widespread (13 % thought that it was very widespread; 38 % that

363 Article 510 of the Spanish Criminal Code: “Discrimination, hatred, or violence against groups or associations for racist, anti-Semitic, or other motives related to their ideology, religion or belief, family situation, the belonging of their members to a particular ethnic, racial, or national group, their sex, sexual orientation, illness or disability, will be fined with a penalty from six up to twelve months or punished with a prison sentence from one up to three years.”

364 Northern Ireland Part III of the Public Order of 1987, as amended by Criminal Justice No. 2. Order 2004.

365 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_296_en.pdf

it was fairly widespread), as opposed to 41 % who thought that it was rare (30 % fairly rare; 11 % very rare). Three per cent thought that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was non-existent in their country and 6 % didn't know. Examining results country by country, we can see that discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation is seen as being particularly widespread in many of the Mediterranean countries. For example, the three countries where it is seen as being most widespread are Cyprus, Greece (both 73 %), and Italy (72 %). Portugal (65 %) and France (59 %) also have results above the EU average of 51 %. Looking towards the lower end of the ranking, we can see that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is seen as much less widespread in many of the newer entrants to the EU. The bottom three countries are Slovakia (30 %), the Czech Republic (27 %), and Bulgaria (20 %), which seems to show a not very inclusive attitude; that might be due to some conservative traditions and religious roots. But the average European is largely comfortable with the idea of having a homosexual person as a neighbour, with an average of 7.9 on a comfort scale of 0 to 10. Furthermore, 45 % of the respondents say that they would be totally comfortable with this (in other words, a 10 on the comfort scale). Nine per cent give the spontaneous answer that they would be indifferent. Swedes are the most comfortable (9.5) with this idea, followed by Dutch and Danish respondents (9.3). A much lower level of comfort is seen in Lithuania (6.1), Latvia (5.5), and Bulgaria (5.3).³⁶⁶

4. The History of Pride Marches in Hungary

There were attempts to organise the first LGBT march in Hungary in 1992, but it had to be cancelled due to lack of interest, so the organisers, following an international trend, organised a "Pink Picnic". In 1993, a gay film festival and a torch march were organised to commemorate World AIDS Day.

On September 6, 1997 approximately 600 LGBT people marched in Budapest. In 1998, the Central European University (CEU), founded by George Soros, hosted the Third LGBT Culture and Film Festival, which included a march with more than 500 people chanting and celebrating. This march was accompanied by counterdemonstrators carrying homophobic posters. In 1999, the CEU hosted the festival again; this time it was opened by the liberal politician Iván Pető, especially well known from the transition period. The focus of this event and march was the current government's family policy, which was clearly discriminatory in the opinion of the gay community. The marchers travelled via a longer route to a central square in the centre of Budapest; all the events could be followed on the organisers' website (www.gaypride.hu) that year.

In 2000 the Trafó Contemporary Art House hosted the festival, which was opened by the liberal politician and architect László Rajk. The slogan of the festival was "Throw away your masque", and that year, connecting with the international tradition, thousands of people attended the "Gay Pride March" on the first Saturday of July. When they arrived at Parliament, in Kossuth Square, the participants delivered a petition and read Bill Clinton's statement to Parliament.

In 2001 the festival took place in a Contemporary Art Movie house (Kultiplex) and was opened by the philosopher and liberal member of Parliament Miklós Tamás Gáspár. This time the "Rainbow Mission Foundation", founded especially for this event, was the organiser, taking over from the previous organisers, the Lambda Budapest Gay Friends Association (Lambda Budapest Meleg Baráti Társaság), the Background Association for Gays (Háttér Baráti Társaság a Melegekért), and the Labris Lesbian Association (Labrisz Leszbikus Egyesület). The march followed a new route that year and was opened by Alan Reiff, president of Interpride and co-chair of the World Pride Committee. Three right-wing civil

³⁶⁶ Ibid. See pp. 52–58 of the report.

organisations asked for the march to be banned, but they were refused.

It signalled increasing legitimacy for the movement that in 2002, the Seventh Gay Festival was opened by the liberal mayor of Budapest, Gábor Demszky, and was followed by a march attended by 2000 people. In 2003, the Eighth festival was held in the “Art Cinema” and was opened by Joke Swiebel, a socialist member of the European Parliament (MEP), and other MEPs were also in attendance. In 2004, the Ninth Festival was opened by another socialist MEP, Csaba Tabajdi. At the march, which drew 2000 participants, there was some violence; some counterdemonstrators threw stones at the participants.

The extreme right-wing group Jobbik (which at that time was still just a movement but since 2010 has been a parliamentary party) organised a counterdemonstration, actively supported by a known right-wing blogger named Tomcat, in a central square in Budapest, featuring T-shirts that read “Child Protection”. In 2005 the Tenth Festival was opened by the Minister for Equal Opportunities, Kinga Göncz, who was later a socialist MEP; as a consequence of her attendance and featured role, Jobbik called for her resignation and requested a ban by the police. Tomcat and others tried to disturb the demonstration by throwing eggs, but did not succeed (the eggs did not land close enough). In 2006, the Eleventh Festival was opened by Klára Ungár, a liberal politician who had recently come out; in 2007, the festival was opened by Gábor Szetey, who came out during his opening speech.

The 2007 march was accompanied by aggressive acts of violence and the police was not able to sufficiently safeguard the participants from extreme right-wing counterdemonstrators who threw eggs, bags filled with sand, and beer bottles. During the evening, more than a hundred counterdemonstrators were waiting for the participants in the street. Riot police dispersed the roaring and spitting crowd, which was wearing black hoods and had also attacked the

police. Eight people were arrested and accused of rowdiness and disorderly conduct. Some extreme right-wing civil organisations also held a planned and registered counterdemonstration nearby.

5. The Ombudsman’s Reports on the Freedom of Assembly and the Pride Marches

About the Ombudsman

(the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights)

The work and the mandate of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (the Ombudsman) and his Office are determined by Article 30 of the Basic Law of Hungary, adopted in 2011 and based on Act 111 of 2011 on the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, both of which entered into force on January 1, 2012. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights is the legal successor of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Civil Rights (the predecessor institution was established in 1995), following the relevant regulations in order to ensure the effective, coherent, and most comprehensive protection of fundamental rights and in order to implement the Basic Law of Hungary.

The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights gives an opinion on the drafts of laws affecting his or her tasks and competences, on long-term development and land-management plans and concepts, and on



plans and concepts otherwise directly affecting the quality of life of future generations; in addition, he or she may make proposals for the amendment or making of rules of law affecting fundamental rights and/or the recognition of the binding nature of an international treaty.

The Ombudsman surveys and analyses the situation of fundamental rights in Hungary and prepares statistics on those infringements of rights in Hungary which are related to fundamental rights. Therefore, the Ombudsman submits an annual report to the Parliament in which he or she gives information on his or her fundamental rights activities and gives recommendations and proposals for regulations or any amendments. Parliament shall debate the report during the year of its submission.


In the course of his or her activities, the Ombudsman cooperates with different organisations (professional groups, NGOs, etc.) aiming at promoting the protection of fundamental rights.

As a new mandate, since 2012, the Ombudsman may initiate the review of rules of law at the Constitutional Court as to their conformity with the Basic Law.

Furthermore, the Ombudsman participates in the preparation of national reports based on international treaties relating to his or her tasks and competences and monitors and evaluates the enforcement of these treaties under Hungarian jurisdiction.

Anyone may turn to the Ombudsman (in a complaint via e-mail, personally, or by letter) if, in his or her judgment, an activity of or an omission by public and/or other agencies performing public duties (all these agencies are in an exhaustive list in the Act) infringes on a fundamental right of the person submitting the petition or presents an imminent danger. The Ombudsman can conduct ex officio proceedings in order to have such improprieties terminated as are related to fundamental rights and which have come up in the course of the activities of the authorities. Ex officio proceedings may be aimed at an inquiry

into improprieties affecting not precisely identifiable larger groups of natural persons or at a comprehensive inquiry into the enforcement of a fundamental right.



The Special Project on the Freedom of Assembly
Prof Dr Máté Szabó, Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (Ombudsman) since 2007, launched a special annual project on the freedom of assembly in 2008. The right to assemble is partially a prioritised fundamental human right to communication and partially a function of the fact that protests and demonstrations are an important indicator of the stability of a democracy.

In the framework of this project, the Ombudsman investigated, among other things, how law-enforcement agencies, in this case the police, handle reports and how far their measures taken during events, as well as police practices related to ensuring the right to assemble, together with the elements of legal safeguards of legal regulations, meet the requirements set by the Constitution and whether the realisation of fundamental rights is ensured. During the course of the project the Ombudsman was in search of other, newer techniques of investigation and forms of cooperation aside from the traditional tools of the Ombudsman that could, jointly, more effectively promote his activities for protecting fundamental, human rights.

Looking just at the bare facts, it becomes clear that the Ombudsman and his associates participated in more than hundred events that fell within the validity of Act III of 1989 on the Freedom of Assembly or



were closely related to it. Participation in state and local government events open to all as well as the various modes of expression of opinion by groups as also justified participation, the fact that the police repeatedly acknowledged them as events covered by the right to assembly. In the case of the latter cases it was the protection of the right to self-determination (the private sphere), along with the freedom of opinion, that was the focus; consequently, the Ombudsman's staff monitored identification procedures, entry procedures and spaces, the search of clothing and packages, security, etc. in the venues of events.

The Ombudsman has summarised the experiences of on-site investigations into the realisation of the right to assembly, acquired in 41 events, in five comprehensive reports so far. All in all it can be stated that in 2008 there was no major event in a public space in Budapest in which the Ombudsman and his staff did not conduct an investigation.

In his reports, the Ombudsman has drawn up a complex map of problems related to the right to assemble. During the course of his investigations he has identified anomalies in relation to the realisation of the right to assemble in the following areas:

- ◆ The manner of announcing an event [electronic reporting],
- ◆ The timeliness of reporting [events reported within the 3-day deadline],

- ◆ Identifying the organiser of a non-reported event,
- ◆ The measures to be taken as a result of the report ["waiting" by members of a civil organisation in front of the Municipal Law Court],
- ◆ The grave endangerment of the undisturbed operation of the agencies of popular representation or of the law courts,
- ◆ So-called concurrent or parallel events [in relation to phenomena accompanying the LGBT march],
- ◆ Entry practices at the various events [October 22–23 2008],
- ◆ Issues of the so-called protection of institutions [in relation to the LGBT march and the September 20 events],
- ◆ Limitations on the expression of opinion during the exercise of the right to assemble [massive throwing of objects on marchers], and
- ◆ Anomalies in relation to dispersion [measures taken at Clark Ádám Square³⁶⁷].

As concerns issues that are not primarily issues of the right to assemble, but that affect it in practice, the Ombudsman took up problems related to the identification of policemen, police reports, and investigations of them by their commanders, finding anomalies there.

The 2008 Pride March (Report OBH 3262/2008)

After many withdrawn notifications, the Rainbow Mission Foundation notified the police of the Pride March on June 9, 2008. Budapest's chief of police first banned the Pride March, then withdrew his own decision and authorised the march. Parallel to the Pride March, a private person registered another

³⁶⁷ Police handled the right-wing demonstration as not having had adequate legal notification, so the participants were requested to leave Clark Ádám Square. The crowd remained peaceful and followed the police order. After a few minutes, police blocked the route which had previously been marked as the exit route and checked the identification of participants; 59 people were later arrested.

demonstration in the name of the so-called “Transition Forum”, and three other private persons registered demonstrations following the same route that the Pride March would take. The police, taking the aggressive events of 2007 into consideration as well, had divided the different events with cordons and police forces.

At the march, which took place on July 5, 2008, there were approximately 4000 to 5000 people in attendance, but there were also “some journalists” who went along with them and who, as later became clear, did not agree with the aims of the march. There were no disorderly incidents along the route, but there were some around the march. At the counter-march that was running in the opposite direction but along a parallel route, some speeches encouraged participants to physically harm the participants in the Pride March. In some places, as the registered counter-demonstrations finished, they were continued without a permit, and at these demonstrations the Pride March participants and the police had eggs, vegetables, fruits, stones, and Molotov cocktails thrown at them.

The Ombudsman investigated issues related to the following fundamental rights (laid down in the Constitution):

- ◆ Legal certainty, the rule of law, and the right to fair procedure (Article 2),

- ◆ The state’s obligation to protect fundamental rights (Article 8),
- ◆ The right to life and human dignity, the right to privacy (Article 54), and
- ◆ The freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 62).

In his report, the Ombudsman stated that the throwing of objects (eggs, stones, Molotov cocktails) as a form of expressing opinion cannot under any circumstances enjoy constitutional protection. It is opinion that is under protection as a human right, not its expression with different objects. He also stated that in the case of a hermetic blockage of the area of assembly (or the route of a demonstration), the right to communication (or the freedom of expression) is violated because the message cannot reach its addressees, the viewers of the communication process. Thus, vacating the demonstration area carries in itself the direct danger of an anomaly concerning the freedom of expression. In the case under discussion here, it was the participants in the LGBT march of July 5, 2008 who were attacked by those standing along the route throwing things at the marchers, despite the fact that the police had totally isolated the event from the street environment in most places. The Ombudsman studied how the police could have secured the march so that the participants



would not suffer from such attacks while still making it possible for the opinion intended to be expressed to reach its addressees. The Ombudsman sent his report to the Deputy and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Court and to the Chief Prosecutor by way of information, asking them to consider a proposal for a process of legal unification so that the procedures in cases of objects being thrown should be uniformly carried out. The Deputy and Acting Chairman of the Supreme Court informed the Ombudsman that the Penal College of the Supreme Court had discussed certain questions of the legal interpretation of the criminal act of truculence in their session on September 29, 2008 and created College ruling No. BKv. 71. According to that ruling, the throwing of objects typically unsuited to do harm to other persons (such as eggs) may constitute an act of slander. An act of slander committed in a public place, if its performance is conspicuously directed against a community, may be appropriately identified as truculence, and therefore the question of whether the conditions of this criminal act have been fully satisfied should be examined.

The legal definition of truculence was modified by the Act on the Modification of Certain Acts in the interest of protecting public order and the operation of the administration of justice. The lawmaker, in addition to making the commitment, in a group, of acts gravely disturbing to the public order a qualifying condition and ruling that starting on February 1, 2009 it would be more seriously punished, also supplemented Article 271 of the Penal Code with a regulation according to which “a physical impact of attacking nature qualifies as violent behaviour even if it is not of a nature to cause bodily harm”. (The Ombudsman did not comment on the proposed bill.)

In his report, the Ombudsman also emphasized that the Act on the Freedom of Assembly does not properly regulate events organised in parallel. Naturally, anyone can express his or her opinion and say that he or she does not agree with a demonstration's

aim. But freedom of expression is only valid up to the point at which other people's fundamental rights (in this case their freedom of assembly and right to life and human dignity) are violated. The participants in the unregistered events abused the freedom of peaceful assembly of the participants in the Pride March. The (even more violent) behaviour is not under the protection of any fundamental freedom but has to be judged from the aspect of criminal law.

The 2009 Pride March (Report OBH 6021/2009)

On May 28, 2009, the Rainbow Mission Foundation notified the police of an LGBT march organised for September 5; three counterdemonstrations were also registered with the police but all three were later withdrawn. The Ombudsman requested all the formal documents and DVDs and his staff attended the march. The chief of the national police informed the Ombudsman that the preliminary notification had been examined by the police, who found that it could be held as requested but that because of the date (it was the first weekend after school had started) some negotiation would be needed with Budapest Public Transport, Ltd.

There was a concern about blockage of the area and the neighbourhood around the route of the march, with thousands of pedestrians and people



who wanted to travel to the route by tram or by car, starting at 11 a.m. (the march was planned to start at 3 p.m.). But the police did not develop any survey or analysis of the consequences to public transportation of such a long and wide blockage.

In a press release, the Budapest police asked the members of the march to refrain from any behaviour that could injure or offend “public taste”. The Ombudsman tried to examine this request. Governmental Decree 218 of 1999 on public morality states that anyone who behaves in a manner that is abusive to public morality in a public space may be punished with a fine. But this piece of legislation does not offer any explanation of what constitutes behaviour against public morality, and the Budapest police wanted to put out a clearer, simpler, and more understandable call to the marchers; as a result, they talked about refraining from any behaviour that harms *public taste* and asked them to accept the common norms and rules accepted by the majority of society. The police did not initiate any procedures against the participants based on this guideline.

During the march, some counterdemonstrators once again started to throw eggs and stones; the police, after giving instructions by loudspeaker according to protocol, increased its forces at an intersection where an aggressive meeting of the two sides could be expected. The police was getting information that the counterdemonstrations had begun to become less peaceful (they had, for example, burned a peace flag and provoked police officers).

The Ombudsman investigated issues related to the following fundamental rights (laid down in the Constitution):

- ◆ The rule of law, the right to fair procedures, legal certainty (Article 2),
- ◆ The state’s obligation to protect fundamental rights (Article 8),
- ◆ The right to property (Article 13),
- ◆ The right to life and human dignity (Article 54),
- ◆ The freedom of expression (Article 61),

- ◆ The freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 62)
- ◆ The right to non-discrimination (Article 70/A).

In his report, the Ombudsman stated that the police had violated fundamental rights by allowing the disproportional blockage of public transportation. Based on the provisions of the Act on Administrative Procedures, if an agency is unable to decide a professional question (in this case, what the proportional and adequate length and duration of a blockage is), it must request support from authorities who have the relevant expertise and competence. As for the police’s press release on public taste, the Ombudsman stated that the police did not have the competence to issue such a release, because there could be no legal consequence linked to a behaviour abusing public taste (since it is not defined by law), but the attitude of citizens could nonetheless be affected. The Ombudsman repeated the conclusion of his report on the 2008 Pride March concerning the disproportional blockage, highlighting again that although the police was able to protect the participants from any physical damage, the hermetic blockage (that was kilometres long and used cordons and police forces) infringes on the subjective part of the freedom of assembly. And finally, in the policing issue concerning the preparation, method, and execution of dispersion of a crowd, the Ombudsman found that the visible conflict and lack of cooperation among different police forces (the national, Budapest, and riot police) caused problems.

The 2011 Pride March (Report OBH 871/2011)

(The Ombudsman did not investigate the Pride March in 2010 because of the preliminary information that there was no disorder expected.)

In 2011 the Ombudsman was informed by the media that the Budapest police had banned the Pride March. The Rainbow Mission Foundation, as the organiser, had sent the notification in September 2010 that they would be holding a march on June 18, 2011. After necessary consultations, the police accepted



the registration of the march. In February, 2011, the organiser added an amendment to the original notification, making the march route longer (so that it would reach Kossuth Square, in front of Parliament). The police consulted again and decided to handle this notification as a new one, because the changes related to substantive elements of the planned demonstration. The date of the Pride March fell during the Hungarian EU Presidency (January – June 2011) and a major part of Kossuth Square was occupied by an international photo exhibition, so during that time it was not a public space that was available for any other demonstration. Moreover, the police argued that the transportation of the highly protected VIPs would have to be amended. As a result of the consultation, the organisers decided to finish the march nearby, but not at the square itself. Finally, though, the police decided to ban the event, arguing that the march (and the protection for it) would hinder the ordinary functioning of the tram operations in the affected area. The organisers asked for a review of the decision. The Budapest Court found the petition of the organisers to be well-established and valid, and repealed the decision of the police.

The Ombudsman's staff was on site to investigate starting in the early morning of the day of the Pride March, and also requested all relevant documents. They found that, as in previous years, the police



attended with a high profile and high staff numbers, operating with blockages covering large areas.

A right-wing youth movement organised a counterdemonstration at an intersection where it could possibly disturb the march. The police decided, appropriately, to amend the route of the march and keep it a certain distance from that intersection. After the march had moved further along, the counterdemonstrators indicated to the police on the spot (including the “Dialogue Officers”) that they had finished their demonstration, but they weren't allowed to leave until later, and the police formed a cage to contain them until then. At the end of the march, there were some clashes, mainly consisting of verbal conflicts, between some antifascists who had participated in the Pride March (and who were foreigners, as could be seen because they wore international antifascist symbols and carried flags) and some arriving counterdemonstrators; these clashes were handled by the cordons formed by the LGBT organisers and the police.

The Ombudsman investigated issues related to the following fundamental rights (laid down in the Constitution):

- ◆ The rule of law, the right to fair procedure, and legal certainty (Article 2),
- ◆ The state's obligation to protect fundamental rights (Article 8),



- ◆ The right to free movement (Article 58),
- ◆ The freedom of expression (Article 61), and
- ◆ The freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 62).

In his report, the Ombudsman stated that police crowd management is basically a policing issue and, as such, may only be the object of Ombudsman investigations when the exercise has an impact on fundamental rights. Thus, the action itself and overall cannot be examined by the Ombudsman. However, during the procedure, the Ombudsman always looked at whether the police's actions promoted the enforcement of fundamental rights (this question goes beyond the question of the professionalism or legality of the actions). The fact that the police have the legal right to take a measure does not mean that the measure taken cannot then be examined from the perspective of human rights; and in fact, such an examination is especially important in the case of freedoms. With respect to the counterdemonstration at the intersection, the Ombudsman emphasized the right to leave a demonstration as part of the freedom of assembly (specifically the right of nonparticipation). This caging, or kettle formation, used by the police (named after the "Polizeikessel" or "police kettle" used to detain demonstrators in Hamburg, Germany in 1986) was neither proportional nor necessary after the Pride March participants had moved

on, and it violated the counterdemonstrators' right to move about freely (specifically here, to leave the event). The police maintained a high profile during the entire event, whereas the Ombudsman pointed out the virtues of low-profile, knowledge-based crowd management as a positive practice according to the experiences in the Godiac project.³⁶⁸

The 2012 Pride March (Report AJBH 5595/2012)

Notifications for many different demonstrations were submitted to the police for July 7, 2012. The Rainbow Mission Foundation, as the organiser of the LGBT march for that day, was turned down by the Budapest police, who said that the traffic could not be managed there or on any other route, and therefore the event was banned. The organisers turned to the Budapest Court for a review as they had done the previous year, and the court repealed the decision of the police, so the demonstration could be held. This year, some international LGBT organisations and many diplomatic missions (including the United States embassy) had indicated that their representatives would like to attend. The march proceeded basically undisturbed; at the endpoint (Kossuth Square), a few counterdemonstrators arrived as the march was arriving and chanted homophobic and/or fascist slogans. The police separated the demonstrators and the chanting counterdemonstrators with cordons and high-profile police officers. After a while, when the march participants were starting to leave the square, the counterdemonstrators – in spite of warnings from the police and efforts by the Dialogue Officers – started to provoke the police officers (for instance by spraying them with irritants and hitting them). One of them, who

³⁶⁸ The Ombudsman is a participant in the Godiac research project ("Good practice for dialogue and communications as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe"), which is being supported under the specific programme of "Prevention of and Fight against Crime", which aims to promote cooperation among European police forces in connection with large-scale demonstrations.



wore a Nazi swastika, was arrested, as were some others who physically attacked the police forces.

The Ombudsman investigated issues related to the following fundamental rights (laid down in the Constitution):

- ◆ The rule of law, the right to fair procedure, and legal certainty (Article 2),
- ◆ The state's obligation to protect fundamental rights (Article 8),
- ◆ The freedom of expression (Article 61), and
- ◆ The freedom of peaceful assembly (Article 62).

In his report, the Ombudsman found that the police had operated professionally in order to protect the participants in the Pride March, and also that the numerous Dialogue Officers who had been involved from the preparatory phase through the post-event management had had a positive influence. He repeated his concerns about the unclear (and therefore misleading) preliminary call from the police to the participants to refrain from behaviour that would offend "public taste".

The counterdemonstration at the end of the Pride March was found by the ombudsman not to be a flash

mob,³⁶⁹ so it had to be examined and handled under the Act on the Freedom of Assembly. In his opinion, the police evaluated and handled the events properly.

As for crowd management, the Ombudsman pointed out once again, as he had in previous years, that there is an existing effective and positive tendency in Europe, connected with the Godiac project, which can be fully supported from the human rights perspective: namely, the use of knowledge-based crowd management strategies, using facilitation, communication, and dialogue as basic tools to keep a demonstration from turning violent and aggressive. The police made visible attempts to use this forward-look-

³⁶⁹ A "smart mob" is a demonstration that is a short, quick event, organised using modern communication channels (such as text messages), for political reasons. Its main aim is to draw public attention to a social or political issue. Some cultural or sports events can also be seen as demonstrations, usually when the organisers have forgotten to announce them in time or when they could be denied for some reason. But a "flash mob" is not a demonstration. It is not an open-space public event but is instead suddenly organised as a joke or to shock people (an example would be a pillow fight in the street organised via text messages). (But if it has any political message and it represents common opinion, then it qualifies as a smart mob.) Events organised by the government or by local authorities (such as national celebrations or other memorial events), press conferences (even if they are organised in an open space to emphasize something), commercial events (such as a Red Bull Air race), and other such events in open public spaces are also not demonstrations.

ing method to manage the Pride March and the accompanying counterdemonstration in 2012.

Conclusion

For historical and political reasons, Central and Eastern European societies have been behind the Western European and Anglo-American world in the development of LGBT culture. This became very obvious in this study, not primarily in terms of culture, but in terms of the fundamental right of LGBT people to peaceful assembly and justice. While in the United States and Western Europe, fighting for gay rights organisations has a long history, in Central and Eastern Europe civil society in this field became active only in the second half of the nineteen nineties. Nowadays, international conventions guarantee the principle of non-discrimination and, in many cases, have an explicit ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation; in practice, however, some Central and Eastern European countries which are signatories to these international conventions show a different picture.

As a result, although there are existing basic legal frameworks in each country relevant to the freedom of assembly for LGBT people – particularly due to international treaties – there is a very clear boundary between Western Europe on the one hand and Central and Eastern European countries on the other, produced by the different practices and levels of authorisation, the different intensity of political influence, the presence or absence of extreme right-wing organisations, the intensity of and methods used in police interventions, and the social legitimacy of LGBT culture, and which side of the boundary one is on determines whether LGBT organisations and Pride Marches are surrounded by peaceful, colourful events or by aggressive acts of violence.

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2.5 State, Security, and the Media: The Ritualization Process in Contemporary Politics

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Introduction

The relationship among politics, the media, and the public – the core of political communication – has a high degree of density not only because it involves a huge number of actors in producing and sending messages but also because of the extraordinary diversity of meanings attributed to it by the receivers. Habermas identified all the actors among media and political elites that are essential to the formation of a discussion arena in which critique might take place – the formation, that is, of the public sphere (1991, 2006).

A vast amount of literature acknowledges and criticizes the relationship of political power with media (Habermas 2006; Meyer and Hinchman 2002; Castells 2000; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) and recognizes the importance of that relationship in the formation of public opinion. Considering the senses in which that relationship overlaps and its consequences for democracy is a classic approach that might be extended to investigations of other topics, such as the ways some actors not only present their ideas and try to capture public attention for them but also *how* they do this, the strategies they use.

It is generally acknowledged that, besides amplifying the view of an issue, political communication fulfills ulterior goals, among them self-presentation and self-perpetuation. Participants become actors, and their actions a performance, a dramatization that leads observers to think that political communication and all involved in it is spectacle. Performative strategies are becoming very common in contemporary political agendas, distancing political communi-

cation from regular discursive practice as it becomes more and more engaged with symbolic practices, rituals, and dramatization. And in this process the media play a very important role.

Objective and Method

In 2010, between November 16 and 20, Lisbon and the Portuguese government hosted the 2010 NATO summit. NATO summits are important events on the international political agenda; political leaders of every member state are present, to the highest level – usually presidents, prime ministers, and ministers – a fact that on its own gives the event an exceptional level of notoriety and, of course, visibility. A huge number of news agents, television stations, radio stations, and journalists are accredited to cover the summit, beginning well before the event. In this case, the Portuguese media began reporting several weeks in advance. The topic that made the most headlines, besides the event itself, was the exceptional set of security measures that would be enforced during the summit period. Among these, the most important message was the “suspension of Schengen,” the closing of Portuguese borders. The legal framework of the Schengen Convention allows that in exceptional situations, if internal security is in any way threatened, member states may temporarily suspend the terms of the Schengen agreement for a period no longer than thirty days. There must be a public announcement of this decision.

This was the second time in the last seventeen years that the Portuguese borders, internal and external, had become the object of such a measure. The first was the occasion of a sports event, the European Football Cup in 2004. Both instances reintroduced the practice of border control and sparked a debate on security that mobilized the media and drew popular attention for several weeks, mainly because the media apparatus focused on control of the internal border with Spain, which to the eyes of a casual observer usually seems completely open.

Academic research on national and international borders – clustered on the eclectic border studies agenda – has shown that despite political rhetoric claiming that we live in a borderless world, especially within the European Union, borders have not disappeared; they have changed. The meaning that people attach to the concept is different: borders were political constructions, and now, especially for those who live in the borderlands, they are mainly cultural constructs (Wilson and Donnan 1998; Strüver 2005; Amante 2007, 2010). This is the case with the Portuguese internal border, “open” since the early 1990s.

But in November 2010, Portugal’s international borders were once again the perfect answer to the state’s anxiety, given that the NATO summit was an event that clearly reinforced the idea prevalent in the post-9/11 globalized world that “the subject’s consciousness is being re-oriented toward a sense of the need for enclosed mobilities, regulated transnationalism, and monitored, rather than simply [toward] flexible sovereignties” (Cunningham 2004, 332). The event also revealed the power of the media in the process by which a state creates ritual sociodramas that it later fixes, dramas that in themselves are symbolic manipulations of people and their opinions.

Highly relevant in this process were the ways politicians and technocrats behaved during the summit and in the weeks before it. From November 16 to November 20, old and new technologies of border control were used for “ensur[ing] internal security and maintaining public order,” as the minister of internal affairs told journalists. Newspapers, radio stations, and national television stations were the vehicles used to distribute information both on the summit itself and on the necessity of increasing external border controls and rebounding the internal border.

What follows is an analysis of the strategies that the Portuguese state employs through some of its institutions in order to communicate and – more important,

I argue – in order to stress the state’s power in the public sphere. My goal is to explore the various strategies used by the state in a specific situation not only to communicate and connect with citizens but mostly to reify its authority regarding a critical point of national sovereignty: internal security. Specifically, in what ways were the formal resources insufficient, and how were they complemented by other strategies? How did the Portuguese state capitalize on a major international political event to self-project in the public sphere? I approach these questions from an anthropological perspective, making use of a framework that involves the concepts of ritualization, social drama, performance, and symbolic power.

The collection and analysis of news items reported via Portuguese media, coupled with a systematic reading of newspapers from October 29 to November 28, revealed that the NATO summit was an omnipresent topic. My analysis was guided by three categories: the NATO summit, Schengen/borders, and security. Headlines were the units of analysis considered in the selection of the material, which was then explored through systematic reading.

The Portuguese state fulfilled the information requirement, keeping citizens informed through the conventional methods: short and medium-size news pieces in daily newspapers and in weekly magazines reported the closing of the internal Portuguese border because of the NATO summit and called readers’ attention to the need to prevent members of identified extremist organizations from entering the country – those who deploy the black bloc strategy being the most feared in this respect. The headlines “Portugal is Closing Borders during the NATO Summit to Avoid the Entrance of Extremists” in the daily newspaper *Público* (November 4), “Controlled Borders” in *Correio da Manhã* (October 29), and “Portugal Is Suspending Schengen due to NATO Summit” in *Diário Digital* online (November 16) are but a few examples showing that the border was being reintroduced in its classic connotation.

But as the summit approached, traditional procedures became only a part in the process of political communication. In addition to these, prime-time television audiences nationwide were exposed to images, some real and some fictional, related to the event and to actions of the state and some state institutions. My goal then is to conduct an anthropological analysis of the state's use of ritualized practices – performances – designed to capture the attention of a generalized media audience as a way to reinforce power by representing a kind of sovereignty that national states that are part of supranational structures often feel is undermined. It is, ultimately, to address the question how political communication in the public sphere can contribute to legitimation processes (Habermas 2006).

Performance, Social Drama, and the Ritualization Process

Depending on the level of assertiveness and the audience that a message is intended to reach, formal and heterodox mechanisms of communication might be used by political powers or, in the context of this chapter, the state. In terms of formal procedures we might refer to an array of state communication techniques intended to increase state's efficacy, such as housing regulations, fiscal and monetary policy and martial laws (Borneman 1999) basing itself on a "model of administrative ordering of nature and society" (Scott 1998:5). These features are essential in the construction of a more classical Weberian idea of the modern state: a bureaucratic impersonal structure whose behaviour is highly rational and standardized.

There are, nevertheless, several indications that national states do not conform always to this pattern. Developments on the so called anthropology of the state (Abélès, 1988; 1990; Abélès and Jeudi 1997; Trouillot 2001) lead to different analytical dimensions presenting politics in general and the state also as a producer and object of cultural representation (Bal-

andier 1999) with A symbolical dimension attached to it (Geertz 1980; Sharma and Gupta 2006) and opening to the possibility of concentrating also on the "idea of the state takes its shape in the lives and beliefs of ordinary people (Taussig 1992:132).

In its struggle to project to society and to increase communication, it becomes clear that politicians and other interest groups take an increasingly proactive approach to amplify their views of what an issue is about and adopts practices that supposedly are effective in reducing that initial modernist gap between the structure and the group, between the state, civil society and the citizen. The anthropological perspective on the relationship between politics and media concentrates on the "circumstances [and] the instruments that are not part of the argumentative rationality but of symbolic rationality" (Coman 2005: 46). The *state's performance*, as I call this symbolic and ritualized practice through which the state displays its power and connects with the citizens, allows observers to concentrate on mechanisms other than formal ones (e.g., laws, formal announcements).

Performance is a concept that has entered the social sciences, emerging first through the sociology of Erving Goffman (1956), who presented social performance as a kind of dramatization, and then evolving as part of the "postmodern turn" in anthropology spearheaded by Victor Turner (1982, 1986), whose interest in rituals and sociodramas began in the 1950s as part of his research on Ndembu society (1957). In the presentation of self in everyday life, Goffman applied the concept to social interaction: life as a theatre in which everyone performs a part, the action takes place on a stage, and an audience assists. Within anthropology, Victor Turner adopted performance as an analytical tool for addressing social interaction in specific situations.

Contrary to the approach taken by Goffman, for whom life is a theatre, Turner insisted that the performance actions appear in critical situations. He put it this way:

“For me, the dramaturgical phase begins when crises arise, in the daily flow of social interaction. Thus, if daily living is a kind of theatre, social drama is a kind of metatheatre, that is, a dramaturgical language about the language of ordinary role-playing and status-maintenance which constitutes communication in the quotidian social process” (Turner 1986).

Unlike Goffman, who dealt with the quotidian, Turner related performance and dramaturgy to exceptional moments, ruptures, and social crises, trying to understand life when the usual roles are suspended, out of their regular order. Turner grew as an anthropologist in the School of Manchester, whose students, under the influence of Max Gluckman in the years that followed the end of the Second World War, were already leaving the notions of order and structure behind, concentrating instead on rupture, on conflicts as disharmonic unities more appropriate for addressing social and political issues. Ultimately, this led to the concept of social drama, a mechanism that would allow anthropology to approach the means of obtaining and maintaining power. In Turner’s own words:

“In the social drama... though choices of means and ends and social affiliation are made, stress is dominantly laid upon loyalty and obligation, as much as interest and the course of events may then have a tragic quality... Conflicts seem to bring fundamental aspects of society, normally overlaid by the customs and habits of daily intercourse, into frightening prominence” (Turner 1974, 35).

In this study I apply Turner’s concepts of performance and social drama to a specific situation – the case, one might call it – that is itself an exceptional situation in the life of the Portuguese, one that demanded of the Portuguese state an action far beyond orthodox political praxis. In November 2010,

on the occasion of Lisbon NATO summit, the Schengen agreements were suspended for a period of five days, closing internal, European borders and external, international borders. This situation constituted a rupture in the normal social and political order that bore consequences for the lives of both national citizens and foreigners who during those days wanted to enter Portuguese territory.

The actions of the state through some of its agencies (mainly security forces) can be conceived as dramaturgy, as a narrative presupposing a sequence, staging, and actors whose performance was intended for an audience. The audience would receive the performance through the media, primarily through television images and newspaper photos showing the security forces in action, controlling borders and anti-NATO protesters. As for dealing with the feeling of anxiety that the summit created, the formal mechanism does not seem to have allowed the Portuguese state to assure nationals that everything possible was being done to maintain internal order. As I argue, complementary ritualistic action was also necessary to accomplish this goal.

Following Hughes-Freeland and Craig (2005), I submit that the analysis of ritual can be very effective in revealing a kind of identity politics. In this chapter the concept of ritualization is preferred to that of ritual, focusing on the processual aspect of ritual action – that is, on performance. Bell defined ritualization as a “way of acting that is designed and orchestrated to distinguish and privilege what is being done in comparison to other, usually more quotidian activities” (1992, 74). This design and these orchestrated actions coincide with state actions during the preparation for the Lisbon summit, and they began with a growing information campaign via national media, a vital element in reaching citizens.

In contemporary societies, staging and spectacle in politics are often associated with the media. Politicians choose the right moments to “talk to the nation,” scheduling their addresses to air during

prime time so as to reach a vaster audience and also to reiterate their power. Not everyone can make use of a TV news journal's opening moments; when someone can and does, it symbolizes a level of power that only a few wield.

In political science this spectacular and symbolic dimension of politics has been of particular interest: some argue that the state has become a theatrical company and a producer of spectacle, transforming politics into staging (Schwartzberg 1977) and using the media as a vehicle. In the United States, analysis of presidential campaigns has frequently used the "spectacle" category. Erikson referred to the specific case of presidential travel events as spectacles coordinated by the White House and presented to citizens through the media (1998), and more recently Douglas Kellner, drawing on a number of political events that became media spectacles – such as 9/11 and Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign – emphasized the idea of spectacles as media constructs that involve an aesthetic dimension and often a sense of drama (2005, 2009). Politics has become impregnated with symbolism. Protagonists choose key moments and prepare their actions just as actors block their movements on the stage.

This is familiar ground for political anthropology, in which it is not unusual to see power deeply related to other social structures, symbolism and the sacred being among the most important of these. Anthropologists such as Aronoff (1976), Geertz (1980), Herzog (1987), Abélès (1990), and Balandier (1999) conceive politics as symbolic. As Balandier said, political power in contemporary societies, as well as in traditional ones, "achieves subordination through theatre... [and] performance implies separation, a distance: it establishes hierarchies and transforms those who hold that position" (1999, 25). Specifically referring to the "tendentious dramaturgy of state ritual," anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1980, 104) stressed that state ceremonials in Bali were a kind of metaphysical theatre "designed to express a view of

the ultimate nature of reality and, at the same time, to shape the existing conditions of life to be consonant with reality" (Geertz 1980, 103). Rituals and ritualization processes are important parts of this, and they do not depend on ideology. Abélès explained the persistence of ritual in contemporary French politics, arguing that simply looking at the agenda of a politician reveals that a significant proportion of political activity falls within the domain of the rite. If governments pass, the rites remain, starting with two distinct forms, openings and celebrations, modern versions of two well-known types of rituals: propitiatory rites and expiatory rites (Abélès 1988, 1997).

The 2010 NATO Summit: Performing Security

Analysis of the process of political communication regarding the 2010 NATO summit demonstrates that the actions of the Portuguese state can be conceived as social drama and ritualization meant to reproduce state power in the public sphere by using national prime-time television and national newspapers to show "what might happen" and "how we will deal with it." And the method used was that of ritual action, the performance. The state's power and authority were in this way reified. The argument put forward by Schmuhl that "statecraft can be enhanced through stagecraft" (1990, vii) is of some utility here.

A central element in the state's performance was its treatment of Portugal's international border, which for a time regained its visibility. Symbols of the border appeared in their traditional locations, and the ritual of border control was once again performed: police patrolled traditional checkpoints and more unusual places along the border's entire extent. Television stations were there to capture the events on camera for those who were not present, those who did not try to cross the border on those days. Footage showed vehicles pulling over for police officers to check passengers, verify identity documents, and ask travellers their reasons for entering Portugal at that

time. The police practice of border checking followed a protocol in those days that was itself a ritualization. Fragmentation and repetition characterized both the actions of state agents controlling the border and the actions of citizens.

The Schengen suspension was an important occasion of state – citizen encounter and an especially significant opportunity for the Portuguese state to project itself into the public sphere through security institutions. The state approached the border-security axis in a ritualistic way, and in this the media were once again involved because it was through the media that most Portuguese citizens acknowledged what was taking place regarding the border and the events in Lisbon that November. It was through the media that repetition, the main characteristic of both performance and ritualization, accomplished its function of reiteration.

This ritualization comprised in itself a political discourse: the state located insecurity problems outside the national territory, anticipated their coming, and as a response closed the border to prevent them. On each of the five days when the border was closed, 450 agents of the Borders and Foreigners Office were involved in the operation, 229,385 persons were controlled at border checking posts and authorized border passages, 291 were denied entrance in the country and 22 were arrested (SEF 2010: 26). Most of those who were denied entrance in Portugal through terrestrial borders were related with the summit. Twice a day, there were briefings to media in which the number of arrests were reported, the motives of denied entrance revealed and images of people being held at the border showed in national television and printed on newspapers.

One specific form of social drama came through simulacrum. As the summit approached, people got the notion that something was expected to happen, internal security might be in danger, and the state was already taking measures to prevent it: – the border closing was announced. Nevertheless, this

was not enough. The state had created a feeling of anxiety, communicated to people the possibility of a threat to internal security, and used the formal, classic mechanisms to deal with the threat. The state now had to reassure the public that it was being vigilant at the border, closing it to those who were not wanted in national territory, by publicizing this set of actions through the media. To complete the ritualization process, the state made public a number of simulacra, actions that in fact constituted theatrical performances.

As the summit approached, all the national TV stations displayed prime-time accounts of state special forces preparing to prevent riots and to deal with anti-NATO activists. This theatrical display usually had two parts: the first comprised images of riots involving anti-NATO protesters and police in European cities that had hosted previous summits. The images displayed were extremely violent – for instance, a furious crowd walking in urban settings, shouting, carrying signs with slogans; protesters breaking shop windows, attacking police with stones, and setting cars on fire. These very powerful images and their place in the visual narrative symbolized imminent danger. During one piece that aired on the public television network (RTP1 Journal), the journalist narrating such scenes emphasized that actions of this kind never happened in Portugal, but as the summit approached this might nevertheless be expected. Police officers were shown taking action, sometimes violent, arresting protesters, and trying to stop the disturbances. This display of police power in fact symbolized the power of the state and its competence to guarantee national security.

The first segment of the performance, characterized by real images, was followed by the second, an imitation of real events. In these presentations different characters appeared, all of them portrayed by state actors, some playing the part of “good guys” – state agents in uniforms – and some playing their antagonists in a staged imitation of activists in a pro-

test event: they dressed in dark clothes and shouted loudly, mimicking real protesters. They were now make-believe activists, their faces painted or covered, showing an ostensibly disruptive attitude that was eventually completely controlled by their colleagues dressed as police (in “state clothes”). The state’s performance symbolizes control; the message sent was that no matter how volatile the protests, the state was prepared to defend national security. State authority was reified through these two set of images, real and theatrical. Like all plays, this one needed a proper stage. Actions were set in the places conceived as problematic: the area surrounding the summit venue and Lisbon Metro stations.

This additional social drama is a very persuasive element attesting the idea that power enlightened by reason alone is sometimes insufficient; power maintains itself only by transposition, by the production of images, by the manipulation of symbols in an organized ceremonial frame (Balandier 1999, 20–21).

The theatrical performance presented to audiences as a “preparation exercise” was an exceptionally apt occasion for the display of control, a discourse on the power of the state to manage international borders and Lisbon’s public spaces, which became the stage for a performance in which characters embodied the political bipolarization that usually surrounds political events: good versus bad, the defenders versus the dangerous, the state versus “others.” The 2010 NATO summit was revealed as a brilliant occasion for authorities to address an issue of growing importance for Portuguese society, generally speaking, and for people living near the border, in particular: security and safety and their dependence on the idea of an existent or inexistent border. This kind of insecurity, promoted by the idea that a lack of borders allows undesirable elements to enter state territory, is socially constructed as fear. The state used the fear that the unknown always raises in people’s minds, fed it with images through the media, and then fixed everything. Every state action during the days before the summit

– the announcement of the Schengen suspension, the ritualization of border control, the simulacra – facilitated fear by displaying an opposition of “us” and “them”: we the state and the people that are hosting a political, relevant event and them, who will come from abroad that might constitute a serious threat. People wanting to cross the border were seen and displayed as threats to internal security, in an extraordinary stigmatized way.

The formal mechanisms, revealed insufficient: it was not enough to print in newspapers or announce in daily briefings that the state was addressing potential problems. Repeated images showing protesters in other European cities filled the main news reports on TV channels in anticipation of what might happen when the Lisbon summit took place. These images enlarged the potential threat and simultaneously reaffirmed the state’s power because they presented the government to citizens as fully prepared for all that might come.

The Portuguese state was thus involved in practices representing disorder followed by the reinstatement of order. This strategy ritualized and politically manipulated both the order and its inversion (Balandier 1999), allowing the Portuguese state to display its power not only to citizens but also to its peers and demonstrating that Portugal was fully prepared to host an event of this magnitude. It was an occasion for inscribing and legitimizing the country’s host position. Moreover, the images publicized in newspapers and on television also constructed the image of protesters. There was a certain essentialism in those images, which reduced all anti-NATO activists to a particular profile: foreigners with a specific look, potentially violent individuals who should be controlled.

At the same time it was instigating feelings of insecurity regarding “what might come” and to some extent regarding people’s fear of the unknown, the state was also using all the resources at its disposal to deconstruct that uncertainty through technologies of

border control, displaying preparedness to defend the event's and the nation's security, making clear that everything was under control. By doing so, however, state authorities reinforced insecurity. The images that media disseminated and the state's performance at the border are extremely relevant to perceptions of security and especially of identity because they contributed to an exclusivist construction of *us versus them*.

Another interesting aspect of this series of events is that the Schengen suspension entailed the power to move the border from its usual place. During the period in between November 16 and 20, control of movements in national space began on the borderline, hundreds of kilometres from the summit's location, and it was transferred to the centre of Lisbon. The control of mobility took place in several grades: it began on the internal border and ended in the immediate vicinity of the summit venue. Highly visible police agents cordoned off the area, which was restricted even to anyone who lived, worked, or needed for some reason to go to that area of the city. In this sense, the Portuguese border could in those four days synthesized and reproduced changes that usually are, within post modernity, associate with political borders: no longer in peripheries but in places like the centre of cosmopolitan cities where, "in order to preserve all the functions of sovereignty of the state [borders] are no longer entirely situated at the outer limit of territories; they are dispersed, a little everywhere whenever the movement of information, people and things is happening and is controlled (Balibar 2004:1).

Concluding Remarks

Taking advantage of idea of threat to internal security by anti-NATO activists, the Portuguese state closed national territory, recovered old practices of border control that made him visible to citizens and reified state's authority on a matter – sovereignty over national territory and national security – that

is conceived not only as fundamental but also growing weak when states became part of supranational political structures. The state's action took the form of a dramaturgy. It was prepared, rehearsed and presented before an audience. In the preparation phase, the state created social disorder, crisis and drama through the simulacra showing what was expected to happen. From the disorder created by him, the state rebuilt order and by doing that reified his power and stressed on the importance of borders as a barrier and once again as the symbol of states sovereignty. Ritualization process was the key in the state's action because it allowed the state to show that he was completely in control. He could recover old procedures, repeat them in the same way, over and over, and also reinvent border control through the usage of new technologies. The ritual of border control was reinvented, but in the process of reinvention, the same ontogenic characteristics of rituals were preserved: orderly, repeated, patronized actions that by taking place and for being exposed to an audience functioned as a system of communication that succeed in promoting discussion, forming a critic space, that is public sphere.

Media were, to this extent, completely indispensable for this performance not because they were unavoidable for the ritualization process to take place at the border, but to reiterate the message that the ritualization of the border control was conveying. Otherwise, only those individuals experiencing a closed border experience on the exceptional time of Schengen suspension would be aware of the procedures that were to take place. Ritualization and media were the key features to the performance of the state in the production of a discourse on the summit, on Schengen suspension that was in fact a discourse on the state itself.

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2.6 Media Perceptions of Police Activity in Major Political Events: An Overview of the Portuguese Context during 2011

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Introduction

We begin this discussion by pointing out several considerations related to democracy and the media. As Benkler (2006, 176) puts it, “modern democracies and mass media have coevolved throughout the twentieth century.” Specifically, after World War II, the public sphere (Dahlgren 2005; Habermas 1989) came to be increasingly dominated by the mass media as commercial media emerged and people gradually became more educated. However, in complex contemporary societies, considering the huge amount of information circulating, “no one knows everything” (Benkler 2006 p 198), and citizens cannot be expected to acquire knowledge about some subjects entirely on their own. Therefore, “since successful democracy depends on their acquiring such knowledge, the responsibility of its promotion and facilitation naturally falls to the press” (Goldman 1999, 340) or, in a broader sense, to the media. In fact, citizens sometimes become acquainted with subjects through the media, not having previously encountered any basic information about those

things. The media can be the only way people are educated about a certain topic.

In fact, people expect the media, with top journalists and experts and commentators, to explain and interpret political information. However, the “classic idea that democracy resides, ultimately, with citizens who engage in talk with each other” (Dahlgren 2005, 150) leads us to consider the (not so) new forms of electronic communication. For instance, the Internet has been seen as a saviour of democracy (Dahlgren 2005; Goldman 1999), as it enables people to freely express their own opinions and to participate actively in social and political debates, thus allowing diverse forms of “civic interaction” (Dahlgren 2005). However, to some extent, the characteristics of electronic communication put these ideas under intense scrutiny. For instance, Dahlgren (2005) writes about the “destabilization of political communication systems” but also about the enlargement of political engagement as more citizens from outside the political system begin to participate. Beyond these considerations, however, even with the increasing use of the Internet, many people still rely on traditional media for information about social and political issues of general concern.

The media create reality. They spread representations that come to be shared by citizens, in the sense of Durkheim’s expression of collective shared beliefs (Durkheim 1995). Thus, one can think about the existence of an agenda-setting, which supposes a causal relation between the media agenda and the public perception of certain important matters. In this sense, social representations (Moscovici 2000) are linked with social control because “they define for the majority of the population the present meaningful events, but they also offer hard interpretations for its understanding” (Cricher, Clarke, Hall, Jefferson, and Roberts 1993, 228). They therefore allow people to access experiences that otherwise would be unachievable. The media are meaning producers, not merely reproductive devices or reflectors of mean-

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ing; they offer and constitute “modelling influences” (Bandura 2001).

When talking about the media, one must consider that they are, first of all, “a collection of private enterprises that aim at profits, and this aim often conflicts with veritistically [truth-linked] optimal practices. Second, the personnel... are not, by and large, suitably trained to advance veritistic [truth-linked] ends as much as possible” (Goldman 1999, 340). One might also think about messages with hidden manipulative political or economical strategies (for instance), given that mass media are for the most part, as we have just said, commercial ventures. And here a price has to be paid. To raise income, commercial media networks try to capture the attention of the largest audience possible, transversally from the whole of society. But media administrators usually believe that gaining popularity involves highlighting the competitive or game-like nature of political and economic campaigns, for instance, or even of the daily conduct of government. Or using another strategy, sometimes to divert people’s attention from important matters, they also give prominence to subjects like crime and sex, which, as we know, capture people’s attention due to their linkage with (our own) intimacy. Focusing on television, Goldman (1999, 341) argues that there is an obsession “with stories about conflict and adversarialism, to the detriment of genuinely important stories about agreement and conciliation.” And this strategy offers a partial vision of important subjects, framing reality by giving people a focus or by simplifying the complex meanings of a certain theme. On the other hand, economic interests dictate that the media concentrate resources where some significant news is expected, where regular press conferences are held by important and highly positioned individuals (e.g., on government offices and big-business corporations; Goldman 1999). This asymmetry in the communication process is important because it is linked to the speaker’s authority and legitimacy. Source reliability often depends on the hierarchical

place the speaker occupies regardless of the social, historical, and political context.

In addition, the need to consider the receiver’s point of view is of major concern, especially when “fear of crime” is at stake. It is known that people construe violence in accordance with their own position regarding the narrative characters, independently of what the news makers would like the audience to perceive (Livingstone, Allen, and Reiner 2001). Fearful individuals are more dependent and easy to persuade and manipulate, so they are willing to accept stronger law enforcement when a certain political climate is exaggerated by the media in terms of possible dangerous situations. Or instead, such people simply give up participating in political and other major events. Recall the media-constructed negative climate before the NATO summit held in Lisbon in November 2010. Two weeks before the event, some news about extremist groups that might attend the manifestation against NATO was repeatedly exhibited by television networks, with images showing the black bloc’s violent actions in previous demonstrations in other European cities. During the field study, some interviewees mentioned friends who did not attend the demonstration because they feared that violence could occur. This example has to do with the media’s power of persuasion over people.

One may think about rational persuasion, persuasion that depends only on the quality of argumentation used by A to convince B – a reasonable consideration in many cases. But we would point out that whenever power relationships are concerned, instead of (or besides) asking, “Which arguments should I consider?,” people usually ask, “Whom should I obey?” (Chazel 1995, 203). The power of persuasion is the power to construct meaning in people’s minds. Or persuasion is “the use of verbal and nonverbal symbols to affect audience perceptions and thus to bring about changes in thinking, feeling, and/or acting” (Stewart, Smith, and Denton 2007, 21). And here, along with the quality of argumentation, the

credibility of the communicator is of extreme importance because “credible communicators are [usually] perceived as trustworthy experts” (Myers 1988, 311); the social (hierarchical) position a credible communicator occupies is likewise significant. Further, the content of the message is crucial; whether it touches individual emotions, the type of information presented, the order of its presentation, and the amount of information all produce different results in terms of the way receivers decode the information. How the message is communicated (the channel) is also central. It is known that active experience and personal contact are key factors in influencing people. Finally, what the audience is thinking and its characteristics (age, gender, and literacy) are essential, as is their field of experience. In this sense, “social comparison and persuasive arguments work together. Discovering that others share one’s feelings (social comparison) can unleash arguments (informational influence) supporting what everyone secretly wants to do” (Myers 1988, 345).

Now it seems that the extensive visibility and independence of nongovernmental media enable them to identify and isolate some important issues in society. Benkler (2006, 198) writes that such media “form the basis for providing the synthesis required for public opinion and raising the salience of matters of public concern to the point of potential collective action.” Therefore, considering the mass media’s effects and functions, one may say that they provide maps of meaning so that people can contextualize information at a social and cultural level; they do this by producing and making information to be circulated, enabling a certain view of order and a particular form of seeing the world. The mass media also reinforce social structure stability by offering a view of a “consensus society” that criticizes disruption. Here, one may consider the mass media as social regulators. For instance, the news of a crime is always accompanied by news of the police response to it, aimed at maintaining order and security (Ericson, Baranek,

and Chan 1991); therefore, the mass media can also be considered instruments of (for) social control (Cohen and Young 1988). In fact, the media exercise an indirect influence on the people’s perceptions about institutions of the social system, which strategically favour social action (Saperas 2000).

The amount of consequences of the communication action (public or institutional) fall upon common knowledge and constrain the way in which individuals perceive and organize their immediate surroundings and their knowledge about the world, as well as the way they direct their attention towards a certain kind of subject (Saperas 2000). Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that contemporary people (or the mass audience) must not be considered “largely homogeneous, or susceptible to being made homogeneous” (Botein and Rice, in Castells 2010, 359), a point of view that dominated governmental television networks until about the 1980s, when “the standard was the lowest common denominator in the minds of bureaucrats in control of broadcasting” (Castells 2010, 359).

Moreover, we do not embrace the telementation point of view (e.g., Harris 1981, 1997) of communication theories because it reduces individuals to mere recipients of contents. As the telementation approach states, language enables the transfer of thoughts and inner mental states from the speaker to the receiver. Instead, we hold, as Wittgenstein does (1967, 1980), that when people communicate with each other they are engaging in complex social activity; they use words with a public, negotiated meaning (Bruner 1990), and by using language they actually do things (Austin 1962, 1970; Wood and Kroger 2000). In this sense, one may think about a social-political and cultural framing that can be built up by the mass media over time, with no perverted intention (clear or insidious), although ultimately, this frame constitutes the matrix in which all complex social activities take place. As Benkler (2006, 209) notes, the debate of some important matters “is an iconic representation

of discussion, a choreographed enactment of public debate.” But even if one stresses individual autonomy in decoding the messages received from the media, this means neither that the media are neutral nor that their effects can be neglected. Media messages, “explicit or subliminal, are worked out, processed by individuals placed in specific social contexts, thus modifying what was the intended effect of the message” (Castells 2010, 364). Being a relational being, the individual person actively reconstructs meanings in the course of his or her relationships, and this has forced the media to become specialized, focusing on the audience’s particular characteristics.

Having outlined these conceptual tools, we are in a better position to understand the communication processes vis-à-vis police activities in the context of political protest, mainly focusing our attention on the messages people are confronted with. Regarding all this, it is relevant to consider the influence of media discourses on people’s perceptions in relation to the system’s social institutions, including those that are strategic, such as the police. As Saperas (2000) mentions, the media may not have the capacity to tell people how to think, but they are certainly able to tell them what to think about. This happens because people have been exposed (more) to certain subjects, so it becomes difficult to simply ignore them, and because this exposure strengthens people’s ideas about certain subjects. Therefore, we have aimed to characterize Portuguese media discourses about police activities – specifically, about policing major political events – attempting to understand the interpretative schemes that news media provide for viewing and understanding them. We developed a comparative approach so as to highlight discourse differences and similarities in different media types: news agency, newspapers, and television networks.

Method

The research programme was designed to explore the topic of policing in the news – to be precise, media

perceptions of policing at major political events in Portugal. In this exploratory study, a qualitative approach (Denzin and Lincoln 1994) was used, allowing for coding information contents and inferring from them attempting to understand the construction of meaning.

We conducted three studies in order to make a comparative analysis possible. The same approach was used in collecting, coding, and analysing the contents of materials presented by the Portuguese news agency, three daily newspapers, and three television networks during the year 2011.

Corpus

In each study, the corpus submitted to analysis is constituted by the universe of the news items (for each media medium) regarding policing at major political events, stories that were presented during 2011 in Portugal, considering the selection criteria. The Portuguese news agency (LUSA), three daily newspapers (*Correio da Manhã*, *Diário de Notícias*, *Jornal de Notícias*), and the main news programmes (broadcast daily at 13:00 and 20:00) of three television networks (RTP, SIC, TVI) were selected for analysis. Newspapers and television networks were chosen based on their shares of audience.

A common definition of *major event* was adopted (International Permanent Observatory on Security during Major Events 2007), and in accordance with that definition, six major events that took place in Portugal were selected: three political protest manifestations, two left-union manifestations, and a general strike.

All the studies were conducted using the same key words in selecting and collecting the news from an official database (newspapers and TV) and from the LUSA database: *manifestation*, *policing*, *police*, *protest*, *PSP* (*Portuguese Security Police*), *rasca* (“Generation at a loss”), *indignados* (indignants), and *general strike*. The corpuses were considered valid because they respect the exhaustiveness rule (no news item

corresponding to the selection criteria was excluded), the representativeness rule (all the news items gathered was taken for analysis), the homogeneity rule (all the news items belong to the same type), and the pertinence rule (all the news items were relevant for analysis; Bardin 1977).

Instrument

Content analysis was used as the data analysis instrument, and the following presentation of the instrument analysis is anchored in the works of Bardin (1977), Ghiglione and Matalon (1993), Krippendorff (1980), Pais (2004), and Weber (1985). Content analysis has been described as an appropriate instrument for dealing with data that were not generated for research, for it applies to materials that were freely considering the authors that have produced the data. This is the case with the materials selected for analysis in this research.

Like any scientific instrument, content analysis requires specialized procedures in order to be valid and replicable, ensuring the quality of analysis and the validity of results. So, the quality of the content analysis is determined by reliability and validity procedures. Reliability is linked with analysis procedures (coding) and therefore with the instrument and with the analyst him- or herself. First, content categories must not be ambiguous so that they enable the codification of all recording (or coding) units – in this case, a proposition or a paragraph that expresses an idea fitting a specific content category – with certainty and in a rigorous manner. Then the corpus must be submitted to coding procedures in different times throughout the analysis (intracodifier reliability), by the analyst (stability criterion), and also by different analysts (intercodifier reliability) in order to achieve the same results. This is the reproducibility criterion, which according to Krippendorff (1980), is perhaps the most important attribute of reliability.

As for validity, it runs through all the analysis procedures and is linked with their quality. If proved,

it enables the proper use of research results, rendering them “undisputable facts” (Krippendorff 1980) that must be taken into account. The definition of categories is crucial, for they should permit “a simplified representation of raw data” (Weber 1985), functioning like a “general title” (Bardin 1977) for a collection of information with shared characteristics. Meanwhile, the coding of a section of information implies the detection of the features of a specific category. An important criterion is the exhaustiveness of the analysis: the entire corpus must be coded according to the defined categories. In addition, the exclusiveness criterion must also be applied: each recording unit fits into one and only one of the defined categories.

Procedure

All the written materials were copied to datasheets (TV materials were first transcribed verbatim) and then analysed following the rules described in the preceding section, granting reliability and validity. The table of categories was defined based on previous research of media contents (Fernandes 1997; Gomes 2003; Mealha 2009) despite the fact that, owing to the specificity of the present research subject, openness to new categories was maintained by using a mixed procedure (Pais 2004). The categories were mutually exclusive, homogeneous, and pertinent regarding the research purposes. The following categories were defined and used for the content analysis:

- A. Demonstrators (e.g., subcategory A.3, characterization: “Some people with covered faces were moving forward,” news 7 from LUSA)
- B. Portuguese Security Police (PSP; e.g., subcategory B.6, results of intervention/consequences: “Two demonstrators were arrested during the protest,” news 9 from newspapers)
- C. Direct discourse, or speech (e.g., subcategory C.7, unions: “We union leaders do not intervene at all,” news 19 from TV);
- D. Institutions, or authorities (e.g., subcategory D.4, judicial instances/institutions: “The trial takes

place at the Petty Criminal Court,” news 35 from LUSA)

- E. Indirect discourse or speech (e.g., subcategory E.2, police source: “A police source said...,” news 32 from LUSA)
- F. Description, or characterization (e.g., subcategory F.5, objectives: “Trying to launch a qualitative change in the country,” news 4 from newspapers)
- G. Spontaneous explaining discourse, or news subjectivity (e.g., subcategory G.2, demonstrators: “The distance from provocation to victimization is very short,” news 20 from TV).

Each author served as an independent judge in the studies conducted, and there was a high level of consensus among them. Any disagreement in the coding process was resolved by consensus, returning to the raw data in order to analyse the recording units in context. We developed a descriptive statistical analysis then analysed and interpreted the results following a descriptive and comparative approach.

Results

A total of 6,131 recording units (ru) were codified: 3,311 ru from 114 LUSA news items covering the six events studied; 1,264 ru from 32 newspaper stories covering three events; and 1,556 ru from 49 television news items covering two events. Newspapers were more productive in terms of the amount of contents (around 40 ru per news item), compared to the other mediums of communication. This may be because LUSA must be strict about the information given (around 29 ru per news item) and because television sources have limited time to transmit news (around 32 ru per news item). These results become even more interesting when one considers the difference in terms of the number of events reported by each of the communication mediums. In fact, both the television networks and the newspapers reported only events at which some disruption occurred between police forces and demonstrators.

Information Sources

Considering the information sources, we tried to determine who talks in direct speech and who is quoted, sometimes referring to anonymous sources (indirect speech paraphrased by journalists). First, indirect sources are more prevalent than direct sources (speech) in all three media types studied. However, when we examined the actors who spoke directly to the media (who talks), some interesting differences emerged (see figure 1).

Although the media endeavour to use words or statements from the police, it seems that this is not the preferred option. LUSA aired union members more than other sources, followed by event organizers and then the police. It should be stressed that the narratives based on union members’ and event organizers’ statements predominantly highlight the protest agendas and claims typical of such demonstrations. Newspapers used speech from various people, including event participants and event organizers. Television reports focus on the words of demonstrators, the police, and some (political) commentators. It is also worth mentioning that in the television news reports, the voices of actors on the spot are highlighted. In fact, the demonstrators and the police receive the most attention, though some is also given to experts




Figure 1. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category C – Direct discourse (speech).

and commentators and to the slogans heard during the events.

On the other hand, the police force is the top information source quoted by all types of media (see figure 2), even if no identification is provided for the specific source (e.g., “police forces fear the infiltration of far-right extremist groups,” news 1, from newspaper study). After the police, the sources most commonly quoted by LUSA and newspapers are mainly union members and various other people, whereas television news sources quoted demonstrators and some members of the Portuguese government.

If one considers all indirect sources of information and specifically examines the LUSA contents, it can be said that the discourse presented carries predominantly negative connotations (e.g., “police kicked everybody out,” news 74). Regarding the newspapers, more than 30% of the news contents refer to indirect sources, making them the very basis for news making. Moreover, whenever union members are mentioned, the dominant discourse is negative regarding the Portuguese government, and when politicians are referred to, two main topics come across: criticizing the government (again) and criticizing police actions (e.g., “one of the raised voices heard is..., a member




Figure 2. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category E – Indirect discourse (speech).




Figure 3. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category G – Spontaneous explaining discourse (news' subjectivity).

of parliament for BE [Left Bloc political party], demanding for explanations,” news 28).

A word regarding the news' subjectivity is in order here; we endeavoured to disclose this element in a specific category by coding the information supported in subjective statements made by journalists, whether attributions or implied causalities, in their reports on several episodes. The news submitted to analysis shows that only about 5% of all the information could be coded in this way. Although the number of subjective statements seems small, these news items reveal personal judgements, made especially in newspapers and especially regarding police activities. In addition, LUSA and the television news sources tended to make such assertions, mostly when describing the events (see figure 3).

The Events

The events studied (see figure 4) were presented in the news sources largely through narratives centred on description, on characterizations of the environment and the event's development (e.g., “The protest is not sponsored by political parties; it is laical and pacific, as announced,” news 4, from newspapers; “Meanwhile, more objects were thrown at the police, namely, tomatoes,” news 22, from LUSA), with specific details regarding the location (e.g., “The demonstration remained for some time near the Parliament,” news 3, from TV sources), the name of the event




Figure 4. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category F – Description (characterization).

(e.g., “the march of the indignados” news 6, from newspapers), and date and time (e.g., “The gathering of demonstrators is scheduled for 15:00,” news 1, from LUSA). Structural issues like political, economic, and social questions, which usually influence mobilization and participation in political demonstrations, received minor emphasis in the news reports.

Event Participants: Demonstrators and Police

We now turn to what was said about the participants in the political events studied: the demonstrators and the police. People attending the demonstrations during 2011 (see figure 5) were referred to in terms of their characterization – that is to say, once again a descriptive narrative was prevalent in the media discourse




Figure 5. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category A – Demonstrators.




Figure 6. Distribution of the recording units' percentages among the subcategories of category B – PSP (Portuguese Security Police).

(e.g., “There are youngsters, retired people, workers, middle-aged people...,” news 6, from newspapers; “There are lots of children and elderly people,” news 20, from TV sources). Particularly, LUSA gave more attention to demonstrators than did the other communication media studied. Personal, political, ideological, and social reasons that may have led people to participate in the events seem to have been largely irrelevant to the media. Nevertheless, newspapers paid some attention to the personal reasons given by people to attend the manifestations (e.g., “I am fighting against despair,” news 12), while the television news sources preferred to point out extrinsic reasons (e.g., “Above all, we are here to fight for a completely different society,” news 2, from TV sources).

Concerning the police forces on the spot (see figure 6), the media offered descriptions of the activities carried out during the course of events and mentioned their consequences or results, mainly focusing on any arrests that were made. Next in frequency were the motives that had led to the interventions. Some information whose presentation would have demanded more substantial knowledge of police methods and practices (e.g., police deployment) was much less emphasized, raising the question whether the journalists were acquainted with this type of issue.

It must be said that television news paid special attention to police activities. Further, a deep analysis of the recording units shows that a quarter of such recording units exhibit a negative perspective, mainly presented by demonstrators (e.g., “The police here were always quite aggressive,” news 24), and by journalists (e.g., “The antiriot unit is moving forward and charging over the protestors,” news 13). Yet positive evaluations were made by official authorities, such as the minister of internal security and the national director of the PSP.

The images shown in television news coverage also merit some attention. Around 80% of all images analysed show police in action – in particular, confronting demonstrators, using force to disperse violent individuals, and making arrests. In contrast, demonstrators were almost always shown demonstrating peacefully or simply verbally harassing police officers. Finally, regarding what is called citizen journalism, some amateur images were exhibited alongside the “official” ones.

Discussion

We consider good communication and dialogue practices strategic principles for policing political demonstrations. But we also think that to achieve this goal, the discourses found throughout society related to police activities should be better known in order to better understand and overcome some misconceptions about the police forces.

As clarified above, the idea underlying this study was not to examine the effects of mass media on people’s minds or actions. Instead, the aim was to access and gain some knowledge about the communication climate that pervades society and to which people accede easily through traditional media.

One of the main ideas to emerge from the results is that despite the Portuguese news agency LUSA’s delivery of news concerning all the events studied to all the media networks, both television networks and newspapers tended to focus on events at which

some disruption occurred between police forces and demonstrators. This focus clearly aligns with the news-values of conflict and negativity (Galtung and Ruge 1999; McQuail 2003; Tuchman 1978; Wolf 1987) that make these events newsworthy, and it relates to the potential of news sources to take into the system issues that the public may consequently assume merit concern and consideration (Benkler 2006). Further, the tendency accords with the particular interest that television has in “stories of conflict and adversarialism” (Goldman 1999 p 341). But it also raises questions about the image of police activities that is transmitted into the public sphere, especially in major political events, which are supposed to be manifestations of the citizens’ freedom of assembly and speech. Although these specific news touch on some deviant behaviour, it is clear that the media reported a largely negative image of the police. Here one may think, for instance, about the different approaches police often adopt when addressing the media in the context of an important football match, when police supply the media with information in advance regarding, for instance, figures, traffic issues, fan policy, forbidden objects, and inappropriate behaviour that will not be tolerated. This seems a more suitable and adequate police communication strategy, specifically regarding police relations with the media, and accords with the education principle of conflict-reducing principles (e.g., Reicher, Stott, Cronin, and Adang 2004; Reicher et al. 2007). In our opinion, this principle also fits in reverse.

In fact, if police must be educated concerning the social identities of the various groups that compose a crowd, as well as their values, their goals, and the history of their actions, the general public and journalists must also be educated about the police in the same way. As already mentioned, journalists seem unprepared to report on some issues related to police methods and practices. This particular case can be considered in terms of Goldman’s (1999, 340) position regarding the lack of training among mass media owners and journalists in “veritistically optimal prac-

tices.” But of course, all this has to do with the way society views police maintenance and imposition of order, whether this is done by force in the name of the state or in answer to citizens’ collective demand that the police protect each and every one of them (e.g., “policing by consent”; Waddington and Wright 2009). Here it should be remembered that Portugal’s history includes a relatively recent dictatorial regime that was very tightly linked to a coercive political police and a paramilitary police style (Waddington 2007). Police actions under the dictatorship were mainly based on the ostentatious exercise of power and strength at the expense of citizens’ fundamental rights. This social representation (Moscovici 2000) probably remains even today, framing the social and cultural climate; some social sectors almost certainly believe that the police represent the state alone, though this idea is belied by the practices previously mentioned regarding the communication processes around important football matches. Moreover, if the media are supposed to be instruments of (for) social control (Cohen and Young 1988), the particular view of police activities in media reports of major political events disclosed by this research must be carefully analysed and discussed, for it goes precisely in the opposite direction. Here, we do not agree with the idea that media producers are entirely independent and therefore not instruments of social control at all, as they want to be viewed. As stated before, in one way or another, they constitute “modelling influences” (Bandura 2001), generally spreading an image of a consensus society (Cohen and Young 1988; Ericson et al. 1991), organizing people’s immediate world (Saperas 2000).

Another conclusion that needs to be highlighted is the prevailing media use of indirect discourse (speech) based on “police sources”, sometimes with no explicit identification of the speaker. This deviates from the Portuguese police communication strategy, which attempts to maintain a direct, fruitful relationship with the media so as to provide the general public with credible and accurate information, knowing that this

increases public trust and confidence in police activities. Further, this media strategy clearly questions the credibility of the source, one of the crucial aspects necessary for a message to be taken into serious consideration (Myers 1988). In this regard, television networks seem to be distinct, for they are the communication outlet that most often uses direct speech. Nevertheless, media timing is different from police timing. Television journalists specifically are better positioned than police are to be on the spot, talking to all participants in real time. On the other hand, the police may not be available continuously to satisfy journalists’ interests and curiosity during the course of a major event, given the unexpected episodes that can occur. However, this situation could be addressed by appointing a police spokesperson as a credible and well-informed source that would also maintain a certain strategic distance from events on the ground.

The negative tone across the media narratives must also be emphasized. Whether the reports use direct or indirect information sources when describing the police activities or even the event, the general character is one of disapproval. The only exception occurs when official authorities are heard with respect to the police activities. Though this result could be expected considering the type of events studied – political protests, general strikes – it provides the general framework for interpretation of the social and political climate. In addition, as already discussed, the narratives are eminently descriptive and contain almost no emphasis on the structural issues that usually mobilize people to participate in this type of social action. Perhaps this is the “lowest common denominator” that Castells (2010) wrote about – a negative evaluation of what represents established power, despite the larger social ecology of the political scenario.

As we said earlier, the media give people maps of meaning with which they can interpret the world around them and take up positions in that particular perceived world. The media “can express, filter, and accredit statements about these issues, so that they

become well-specified subjects and feasible objects for public debate among informed citizens” (Benkler 2006, 198). Further, and to reinforce our idea, Castells (2010, 364) states that “particularly audiovisual media in our culture, are indeed the basic material of communication processes.” In this regard, consider that analyses of television news in our study revealed the same negative tone: police confronting and arresting demonstrators in contrast to the demonstrators’ merely haranguing the police. Let us mention here one limitation regarding this result: the duration of the images was not taken into account for analysis. Even so, four of every five images exhibited were negative in this respect.

Regarding this study’s limitations, critiques can always be made of research that employs content analysis. But this is precisely why every condition for granting reliability and validity was described and respected throughout this whole study. Furthermore, to use Reiner’s words (2007, 304), “results must be interpreted reflexively and tentatively as one possible reading. As such, they can yield valuable insights and questions about the significance of trends and patterns.” In addition, this research line is in progress, and results from the 2012 news will soon be presented, facilitating a more accurate look at results.

Another aspect worth referring to touches upon the hypothetical different narratives that commercial and state media networks transmit to society. This comparative approach was not taken in the present work. In fact, this study involved data from both kinds of networks, analysed altogether. However, because commercial media are driven by the profit motive (Bandura 2001; Dahlgren 2005; Goldman 1999) and give prominence of conflict issues another research path needs to be explored – in particular, researchers should examine the dissimilarity of commercial and state media narratives regarding police activities during major political events.

In closing, we mention two emerging issues. The first relates to citizen journalism, a growing phenom-

enon that we saw only in fleeting occurrences while analysing television images. Citizen journalists are becoming a regular information source whom media outlets themselves invite to participate in the communication processes. The second issue, electronic communication – particularly through the World Wide Web – is nowadays deeply studied. The Internet and the public sphere constitute a theme “now entering the mainstream of concern for the study of political communication and taking its place alongside the established research on the traditional mass media” (Dahlgren 2005, 148). Although it was not within the scope of this research, it seems that sooner or later electronic communication will become a topic of major concern in our research programme, for it is radically changing individual communication processes. Indeed, as Benkler (2006, 180) states, by using the Internet, individuals are able to “abandon the idea of the public sphere as primarily constructed of finished statements uttered by... ‘the media’... and separated from society, and to move toward a set of social practices that see individuals as participating in a debate.” People are increasingly able of self-construction doing their own work collecting, processing, and interpreting information in relation to acquiring some position in society, and this inevitably challenges police forces to envisage new forms of relationship and communication.

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2.7 Social Media Images of Police Use of Force during Protest Demonstrations

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Police on the Internet

Recent major confrontations between forces of order and protesters, particularly during unplanned large-scale riots, have demonstrated the significance of social media. In theory, the use of social media is available to both protesters and police, but it seems that police organizations are not exactly in the vanguard of the digital revolution in terms of exploiting the latest information and communication technology. While the large-scale upheavals during 2012 in the UK, predominantly in London and Manchester, demonstrated the advantages but also the risks posed by using Twitter and Flickr for the information policies of police during riots and protest, this was a rather new development, and on the Continent it seems that police forces have been much slower to implement social media. This phenomenon predominately concerns the use of Facebook and apps by police. One aspect is beyond doubt the ubiquity of digital recording devices during police operations. This is the subject of the following short version of a research study carried out by Caroline Schug for her master's thesis at the German Police University. Her research was supervised by Professor Joachim Kersten, who is the author of this English-language revised version of an earlier published article (Schug 2012).

Technological and societal developments have resulted in the widespread availability of cell phones with camera and video functions and World Wide Web access. Anyone can put home-made videos and snapshots on the Internet, and these can be viewed by all users. Police operations provide ample opportunities to record live documentation of police action. This affects the acceptance and the legitimacy of

police in society's eyes in a previously unimaginable way.

Police media activities may enhance the image of policing and by doing so strengthen the public's trust in police. On the other hand, the everyday experience of police strongly determines citizens' perception of and attitude towards the police service. Even for people with no previous contact with police, definite images of police officers are mixed with ideas – some of them potentially flawed or erroneous – about police work and areas of police activities. In the past, daily police reports in the print media and television accounts (in documentary or fictitious crime-fighter format) determined public images of policing. But today, new media play a pivotal role in public opinion. Through online services like YouTube and Facebook, the Internet has become a major source of information.

A German state television survey (2010) found that 70 percent of German-speaking people above the age of 14 use the Internet, while among this group, the rate of 14- to 19-year-old Internet users is close to 100 percent. Therefore, social media have a strong impact on the images of policing, particularly among younger citizens. The consumption of moving images (videos) is of particular significance. In 2010 more than one-third of Internet users watched videos at least once a week (2008: 24 percent). Close to 90 percent of users visit video portals such as YouTube, MyVideo, Clipfish.de, iTunes, and so forth. However, YouTube remains the preferred platform.

A problem for police is the unchecked quality of videos and clips. In addition, technical tools like Photoshop have the effect of destroying the borderline between facts and fakes. Sources of online video footage are often left anonymous. This makes verifying available documents and videos very difficult. Video documentation on the Internet seems to be able to claim a quality of authenticity and truth. As a side effect, long-term agreements between professional journalists and police concerning press embargoes or

keeping specific information out of the press for a certain period of time no longer work. Journalists must also make use of video footage available on YouTube and other providers. This impedes police efforts to use strategies of directed public relations as a vehicle for supporting major operations.

Using the German keyword *Polizei* (“police”), an online search of YouTube leads to 96,000 hits (2013: 550,000). Regarding two large-scale scenarios of political protest (Castor 2010/Stuttgart 21), police use of force has proved to be an influential topic. Here *Stuttgart 21* refers to protests by Stuttgart citizens of all ages, mainly law-abiding citizens opposed to the construction of a new railway station in the middle of this southwestern German city. The democratic and legal process that led to the approval of the project took more than a decade; however, when construction work began protest against the demolition of the old railway station building – an architectural monument – became visible and gained increasing momentum. This led to regular demonstrations and peaceful street blockades. The particular clash between a larger number of police units, mostly in riot gear, and citizens occurred over the felling of trees in Schlossgarten. This is a park next to the Stuttgart castle and is a favorite spot for leisure and cultural activities, much like Hyde Park in London and Central Park in New York City. The trees were very old and had survived World War II; they were therefore of symbolic and environmental significance for large parts of the population.

On the Thursday in question (“Black Thursday”), the felling of the trees was about to begin, and the police had to clear the park of the protesters, among them an unexpectedly large number of high school students. Doubts about the appropriateness of the particular police strategy employed to clear the park prevail; there was political pressure on the police leadership to show “a strong hand.” At the end of the day, events were dramatic for both citizens in the park and the police officers who had to take action against

the citizens. Among other forms of escalation, for the first time in forty years a water cannon was used, resulting in severe injuries (including blindness) among protesters.

The events were widely documented in amateur videos and posted on YouTube. In addition, television crews from state and private channels provided widespread video coverage of the police activities against protesters. In regard to Stuttgart 21 and the other large-scale scenario of protest (Castor 2010; discussed below) police use of force appears to be the main focus in the titles of the clips documenting the events: “Truncheons against Stuttgart 21”; “When the police really hit hard”; “Rambos ‘treating’ demonstrators with tonfa”; “Violence against peaceful protest,” and so on.

It is in this context that the following study investigates how these police activities were presented on YouTube. Did the data reveal any general patterns regarding the overall image of police in video documentations? Is there a construction of a violent police image in such video coverage on new media? An additional aspect, recipients’ perception – specifically, their reactions as recorded in YouTube user comments on the clips – is here a point of quantitative and qualitative analysis.

Methods

YouTube was selected because of its position as the world’s leading video platform. At the time of research, YouTube contained a total of 440 million videos available to users. The number of video clips increases steadily, as each minute nearly 50 video hours are uploaded onto the YouTube platform. The design, the length, and the quality of video clips related to police vary widely. On the whole, television news footage and similar material produced by professionals is found alongside footage provided by amateurs. There are also semiprofessionally cut videos covering police activities with music tracks and spoken commentary underlying the images. Videos

cover a wide area of police actions, mainly controls, car chases, and police-demonstrator clashes. The sum of the supply of such video clips is hardly conceivable.

Accordingly, for this study it was necessary to select a sample of the demonstrator-police confrontations available on YouTube. The first selected incident relates to the protest demonstrations in the park near the construction site of the Stuttgart railway station (described above). In particular, on “Black Thursday” police units clashed with high school students and average Stuttgart citizens who were present to protest the felling of the old trees. The planned new station will be subterranean, and therefore construction work affects areas near the old station.

The second selection contains a series of events during the 2010 Castor transport, a protest site that became part of GODIAC’s field studies. *Castor* refers to the containers that are used for the rail and truck transport of highly radioactive used fuel from the nuclear refueling plant in La Hague on the French Atlantic coast to a nuclear-waste deposit in the rural part of Lower Saxony. For decades the nuclear-waste location itself has been disputed in the courts and has provoked altercations between police and citizen, particularly local farmers and the resident population but also supporters of the wider German antinuclear movement. It is also a routine theater for semiprofessional violent rioters (*der schwarze Block*, the black bloc).

Since the year 1995 Castor transports have been moved by train between La Hague and Gorleben, and transports been accompanied by protest along the train route – particularly its final kilometers, where the containers are unloaded from the train and then transported by truck to the final destination. Protesters try to erect blockades on the train tracks to delay the transport as much as possible while police, numbering up to 20,000, must protect the trains, clear the tracks, and remove protesters. While major violent clashes occurred in the past, for several

years Castor protest sites have been mainly peaceful, characterized by only localized clashes between police and demonstration participants and by much smaller numbers of injured police and protesters than in earlier years.

The criteria for the selection of Stuttgart 21 and Castor 2010 were the specific coverage of police action, the number of clicks on the specific YouTube sites, and the number of user comments that allowed for a content analysis. The following clips were chosen from a very wide range of videos available.

1. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G9pIG-3_mtI “Clearing of the park police beats defenseless person! Stuttgart 21: NEIN DANKE (no thanks)” (106.000 views at the time of research, 730 comments, 8 minutes); 2013: 135,881 views
2. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KJTG0KWAP-sA> “Use of truncheons/force against Stuttgart 21 demonstrators” (48.000 views, 540 comments, 7 minutes); 2013: 177.629 views
3. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c17cIyO3S4Q> “Stuttgart 21: police violence at demonstration in Schlossgarten (castle park) 30th September 2010 water cannon, capsicum, riot police” (86.500 clicks, 800 comments, 3 minutes); 2013: 104.033 views
4. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBuRkBVdF8o> “Stuttgart 21: our police – action in the park on day Y – 30th September 2010” (54.300 clicks, 470 comments, 4 minutes); 2013: 78.869 views
5. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ll6ALmQcG_A “Castor 2010 – the police protects the interest of nuclear industry (45.900 clicks, 360 comments, 3:30 minutes); 2013: 52.003 views
6. “Escalation of Castor blockades” (23.300 clicks, 370 comments, 4 minutes); 2013: the original clip is no longer available on Youtube; similar footage under keyword Castor 2010;
7. “Castor 2010: riots in Wendland” (26.800 clicks, 100 comments, 2 minutes); 2013: the original clip

is no longer available on Youtube; similar footage under keyword Castor 2010.

Transcribed data were processed into a register with the number and the duration of the sequence. A short summary of the content was added, and additional columns listed characteristics of visual data units (camera movement, vista/camera perspective, camera angle). These units of analysis were noted, along with audio data (next to the camera, in front of the camera). This score formed the primary basis for the data analysis. The construction of media reality in the context of this research on police-protester interaction and clashes not only rests on the publication of the material but originates through subjective endeavors of interpretation on the part of the recipients. In order to investigate the effects of the selected videos on viewers, on how they judge the police activities, viewer comments related to the sampled videos were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2010). This empirical methodology focuses on encoding and classifying text data. By this means, texts can be ordered and summarized into “units of meaning.” The assessment of police activities was categorized into five dimensions: strong approval, approval, neutral, disapproval, and strong disapproval, allowing for an attribution of statements. Data processing was supported by MAXQDA 10 software.

Findings (Videos)

Use of force by police officers is the central subject matter in all the videos selected for analysis. Only one sequence (Video 1; 00:00 to 00:27) provides an overview of the entire protest event. All other shots deal with the use of the baton, pepper spray, water cannon, or force/physical violence against the protesters.

Quite frequently in these videos, the use of force by police officers cannot be detected easily or at first glance. Because of wide camera angles, many things seem to happen simultaneously. In addition, inci-

dents occur at high speeds. Video clip 1 contains specific scenes that are repeated in slow motion mode, or text points to the use of batons by police or a fist punch used by an officer against a person. In video 7 the viewers’ attention is caught by the rising screams of surrounding protesters: an officer is beating a demonstrator. But only repeated viewing make this apparent. In cases of protesters being arrested or carried away surrounded by numerous members of the police force, a bird’s-eye view is presented. This emphasizes the protesters’ powerlessness against the officers. Stuttgart 21 videos in particular deal with average citizens with whom viewers can easily identify. The audience commiserates with the arrestee, and the use of force appears disproportionate and relentless. This is frequently emphasized through close-ups of the particular person. For example, in video 2 (03:24–03:44), a female person in a face-down position is carried away by several officers. Thereafter she is dropped from knee level onto the ground. Other gestures support this interpretation of excessive force. For instance, in some clips officers place their feet on the legs of protesters lying on the ground (video 2 04:17–04:52; video 7 00:40–01:53).

Most video titles raise an expectation that officer-perpetrated violence will appear in the clip. At a closer look, however, one notices that video 2 contains no image of batons being used against participants of the demonstration. In a similar vein, video 3 is titled “Water cannon, pepper spray, special squad” but shows no special squad police. Further, post-dubbing directs viewer attention. Additional information or clarification is provided on specific occurrences during the clash. News-style voiceovers increase the videos’ apparent authenticity and credibility. However, such commentary can lead to misperceptions. The speaker in video 3 claims that police used batons against protesters (00:38–00:42). The shot however, shows officers tearing down a canvas held up by demonstrators. Then police proceed to run across the plastic canvas. Batons are not used in

this incident. The hustle and bustle imagery, however, seems to provide evidence for the claim made by the commentator.

Reasons for police behavior are not presented or cannot be recognized at first glance in the video material. As an example, in clip 4 a protester is being pushed over by an officer ("Stuttgart 21: Unsere Polizei," 00:00–01:10). It is only through repeated viewing that one can ascertain that the person has thrown a board onto the road and is about to pick up a warning post or beacon. Documentation of preliminary events, such as police requesting or ordering protesters to leave the perimeters and protesters' actions, are not presented. An exception to this practice is video 6 as a production by ZDF (German state TV). This video explains the activities of the demonstrators and the police response. On the whole, cameras cannot capture the full realm of events. The time of the shot and its duration, as well as the selection of elements contained in an image, determine the sections of "reality" presented to the viewer.

Nonetheless, the analyzed video material does not depict police officers as unapproachable. At the margins of several scenes, viewers can recognize officers in conversation with demonstrators. Many sequences contain images of officers who are apparently not exposed to provocations but behave in a quiet and focused manner (video 2 00:00–00:17). This, however, is not the primary interest of those behind the camera. A possible explanation is that YouTube content is provided by users for the viewing audience. As an Internet platform the site serves, foremost, entertainment purposes. Thus sensational footage, thrill, and action are focal concerns.

The analyses reveal that amateur shots with unsteady cameras and long cuts without editing provide the documentation that appears to be strongly linked to real events. Clips by protest participants give viewers feelings of "being there" and of being themselves exposed to police action. This enhances an emotional attachment among viewers to the cov-

ered events. It also influences the process of opinion making. There are two related patterns in this context. One consists of very long uncut sequences. Video 4 consists of a single uninterrupted four-minute sequence. There are no cuts; there is no editing. This creates the feeling for the viewer that he or she is part of the events that are documented. Another pattern involves a high frequency of cuts. Video 5 consists of a rapid series of still shots (00:00–00:04). This results in additional dramatization and thrill. Furthermore, it is obvious that some scenes are repeated in several clips – for instance, the tearing down of the canvas and the officer using pepper spray against protesters.

The effects of the video documentation vary between these two major protest events. Stuttgart 21 police activities were directed against "normal people" (women, senior citizens, high school students), most of them using passive resistance against police. Accordingly, the image of police in riot gear suggests excessive use of force. "Castor 2010" displays police measures against "trained" (masked) protesters. Some police measures remain ineffective; police measures do not appear overwhelming.

The in-depth analysis of the video material reveals a number of observations that can be used for further analysis of police-protester interaction during controversial demonstrations.

- ◆ Unsteady "live" camera shots by onlookers who happen to be near the clashes create a very high level of authenticity. Long shots intensify this effect. Rapid sequential scenes result in a build-up of tension and thrill and increase the dramatic appearance of what occurs before the amateurs' lenses.
- ◆ Police officers make use of batons, pepper spray, water cannons, and physical force against members of the protest scene. Officers act in groups against individual protesters.
- ◆ Most videos do not provide reasons for the officers' activities. Events that occurred before the

documentation or are not covered by the shot are not revealed to the viewer. Cameras do not record the entire context of the incidents.

- ◆ Officers who are not provoked and do their work in a quiet and concentrated fashion can be detected but are not the focus of the video documentation.

All in all, police activities in the videos under investigation were covered very realistically. There were no indications of intentional manipulation. However, bias is created by things that are left out: the entire incident is not covered, resulting in a lack of documentation regarding the original reasons for police action.

Content analysis of viewers' comments

The analysis of posted viewers' comments points to a general debate about the issue at stake – namely, the use of force. Specific elements of the videos were discussed only in the case of particular officers (the aforementioned bald officer using pepper spray in several Stuttgart 21 videos) or specific police actions (video 1 in which a protester is beaten by an officer, 02:01–02:21).

The police action is judged in 22 percent of statements in a split mode, and 53 percent of statements approved of police activities during the Stuttgart 21 riots. Statements voicing strong approval said, for example, “The police were doing a great job” and “Police behavior was of exemplary quality and not out of proportion.” Some hateful or odd comments asked for more police use of force (“Pity the police are not hitting harder” and “Much too soft reactions towards the demonstrators”). And 42 percent of the statements showed disapproval of police measures: “Police, your friend and helping hand: no longer true” and “Cops [Bullen] should let us demonstrate.” Strong disapproval was expressed in statements like “The escalation was caused by police” and “Disproportionate use of force by police.” In the case of

the Castor 2010 videos, 61 percent of the comments approved of police activities, whereas the disapproval rate was at 32 percent.

Consider that in the case of Castor 2010, more than 12 percent of the commenters approved of police violence (Stuttgart 21: < 5 percent). Neutral, relatively rational opinions were voiced in 5–7 percent of the comments. About 25 percent of viewers' comments stated that the protesters had provoked or caused the reaction of the police.

Comments contained several expressions of abuse or denigration in about 5 percent of cases, such as “human scum” (*menschlicher Abschaum*) and “pig bitches” (*verhurte Bullenschweine*), and some conveyed open threats: “Someday the violent criminals paid by the system will get it back 1000 fold. Listen fucking cop gangs! At the end of the day it will be you lying on the floor bleeding and maimed!” In 31 cases police were equated with the Nazi Third Reich, and 41 times *ACAB* appeared (“All cops are bastards”).

Comments of a more general nature referred to the helpfulness of officers or positive results in comparison with police abroad. Negative comments complained about police opposition to human rights and that officers had chosen this job so they could “legally bash” citizens. Name tags were requested 20 times, and three comments asked for an ombudsman or an independent complaints authority.

About 2 percent of the comments dealt with legal issues, often with no solid legal basis. Several comments expressed observations that were also made in the analysis of the video documents – that is, police were wearing riot gear and acting against average citizens (women, children, senior citizens). The misuse of batons (*Schlagstockeinsatz*) was also noted. Additionally, it was mentioned that the videos did not show what had happened before the incidents and that this was the reason officers' actions did not appear to have a legitimate basis. Other comments argued the opposite: images of too many violent

protesters had been shown, so the police appeared in a positive light.

Content analysis of viewers' comments led to the following conclusions:

- ◆ Only a small number of comments referred to the specific content of individual clips. Discussion and expression of opinions encompassed a wider, more general context.
- ◆ 22 percent of the comments assessed the police activities shown in the video screenings or in their context.
- ◆ The activities of police met a split reaction. There was little differentiation. Approval was at more than 50 percent; explanations and justifications for police measures increased approval.
- ◆ 5 percent of the comments were deliberately offensive to or denigratory towards officers; 2 percent contained legal arguments.
- ◆ Language was often offensive and threatening. Style of language was colloquial, and emoticons were frequently employed. Incorrect wording or orthography was frequently observed.

When looking at these results, one should keep in mind that only a few of those who watch videos expend the time and effort necessary to write a comment. Only 7–13 percent of video platform users post comments on clips. Thus, the effects of the videos about police and protest recorded in the comments reflect only a selection of viewers. General social statistics about YouTube users relating to age, sex, and household income could not be verified in the case of the individuals who wrote comments on the selected videos. Accordingly, the findings on the effects of amateur videos about police use of force cannot be generalized. However, they give an impression of how police activity – in particular, police use of force – is viewed by the Internet community and in which ways such activities are discussed.

Conclusion

In relation to social media and Internet displays of police operations, strategies must be carefully considered. Video data taken by police cameras cannot be displayed on YouTube or similar platforms because of data protection laws and the potential interference with ongoing investigations and future court proceedings. Video coverage of police operations may be used as evidence; therefore, it must be kept and archived.

However, video material that is posted on YouTube by users should be monitored continuously, particularly in cases involving riots or nonpeaceful demonstrations. During recent cases concerning citizens' allegations that officers used excessive force, frequent complaints were directed against police stations because videos of violent altercations between police and citizens had been "accidentally deleted" or "otherwise lost." This raises doubts about police accountability and leaves a somewhat suspicious aftertaste. In the cases analyzed in this study, such allegations did not come to the attention of the researchers.

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2.8 Transnational Aspects of Social Media 1900–1967: Influence, Signals and False Flags

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Introduction

This article examines the development of social media as a tool for recruitment and radicalization in a variety of belief systems. Methodologically, it employs cultic milieu theory which posits a milieu of oppositional belief systems that exist in concentric neighborhoods located in time and space by their degree of opposition to mainstream society and the demonization of that belief system by the dominant culture. The cultic milieu encompasses an almost infinite variety of belief systems that recognize no national borders and provide a repository for hidden and suppressed knowledge. The seekers who inhabit the cultic milieu come from a wide variety of backgrounds and represent a host of political, religious and social belief systems. They are competitive and are often bitterly divided. What links them together is a shared rejection of the dominant culture and their quest for this esoteric knowledge, the possession of which is believed to be the key to a utopian future which will unlock the secrets of this world.³⁷¹ Through the lens of cultic milieu theory, the article will demonstrate patterns of recruitment and radicalization that span the years. The advent of computer-based social media enhance the speed at which cultic belief systems are disseminated and provide linkages between belief systems that were present in the pre-Internet ‘stone age’. In that

distant pre-Windows 95 past, the effort and costs of establishing and maintaining such contacts were infinitely greater. However, history did not begin in the computer era. It is somewhat disappointing to note that there is nothing new in any of this. Rather, there are patterns of history which are timeless and enduring.

Just as history did not begin with the appearance of the microchip, social media long outdated FaceBook, Twitter, YouTube and their many, many competitors. From the 19th century through the WWI era, social media focused on books, pamphlets and tracts. For the purposes of this paper, social media are defined as any unmediated form of communication emerging from the cultic milieu. Mediators to be avoided are the mainstream press and any other form of corporate media, the tentacles of government, and in the United States, media that might be classified as ‘foreign’ or ‘cosmopolitan’.

Imported social media was suspect, especially in the United States, because of the pervasive American fear of ‘foreign entanglements,’ a fear that which the widely popular isolationist policies sought to reinforce. The danger of foreign social messages, however, was subjective, at best. For communists and anarchists, unionists and syndicalists in the United States, media coming from Russia were welcomed as missives from the center of the international proletariat revolution. National Socialists welcomed German messages for the same reason. Both rejected similar media from within the Western democracies or by fellow citizens of different political persuasions. Anarchists, in particular, were receptive to messaging emanating from their ethnic homelands. Religious seekers were similarly inconsistent in

371 Jeffrey Kaplan and Heléne Löw, *The cultic milieu: oppositional subcultures in an age of globalization* (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2002), 1–11.

their rejection of foreign messages.³⁷² Media deemed cosmopolitan, however, was far more suspect. The term ‘cosmopolitan’, shorthand for ‘rootless cosmopolitans’, referred to Jews who were seen by most Americans as suspect due to the popular stereotype of the ‘International Jew’ as a conspirator in an age-old plot against Christianity. The presence of Jews in communist and anarchist groups were seen as further

proof – as if any more was needed – of the truth of these charges.³⁷³

To demonstrate the continuity that underlies the rapid changes in the technology available to social media, this article will focus on a single artifact – the humble mailing list. How these lists were painstakingly compiled and put to use will allow for an in-depth examination of the development of social media as a tool for recruiting, radicalizing, and on occasion catalyzing violence. David Rapoport’s Four Waves of Modern Terrorism theory has been adopted to best anchor this examination to the history of terrorism.³⁷⁴

372 Take, for example, the case of Christian Identity, a racist theology that posits the White Man as the true bearer of the Covenant which had been stolen by the insidious plotting of the Jews who had convinced the world that they, not the White race, were God’s chosen people. Identity grew out of an eccentric British-born theology known as British Israelism. Cultic media originating from Great Britain were therefore welcomed while all other messaging was rejected by the strongly xenophobic Identity Christians. Rastafarians, to take another example, eagerly sought material from Jamaica and Ethiopia. The Rastafarian faith originated in Jamaica while the former Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was seen as an emanation of God. On Identity, see Michael Barkun, *Religion and the racist right: the origins of the Christian Identity movement*, Rev. ed. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997). For a microcosmic, field work based view, Cf. Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Context of American Millenarian Revolutionary Theology: The Case of the ‘Identity Christian’ Church of Israel,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 5, no. 1 (1993). On the Rastas, see Peter B. Clarke, *Black paradise: the Rastafarian movement*, Rev. ed., Black political studies, (San Bernardino, Calif.: Borgo Press, 1994).

373 The Russian forgery, *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, was widely translated and was widely believed. In the US, the Victor Marsden translation was ubiquitous. Victor Marsden, *The Protocols of Zion* (no publication information). Cf. Stephen Eric Bronner, *A rumor about the Jews: antisemitism, conspiracy, and the protocols of Zion* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Henry Ford’s company newspaper, the *Dearborn Independent* ran a highly influential series of articles collectively referred to as “The International Jew” which took the basic premises of the Protocols and Americanized them in such a way as to make anti-Semitism relevant to the lives of Americans. The Noontide Press, for many years a publisher of racist and anti-Semitic literature, provides a PDF file of the full series at <http://www.radioislam.org/ford/TheInternationalJew.pdf>. The file is hosted by the Swedish anti-Semitic group Radio Islam. RI is a one-man band conducted by Ahmed Rami. He pioneered the use of radio as a social media. Today, Radio Islam is a flashy web presence featuring streaming video, sound files, and a rich array of articles and links. <http://www.radioislam.org/>

374 The Four Waves theory posited by David Rapoport holds that there have been four waves of terrorism in the 20th and 21st centuries: Anarchist, National Liberation, Leftist and Religious. In a recent monograph, I posit a Fifth Wave; the New Tribalism. David C. Rapoport, “Modern Terror: The Four Waves,” in *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, ed. Audrey Cronin and J. Ludes (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 2004). Jeffrey Kaplan, *Terrorist Groups and the New Tribalism: Terrorism’s Fifth Wave* (London: Routledge, 2010).

The First Wave: Anarchists, Communists and the War of the Tracts

In the beginning there was the mailing list. For radical movements in the WWI era, the mailing list took on the role of Holy Writ. This was the age of organizations. Oppositional groups, however small, mimicked the trappings of the nation states they sought to ignore or overthrow.

Radical political ideas, some of which espoused forms of violence which were undertaken with great effect, took root in the New World as anarchist and communist ideologies traveled to the United States with the wave of Irish, Eastern European and Jewish immigration that had begun in the 19th century and reached a crescendo by 1924, when legislation imposed immigration quotas. With these ideas the first wave of modern terrorism – the anarchist wave – opened a new front in the United States.

Communist and anarchist groups were capable of making alliances to support specific goals, but in reality, they were competitive for a limited pool of adherents. The Communist Parties (CP) moreover, were under the sway or outright control of the Soviet government in Moscow. In the Western World, the CP's plotted, planned and dreamed of revolution. They took part in strikes or other industrial actions that could turn quite violent, but this violence was almost invariably initiated by companies who brought in 'strike breakers' to intimidate workers with violence or the police, who had by and large the same role. Anarchists also supported workers organizing to press for social justice. But their revolutionary dream was more immediate and their weapons of choice were dynamite, bombs and guns. A wave of assassinations in Europe lit the fuse that initiated WWI. In the United States, anarchist violence took the life of an American President, William McKinley in 1901. No less than two assassination attempts were made against the Attorney General A. Mitchel Palmer whose house was bombed both times. The Justice Department was the first line of defense,

with the that department giving birth in 1908 to the Bureau of Investigation, the name of which was changed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1935. The FBI, led by John Hoover (upon his appointment as Director the prosaic 'John' gave way to the more flamboyant handle, J. Edgar Hoover) was tasked with the battle against subversives of every stripe.³⁷⁵ The primary weapon wielded by the government in this battle was deportation. It was believed – with some justification – that as anarchism was an imported ideology, and that the best way to combat it was to deport its adherents.³⁷⁶ The mailing list was for this reason a much sought after prize by law enforcement as it was the radical leaders' key to survival.

Despite the altruistic rhetoric emanating from these movements and the internal use of the title 'Comrade' as a formal mode of address, communist and (ironically) anarchist groups were hierarchical in nature. Some donned uniforms or found other ways of distinguishing themselves from mainstream society by means of dress, fashion or lifestyle. New religious movements began their steady proliferation in the United States,³⁷⁷ many of which would be exported to Europe. In America, religiosity is pervasive and

375 For this history from the FBI's perspective, see the (extremely cool) FBI website, <http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/highlights-of-history/>. The top page carries a cover photo of the Biograph Theater in Chicago where Al Capone died in a hail of FBI bullets. For a less partisan monograph, Henry M. Holden, *FBI 100 years: an unofficial history* (Minneapolis, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2008).

376 Paul Avrich and Paul Avrich Collection (Library of Congress), *Anarchist voices: an oral history of anarchism in America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995). Regin Schmidt, *Red Scare: FBI and the Origins of Anticommunism in the United States, 1919–1943* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2000). The most comprehensive source on anarchism, its ideologies, adherents and the documents they produced is the Anarchy Archives http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_Archives/.

377 Philip Jenkins, *Mystics and Messiahs: Cults and New Religions in American History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2000).

for this reason, radical ideologies, despite their fervent proclamations of atheism, were, at heart, deeply millenarian and thus understood by their American adherents through the lenses of the religious contexts in which they had been raised. Ideas within the cultic milieu of which all oppositional movements are a part were cross-pollinated by the writings of political and religious radicals; a process that subtly reshaped European ideologies into belief systems easily adaptable for Americans.

This was the age of meetings. Seekers joined believers and began to attend meetings. The entry level get-togethers may have focused on union organizing, social welfare, temperance or ethnic clubs purporting to keep up with the news from the homeland. It would be no exaggeration to say that the determined seeker could attend meetings every day of the week, had he or she the determination, interest, and a well-padded seat. Many seekers grew tired of these get-togethers, as dreamy, pompous or just plain silly. Others, however, found them irresistible, and their dreams of reform or revolution – of a utopian future or a drastically changed present day – drew them to still more meetings and put them in contact with yet more organizations and more belief systems. As the seekers drifted toward a particular idea, they became known to the leaders of the group and were increasingly trusted with gradually escalating access to heretofore hidden or suppressed knowledge.

These seekers, now having become ‘dues-paying members’, were the prize signatures on the group’s mailing list. Their names would join those of more casual seekers who would visit meetings out of interest but without great investment, of undercover police officers, and when the federal government became fully engaged in this first War on Terror, after the McKinley assassination and the rash of anarchist bombings in the Northeastern United States, of federal undercover agents, as well. The latter, agents of the police or of federal intelligence agencies, monitored the meetings, desperately sought to be

accepted into the inner circle, and vied for possession of the mailing lists. The contest for these lists not only pitted law enforcement against the radical group, but was also bitterly contested between local and federal undercover agents. The lists had value to the private sector as well. Businesses would pay dearly for copies of the lists so as to weed out potential trouble-makers in their employ and to blackball potential applicants for jobs, as well.³⁷⁸

The Second Wave: Covert Daring Do

Rapoport’s second wave, that of national liberation, took place in the Third World and involved European former colonial powers more directly than the United States. American interests were in anti-Communism, and European hints that this or that national liberation movement had communist leanings were enough to involve the CIA after its creation in 1948. The British played this game of hints, nods and winks best.³⁷⁹ Within the United States, technology and law combined to expand social media both in terms of technology and impact. The day of meetings as a source for names on a mailing list was fast fading. In its place, mail order radicalism became the norm on the far right while the far left struggled simply to survive within the context of McCarthyism and the modern Red scare. In this period, the masters of social media were those associated with the fusion of religious extremism and right wing politics.

Radio was the dominant medium in the post-WWI era. In the US, radio was regulated by the Federal Radio Commission (FRC). The Radio Act of 1927 provided that the FRC should require broadcasters

³⁷⁸ Curt Gentry, *J. Edgar Hoover: the man and the secrets* (New York: Norton, 1991), 79.

³⁷⁹ Most notably, the 1953 coup in Iran, engineered rather brilliantly by CIA agent Kermit Roosevelt. Mark J. Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 coup in Iran*, 1st ed., Modern intellectual and political history of the Middle East (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

to reserve weekly time for free religious broadcasts by mainstream religious groups. These were primarily the mainstream Protestant denominations whose droning sermons drew virtually no audience. In a word, they were boring. Non-mainstream denominations, led by Protestant fundamentalists, complained of discrimination. The Radio Act of 1934 endorsed a compromise that retained the requirement that time be set aside for religious broadcasting, but now allowed the radio networks as well as independent stations to sell air time to religious broadcasters irrespective of denomination.³⁸⁰ With this decision, radio as an unmediated social media was born. This decision had a seismic impact on the cultural mainstream, and opened new gateways to the cultic milieu for religious right wing seekers who could be introduced to a cornucopia of oppositional belief systems.

In the 1930s, the most influential radio voice was that of a Detroit Catholic priest, Father Charles Coughlin. Father Coughlin's ministry began as another tedious spinner of homilies but by 1938 it became the primary purveyor of anti-Semitism in the United States.³⁸¹ Fr. Coughlin was silenced by the Catholic hierarchy in 1942, but after the War, a number of other incendiary radio ministries flourished. These blended anti-communism, anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories and together paved the way for today's Talk Radio.

By the late 1950s, television had become the primary mainstream media in the United States. Television, unlike radio, was heavily regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Radical mes-

sages occasionally emerged, but these were heavily mediated on talk shows that belittled the radical spokesmen who appeared on these programs. Moreover, there were only three networks and a handful of independent stations in major market areas. This left very little time for religious programming. However, the FCC was not able to overturn the Radio Acts of 1927 and 1934. Thus, at signoff and on Sunday mornings, time was again offered to mainstream denominations – mainstream now meaning Protestant denominations, the Catholic Church and Jewish representatives.³⁸² Television time was sold at non-peak hours to ministries, but these were more interested in donations than demonization. Thus television would not become a part of the social media scene until the 1970s with the rise of cable and Public Access Television, which allowed anyone to buy time, allowing the dissemination of unmediated radical messages.³⁸³

The impact of the electronic media opened possibilities for the future, but the written word retained primacy throughout the Second Wave. Newsletters, pamphlets and the like, professionally printed, were the primary social media. What had changed, however, was that radical groups, which in the days of the anarchists and communists were based on face-to-face contact, had become diffuse, national and profit-driven. Complicating the analysis is the fact that belief systems that today are deeply entrenched in the farthest reaches of the cultic milieu – the most demonized ideas in the view of the mainstream culture – were from the post-WWI era through the 1920s mainstream and not at all oppositional. The Ku Klux Klan is a primary example. In the 1920s, Klansmen

380 Tona J. Hangen, *Redeeming the dial: radio, religion & popular culture in America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 21–29.

381 Tona J. Hangen, *Redeeming the dial: radio, religion & popular culture in America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 30–35. Donald I. Warren, *Radio priest: Charles Coughlin, the father of hate radio* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

382 The addition of Catholicism and Judaism to the religious mainstream took place in the 1950s and represented a seismic shift in American religious history. The change was heralded by a famous book, Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew; an essay in American religious sociology*, 1st ed. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955).

383 Laura R. Linder, *Public access television: America's electronic soapbox* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999).

were elected to public office throughout the American Midwest and Klan politics impacted on the national level as well.³⁸⁴ This so-called Second Era Klan was a response to two important events. First, the ongoing wave of immigration was so great that in the minds of many Americans that it threatened to change the demographic balance of the country (an issue pertinent to European nations in the 21st century). Outside the South, the reborn Klan was aimed more at Catholics and Jews than African-Americans. Traditional Klan racism, particularly in the South, was fanned by the 1915 release of D.W. Griffith's classic film "Birth of a Nation." The latter, was based on the novel "The Clansman: An Historical Romance of the Ku Klux Klan" by Thomas Dixon.³⁸⁵ In this film, the flower of White womanhood is menaced by African-Americans who are portrayed as hulking, violent, simian-like creatures whose violence and lust for White women presented a threat to all that is great and true in America.

The new Klan was not only national in scope, but it was a mail order organization. It was run for profit, not for ideology. It sold literature, regalia and knick knacks. By 1930, the Second Era Klan had collapsed, the victim of criminal prosecutions of its national leaders as well as its local affiliates on charges ranging from mail fraud to violations of the Mann Act (taking underage females across state lines for sexual purposes). In the end, the rotting corpse of the organization was sold for the princely sum of \$1. Its mailing list however, was priceless. No longer of interest to police or the US government, the mailing

list was seen as an economic asset by marketers and publishers alike.

By the late 1950s, on the cusp of the Third or Leftist wave of modern terrorism, the United States was the undisputed leader of the Western World. Similarly, the 1950s saw the US as the primary exporter of radical and violent ideas. This was particularly true in the radical right, and the best example of this peculiar primacy was George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi Party (ANP). The ANP set up their own publishing and distribution chain from their Arlington, Virginia headquarters.³⁸⁶

The ANP could be thought of as a transitional group. They held meetings and had a tiny permanent retinue of misfits, lunatics and dreamers who lived communally in Arlington. Far more important was its mailing list. Like the Second Era Klan, the Party published a newsletter, an academic journal, the *National Socialist World* edited by former University of Colorado Physics professor William Pierce, as well as producing paraphernalia for those distant adherents who liked to cross-dress in mock German SS uniforms. It was a tenuous economic existence at best, but they survived. Just barely...

The ANP may have lionized all things German, but they were Americans to the core. This meant that the cult of Hitler was seen in soteriological terms. Hitler was seen as a religious messiah – a true prophet of the White millennial world to come. In fact, Rockwell's marriage to his Icelandic wife Thora came to an end over a dispute over the décor of their small house. One day Thora returned home to see the living room turned into an altar, with a Nazi flag draped on the wall, a framed photograph of Hitler under it, and the photo surrounded with relics such as a copy of Mein

384 Kelly Baker, *Gospel according to the Klan: the KKK's appeal to Protestant America, 1915–1930*, Culture America (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas, 2011); Thomas R. Pegram, *One hundred percent American: the rebirth and decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2011).

385 Available today as a free download from Project Gutenberg, <http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/26240>.

386 Rockwell wrote several quite literate books. Best known were George Lincoln Rockwell, *In hoc signo vinces* (Arlington, Va.: World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists, 1960); George Lincoln Rockwell, *This time the world* (Arlington, Va.: World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists, 1961).

Kampf, candles and Nazi regalia. She returned to Iceland, leaving Rockwell. He would die alone.³⁸⁷

The ANP was a micro organization with its revolving membership of perhaps 20–30 full time ‘storm troopers’ and a mailing list of perhaps 2,000. Indeed, radical right wing groups for the next four decades would invariably estimate their lists to be about 2,000 names. The ANP, located in the deepest, most demonized reaches of the cultic milieu, began as street fighters; a miniscule parody of the National Socialist Brown Shirts of the 1920s. In this early stage, their activities were repetitive. They would set up a soap box in a public space, Commander Rockwell would orate, the public would become disgusted, then agitated, then combative. Invariably a group of Jewish War Veterans would arrive on the scene and the fight would be on. This had the advantage of showing the Swastika, so to speak, and in this way finding the attention of seekers, but at the cost of both marginality and bumps and bruises. These occasions, however, enable ANP members to hand out fliers and pamphlets – still the primary social media of the day.

The ANP were inveterate publishers, Rockwell a tireless and polished writer, and William Pierce an intellectual whose own prose would in the 1980s galvanize the radical right with his novels, *The Turner Diaries* and *Hunter*. These messages had limited impact on other radical right belief systems in the United States. The Third Era Klan, which had been banished to the cultic milieu (after the 1960s Civil Rights Movement in which Klan violence was effectively challenged by the FBI and the Department of Justice, the KKK would find itself as deeply mired in the most demonized neighborhoods of the cultic milieu as the ANP). Identity Christianity and other racist and anti-Semitic belief systems whose ideology was not far from that of the ANP refused to coop-

erate with a group unpatriotic enough to worship the German National Socialist state and to make of Hitler a Jesus-like savior.³⁸⁸

In the United States, Rockwell struggled to get his message to the mainstream. The social media available to him – the written word – was unwanted and largely unavailable to the broader culture. This is not to say that he didn’t constantly try to break through to the mainstream. An opportunity came with the 1960 release of the film “Exodus.” The ANP picketed the showing in full Nazi uniform. This of course drew cameras like flies to a ripe cadaver. The ANP was now on the national radar.

Rockwell, who was telegenic and in his way charismatic, used his 15 minutes of fame well. He managed to appear on a 1960s talk show hosted by controversial host Joe Pyne (who let him talk but attacked him on every point).³⁸⁹ The height of his fame came in 1966, when he was interviewed by Roots author Alex Haley for an in-depth interview in “Playboy.”³⁹⁰ As Rockwell received greater and greater notoriety, the ANP presses worked overtime to message believers and potential believers. The most interesting audience was the community of European National Socialists. Some, like Savitri Devi and Colin Jordan, were first generation National Socialists. Others were beleaguered ‘leaders’ of movements that were formally banned in their own countries. Gazing across the Atlantic at the photogenic ANP leader and envying his success at publication and disseminating National Socialist propaganda, they mistakenly concluded that Rockwell was leading a mass movement with powerful protectors in the upper reaches of the US

387 Jeffrey Kaplan, “The Post-War Paths of Occult National Socialism,” in *The Cultic Milieu* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Publishers, 2002).

388 Jeffrey Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: a Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right* (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2000), 1–3, 261–65, 352–59.

389 The soundtrack of this interview can be heard on YouTube. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QGgTQHjxx_c&bpc-tr=1361809627.

390 The full text can be downloaded from the internet Archive <http://archive.org/details/1966PlayboyInterview>.

government. The mistake was natural enough. Rockwell's European admirers had no understanding of the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which guaranteed that even the most bizarre citizens had the right to write and speak freely. Surely thought the Europeans, Rockwell could not be so bold without the masses at his back and strong supporters in the federal government.

Upon the rock of this misunderstanding was founded the World Union of National Socialists, which anointed Rockwell their führer.³⁹¹ In social media terms, the process was established whereby National Socialist material in a number of languages (especially German) would be printed in the US and brought to Europe (especially Germany) for dissemination.³⁹²

Rockwell was assassinated by a former ANP member in 1967. By then, he had despaired of the madness and mediocrity that was so pervasive in the ANP's live-in cadre. In its place, he laid the groundwork for the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP), a group whose name evoked the NAACP (Martin Luther King's National Association for the Advancement of Colored People). The NSWPP

would be a mailing list only organization. At the time of Rockwell's death, the NSWPP had begun to record his speeches and to disseminate them on cassette tapes. The tapes – a new social media for American national Socialists – was a long-standing staple of broadcast ministries in the US (and would reach its greatest influence in the 1979 Iranian Revolution where tapes of Imam Khomeini's orations were smuggled into Iran and mass copied for distribution in the markets of that country). The experiment was in its nascent stages at the time of Rockwell's death. Within ANP headquarters (the ANP's barracks still existed and Rockwell continued to operate out of the Arlington address), Rockwell's demise unleashed a feeding frenzy, with the prize possession being the ANP/NSWPP mailing list. Matt Koehl emerged with the list and became führer of the NSWPP, which provided a meager but sufficient living until he bought some land to become a gentleman farmer in his dotage. The tapes and much of the writings went to William Pierce, who would establish a radio show that played the Rockwell tapes publically.³⁹³ The WUNS correspondence ended up in the hands of another long time National Socialist, James Mason.³⁹⁴

391 Frederick J. Simonelli, *American fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999). Cf. Frederick J. Simonelli, "Thriving in a Cultic Milieu," in *The Cultic Milieu* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 2002).

392 After Rockwell's death a young man, living in his parents basement in Nebraska (of all places) learned German, grew a toothbrush mustache and began to print quantities of NS agitprop which he would bring to Europe on his frequent continental tours. Later, as a much older if not wiser man, Gary Lauck was imprisoned in his beloved Fatherland for fomenting racial hatred. His defense was that as a US citizen he had the right to free speech – an argument that did not impress his German heroes. By then, Tony Hancock, a British believer had taken over the business and an idiosyncratic core of believers – the Finn Nils Mandell comes to mind – would drive the material around Europe for distribution. Kaplan, *Encyclopedia of White Power: a Sourcebook on the Radical Racist Right*: 170–72. Interview with Nils Mandel, Stockholm, 19 August 1995.

Conclusion

Rockwell's death occurred at the interstice between the Second and Third Waves of modern terrorism. The Leftist wave of the 1960s brought the radical left to the fore and vastly multiplied the palette of new religious movements peopling the cultic milieu. Much would change in technological terms, but the primacy

393 Pierce in the 1990s would enter the racist music business through his purchase of Resistance Records. Racist music labels, unmediated by established labels or distribution chains, would become the most powerful social media of the late 1990s for recruiting and radicalizing racist groups from National Socialists to Skinheads. But that is a story for another day.

394 Mason made copies of these available to me. Much of what is said about WUNS in this paper is based on these letters.

of the mailing list and the written word would continue to dominate the messages available from the social media of that day.

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